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**The influence of the Jewish lobby in the U.S. foreign policy making
towards Iran**

**Dissertation submitted in conformity with the requirement of the
Master Degree of English Language, Literature, and Civilization**

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Dedications

This thesis is dedicated to:

The sake of Allah, my Creator and my Master,

My great teacher and messenger, Mohammed (May Allah bless and grant him),
who taught us the purpose of life,

My supervisor, especially for his guidance, patience and for helping me develop
my technology skills

My great parents, who never stop giving of themselves in countless ways,

My dearest husband, who leads me through the valley of darkness with light of
hope and support,

My beloved brothers and sisters; particularly my dearest sister, who stands by
me when things look bleak,

To all my family, the symbol of love and giving,

My friends who encourage and support me,

All the people in my life who touch my heart,

I dedicate this research.

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Last and not least, we offer our regards to each and every one who has stood by us in any respect during the previous years.

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own original work, which I have created myself.

All the literature I used is properly quoted and is listed in Bibliography.

I declare that I worked on my final master's dissertation on my own using only cited literary sources, other information and sources in agreement with the disciplinary regulations for the Faculty of Letters and Languages at the University Mohammed Boudiaf of M'sila and with the regulations and laws of research of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in Algeria.

I agree with the storage of this work in the library of the Faculty of Letters and Languages at the University Mohammed Boudiaf of M'sila and making it accessible for study purposes.

Sebtoui Salima

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Zeghlache Rayhana

.....

M'sila:

Abstract:

This study is conducted in an effort to highlight the significance of the Israel Lobby role in U.S. foreign policy decision making towards Iran, with special reference to the case studies of Iran's war. The various types of Jewish lobbyist groups and the manner in which they exert influence upon the White House and presidents in particular have been also discussed in order to investigate the reasons behind the massive influence of the Jewish lobby in the U.S foreign policy decision making. This study establishes the significance of Jewish interests in the policies of U.S. towards Iran and the liberal internationalist wars the U.S. has conducted in the Middle East. The belief that U.S. interests in an Israeli alliance encompass that the government of Israel serves as a Middle Eastern watchdog for the U.S. has also been shunned and the fact that U.S. policies in the Middle East are singularly governed by interests of Israel and not the interests of America has been established.

Key words: Jewish lobby, United States, Iran, foreign policy, decision making, Israel, Middle East.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIPAC American Israel Public Affairs Committee

ABC American Broadcasting Company

AJC American Jewish Committee

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

NBS National Broadcasting System

CBS Columbia Broadcasting System

EU European Union

US United States

ZOA Zionist Organization of America

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

General introduction

1. Background of the study:

Since the creation of Israel in 1948, the US has adopted a pro- Israeli policy towards Israel in the Middle East at the expense of Arab countries. The strength of the relationship between Israel and the US is built on friendship, partnership, and alliance. Not surprisingly, friendship between Israel and US runs deep, in shared values, economy, and culture, as well as by mutual interests.

Following the attacks of 9/11, both the US and Israel have strengthened their alliance towards counter-terrorism. The new approach adopted policy has been justified by the claim that the US- Israeli interests have been threatened by countries leading sponsor of terrorism; namely, Iran, in addition to rising terrorist; such as, Al Qaeda. It is worth to mention that the aforementioned approach policy has been designed and shaped by the leading powerful lobbying organizations; such as, American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

2. Statement of the problem:

The word 'Jews', 'Israel', and 'USA' are inter- changeable in the minds of many people in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Despite the fact that the US plays a key role to solve the Arab- Israeli conflict, it clearly supports Israel materially i.e. arms, funds, and WMD programs. In other words, the US helps Israel for its

interests: to control oil and gas supplies, to promote arms' sale, and to provide financial provisions. In the meantime, the later continues to influence US foreign policy decision- making through the Jewish lobby which has become a key role-player in the field.

As the term indicates, it means organizations and pressure groups that are challenging to shape US foreign policy and to successfully achieve its objectives. Being the most advocator in pushing the US to invade Iraq in 2003, the Jewish lobby has become as one of the most powerful interest groups in the US. In addition, it helps to shape important aspects of US politics, especially in presidential elections. i. e. The Jewish lobby always works actively to steer US foreign policy in a pro- Israel direction.

The present dissertation explores the influence of the Jewish lobby in US foreign policy in decision making towards Iran. Also, it explains the US special relationship with Israel.

3. The literature review:

The US interests are always the primary objective of US foreign policy, especially during the past decades. Since the Six- Day War in 1967, the focus US foreign policy in the Middle East has been to create Israel as a major power in the region. This, of course, has created a resentment among Arab countries.

The general motive for US foreign policy is the activities of the 'Jewish lobby' which convinces the world with the message that the US and Israel's interests are fundamentally identical. Indeed, most US citizens never ask whether

supporting Israel benefits or harms the US; for they always see Israel as democratic nation.

Much has been debated and written about the Jewish lobby and its influence in US foreign policy, with particular concern on AIPAC as the most powerful lobby acting in the US. In this regard, Mearsheimer and Walt, in their book 'The Israeli lobby and US foreign policy', emphasized that the US support for Israel is in itself a prime cause for terrorism directed against US interests, it also regularly spies upon the US. Overall, Walt and Marsheimer concluded that Israel is not a strategic asset for the US, but rather a strategic liability. Accordingly, supporting Israel is detrimental to US interests rather than advancing them.

Tivan claimed, in his book 'The lobby :Jewish political power and American foreign policy', that a principal obstacle to peace in the Middle East ...perhaps the principal obstacle ...is Israeli intransigence and it is encouraged by American Jews who lobby on Israel's behalf irrespective of its policies, in which their lobbying agency is a neo- conservative group ; namely, American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), it has come to dominate the Jewish community, because Israel become the religion of American Jews.

Moreover, he demonstrated that AIPAC is also a field's 'phenomenal' power in US politics as a whole. Accordingly, 'few ambitious American politicians could even dream of higher office without the prospect of Jewish money'.

Paul Findley's book 'They dare to speak out: people and institutions confront Israel's lobby' explained how the Jewish lobby helps to shape important aspects of US foreign policy, and even how it plays a key- role in presidential elections.

The author clearly showed how the degree of control they have over the United States government.

Goldberg's book 'Jewish power, Inside the American Jewish Establishment' showed how American Jews have become a national political force since the end of World War 2. He explained how Israel became strong, and examined the sources of their power including patterns of fund- raising and media access on other issues. Accordingly, the two prominent political lobby organizations are the Conference of Presidents and AIPAC.

4. Research questions:

The present research explores the influence of the Jewish lobby in US foreign policy in decision making towards Iran. Therefore, this research addresses to the following questions:

- How powerful is the Israel lobby in the US?
- What are the roles and the mechanisms of the Jewish lobby in US foreign policy- making?
- What are the interests of the Jewish lobby in exerting influence in US foreign policy- making?
- What are the threats posed by Iran on both the US and Israel in the Middle East and the Gulf region?
- How does the Jewish lobby intervene in US foreign policy- making towards Iran?

5. The significance of the study:

The main point that make the present paper significant is that it shows the influence of the Jewish lobby in US foreign policy decision-making towards Iran. Also, it analyses the support of America to Israel, more importantly it sheds light on the influence of Israel, it has on American politics is purely external a special relationship based on mutual interests in foreign policy rooted in shared values.

6. The purpose of the study:

The objectives by writing this dissertation are as the following:

- To find out that the Jewish lobby has a large influence in US foreign policy decision making.
- To identify the impact of Israel on America.
- To investigate the reason behind supporting America to Israel.
- To explain the control of Israel lobbying groups on US foreign policy.
- To explore the role played by US in increasing the Israel lobby's power.

7. Research methodology:

Searching for the reason behind the influence of the Jewish lobby in US foreign policy decision making and the role played by US in increasing Israel, demands the use of analytical, descriptive approach, for accomplishing this research, we will use : books, videos, articles, archival and historical documents to collect the necessary data to fulfil the requirement of this study.

The analytical descriptive approach allows us to analyze the Israel lobby, as well as to show the influence of the Israel lobby in US foreign policy decision making.

1. The structure of the dissertation:

The present research paper is entitled “The influence of the Jewish lobby in the U.S. foreign policy making towards Iran”. It seeks to analyze (1) the strength of the Jewish lobby in the US foreign policy- making towards Iran, (2) what are the common interests of both the Jewish lobby and the US administration, and (3) what threats posed by Iran to both US and Israeli interests in the Gulf region and the Middle East.

The paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter provides a historical overview of the US- Israeli relationships. It recites the Jewish immigration to the US and how the Jewish lobby had been created. Also, it describes the special relationships between the US and Israel since the creation of the Israeli state in 1948.

The second chapter provides a thorough analysis of the Jewish lobby and how it is influential in the US. It defines the Jewish lobby and its origins. Also, it describes the means and the mechanisms used by the aforementioned lobby in exerting its influence in the US society and the US administration.

The third chapter analyzes the role of the Jewish lobby in foreign policy making towards Iran. It highlights the threats posed by the Iranian regime to both the US and Israel, and how the Israeli lobby reacts to these threats by exerting

influence via different channels and means in order to legislate laws against Iran to curb its ambitions in both the Gulf region and the Middle East.

Chapter one: Overview of the U.S.- Israeli relationships:

Introduction:

The U.S. national interest should be one of the primary objects of American foreign policy. For the past several decades, however, and especially since the Six Day War in 1967, the high point of U.S. Middle East policy has been its relationship with Israel. The combination of unwavering U.S. support for Israel and the related effort to spread democracy throughout the region has inflamed Arab and Islamic opinion and jeopardized U.S. security.

U.S.-Israel defense, diplomatic, and economic cooperation has been close for decades, based on common democratic values, religious affinities, and security interests. On May 14, 1948, the United States was the first country to extend de facto recognition to the state of Israel.

Israeli defense posture was relied on U.S. support. Despite the fact that there were private and sometimes public disagreements between U.S. and Israeli officials on how to deal with and prioritize various security challenges. Congress supplied active control of the administrative branch's dealings with Israel. Some Members of Congress oppose what they perceive as U.S. support of Israel without sufficient scrutiny of Israel's actions. Other Members of Congress have criticized actions by the Obama Administration and previous U.S. Administrations for being insufficiently supportive of Israel, and occasionally have authorized and appropriated funding for programs benefitting Israel at a level exceeding that requested by the executive branch.

1.1. A brief history of the Jew's immigration to the US:

One of the most striking features in the U.S. is the Jewish influence that pervades the corner of society and the U.S. economy. Historically the Jewish presence in the U.S. appeared between the turn of the 20th century and the outset of the first world war. It was a period of a very heavy immigration, averaging nearly a million immigrants a year. The vast majority were of European origins, and this predominance was legally sanctioned by various acts of congress culminating in the national origins acts of 1921 and 1924 (Fortney, 1972, p. 15).

While there have been Jews in America since colonial times, they were driven by persecution and violence, drawn by the promise of opportunity and freedom. Despite the harrowing circumstances that brought them here, and the difficulties that they, like all immigrant groups, encountered as they adjusted to life in a new land, Jewish immigrants quickly became an influential force in American society, making profound contributions in diverse fields ranging from science to the performing arts ("Immigrating to America: The Jewish Experience", n. d., para. 2).

Historians have traditionally divided American Jewish immigration into three periods: Sephardic, German, and Eastern European. While the case can be made that during each period, immigrants were not solely of any one origin- Some Germans came during the "Sephardic" period and some Eastern Europeans arrived during the "German" era; for example- the fact remains that

the dominant immigrant group at the time influenced the character of the American Jewish community (Zollman, 2010, para. 3).

1.2. The creation of the state of Israel and U.S. recognition:

On April 2, 1947, the United Nations Organization set up the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). This committee recommended that the British control over Palestine end, and that the territory be partitioned into two states— one Arab and the other Jewish. However, regardless of these efforts, the Provisional Government of Israel proclaimed a new State of Israel. The new state of Israel was proclaimed on May, 14, 1948. In its capital city Tel Aviv in the following terms:

We the members of the national council representing the Jewish people in Palestine and the Zionist movement of the world, met together in Solemn assembly by virtue of the national and historic right of the Jewish people and the resolution of the general assembly of the United Nations, hereby proclaim the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine, to be called Israel. (Marshall, 2015, para. 5)

On that day, the US President Harry Truman recognized the provisional Jewish government as de facto authority of the newly established Jewish nation ("Key Press Release on the Recognition of the State of Israel", 1978, p. 469).

When Harry S. Truman became US President, he made it clear that his sympathies were with the Jews. On May 15, within few hours after the proclamation of the Israeli state, President Truman issued the following statement in support of the new state, in which he declared that “The United States government recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new state of Israel”. However, despite this total support of Israel, the Departments of Defense and State recognized the possibility of a Soviet-Arab connection and the potential Arab restriction on oil supplies to the U.S., advised against intervention on behalf of the Jews (Bickerton, 1968, p. 176).

1.2.1. US foreign policy and Israel: special ties and interests:

U.S.-Israel defense, diplomatic relations, and economic cooperation have been close for decades, based on common democratic values, religious affinities, and security interests. On May, 14, 1948, the US was the first country to extend de facto recognition to the state of Israel. Subsequently, relations have evolved through legislation, bilateral agreements, and trade.

U.S. officials and lawmakers often consider Israel’s security as a priority when they proceed with policy making in the Middle East. Congress provides military assistance to Israel, and has enacted other legislations in explicit support of Israel’s security. Such support is part of a regional security order—largely based on U.S. arms sales to Israel and Arab countries—that have avoided major Arab-Israeli interstate conflict for about 45 years. Some Members of Congress have occasionally authorized and appropriated funding for

programs benefitting Israel at a level exceeding that requested by the executive branch. Other Members have sought greater scrutiny of some of Israel's actions (Zanotti, 2014, p. 5).

For decades, both US and Israel have preserved strong bilateral relation based on some factors. US foreign aids have been a major component in consolidation and reinforcing these ties. Although successive administrations, US presidents and many Members of Congress have explained a commitment to Israel's security and to close US- Israel cooperation. Strong bilateral ties influence US policy in the Middle East, and Congress provides active oversight of the executive branch's actions. Israel is a leading recipient of US foreign aid and a frequent purchaser of major US weapons systems. Israel regularly seeks help from the US to bolster its regional security and defense capabilities. Legislation in Congress frequently includes proposals to strengthen US -Israel cooperation, such as the US- Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act of 2018 (Sharp, 2010, p. 5).

1.2.1.1 Eisenhower Administration (1953- 1967):

In the 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower was a strong supporter of the fledgling Jewish state and had supplied Israel with advanced U.S. weaponry. Yet, despite Eisenhower's generosity and good intentions, Israel sided with the British and French in 1956 in a conspiracy against him (Strong, 2017, p. 4).

The administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower considered Israel the more aggressive of the sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. His administration gave Israel vague assurances that the United States would not allow its destruction. But the United States saw in Israel an impediment to a Middle East policy, the main objective of which was to achieve closer relations with the Arab states in order to bring them into a pro-Western alliance and ensure a steady supply of oil (Strong, 2017, p. 6).

This administration opposed Israel's practice of severe retaliation in response to raids from Arab states, withheld diplomatic support when it viewed Israel's use of force as excessive (as in 1953, during a dispute over the waters of the Jordan River), and planned, with Britain, to require Israeli territorial concessions in order to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. In early 1957, President Eisenhower threatened Israel with sanctions to force it to withdraw from Egyptian territory it had conquered during the 1956 Sinai campaign and U.S.-Israeli relations during the second Eisenhower administration (1957 to 1961) remained cool ("Israel, Relations With", 2019, para. 4).

1.2.1.2 Kennedy and Johnson administration (1961- 9):

In the beginning of the 1960s, US President John F. Kennedy adopted a more accommodating approach towards Israel, and in 1962 he authorized the sale of US Hawk anti- aircraft missiles. Yet, at the same time, he attempted to elicit Israeli agreement to a significant unilateral concession on the Palestinian refugees' problem and took a tough stance toward Israel's nuclear development.

On the other hand, according to the president's rapport with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Lyndon Johnson's seemed to usher in a new period in US- Israeli relations. In fact, Johnson was determined that the US should not only provide Israel with arms, but should adopt a policy aiming at avoiding a far- reaching political commitment (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998, pp. 240- 1).

Johnson transmitted from Kennedy a U.S.-Israeli relationship with two major sticking points: nuclear non-proliferation and arms sales. Kennedy had made nuclear non- proliferation a key goal of U.S. foreign policy just as Ben- Gurion's government committed to develop an Israeli nuclear weapon. When he became a US President, Kennedy demanded that Ben- Gurion allow US inspectors to visit the site; the Israeli prime minister responded vaguely, promising to grant such permission at some point in the future. A series of sharp diplomatic exchanges between the two nations crested in 1963, with Israel finally agreeing to inspection just before Ben- Gurion left office. Yet, no clear inspections regime was in place when Johnson took over as President (Johnson, 2008, p. 15).

In 1962, John Kennedy made the first major U.S. weapons sale to Israel when he authorized the delivery of Hawk missiles. Despite such assistance, by the early 1960s, the Arab states were spending a total sum of \$938 million annually on arms' deals, in comparison to Israel's expenditure on arms' sales. A close patron- client relationship that included a steady supply of modern arms emerged gradually after the Six Day' War of 1967. However, Johnson's willingness to aid Israel flowed in part from personal concerns. As he told one

Israeli diplomat shortly before his assassination, “You have lost a very great friend. But you have found a better one” (Israel’s Defense Line: her friends and foes in Washington. Isaiah L. Kenen (1981). p.173) Johnson had worked closely with a variety of pro-Israel figures before coming to the presidency, and that was the reason behind his cooperation (Johnson, 2008, pp. 16- 7).

1.2.1.3 Nixon and Ford administration (1969- 1977):

In 1969, US President Richard M. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, had come to view Israel as a Cold War asset, and during the Egyptian- Israeli War of Attrition, supplied it with more advanced arms. In September 1970, during the large-scale clash between the Jordanian army and Palestinian guerrillas, Israel deterred Syria from employing its air force to support the armor with which the Syrians had invaded Jordan, thus earning Washington's appreciation for aiding the pro-Western monarchy. Yet, from 1971 to 1973, U.S. acquiescence to the lack of receptivity of the government of Golda Meir to negotiate with Egypt contributed to the stalemate that led to war in 1973. U.S.-Israeli relations had become much closer, but during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the US again demonstrated that strategic interests, and not a nascent special relationship, determined its policies (“Israel, Relations With”, 2019, para. 6).

The U.S. role during the 1973 war and the diplomatic process that eventually led to an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty demonstrate that even after the establishment of a patron-client relationship, in the framework of which Israel acquired nearly all of its military hardware from the US, ties were much closer when Washington could reconcile support of Israel with further policies in the Middle East. The US flew arms to Israel during the War of 1973, but prevented a defeat of Egypt on a scale that would have obviated a later U.S.-Egyptian rapprochement. From 1974 to 1976, the US granted Israel \$5.8 billion in combined civilian and military assistance, a level at which aid has since approximately remained. Yet, in 1975, President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger warned that they would "reassess" relations, forcing Israel to sign an agreement that included partial withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula (Strong, 2017, para. 6).

1.2.1.4 Carter administration (1977- 1981):

Despite the US president Carter's helpful cover-up of the Israeli-South African nuclear test, he was still viewed with disdain by Israel's hard-line Likud leadership. Indeed, he arguably was the target of Israel's most audacious intervention in U.S. politics. President Carter failed to protect the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi who was deposed from power by the Islamic Revolution. Also, he was an important Israeli regional ally. When Carter acceded to demands from the Shah's supporters to admit him to New York for cancer treatment, Iranian

radicals seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held 52 Americans hostage (Strong, 2017, para. 8).

In 1978, at Camp David, President Jimmy Carter threatened to cut Israeli aid if they failed to evince more flexibility in the negotiations with Egypt. President Carter used the term "special" to describe the US- Israeli relationship, and he maintained the high levels of support his predecessor had established. However, he also called for the creation of a Palestinian "homeland" and reminded Israel that close relations did not mean U.S. acquiescence to the policies of Prime Minister Menachem Begin of the right wing Likud party, policies intended to perpetuate Israel's presence in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights (Bar- Siman-Tov, 1998, p. 255).

1.2.1.5 Regan administration (1981- 9):

In June 1981, the Reagan administration condemned Israel for bombing Iraq's nuclear facility. Israel's unsuccessful opposition to the sale of sophisticated U.S. arms to Saudi Arabia in a manner that the administration considered interference further strained relations. The US intended a strategic memorandum of understanding it signed with Israel in November 1981 to compensate for the U.S.-Saudi deal, and the memorandum noted agreement to "deter all threats from the Soviet Union in the region" (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998, p. 260).

However, in December 1981, Washington suspended the memorandum in response to Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and the extension of Israeli law to the Golan Heights. In the view of the Reagan administration, Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 exceeded the strategic exigency of ending the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) threat to Israel's northern region. The Reagan Plan, issued in September 1982, called for a halt to Israeli settlement of the occupied territories and opposed the extension of Israeli sovereignty. The administration referred to Palestinian self-determination in federation with Jordan, but its concern for the Palestinian people pointed out Washington's consistent disagreement with Israeli policies oriented toward any solution other than that of land-for-peace ("Israel, Relations With", 2019, para. 9).

During the first seven years of the Reagan administration, the kinds of justification publicly adduced by U.S. officials for their government's support for the State of Israel shifted significantly from the moral reasoning that had previously prevailed in U.S. public discourse, toward a cluster of strategic justifications. This shift in the official rhetoric was accompanied, furthermore, by concrete policy moves which tied the defense structures of the two countries much closer together than ever before. However, In the last year of Reagan's term, the eruption and continuation of the Palestinian intifada (uprising) in the West Bank and Gaza, and more particularly the means by which the Israelis tried to end it, provoked a wave of soul-searching in many sectors of the American public, including the American Jewish community (Cobban, 1989, p. 5).

Reagan's greatest substantive contribution to the US- Israel relationship was the formalization of strategic cooperation, which created a web of ties between the DOD and Israel Defense Forces and a progressive strengthening of Israel's military capability. Also, in 1981, Israel bombed the Iraqi reactor at Osirak. Reagan was furious and the U.S. supported the UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel. The most important thing is that under Reagan, Israel began to receive \$3 billion annually in foreign aid and, from 1985 on, the aid was all in the form of grants. Israel was allowed to use some of this aid in Israel and for a time was permitted to devote U.S. funds to the development of its own fighter plane. In 1985, the U.S. also signed its first Free Trade Agreement – with Israel. In fact, a series of memoranda of understanding were signed during the Reagan administration between U.S. agencies and their Israeli counterparts that promoted cooperation in a range of fields such as education, space research and health (“Reagan’s Legacy On Israel”, n. d. para. 2).

1.2.1.6 George Bush administration (1989-1992):

The beginning of President George H. W. Bush's sole term in office could be categorized as one that engulfed anti- Israeli sentiment. Also, he worked on a peace agreement to end the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. The president refused to approve Loan guarantees to Israel to help deal with the wave of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, and later demanded a freeze on settlement construction. It is also the first time a US president has dared to link military or economic aid to Israel by ceasing to build settlements in the West Bank, the

Gaza Strip, or the occupied Golan Heights. The executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) stated that on September 12, 1989, when President Bush announced that he had told the congress that the request for guarantees should be postponed was “a shameful day for pro-Israel Americans” (Curtiss, 2019, pp. 21- 2).

At that time, President Bush told reporters that the postponement of Israel’s granting of guarantees was a vital step to the peace process; for the approval would have affected our position as a mediator in the peace process, and would weaken our efforts at the negotiating table. The Jewish communities of America and Israel’s supporters in the US preferred Bill Clinton, his democratic rival in the election, at the same time Haaretz-Israeli newspaper declares that the heritage left by George Herbert Walker Bush is a respectable hero from decades ago, asserting that America has lost the beloved former president (Coates, 2014, p. 42).

As CIA director in the mid-1970s and as Ronald Reagan’s vice president, Bush helped forge a world of strongmen, wars, cartels, and refugees that continues today. In particular, he was deeply involved in the events that became known as the Iran- Contra scandal, a series of illegal operations that began with a secret effort to arm Contra fighters in Nicaragua in the hopes of toppling the leftist Sandinista government; this effort became connected to drug trafficking, trading weapons for hostages with Iran, and banking scandals (Dumbrell, 1997, pp. 110- 1).

1.2.1.7. Clinton administration (1993-2001):

The nature of US- Israeli relations during this era were interrelated. The reasons underlying US policies towards the Arab world, in general, and the Palestinian issue, in particular. The historical justifications and contradictions of the Islamic- Christian conflict, the Christian dimension based on common beliefs, and the accompanying interests, strategically, economically and military, that hoped to build US relations biased to Israel. As it is mentioned in remark written by the president Clinton to Israel ambassador Shoval, he stated that:

America and Israel share a special bond. Our relations are unique among all nations. Like America, Israel is a strong democracy, as a symbol of freedom, and an oasis of liberty, a home to the oppressed and persecuted ... The relationship between our two countries is built on shared understandings and values. Our peoples continue to enjoy the fruits of our excellent economic and cultural cooperation as we prepare to enter the twenty-first century. (Remarks to Israeli Ambassador Shoval, September 10, 1998)

Hence, a number of factors and multiple motivations supported to influence the US decision centers. As a result, the US American administration pledged to protect Israel, and the preservation of its security, as well as its presence in the Arab region through the efforts of peace by the American administrations in favor of US bias to Israel, with adoption of the “principle of duality” as a political game practiced by America permanent strategy to pass time that is in the

interest of perpetuating America's bias towards Israel through all the republican and democratic administration (Zanotti, 2018, p. 10).

1.2.1.8 George W. Bush administration (2001-2009):

Ehud Olmert, the former Israeli Prime Minister, stressed that George W. Bush is “the strongest ally of Israel in the battle against terrorism, extremism and a major support in our quest for peace and stability”. Foreign policy had little to do with Bush's election campaign. He was not much interested in the peace process, but the 9/ 11 attacks changed radically his foreign policy, and everyone remembered his term, especially when he declared the “War on Terror”, the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. He further stated the “if the nations of the world want to fight terrorism, they have to do something, they should either be with us, or against us”.

The US administration has taken a clear stand in support of Israel to crush “Palestinian terrorism”. Bush said that Israel faces a difficult attitude in its quest to root out “terrorism”; moreover, supporting Israel's right to end “terrorists” and justify the massacres of Palestinian civilians as inevitable. Bush considered Israel a friend of the US facing the same threats. In addition, Israel deserves support, according to him.

In examining the first three years of the Bush administration's policy toward the Arab- Israeli conflict, it is remarkable that after an initial reluctance to get directly involved in peace-making after the failure of President Clinton's efforts, Bush was drawn into the peace- making process on four different occasions.

The first was in June 2001 when, following the Dolphinarium suicide bombing. The second U.S. effort came after 9/11 when the president sought to expedite a two-state solution by sending General Zinni to work out a cease-fire. The third U.S. effort occurred in March-April 2002, as Bush sought to build a coalition for a war against Iraq.

Zinni was again sent to secure a cease-fire, but then came the suicide bombing at a Passover seder in Netanya, and other bombings in Israeli cities. Bush dispatched Secretary of State Powell to the region, but these efforts once again ended in failure. The fourth effort came in April 2003 after the major military phase of the war in Iraq when the Quartet published the long-awaited Road Map. Yet Arafat was unwilling to cede power to Prime Minister Abu Mazen, and the Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel continued. Thus, all four U.S. peace-making efforts failed primarily because of Palestinian terrorism (Jerusalem Viewpoints .by Robert O. Freedman. No. 516. 1-15 April 2004).

1.2.1.9 Obama administration (2009- 2017):

During the first four years for the president of U.S. Obama in office, he has reiterated his commitment to rapprochement with Muslims and changing their native attitudes towards the US. The new US president repeated time after time that “the United States is not, and will never be, in a conflict with Islam”. In his early efforts for rapprochement with Arabs and Muslims, immediately after his inauguration, Obama gave his first television interview to Al-Arabia. In his speech at Cairo university in June 2009, Obama touched critical challenges,

and he introduced a new way to manage US-Islamic relations, when Obama took office in his first term, he had to repair the destruction that Bush administration had inflicted on the United States 's relationship with Muslims around the world.

In the light of the subsequent developments in the Arab world, the long and clear paragraphs of Obama's speech on democracy, in addition to the need for political regimes in the Orient to express the will of their people cannot be forgotten. Obama said:

... some call for democracy only when they are outside the power's centers and do not pity others in their repressive practices of the rights of others when they come to power. A government that is made up of the people, and managed by the people is the only standard for all those who aspire to occupy positions of power, regardless of where such a government assumes its functions, rulers must exercise their powers through consensus rather than by compulsion, the rulers must respect the rights of minorities, also participate in a spirit of tolerance and compromise, they must give the interests of the people, as well legitimate objectives of the political process priority over the interests of the party to which they belong. Elections that take place without these elements do not lead to true democracy.

Obama has always demonstrated a particular interest in maintaining the US- Israeli “special relations” and in solving the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. In fact, he considered its resolution as the first step towards a more stable Middle East and the weakening of terror organizations related to Iran such as Hamas and Hezbollah. His doctrine, which was based on the end of “American exceptionalism” and on more multilateral international relations, the rapprochement of the moderate Islamic countries and a more even- handed approach to the Israeli politics, did not find a favorable historical moment to be put into practice (Cosmelli, 2015, p. 19).

1.2.1.10 Trump administration (2017-):

When it comes to his managing of the US- Israel relationship, US President Donald Trump has been precisely a pro- Israeli. Throughout 2018, Trump made a series of decisions that have had vast implications for Israel’s future— for its conflict with the Palestinians, and for its efforts to thwart Iran’s quest to obtain nuclear weapons and spread its influence throughout the region. Also, he has put Israel in the center of the news, and made it a focal point of his administration (Cortellessa, 2018, p. 1).

As part of his first trip abroad as president, Trump broke with past protocol and became the first sitting US president to visit Jerusalem’s Wailing Wall. The Old City site, the holiest for Jews, sits on disputed territory claimed by both Israelis and the Palestinians. Previous US presidents largely restricted official visits to West Jerusalem and the rest of Israel. At the end of last year, Trump

again broke with convention when he stated that “I have determined that it is time to officially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel,” he said during a televised address. He then announced controversially that he had been moving the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (Ruttenberg, 2018, p. 1).

President Trump agreed on Monday to certify again that Iran is complying with an international nuclear agreement that he has strongly criticized, but only after hours of arguing with his top national security advisers, briefly upending a planned announcement as a legal deadline loomed (Baker, 2017, p 1).

Trump did not want to certify Iran’s compliance, but he talked about the condition that his team comes back with a new strategy to confront Tehran. In this regard, Trump’s advisers informed him that they needed more time to work with allies and Congress. Accordingly, Trump responded that before he would go along, they had to meet certain conditions (Baker, 2017, p 1).

1.3. U.S. –Israeli alliances: Key policy issues:

Today, the relationships between the US and Israel include multiple bilateral initiatives in the military, industrial, and private sectors. Israel is America’s most established ally in the Middle East in the largest cumulative of US foreign assistance since World War 2. The two countries are known to possess “special relationship” highly valued by the US. Although diplomatic relations between the two countries drive both America and Israeli foreign policy in the Middle East today. The US has provided Israel with \$124.3 billion in bilateral assistance, which represents only one half of one percent of the national security budget.

Almost all US bilateral aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance. Strong bilateral relations have reinforced significant US–Israel cooperation on defense, including military aid, arms sales, joint exercises, and information sharing (Zanotti, 2018, p. 05).

US military aids have helped in the transformations of Israel’s armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated militaries in the world. This aid for Israel has been designed for maintaining Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) over the neighboring countries in the Middle East. Later on, the two countries signed Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) to enhance the national security of both sides (Zanotti, 2018, p. 05).

1.3.1. Preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME)

The U.S. commitment to maintain Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) is a longstanding tradition that every president since Lyndon Johnson has maintained and reiterated. The basic principle behind this commitment is as follows: Israel is a bastion of liberal representative government in the Middle East, and, as such, its continued survival is a vital national interest of the US. According to Zanotti (2014), the US commitment serves two purposes:

- ✚ To ensure this longtime ally’s continued existence in a sea of nations that reflexively call for its destruction, Israel must be able to defend itself militarily and deter potential aggression. In this effort, Israel will always be militarily outnumbered with regard to the

artillery, tanks, and combat aircraft that can be deployed by a coalition of Arab states;

- ✚ Israel's continued survival can be ensured only if it is able to maintain qualitative military superiority, relying on superior weaponry, tactics, training, leadership, and other factors of military effectiveness to deter or defeat its numerically superior adversaries in the Middle East. (p. 21)

Israel maintains conventional military superiority relative to its neighbors and the Palestinians. Shifts in regional order and evolving asymmetric threats have led Israel to renew and double its efforts to project military strength, deter attack, and defend its population and borders (Zunes, 2002, p. 31).

Israel appears to have reduced some unconventional threats via missile defense systems, reported cyber defense, warfare capabilities, and heightened security measures vis-à-vis their counterparts, the Palestinians. In this context, Israel's military features total active duty manpower across the army, navy, and air force of approximately 180,000, plus 445,000 in reserve— numbers aided by mandatory conscription for most young Jewish Israeli men and women, followed by extended reserve duty. Israel's overall annual defense budget is approximately \$16.4 billion, constituting about 4.6% of its total gross domestic product (GDP) ("Israel Defence Budget," cited in Zanotti, 2018, pp. 9- 10).

Israel has a robust homeland security system, featuring sophisticated early warning practices, thorough border and airport security controls, and reinforced rooms or shelters that are engineered to withstand explosions in most of the country's buildings. Also, Israel has proposed and partially constructed a national border fence network of steel barricades (accompanied at various points by watch towers, patrol roads, intelligence centers, and military brigades) designed to minimize militant infiltration, illegal immigration, and smuggling from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip (Zanotti, 2018, p. 10).

1.3.2. U.S. aid and arms sales to Israel:

The US and Israel have maintained strong bilateral relations based on number of factors including strong domestic U.S. support for Israel. U.S. economic and military aid has been a major component in cementing and reinforcing these ties. These military aids made Israel's armed forces one of the most powerful forces in the world. For many years U.S. economic aid helped subsidize a lackluster Israeli economy. Though since the rapid expansion of Israel's Hi- Tech sector in the 1990s (sparked partially by U.S. Israeli scientific cooperation). Israel is now considered a fully industrialized nation with an economy on par with some western European countries (Zanotti, 2018, p. 18).

Since 1999, overall U.S. assistance to Israel has been outlined in ten years government-to-government Memoranda Of Understanding (MOUs). The first two years MOU (FY1999-FY2008) agreed to under the Clinton administration was known as the "Glide Path Agreement" and represented

political commitment to provide Israel with at least \$26.7 billion in total economic and military aid over its duration. In 2007 the Bush administration and Israeli government agreed to the current \$30 billion military aid package for the ten years period from FY2009-2018 under the terms of agreements (Zanotti, 2018, p. 23).

1.3.2.1. Aid:

Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. Since 1976, Israel has generally been the largest annual recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, with occasional exception of Iraq and Afghanistan after 2004. Since 1985, the United States has provided approximately \$3 billion in grants annually to Israel. In the past, Israel received significant economic assistance, but now almost all U.S. bilateral aid to Israel is in the form of Foreign Military Financing (FMF). U.S. FMF to Israel represents approximately one-half of total FMF and between 15-20% of Israel's defense budget. The new 10-year bilateral military aid MOU commits the United States to \$3.3 billion annually from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. The United States also generally provides some annual American Schools and Hospitals Abroad (ASHA) funding and funding to Israel for migration assistance ("Israel Government System Handbook", 2018, p. 66).

1.3.2.2. Arms Sales:

The 1952 Mutual defense Assistance agreements and subsequent arms agreements between Israel and the United States limit Israel's use of U.S. military equipment to defensive purposes. The arms Export Control Act authorizes the sale of U.S. defense articles and services for specific purposes. In the late 1970s and early to mid-1980, the Carter and Regan administrations questioned Israel's use of U.S. supplied equipment during various military operations in the region. After Israel's 2006 War in Lebanon, the state department issued a preliminary report to congress concluding that Israel may have violated the terms of agreements with the United States that restrict Israel's use of U.S.-supplied cluster munitions to certain military targets in noncivilian areas (Sharp, 2019, p. 26).

Israel uses approximately 74% of its FMF to purchase arms from the United States, in addition to receiving U.S. Excess Defense Articles (EDA). Given the new MOU's phase-out of Israeli use of FMF for domestic arms producers, by FY2028 all of Israel's FMF will go toward U.S.-origin arms (Sharp, 2019, p. 27).

Israel's procurement of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter from the United States has been underway since 2016. To date, Israel has received 12 F-35s, and it is under contract to receive a total of 50 by 2024.⁷⁹ In late 2017, Israel was the first non-U.S. country to declare operational capability for the F-35, and it has reportedly used the aircraft in combat over Israel's northern border. Under the terms of its arrangements with the United States, Israel has had domestic

contractors install customized equipment and weaponry, and it is the only F-35 recipient to date with the right to perform depot-level aircraft maintenance within its own borders (“Israel Government System Handbook”, 2018, p. 67).

1.3.3 Missile defense cooperation:

American globalization missile defense is now one of the major issues in the international relations environment it will reflect deeply on the structure of international security in the common years, it will also have a long-term impact on the strategic balance at the top of the international system. In this regard, Zanotti (2018) stated that the US has taken new steps on the road to building a missile defense system that covers the rest of the US territory, and extend its components and direct effects toward NATO allies, as well as what is vital to US interests (p. 7).

The Gulf region has become one of the world’s leading regions of the new US globalization of anti-missile defense, globalization that takes many forms today, and it is based on the system of bilateral, multilateral agreement and understandings. In addition to its ties to Iran, the new US approach appears to be relevant to Gulf security from the perspective of US missile defense inside the Gulf, as well as in the Mediterranean region (Zanotti, 2018, p. 24).

The current US missile defense system developed in the form of regional defense system; it is similar to the European defense one against missile threats. And more the world is in the process of global missile defense system that the US seeks to achieve (Zanotti, 2018, p. 24).

In February 2010, the Pentagon's missile defense review report indicated that the threat of ballistic missiles was increasing in both quality and quantity, that efforts are being made by various countries to protect them from the pre-entire attack's threat; this means that the proactive attack is part of American military doctrine. The US national missile defense system consists of (1) Ground base for GBI into sector missiles, there are two such sites in Alaska and California, (2) Command, control and communication center, (3) X-ray radars station, (4) Early warning center, and (5) Space support program.

In addition, the US is developing the space information system. The SBIRS an infrared device will be one of the most important components of the US missile defense system in the future. Originally, the US anti-missile system designed to counter strategic intercontinental missiles, it is not interested in intercepting short and medium range tactical missiles; the intercontinental one is currently available only in two countries: Russia and China.

As far as the new perspective of the American shield in Europe, Washington saw the purpose of setting up a missile defense system in the Middle East and Europe to protect Europe and the United States from any ballistic missiles that could be fired from Iran. Later, the Obama's administration entered a review of the missile shield project in Europe, focused on the evolution of Iran's missiles capabilities.

On September 17, 2009, US President Barack Obama officially abandoned the Bush administration's perceptions, he said: "This system is characterized by being very flexible. At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) summit held in Lisbon on November 19, 2010, president Obama received the support of the Atlantic Allies for his new project on anti-missile defense in Europe. NATO intends to integrate the capabilities of its anti-missile defense system into its theater of military operation with the US missile shield system for the Euro-Atlantic region. Originally, there is European-American Cooperation; this system provides early warning to the United States and its European allies. There are also separate initiatives to develop early warning systems and missile defense in Europe.

The US administration has signed agreements with 11 countries in the field of anti- missile defense in different regions of the world; similar agreements are soon to be signed with other seven countries, including those in Asia Pacific, where North Korea was originally viewed as a missile threat sources. There has been US-Japanese cooperation in the area of anti-missile defenses since 1999, there is also long cooperation between the two countries under the G-7 missile control system, which later became the G-8 after Russia joined it.

1.3.4. Security cooperation legislation:

Over the past decade, congress has authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct wide range of security cooperation programs. DOD's role supporting foreign military and other security forces has evolved over recent decades. DOD defines "security cooperation" as a broad set of activities undertaken by DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the US to achieve strategic objectives.

SC Program authorizations and appropriations are provided to the Secretary of Defense primarily under the annual National Defense Authorization and Appropriations Act. By statute or Executive Order, they are sometimes required to be exercised in coordination with the Secretary of State. These programs vary greatly in terms of the agency or DoD activity responsible and the manner in which they are planned for and funded. Congress has provided DOD with, by CRS's estimate, more than 80 separate authorities to assist and engage with foreign governments, militaries, security forces, and populations, although other organizations have identified a larger number of authorities. These authorities are briefly described below under the following rubrics:

- Contingency Operations and Related Coalition Operational Support;
- Global and Regional, Non-Contingency Train and Equip, and Other Assistance;
- Multi-purpose;
- Operational Support;
- Counternarcotic, Counter-Transnational Organized Crime, and Counter proliferation;
- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief;
- Exercises;
- International Armaments Cooperation;
- Education and Exchange Programs;
- Military-to-Military Contacts;
- Defense Institution Building and Support; and

- Recovery and Accounting of Missing Personnel.

Signed by President Obama on Jul. 27, 2012, the US Security Cooperation Act strengthened security cooperation between the two allies. The U.S. and Israel face unprecedented challenges in the region, including Iran's nuclear weapons drive, Arab political instability and the rapidly growing arsenals of Hamas and Hezbollah. The legislation reaffirms US unshakable commitment to Israel's security and to providing Israel the means to defend itself.

The Antiterrorism Clarification Act which was signed by the US President Donald Trump in October, 2018, and which was approved by the US Congress, would allow US authorities to seize assets from any foreign "terrorist entity" that receives financial aid from the US government. The law would also permit any US citizen to use the PA for its involvement in terrorist acts and be compensated by the money received through financial aids. In order to avoid being subjected to controversial law suits, the PA's leadership might reject any kind of financial aid from the Trump administration, including a funds meant to preserve the coordination between the PA and Israeli security forces in west bank.

1.3.5. Technology and Intelligence Cooperation:

With the increasing of technological development achieved by the Zionist entity, some Arab countries have turned towards the technological character with the entity to benefit from the Zionist technology to overcome its internal and security crises, stemming from rising dangers. It was supposed to be a huge

expansion in the size of the Arab technological gap with “Israel” as a threat to the balance of conflict between them and Israel; however, the changes in the regional security architecture in recent years have pushed things in a different direction, instead of considering the technological superiority of Israel as a breach of the conflict’s balance is seen now as a key to meeting its growing needs of technology, especially in security, while Israel is considering it as the key to achieving its goal of facilitating relations with its Arab neighbors, without compromising its strategic and security balances (Ofek, 2012, p. 1).

These issues have been addressed by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu when he spoke about enormous changes and a fundamental transformation. He stated that “we are currently in a different place, we are developing strong relations with Europe, and developing them with Eastern Europe and many countries including Islamic, all of this has changed because of technological superiority” (Ofek, 2012, p. 1).

1.3.6. Counter-terrorism:

For more decade, close cooperation between Israel and Palestinian authority security forces has been the strongest pillar of stability in the volatile Israeli-Palestinian conflict, working together to keep the West Bank under control. Now the Palestinian forces which receive training and weapons from the United States appear to be the most affected by the closure of Trump (“National Strategy for Counterterrorism”, 2018, pp. 1- 2).

On January 22, the Palestinian government asked the US administration to stop all assistance to the security services in the Palestinian authority for fear of lawsuits because of the ATCA law. The secretary of Palestine liberation organization Saeb Erekat said that the Palestinian government sent a letter to the US administration in which it requested to stop all its assistance to the Palestinian authority on the instructions of president Mahmoud Abbas, pointing out that there are fears that the authority will be used under a new US anti-terrorism law known as ATCA, and will soon enter into force (Cynthia, Kennedy, and Sherly, 2006, p 28).

The US President Donald Trump has already promised to cut off all humanitarian aids to Palestinian, for the tensions that arose with President Mahmoud Abbas. All these events indicate that there is a responsible, who links any development to Israel's interests, and ensure that it will continue to be superior to all the Arab countries, the earthquake that followed the outbreak of the Arab spring revolutions at all costs, because they opened a hope, to save the nation from the dominance of Israel, also these revolutions threatened allied regimes.

Netanyahu is trying to convince the Western world such as France and Germany that Israel is targeted by Islamic terrorism, because of the Palestinian conflicts between Fatah and Hamas, on the other hand within "Fath" itself, in addition to the open tension between "Hams and Salafistic Jihad" groups in Gaza, which has been in an instability position, Israel may find a chance that could be exploited; supporting the allegation of the Israeli government, and

launches a war on “terrorism”. Benjamin Netanyahu is trying to make such an equality between the Palestinian resistance with ISIS, in order to gain the international sympathy, so the Israeli government wants to show as if it is a victim of global terrorism; while Israel is an example of a terrorist state, which used all kinds of intimidation from assassinations and bombing to displace the Palestinian people, although the regime in Israel is “democratic” (“National Strategy for Counterterrorism”, 2018, pp. 6- 7).

1.3.7. Bilateral Trade:

The US is Israel’s largest single- country trading partner, and— according to data from the US International Trade Commission— Israel is the US 24th largest trading partner. The two countries concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1985, and all customs duties between the two trading partners have since been eliminated. The FTA includes provisions that protect both countries’ more sensitive agricultural sub-sectors with nontariff barriers, including import bans, quotas, and fees. Israeli exports to the United States have grown since the FTA became effective. Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) in Jordan and Egypt are considered part of the U.S.-Israel free trade area. In 2017, Israel imported approximately \$12.6 billion in goods from and exported \$21.9 billion in goods to the United States.⁹⁴ The United States and Israel have launched several programs to stimulate Israeli industrial and scientific research, for which Congress has authorized and appropriated funds on several occasions (“US Relations With Israel”, 2018, p. 21).

The U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship is strong, anchored by over \$3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually. In addition to financial support, the U.S. participates in a high level of exchanges with Israel, to include joint military exercises, military research, and weapons development. Through the Joint Counterterrorism Group and a semi-annual Strategic Dialogue, the U.S. and Israel have enhanced their cooperation in fighting terrorism (Zanotti, 2018, pp. 21- 2).

The US is Israel's largest single trading partner. The top five U.S. exports to Israel are: diamonds, semiconductors, civilian aircraft, telecommunications equipment, and agricultural products. The top five U.S. imports from Israel are: diamonds, pharmaceutical products, semiconductors, medicinal equipment, and telecommunications equipment (Sharp, 2019, p. 14).

The U.S. and Israel also coordinate scientific and cultural exchanges through the Binational Science Foundation, the Binational Agricultural Research and Development Foundation, and the U.S.-Israeli Education Foundation (Sharp, 2019, p. 17).

1.3.8. Israeli-Palestinian issues:

The Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* revealed a document transferred by former Israeli prime minister and defense minister "Ehud Barak" in the 2001, then to Likud's party leader "Ariel Sharon" for the latest political developments. The documents provide for Palestinian and Israeli agreements on the final status issues that reached during the Camp David negotiations in 2000 and Taba in

2001, it refers to important agreements on the three main issues of borders, refugees and Jerusalem, nevertheless there are still differences of opinion on security issues and arrangements. The document showed that the basic principle that Israel initiated in its previous negotiations with the Palestinians is not to transfer new territories to Palestinian control before reaching an agreement on the basic issues related to the final solution with Israel ready to discuss far-reaching ideas, however it stressed that no agreement was reached until all the issues were resolved without exception, in order to link the issues of solution to each other (Spillmann and Bächler, 1995, pp. 48- 50).

According to Roach (2011), the document stated that the security issue was exemplified during the Camp David conference by US president “Bill Clinton” in a way that would carry the Israeli-position, despite that the Palestinians withdrew from most of the understandings. During the Camp David negotiations. The Palestinians strongly opposed most Israeli security demands, particularly in the area of a disarmed state (p. 25).

The report detailed the issues of the final solution and what was agreed in the following order:

 **End of conflict:**

The parties differed on the date of the declaration of the end of the conflict and the claims; while the Israeli-position called for an end to the conflict with the signing of the framework agreement. The Palestinians demanded that the announcement be made at the end of the implement of the agreement, along with they demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners with the signing of the

agreement, and Israel proposed to release them immediately after the declaration of the end of the conflict (Spillmann & Bächler, 1995, pp. 51- 4).

Palestinian state:

A Palestinian-Israeli agreement revealed that the Palestinian state represents a solution that fully fulfills the demands of the Palestinians people for self-determination, regarding Israel, the document notes that the Palestinians face a problem in formally recognizing the Jewishness of the Jewish state and considering it a state for the Jewish people (Spillmann & Bächler, 1995, pp. 56-8).

The borders issue:

In this regard, the Palestinians expressed their willingness to be flexible and agreed to make changes to the borders of June 4, 1967, in order to respond to the Israeli-demographic problems, but the problem was to determine the 100% of the land and demographics, where discussions did not determine the position of the areas annexed to occupied Jerusalem after the 67 war and the Dead Sea areas, while Israel demanded the exchange of land from 6 to 8% of the west bank until the settlement blocs are preserved. The Palestinians opposed the idea “blocs”, also demanded that exchange from one to one, but not to exceed 2 to 3% of the West Bank (Roach, 2011, pp. 53- 6).

The Jerusalem issue:

It was agreed to establish two capitals in the Jerusalem area bearing the names of Jerusalem or Salem, during the negotiations, the Palestinians stressed the idea of an open city that would form single sovereign unite serrated from its surroundings with regard to the part outside the walls of the city, Israel acted according to the principle of “everything that is Arab to Palestine”. In the case of the holy sites and the old town, Israel demanded special role in the area, which the Palestinian apposed and demanded severity over the Muslim, Christian, and most Arminian neighborhoods, in addition to made special agreement for the Israelis that did not rich the level of sovereignty, in relation to the Al- Aqsa mosque, Israel suggested two choices: first, to keep sovereignty over it in general and unclear, secondly, to determined sovereignty according to the party’s commitment to the place, which the Palestinians rejected (Roach, 2011, pp. 57- 60).

The refugees’ issue:

Israel refused to recognize the suffering of the 1948 refugees and took part in the international effort, to receive a small number of them and to contribute financially to rehabilitation provided that the implementation of the agreement meant the end of the claims, while the Palestinians demanded that Israel recognize its exclusive responsibility in the refugees issues, in spite of that, it was written in the document that the Palestinians demonstrated during the negotiations an understanding of Israeli sensitivity, and a willingness to find a

solution that balances Israeli sensitive and national needs (Roach, 2011, pp. 61-4).

The water issue in the Palestine-Israel conflict:

The issue of water is integral part of the land issue, making it a focal point in the conflict between Israel and Palestinians, Palestine is greatly affected by water crises, but it suffers from an additional problem that leads to deepening the crisis, this problem is caused by the only responsible the Israeli occupation, moreover its control over the water in the Palestinian territories, depriving millions of Palestinians of enjoying the blessing of water, or even of exercising their minimum natural right; which is supposed to be guaranteed by international laws, conventions, human rights organizations and peace treaties. While Israel trying to control and drain all the water resources in the area in favor of building agricultural settlements, in order to settle more Jewish immigrants annually, the world Bank report published in 2009 indicates the law and bad conditions in the Palestinian territories under Israeli military rule Gaza and the West Bank. Palestinians live on the equivalent of almost 10% liters of water per day, less than the amount recommended by the World Health Organization to protect the region from epidemics, and the situation in the Gaza Stripes is more tragic, drinking water does not exceed 5% (Roach, 2011, pp. 65- 7).

1.3.9. Peace process and international involvement:

Since the Israeli occupation of Palestine in 1948, the relationships between the Israelis and the Palestinians had been rooted, and tensions grew thick. The conflict primarily stems on a sole issue: Land dispute. Both Palestinians and Israelis claim the same area as their own nation (Mckernan, 2017, p 1).

Historically, the Israeli- Palestinian issue has been the longest one that has not yet been resolved. It is arguably no closer to being resolved, although it has been hailed chiefly by the US. Most Israelis, Palestinians, and Arabs outside of the Palestinian territories believe that peace will never happen. This has resulted in a real problem, where people in the region no longer take the term 'peace process' seriously (Mckernan, 2017, p 1).

The Palestinian issue has become the focus of the Arabs since the 1960's; for it was the time of most Arab countries that became independent states. Therefore, the conflict turned to be a pure Israeli- Arab one as the Arabs promised to help the Palestinians against the Israeli entity (Gerner, 2018, p. 2).

It is worth to mention that there were two important wars that helped frame the Arab-Israeli conflict: the 1967 and 1973 wars. These two wars highlight the regional recognition of the necessity of a peaceful solution. Also, they framed American diplomacy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. So, after fighting was over between both sides, Arabs and Israelis, and the Arabs were not able to restore the disputed lands, peace negotiations replaced warfare as

a means to achieve the intended objective: Land restoration for the Palestinians (Gerner, 2018, pp. 3- 4).

1.3.9.1. UN Resolution 242,1967:

After the end of the War of 1967, the 242 resolution was adopted on November 22,1967, by the UN Security Council. It embodies the principle that inspired most of the subsequent peace plans for land and for peace, it called for “the withdrawal of the Israel armed forces from the territories it occupied in the recent conflict”, and “respect for the sovereignty, political independence and right to a peaceful, moreover secure border recognized by any state in the region, and recognized as a free from any threats or acts of force” (Fisk, 2000, p. 1). It is known that the resolution lacks accuracy and clarity, as the wording of the English version of “withdrawal from land”, which made the Israelis said that this means not to withdraw from all territories, but Arab negotiators stated that the withdrawal should include all the territories occupied in 1967 (Fisk, 2000, p. 1).

1.3.9.2. Camp David’s Accords:

Several peace plans were put forward after the 1967 war, but nothing happened even after the October 1973 war or the “Yom Kippur” ,in French “jour du grand pardon”, as it is known in Israel, this ground war has paved the way for peace, as reflected in the historic visit of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in November 1977 (Gerdes, 2015, p. 19).

US president “Jimmy Carter” used public readiness for peace, he called on President Sadat, and Israeli prime minister “Men ahem Begin” to hold peace discussions at the Camp David Presidential retreat near Washington. Negotiations continued for 12 days, it ended with two agreements (Chandler, 2016, p. 5).

The first is called the “framework for peace in the Middle East”, it laid the foundations for peace by expanding resolution 242, and identified it hoped would be a way to resolve the “Palestinian problem”, this agreement called for a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, also for other treaties between Israel and its neighbors. The weak point in the first agreement is the part about the Palestinians, the plan was aimed at establishing a “self- governing authority” in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, however the Palestinians were not part of the agreement (Gerdes, 2005, p. 11).

The second agreement is “The Camp David framework” for the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The agreement came in 1979 after Israel withdrew from “Sinai”, such as the first recognition by a large Arab country of Israel as a state with the right for existing (Gerdes, 2005, pp. 12- 3).

1.3.9.3. Madrid Conference 1991:

The Madrid conference sponsored by the United states and the Soviet Union, it was designed to inspire the treaty between Egypt and Israel by encouraging other Arab countries to sign peace agreements with Israel. Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, as well as Israel and Egypt were encouraged, the Palestinians

also participated in this conference through a joint delegation with Jordan, but not with the presence of “Yasser Arafat” or other leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), whose participation was rejected by Israel (Rodriguez, 2011, pp. 36- 7).

1.3.9.4. The Oslo agreement 1993:

The Oslo negotiations attempted to address the missing element of all previous conversations by hiding direct discussions between Israelis and Palestinians, that represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, it was important to reach a final mutual recognition between Israel and the (PLO). The negotiations were held in full secrecy under the auspices of “Norway”, the agreement reached by the parties at the white house on September 13, 1993 was signed by US president “Bill Clinton”, Palestinian leader “Yasser Arafat” and Israeli prime minister “Yitzhak Rabin” Shook hands (Wilf, 2018, p. 1).

The Oslo agreement stipulated the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank and Gaza, moreover the establishment of a “provisional Palestinian self-rule authority” for a five- year transitional period that would culminate in a permanent settlement (Ahmed Bahaa El-Din, 2006, pp. 100- 2).

The agreement referred to the status of “the end of decades of confrontation and conflict”, in addition to “the recognition by each side of the mutual legal and political rights” of the other side. Although the provision for the establishment of a Palestinian state is not clearly stated in the agreement’s text, the implicit

meaning means the creation of a future Palestinian state alongside Israel (Ahmed Bahaa El-Din, 2006, pp. 103- 5).

There was an exchange of letters between Yasser Arafat who stated that “the PLO recognizes the right of Israel to exist in peace and security”, while Yitzhak Rabin said: “the government of Israel decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people” (Wilf, 2018, p. 1).

Hamas and other rejectionist groups did not accept the Oslo agreement, and they began to launch suicide attacks against Israelis, groups led by settlers inside Israel also opposed the Oslo agreement, it was implemented only partially (Ahmed Bahaa El-Din, 2006, pp. 105- 7).

1.3.9.5. Camp David 2000:

Numerous attempts have been made to accelerate the withdrawal and establish the self-rule authority as stipulated in the Oslo agreement including the “Taba” agreement of 1999, president Clinton then sought to address final status issues, including the border problem, the status of Jerusalem and refugees that not covered by the Oslo agreement, leaving them waiting for future negotiations between the parties (Yelmaz, 2005, p. 66).

Negotiations were held in July between Israeli prime minister “Ehud Barak” and PLO leader “Yasser Arafat”, in spite of that they did not end with specific agreement, although they dealt with more detailed issues than before; the main problem was that the maximum Israel could offer was below the minimum acceptable to the Palestinians (Yelmaz, 2005, pp. 63- 4).

Israel offered to withdrawal from the Gaza strip and waiver large parts of the West bank, as well as to grant additional land from the “Negev desert” to the Palestinians to maintain the main settlements and most of East Jerusalem, Israel proposed the supervision of the Palestinians over the holy places in old Jerusalem, and contribution to a fund for Palestinian refugees (Yelmaz, 2005, pp. 73- 6).

Palestinians want to return to the 67 lines and give Israelis access to the Jewish part of East Jerusalem, also they want to recognize the “right to return” for Palestinians refugees. The failure of the Camp David’s discussions led to the resumption of the Palestinian uprising (Yelmaz, 2005, pp. 28- 9).

1.3.9.6. The Road Map of 2003:

The road map is a peace plan prepared by the quarter commission of the United states, Russia, the European Union and the United nations, the plan does not elaborate on a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but suggests ways to solve the problem, it follows US senator George Mitchell’s efforts to resume peace discussions in 2001 (Thrall, 2017, p. 1).

An important statement was issued in June 2002, before the Road Map by US President George W. Bush, who became the first US President to call for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The statement proposed a phased timetable based on establishing security before a final statement is reached (“The Road Map to Peace”, 2003, p. 1).

1.3.9.7. Annapolis conference 2007:

George W. Bush the US President in his second term held a conference at the Annapolis naval base in Maryland in an attempt to resume the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis. Israeli Prime minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian authority President Mahmood Abbas participated in the discussions alongside Quarter commission, representatives from several Arab countries including Saudi Arabia and Syria. The leaders of this accord were calling for engagement in negotiations aimed at reaching a full peace agreement by the end of 2008, the two parties agreed that the implementation of the peace provisions should be preceded by the confidence-building measures provided for the Road Map, regularly meetings were held between Olmert and Abbas which was said to have made good progress on border issues, but suddenly stopped when the Israeli military offensive in Gaza began in the late 2008 (Silva, 2010, pp. 35- 7).

In September 2,2010 US President Barack Obama launched direct conversations at the white house that brought together Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however the end of Israel's partial settlement freeze on September 26 led to the collapse of negotiations. In 2011, Netanyahu rejected Obama's call for Palestinian state on the borders that includes the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem ("Israeli PM Sneers at watershed peace hid with Palestinians", 2003, p. 1).

On September 23, the quarter commission revealed a plan to resume peace conversations, also begin negotiations within a month, and commit to reaching a peace agreement by the end of 2012 (Silva, 2010, p. 40).

On October 31, the Palestinians received membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO). Israel announced the establishment of 2000 housing units in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, moreover a freeze on the transfer of financial revenues due to Palestinian authority (Silva, 2010, p. 49).

Trump's approach to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict has finally convinced Palestinian leaders that they will lose more if they remain in a Us-led peace process. President Donald Trump's decision last December to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, he crowned by 70 years of US policy and international consensus marked a turning point in the US-sponsored peace process between Israel and Palestinians. Jerusalem has long been considered the basis for a final peace settlement, as it is one of the most complex issues of conflict, a major religious and political symbol for billions around the world (Silva, 2010, pp. 57- 8).

The Trump's declaration greeted the Israeli side with joy, anger and condemnation from the Palestinian leaders, declaring that they would refrain from participating in a US-Sponsored peace process, In response the US administration cut about 80 percent of its aid to Palestinian refugees, also promised further cuts in aid if the Palestinians refused to return to the peace process, meanwhile the bulk of the international community, including most of

the European countries and Washington's Arab allies met against the Trump's declaration for its part, rejected the accusations that the transfer of the capital was aimed at determining the status of Jerusalem in advance, stressing that it is a "recognition of reality" no more, however his declaration on Jerusalem was not a "new approach" to resolving the conflict as the administration claimed, despite the fact that the culmination of the deterioration of US policy, and the decline in the effectiveness of US mediation over the last 25 years (BÖLME, 2007, pp 2- 4).

The decision to recognize Jerusalem may seem to be an attempt to resolve the many contradictions inherent in the peace process, not by restoring the internationally accepted standards on which it is based, or by making the opportunities between the two sides equal, but by re-writing the rules of the diplomatic game, while the chance of a us-brokered peace agreement were essentially too small, Trump's approach to conflict may finally convince Palestinian leaders that they might lose more if they remain involved in a us-led peace process rather than withdrawing from it, yet the diminishing prospects for a two-state solution do not come without cost to the United states (Hallward, 2011, pp. 192- 3).

1.3.10. Jerusalem:

Located in the heart of Palestine, Jerusalem of the oldest cities in the world. Throughout its oldest history, which dates back to more than five thousand years ago, the city of Jerusalem had been settled by different peoples

and nations. Because of its importance geographic location, it had been the center that combined a variety of trade routes (Krieger, 2011, p. 1).

Jerusalem is the city of the most diverse religions and civilizations. It is characterized by different cultural and religious aspects for the multitude of peoples that inhabited the land. Also, it is the cornerstone in which the three divine religions of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism had been established (Lee, 1999, p. xiii).

In addition to its historical significance, Jerusalem is also significant for its religious important roots. As for the Arabs, Jerusalem is the third holy city after Mecca and Madinah. It was the first of the two Qiblas where the Muslims went to in their prayers. Also, it also represents the site from which prophet Mohammed (Peace Be Upon Him) conducted his journey of Israa and Maaraj. For the Jews, the city had been conquered by the prophet and King David, and made it the capital of the unified Kingdom of Israel around 1000 BC. Then, his son Solomon built his temple, as stated in the Bible, which became a logo for Jewish unity. On the other hand, Jerusalem is mostly important to the Christians because it is where Jesus Christ was brought up as a child, preached to the poor in his adult life, crucified in the end of his life, and resurrected by God (Lee, 1999, pp. 16- 9).

Since Jerusalem is sacred to the followers of the three major faiths, the city has witnessed many conflicts and wars over capture and control. During the Crusades, both Muslims and Crusaders fought each other for nearly one century over maintaining and controlling the Holy Land. It was Salah Eddine, the great

Muslim leader, who liberated the city from the Crusaders (Lee, 1999, pp. 287-291).

After the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948, Jerusalem has been the major issue of struggle between the Arabs and the Jews in the Arab- Israeli conflict. Accordingly, three major wars had been waged between the Arabs and the Jews since 1948; namely, the War of 1948, the War of June 1965, and the War of October 1973. However, the Arabs did not succeed in none of these wars to restore the land back. Moreover, peace negotiations between the Palestinians and the Jews failed totally, and did not provide a chance to the Palestinians to restore the land, or establish their Palestinian state (Armstrong, 2010, pp. 273-303).

1.3.11. Settlements:

Jewish settlement colonies are civil communities founded by the Zionists before 1948 decades ago; then, Israel completed its constitution on the territory of the historic state of Palestine. In this context, it is stated that “Settlements are the most influential factor in the reality of Palestinian’s lives and their human rights” (“Israel approves 6,000 new homes for Israeli settlers in the West Bank”, 2019, p. 1).

Tel Aviv is one of the first settlements built by the Zionist in the early 20th century as the number of Jewish immigrants from Europe increased, the Zionist settled more Palestinian land. After several military attacks between 1948 and 1950 the Zionist forces which later turned to the Israeli army established, many

Jewish settlements on the Palestinian's towns and villages that range 78 percent of Palestine land. Afterwards Israel launched another war in 1967, also it seized 22% the remaining of the territory of the Palestine state; the West bank including East Jerusalem and the Gaza strip also on these lands, they began to build Jewish settlement colonies (Lubell, 2006, pp. 48- 9).

The United Nations Organization has condemned the construction of settlements inside the West bank including East Jerusalem and the Gaza strip in many of its resolutions and votes, considering the construction of these settlements to be contrary to international law. The number of settlers in the West bank including East Jerusalem increased to about 600.000 settler in 2014 (Zanotti, 2018, pp. 6- 7).

Israel has established "by pass roads" to link the settlements of East Jerusalem and the West bank with Israeli territory. These roads separate Palestinian land from each other, and only Jews are allowed to use it. Israel permits Israeli settlers in the West bank carrying weapons and not punish them when they attack Palestinian citizens for the reason that the settlers believe that the West bank should be Israeli territory and that Palestinian Arabs should not be there. Israel continues to build and expand Israeli settlements, in addition to confiscate more Palestinian land to build new settlements (Krieger, 2012, p. 1).

Israel deliberately built these settlements on fertile Palestinian lands that are full of natural resources and deprives the Palestinians of this right to establish a state. It is worth to mention that the Jewish settlement process underwent four stages.

- ✚ **The first stage (1967- 1977):** during the rule of the Israeli labour party where the settlement began first in Jerusalem, the neighborhood of the Moroccans and the expulsion of its inhabitants the Jewish quarter was rebuilt in the old city (Becker, 1971, pp. 8- 12).
- ✚ **The second stage (1977- 1990):** during the Likud party rule, at this stage the settlements became large cities, they numbered about 150 settlements with a population of ninety thousand settlers (Becker, 1971, p. 13).
- ✚ **The third stage (1990- 2000):** through the time witnessed the influx of Russian Jews to Israel, neither the Madrid conference in 1991 nor the negotiations that followed, nor the Oslo agreement that signed on September 13, 1993 prevented settlements' expansion. The number of settlers in the West bank stood at 200000 settlers and in Jerusalem to 172 thousand (Becker, 1971, p.14).
- ✚ **The fourth stage (2000 and beyond):** this period experienced by the constitution of the separation wall in order to protect their colonies, at that time Israel withdrew from the Gaza strip in 2005 and destroyed 21 Settlements, otherwise the number of settlers in the West bank reached the end of 2015 about four hundred thousand while in Jerusalem about 240 thousand (Rothen, 2011, p. 1).

1.3.12. Economic effects:

The Palestinian economy suffers heavy annual losses due to Israeli settlements, where Palestinians are denied access to their land and work places. Accordingly, Pillar (2010) believed that the direct and indirect losses resulting from occupation and settlement amounted to \$7 billion and 3.4 billion because of the occupation restrictions imposed on the Palestinians to reach their land and work in the region. The total annual loss of the Palestinian economy in the quarries and mining sector by about \$ 575 million. Settlers in the West bank consume six times as much as the 2.86 million Palestinians in the West Bank (p. 1).

Conclusion:

When we look at the evolution of the alliance, and the current, broad institutionalization of friendship, it is easier to understand why an Israeli election that brought to power a man whose policies clashed with the President's would have so little impact on the relationship. The truth is the differences between the present administrations in Israel and the US are relatively narrow, primarily disagreements over the means to the same end. In the worst case, a future American administration may seek to pressure the Israelis and might even reduce the level of cooperation, but the ties today are so broad and deep the alliance is unlikely to crack.

Unlike the 1950s, no President could credibly threaten a cutoff of aids, since Congress would not support such action. Most economic, academic, and professional relationships between the countries are immune to political vagaries. The further development of the relationship might be retarded, but the evolution cannot be reversed.

For Israel, the strength of the alliance provides security. Israelis know their ally will maintain its commitment and be limited in its ability to apply pressure to force them to take actions they oppose. The impact on the Arabs should be to dispel the persistent delusion that a wedge can be driven between the United States and Israel. Despite Israel's reliance on America, the state of the relationship today is such that U.S. influence on its ally is constrained. Still, no Prime Minister wants strained relations with Israel's closest friend and the world's most powerful nation.

While U.S. support for Israeli occupation policies, like U.S. support for its allies elsewhere, is primarily based upon the country's support for perceived U.S. security interests, there are other factors complicating efforts by peace and human rights groups to change U.S. policy. Despite these obstacles, the need to challenge U.S. support of the Israeli occupation is more important than ever. Not only has it led to enormous suffering among the Palestinians and other Arabs, ultimately it hurts the long-term interests of both Israel and the United States, as increasingly militant and extremist elements arise out of the Arab and Islamic world in reaction.

Chapter two: Origins and mechanisms of the role of the Jewish lobby in U.S. foreign policy making

Introduction:

The Jewish lobby is the top of the shadow US policy. It is the deeply state rooted in the US political life. It is highly recognized through the existence of pressure groups, as their influence extends to political, media, economic and scientific circles in the US, as well as works in a social, cultural, and spiritual fields that is basically sympathetic to it with its orientations. It is worth to mention that the Jewish lobby does not always defend its interests in the US; however, it defends the interests of Israel, and perpetuates the state of US hostility towards the Arabs and Arab issues (Doulhat, 2009, p. 1).

2.1. Background of the origin of Jewish lobby:

In current official presence and magnitude of the influence of the “Zionist lobby” in the US cannot be understood without reference to the intellectual roots of Zionism in American Christianity (Feuer, 1976, pp. 107- 8).

For a long time, “Zionist Christianity” stated that the return of the Jews to the Holy Land; namely, Palestine, and the construction of the state of Israel corresponds to the biblical prophecies. This; in fact, paves the way for the return of Jesus Christ. This belief was most clearly demonstrated in 1844 in a book by George Bush, the Hebrew professor at New York University, entitled “Valley of Revelation” or “The revival of the Bones of Israel”, in which he clearly called for

the Jews to be brought to the ranks of the honorable nations of the land by returning them to the land of Israel (Feuer, 1976, p. 108).

The first political attempts of the Zionist Lobby were in 1891; namely, the “Blackstone Memorial”, in which William Eugene Blackstone collected signatures to persuade US President Benjamin Harrison to convince the Ottoman Soltan to hand over Jewish Palestine (Gilmour, 1982, p. 7).

In 1914, another step was taken by Louis Brandes, a judge in the US Supreme Court, who turned American Zionism into a significant force in US politics. On September, 21, 1922, the US Congress passed a resolution that provided support for Palestine as a national homeland for the Jews. The resolution stated that “the truth is not only an unprecedented presence of pressure groups in the United Nations, but even in the white house which has been under constant pressure, the presence of few extremist Zionist leaders motivated by political and engaged in political threats...” (Gilmour, 1982, pp. 8-9).

In the 1950s, the American Zionist committee for public affairs was established. Meanwhile, the Jewish issue was not so urgent to the Dwight Eisenhower administration, in contrast to the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Cold War era. However, after tensions between the US administration and the Zionist committee, the latter decided to change its name to the Committee of Public Affairs American Israel (AIPAC) in 1963. Accordingly, it became the most prominent Zionist committee affecting US politics (Gilmour, 1982, p. 9).

According to many scholars, US- Israeli relations remained warm until the setback in 1967 with the misreading of the creation of a Jewish State. George Friedman, a US politician and writer, believed that the US had maintained a hatred of Israel before 1967; however, it changed completely later. The Zionist lobby succeeded in mobilizing massive support for Israel within the US. According to John Mearsheimer, professor at the University of Chicago, and Stephen Walt, professor at Harvard University, the influence of the Zionist lobby in US foreign policy started since 1976, and Israel has become the most beneficiary of US foreign policy aid. So, from 1948 to 2004, the US administration spent more than \$140 billion for Israel (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, p. 6 9).

2.1.1. What is the Jewish lobby? A definition:

The Zionist lobby, aka the pro- Israel lobby, or even the Jewish lobby is an expression that describes a group of individuals and institutions that are actively directing US foreign policy in the interests of the state of Israel. In this sense, the lobby is not one movement with a central reference, or leadership; however, it represents the individuals, or organizations which may agree, or disagree on several political issues. The pro- Israel lobby not only includes American Jews, but also includes individuals, or groups known as Christian Zionists. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is one of the most famous and important lobby in the specific sense which refers to the Israeli American Public Affairs Committee, one of the most important pressure groups,

its mission as its name indicates, it is to press American lawmakers to support the Zionist state (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, p. 111).

As for its structure, Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) believed that the Zionist lobby, in its common sense, is a general regulatory framework within which a number of Jewish and Zionist associations and organizations coordinate among themselves to achieve a number of interests. Amongst these associations and organizations, there is the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, the World Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress and the National Advisory Council on Jewish Community Relations (p. 111).

Furthermore, Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) explained that the term lobby is often used as a convenient shortcut to express the loose alliance among individual organizations that are actively engaged in policy formation of the US Department of State in the direction of pro- Israel policy. The core of the lobby is made up of American Jews who devote their efforts to bend US foreign policy so that it supports their Israeli interests. Besides, they intervene in voting for candidates who are loyal to Israel; they make financial contributions, and support organizations which are loyal to Israel. However, not all American Jews are part of the lobby because Israel is not a prominent issue for many of them (pp. 112- 5).

2.1.2. A brief history of the Jewish lobby:

Historically, The Jews who emigrated in the middle of the 17th century from Europe to the American Continent were able to form the Jewish lobby at various levels and activities. They joined the Jews who fled after and engaged in their ranks in an effort to establish social and commercial bases in America which would be eventually be a viable nucleus to form a large lobby in the US. In fact, this future lobby would have a strong influence in political, economic, social affairs, and in different aspects of their lives in the US. Also, the future lobby in the US promised to provide various aid to the Jews around the world (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, p. 10).

In 1654, twenty- three Jews were displaced from Europe and settled in the colony of New Amsterdam, later New York, were the nucleus of the Jewish community. The American continent became the basis for the creation of the Promised Land of Israel. It is worth to mention that in the period from 1654 to 1984 immigration rates increased with nearly six and a half million Jews. Initially, the Jews sought to form communities in the major US cities for commercial, agricultural, and industrial occupations of great financial benefits, which they can reach to the social level, prestigious, and the ability to employ influence to sensitive government centers and various official agencies with the aim of first acquiring the US economy by establishing banks, financial institutions, and large factories in various industrial, commercial, agricultural, and oil sectors (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, pp. 11- 2).

In order to infiltrate the centers of governments, major public functions in the White House, departments, and parties, organs, and channels of the US media in the US, the Israeli lobby; then, became the active force in running most of the official affairs of the US, especially in the House of Representatives, the House of the Senate, the Department of State, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, p. 13).

In view of this realistic view of the future of Israel, world Zionism has organized the work of Zionist lobby and a large scale in organizations of political institutions, economic, financial, and media stand alone in every US state with the allocation of an independent budget for each organization separately with its own legal professional and personal management. The Jewish lobby is now a state within a state. It is the main engine of all the political, military, economic, social, and media positions and decision- making taken by the US administration, especially in economic and political issues, the Palestinian issue and Arab issues in particular, at the level of the UN Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly which have close links to the Zionist entity (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, p. 14).

2.1.3 The structure of the Jewish lobby:

These days, identifying pressure groups is one of the important discussions in forming public policy. These groups are trying to affect policy makings and decision makings in different ways to achieve their interests. The

history of relevant studies to stakeholders' groups refers to the beginning of 20th century. Although this phenomenon isn't new and even is older than parties but the main concept of pressure group, which is called stakeholder group either, was first drawn in America and was studied for the effects of organizations and private forums on government.

Organized groups do attempt to directly affect legislation. These organizations comprise the formal lobby. U.S. Middle East policy is further shaped by Jewish voting behavior and American public opinion. These indirect means of influence are the informal lobby.

The Israeli lobby in America is receiving appropriate interest and benefit from two modes: Formal and informal modes. We look on groups and organizations that have official status have powers in the field of administration and law; contrary to, there is an informal mode that groups do not enter directly into the arena, but occasionally information collecting and encouraging their members to participate in the elections and political issues of the day, they are trying to influence so in America's foreign policy equations.

The formal and informal components tend to intersect at several points so the distinction is not always clear-cut. Together, however, they form the Israeli (or pro-Israel) lobby. This is a more accurate label than "Jewish lobby" because a large proportion of the lobby is made up of non-Jews. This term also reflects the lobby's objective. The Israeli lobby can then be defined as those formal and informal actors that directly and indirectly influence American policy to support.

2.1.3.1 Formal lobby:

Organized groups do attempt to directly affect legislation. One of these, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is a registered lobby. Other groups do not generally engage in direct lobbying (e.g., B'nai B'rith and Hadassah), but do disseminate information and encourage their members to become involved in the political process. They also sometimes lobby on specific issues. Though they have rarely influenced policy, Christian groups have also frequently weighed in on Israel's behalf and several pro-Israel organizations are comprised entirely of non-Jews. These organizations comprise the formal lobby ("Israel lobby in the United States", 2003, p. 12).

The Formal component of the Israeli lobby consists of organized lobby groups political action committees (PACs). The Center for Responsive Politics which tracks all lobbies and PACs describes the background of these pro-Israel as a "nationwide" network of local action committees, generally named after the region their donors come from, supplies much of the pro-Israel money in US politics, additional funds also come from individuals. The donors' unified goal is to build stronger US-Israel relations and to support Israel in the negotiations and armed conflicts with its Arab neighbors.

There are three key formal lobbying groups:

- Christian United for Israel, is the largest pro-Israel lobby.
- The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) which directly lobbies the United States Congress.

- The Conference of President of Major American Jewish Community and the executive branch of the US government. (“Israel lobby in the Unites states”, 2003, p. 13).

Among these Israeli groups and organizations, there are some specific institutions, as organized, that try to influence the government, the Congress, and the state; and direct the parliamentary and governmental interactional flows of America in Israeli interest. Like Public Affairs Committee, America- Israel known as AIPAC, but these groups under official status have powers in the field of administration and law certainly that facilitate and speed up their routine activities such as the Christian right organizations, southern whites, conservatives and neo-conservatives in both America parties must be considered also as a non-Jew agents but as a lobbyist and components and facilitators for the Israeli (“Israel lobby in the Unites states”, 2003, p. 51).

2.1.3.2. Informal lobby:

Support for Israel is strong among American Christians of many denominations. Informal Christian support for Israel includes a broad range varieties support for Israel ranging from the programming and news coverage on the Christian Broadcasting Network and the Christian Television Network to the more informal support of the annual Day of Prayer for the Peace of Jerusalem (Falk, 2006, p. 23).

Informal lobbying also includes the activities of Jewish groups. Some scholars view Jewish lobbying on behalf of Israel as one of many examples of a US ethnic group lobbying on behalf of an ethnic homeland, which has met with a degree of success largely because Israel is strongly supported by a far larger and more influential Christian movement that shares its goals (Himmelfarb, 2009, p. 118).

2.2. The means of influence of the Jewish lobby in the US:

Two prominent scholars John Mearsheimer and Walt Stephen (2006) have taken on an arduous task to analyze the official power of the Jewish lobby which has grown steadily in recent years. According to them, the power of the lobby was now so large, and its strength of the Jewish lobby which is unparalleled. This; of course, provides the normal or strategic argument by which the US is closely related to Israel, and explains the US support of Israel (p. 140).

The Israeli lobby is not a single entity, or an institution, it; however, consists of different entities that unite around common goals and interests in order to adapt the US policy. Moreover, the Israeli lobby tends to bend its own interests of the Zionist entity and support them in any policies pursued by the strategies and mechanisms in order to extend its influence within the US (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, p. 141).

The means of action taken by the Israeli lobby, together with its Jewish organizations in the US, include exerting influence in the US Congress through members who support their campaigns, or control them intellectually, as well as

influencing the executive branch by playing an active role in the US elections, presidential elections, funding candidate campaigns and campaigning. Also, the Jewish lobby exploits its control of mass media, writers, analysts, and study centers which are largely established in the US. The Jewish lobby depends on two ways of working directly and indirectly: (1) is through the presence of Jews in political positions through which policy- making and decision- making are influenced both in the administration, or in Congress, or states' governors, and (2) through indirect deal with the US administration; however, the reliance on indirect dealings is increasing and it is achieved through:

- The use of electoral campaigns as a means of pressure on the candidates and get them promises to adopt the Zionist point of view and work to support Israel;
 - The use of members of the lobby in congress to support Israel issues;
 - The use of the media to attract the support of US officials to Israel and to raise Israeli issues in public in a way that received popular acceptance.
- (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, pp. 141- 2).

2.2.1. Voting power:

The Jews constitute an organized electoral force, and they participate in the US elections by 50% to 90% among the general US public. The reason for their high participation is that they are organized as educated groups. Accordingly, they seek to increase their power and electoral influence (Gilmour, 1982, p. 4).

As for the importance of the Jewish voting power, Gilmour (1982) believed that it is increasing in initial elections. Jewish voters make up a quarter of the electorate in the New York State Democratic party primary; thus, the choices of the Jewish voters in the primary presidential elections often determine the name of the Democratic candidate who will engage in the competition against the Republican candidate in the final elections (p. 5).

The Jewish voice gains additional strength in view of the fact that American Jews always take center stage in a weak polarity that makes them a “swing vote” for one candidate, or another. The Israeli lobby has always sought to press for the election of US pro- Israeli President through relying on the elective power of the Jews, who often have the highest vote turnout, especially in important states; such as, California, Florida, New Jersey, and New York (p. 6).

When voting competition intensifies among candidates, the Jewish vote always decides in favor of this or that candidate. Thus, the Jewish electorate has an important consideration in the calculations of US politicians, as they seek to introduce themselves to AIPAC, the most powerful and influential Israeli organization in the US, and other lobby organizations. Their support facilitates their access to financial aid, and encourages voters to vote for them (p. 7).

2.2.2. Campaign donations:

The Jews are the major financiers of the US Presidential campaigns. In this context, Kotch (2019) believed that they finance 60% of their costs, especially in the Democratic party which is 30 times the size of the US population, and the

Jews constitute 3 % of the US population for the reason that the US presidential campaigns are too expensive. So, any candidate has to accept the Jewish support. This also applies to the candidates of the Senate and House of Representatives (p.1).

Furthermore, he stated that; in fact, most Jews give their votes to the Democratic Party because it expresses more than minority interests; however, if the interest requires the support of a Republican candidate, they have no objection to the evidence and their support for US President Donald Trump because of his electoral promises in support of Israel. The proportion of their participation in the elections up to 92 % compared to 54 % of the general US public. This gives their voting percentages an effective impact on the ballot results (p.1).

So, it is obvious that any candidate for the presidency has to win the Israeli support and works to appease them. This has been repeatedly expressed by different candidates; such as, George. W. Bush's speech before the AIPAC in 2001 in which he stated that "the safety and security of Israel is the first priority of my foreign policy and my administration will firmly support Israel against terrorism and violence by supporting and ensuring freedom, prosperity and security for the state of Israel" (Helmreich, 1992, p. 13).

Also, the US President Donald Trump's statement before his victory when he met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He stated that "Israel and its citizens have suffered for a very long time in the front lines against Islamic terrorism and that the Israeli people want a just and lasting peace with their

neighbors.” In order to achieve victory in the US elections, Donald Trump campaigned in Israel under the title “Trump equals the Israeli interests”, to urge the voters who hold US citizens to give their votes in favor of Trump; for Trump and his campaign were well aware of the strength of the Jewish lobby and its ability to influence the election and upset the equation in a single moment (Helmreich, 1992, para. 6).

2.2.3. Education of politicians:

According to Mitchell Bard, Israel lobbyists also educate politicians by “taking them to Israel on study missions. Once officials have direct exposure to the country, its leaders, geography, and security dilemmas, they typically return more sympathetic to Israel. Politicians also sometimes travel to Israel specifically to demonstrate to the lobby their interest in Israel. Thus, for example, George W. Bush made his one and only trip to Israel before deciding to run for President in what was widely viewed as an effort to win pro-Israel voters' support” (Bard, 2009, p. 1).

2.2.4. Think tanks:

The centers of studies and researches play a major role in shaping public opinion and pressure on the US administration. They often contribute to policy-making, so the Jewish lobby worked to establish its intellectual arsenal, it is “the Washington Institute for Near East Policy”, the lobby was not limited to the institute, but extended to the American Project Institute, the Brookings

Institution, the Heritage Foundation in order to disseminate the ideas and research of these centers. The American Israel Committee pays the cost of sending 400 free copies per week to US members of Congress, Senior officials, and delegations of states to the US so that the participation of US Presidents and Senior statesmen at the annual meeting of AIPAC is normal. All these researches and studies are carried out with the participation of a number of well-known Jewish researchers in the US (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, pp. 117- 9).

2.2.5. Media and public discourse:

In addition to the influence of the Jewish lobby in US Congress and the executive branch, Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) believed that the Jewish lobby has sought to form false concepts and point a rosy picture of Israel in the media and portrays it as a “victim of terrorism”, that it always seeks peace, but Palestinians and Arabs refuse to reconcile. Thus, pro-Israel organizations have influenced some think tanks and research centers to help shape public opinion for the benefits of Israel. The most popular TV stations are ABC, NBC and CBC, and their most prominent film companies are Fox, Paramount and Universal (p. 169).

Furthermore, it is worth to mention that Article 12 of the protocols of the Elders of Zionist on media and the press states that “newspapers, publishing houses and news agencies must be controlled because the press and literature are the greatest educational forces” (Wilzig and Schejter, 1994, pp. 111- 2).

World Zionism works hard to tighten control of the various media and harness them to serve the Zionist goals and remove obstacles from its path, for the US press the Jews do not have much of the newspapers; however, they control the news export parts. The bulk of mass media and some of it (the New York times, the Washington post, Radio Corporation of America... etc. Israel has more than 300 daily, weekly, periodic and most important thing they have means of pressuring these newspapers which are often the main source of funding guaranteed by the survival and continuity of these newspapers (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, pp. 169- 170).

In addition, Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) confirmed that film industry is also an area of influence of the Jewish lobby's views, as well as some large news agencies. The Jewish lobby works to impose the media quarantine on media agencies that do not respond to its demands through an organization called the Anti- Defamation League (p. 171).

The Jews try to direct the media associated with them to address people according to their social structure, and tickle their emotion and hit the strings sensitive. The result is to convince these audiences how valid their ideas are. Also, they push them behind, and make them a pressing power in politics so as to remain in a pioneer position to serve Israel. Meanwhile, they work hard to create a hateful bias on anti- Israel sentiments for the following reasons: (1) the pressure and influence exerted by the Jewish community in the US, (2) the inclination of the US public to sympathize with a people of European culture;

such as, the Israeli, as well as pro- Zionist media, and (3) looking suspiciously at non- European people (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, pp. 172- 3).

Since the Zionists own their own newspapers, the American Jewish Journalism Agency publishes 140 newspapers which focus on adopting the traditional religion, and reminding the Jews of the ancient homeland, in accordance with the Zionist plan and its goals (Wilzig and Schejter, 1994, p. 116).

2.2.6. College campuses:

Since the early 2000s, a number of organizations made to focus on what could be called "pro-Israel activism" on college campuses. With the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2001, the groups mentioned before became visible more and more. In 2002 an organization that includes many of these groups, recognized as the Israel on Campus Coalition, was formed as a result of what they felt were "the worrisome rise in anti-Israel activities on college campuses across North America". The stated mission of the Israel on Campus Coalition is to "foster support for Israel" and "cultivate an Israel friendly university environment".

Israeli members on Campus Coalition include the Zionist Organization of America, AIPAC, Americans for Peace Now, the Anti-Defamation League, Keshet, the Union of Progressive Zionists. Despite the fact that these groups are hugely united in their support of Israel, in 2007 there was a major internal conflict, when the right-wing Zionist Organization of America unsuccessfully had

a to remove the left-wing Union of Progressive Zionists from the coalition after the latter group sponsored lectures by a group of former Israel Defense Forces soldiers who criticized the Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (Spence, 2007, para. 3)

Some people feel that the pro-Israel activism on college campuses can go further from advocacy to outright intimidation. US President Jimmy Carter, who wailed of great difficulty in earning access to a number of universities to discuss his new book *Palestine Peace Not Apartheid* which criticized certain Israeli policies, a highly publicized accusation comes from this last event. In October 2007, a group of 300 academics about 300 academics under the name The Ad Hoc Committee to defend the University issued a statement in *Inside Higher Ed* calling for academic freedom from political pressure, in particular advocating openness and dialogue with groups identifying as supporters of Israel (Jaschik, 2007, para. 5).

In December 2007, several student leaders who defended pro- Israel groups on college campuses were corroborative by advocacy group Stand with Us as "emissaries of the Jewish state" for their work and would receive up to \$1,000 a year from the Emerson foundation for their efforts (Karni, 2007, para. 3).

2.2.7. Coordination with Israel officials:

Rabbi Alexander Schindler, former chair of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations (a US advocacy group), told an Israeli magazine in

1976, "The Presidents' Conference and its members have been instruments of official governmental Israeli policy. It was seen as our task to receive directions from government circles and to do our best no matter what to affect the Jewish community." Hyman Bookbinder, a high-ranking official of the American Jewish Committee, once said "Unless something is terribly pressing, really critical or fundamental, you parrot Israel's line in order to retain American support. As American Jews, we don't go around saying Israel is wrong about its policies" (Mearsheimer and Walt. 2007, p. 121).

Bard (2009) noted that "by framing the issues in terms of the national interest, AIPAC can attract broader support than would ever be possible if it was perceived to represent only the interests of Israel. This does not mean AIPAC does not have a close relationship with Israeli officials, it does, albeit unofficially. Even so, the lobby sometimes comes into conflict with the Israeli government" (pp. 12- 3).

2.2.8. Responses to attacks on Israel and the Jews:

Zunes (2006) wrote that "assaults on critics of Israeli policies have been more successful in limiting open debate, but this gagging censorship effect stems more from ignorance and liberal guilt than from any all-powerful Israel lobby" (para. 2). Furthermore, he explained that while "some criticism of Israel really is rooted in anti-Semitism", it is his opinion that some members of the Israel lobby cross the line by labeling intellectually honest critics of Israel as antisemitic. Zunes argued that the mainstream and conservative Jewish

organizations have "created a climate of intimidation against many who speak out for peace and human rights or who support the Palestinians' right of self-determination" (para. 4). Zunes has been on the receiving end of this criticism himself "As a result of my opposition to US support for the Israeli government's policies of occupation, colonization and repression, I have been deliberately misquoted, subjected to slander and libel, and falsely accused of being "anti-Semitic" and "supporting terrorism"; my children have been harassed and my university's administration has been bombarded with calls for my dismissal (para. 7).

Alan Dershowitz (2009) wrote that he welcomes "reasoned, contextual and comparative criticism of Israeli policies and actions." If one of the goals of the pro-Israel lobby was to censor criticism of Israel, Dershowitz stated that "it would prove that 'the Lobby' is a lot less powerful than the authors would have us believe.

Conclusion:

Since Israel has been founded in 1948, many important issues and factors related to US Middle East policy have come to center around its commitment to the Jewish State, this tendency has become even more pronounced throughout the time.

It is important to note that the White House is a separate and individual body in America politics. One cannot simply deduce that because of the extent of lobbying by Jewish organizations in the political system, the two have merged.

Although some of the staff of the White House are essentially members of the Lobbyist organizations, the two entities are distinct and; therefore, can have disagreements which can determine the true extent of their power. However, these disagreements do not affect the role of the Israeli Lobby in U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East.

The concept of American exceptionalism is that the U.S. government is inherently destined to govern the world on the basis of economic and intellectual superiority. This can be used as a counterargument to the idea of an immensely powerful lobbyist organization. However, it does not devalue the power the Israeli lobby. This is because the perceived inherent right of the US to rule the world is not inconsistent with the role played by the Lobby. The Lobby only functions to empower the situation of Israel as far as the Middle East is concerned, and it does not seek to become a regional hegemon that exists without U.S. involvement in the region.

Chapter three: The intervention of the Jewish lobby in the U.S. foreign policy toward Iran:

Introduction:

Analyzing the US foreign policy necessitates a study of the US dominance over the world and its heavy influence exerted on both on events and world countries. This understanding requires a thorough analysis of the political decision- making process and mechanism of US foreign policy- making, and its orientations in different regions, and the Arab world in particular. In addition, different US institutions, non- governmental organizations, and lobbying groups are real actors in the process of foreign policy- making (Shakoori & Heidarpour, 2016, pp. 129- 130).

Since the US- Iranian bi- lateral relations have been conflictual, the US has always adopted a particular foreign policy towards Iran. With the intervention of the Jewish lobby, which is supported by several agendas and interests, the US foreign policy towards Iran had been more rigorous. Thus, the Jewish lobby had indeed been successful in affecting, and directing, the US foreign policy towards Iran and in favor of Israel in the Middle East. The lobby had largely been able to garner widespread support to promote legislation that it favors posing several sanctions to curb the Iranian regime (Mc Cormick, 2012, p. 71).

3.1. The Iranian threat to the US interests in the Middle East and the Gulf region:

The US presence in both the Middle East and the Gulf region is to achieve several strategic interests: (1) protecting and ensuring Israel's safety, (2) protecting security for US Arab allies; namely, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, (3) fighting global terrorism which is sponsored by ISIS and Al Qaeda, (4) protecting and assuring the flow of oil resources, and (5) containing Iran. All these roles are mainly played by the US administration mainly through its continued military and naval presence in the Arabian Gulf. On the other hand, Iran is the main threat to all US Arab allies through Tehran's proxies which are made of Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and Houthis in Yemen. These are the spear of the US allies; therefore, deterring Iran and its proxies is central to US foreign policy interests in the Middle East. Moreover, the US presence in both Iraq and Syria is directed towards ISIS and Al-Qaeda which are based in the Middle East. Also, the US has also played a supporting role in the Saudi- led campaign against the Houthis Rebellion in Yemen (Mohamed Ayoob, 2019, p. 1).

The regional strategy for Iran is mainly based on confronting the US interests and its allies. Furthermore, Iran urges the US to withdraw its troops from the Gulf region, Iraq, and Syria. According to Calamour (2018), Iran does not accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state; accordingly, Iran is the main sponsor of the anti- Israel struggle in the region; it seeks to defeat the rebels in Syria and Iraq, and in the meantime, Tehran aspires to a permanent security role in both countries through its local agents. Moreover, Iran intends to

establish a pro- Iranian bloc stretching from Iraq to Lebanon which will help to stand against the US presence in the region (p. 1).

However, Shakoori and Heidarpour (2016) believed that deterring Iran was not an easy task. In fact, the wars which broke out in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen allowed Iran to expand its influence in the region. Moreover, Iran has also invested in the rebellion against Yemen led by the Houthis with the aim of expanding its influence in the Arabian Peninsula to distracting its adversaries; namely, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in both the Syrian and Iraqi issues. Paradoxically, at the heart of Iran's regional strategy is that Iran works to expel the US from the Middle East, nonetheless its behavior is largely the motivation for US forces to remain in the region (pp. 133- 4).

Iran's conflict operations in the Arabian Gulf and its support for its agents like Hezbollah, as well as repeated ballistic missile tests conducted since the nuclear agreement to strengthen Washington's perception that Iran is the main threat to its allies and the stability of the Middle East. Far from US interests in the region, Iran's behavior was a constant reminder of its hostile intentions and a call for deterrence, however deterring Iran was not easy where wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen provided an opportunity for Iran to expand its influence in the region (Shakoori and Heidarpour, 2016, p. 134).

In each country the strength of its agents has increased which made Tehran able to play a leading and important role in its conflicts as long in the future of those countries, moreover the clarity of Iran's strategic objectives enabled Tehran to respond more quickly and more firmly to the US in order to

transform its regional dynamics as in the conflicts that followed the Arab Spring for example, the Obama administration spent four years in Syria without fully and unequivocally support of the rebels at the same time it did not distance itself from the Syrian conflict, Iran has supported Syrian President Bashar Al- Assad from the outset and it has never backed down (Shakoori and Heidarpour, 2016, p. 133).

In this context, Calamur (2018) confirmed that Syria has been an ally of Iran since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution and it was the only Arab country to support Iran during its brutal war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the 1980s, according to him Syria is also a strategic asset to Iran because it acts as a buffer against any military action by Israel or the West, as well as a settlement site through which it can arm and supply Hezbollah to put pressure on Israel and contain its military actions in the region (p. 1).

Clarke and Smyth (2018) claimed that US military intervention against President Assad would possibly have strengthened the power of the extremists in Syria who would possibly have participated in the fight against Iran's proxies. It would also hurt US troops and made them suffer significant financial losses (pp. 1- 2).

Regardless of the reasons that prompted the US to stay mostly out of the circle of battle in Syria, this; in fact, has helped strengthen the power of Syrian regime, expand Iran's security role, and Russia's intervention in the Syrian conflict. Therefore, Russia's intervention in particular has limited the US intervention in Syria, which served the interests of Iran whose allies are fighting

under the Russian umbrella. Over the two past years, Moscow's involvement has shifted the momentum of the war to pro- Assad Iranian forces that have made steady gains against rebels, thus wars provided an opportunity for Iran to further expand its influence in the region. In a related context, the war against ISIS in Iraq deepened the complexity of the US strategy with both Washington and Tehran pushing alliances in support of Baghdad unlike in Syria, where US and Iranian interests are clearly different. Both of the US and Iran support the Iraqi government while both countries are making strenuous efforts to eliminate the ISIS threat. Iran's ability to use its proxies to target US forces was a major pressure card against the US (Clarke & Smyth, 2018, p. 2).

Since both of the US and Iran have different agendas, Special and Gladstone claimed that although the US forces are not coordinating with Iran. However, they are moving side by side with the Iraqi government and army. It should be noted that the US and Iran share the same clear objectives that include defeating both ISIS and Al Qaeda and maintaining the unity of Iraq, together with the issue of Kurdish independence. Although US forces have played a crucial role in the war against ISIS in Iraq, Iran and its allies do not want the US troops to remain in the country when the war is over; for their part, Iran's proxies fought US and coalition forces during operation "Iraqi freedom", as well as they promised to target US forces if Washington took any military action against Assad, or if US forces remained in Iraq after the defeat of ISIS. Iran's ability to rely on its proxies to target US troops has been a major pressure card against the US. Accordingly, the US had been aware of these threats,

knowing that any action against Iranian interests in Syria, or anywhere else could endanger US forces stationed in Iraq (Specia and Gladstone, 2019, p. 1).

As a matter of fact, Donald Trump's decision to side with Saudi Arabia in deterring Iran and its proxies is based on the reasons to prevent Iran from escalating with the US in Iraq just as it wanted to defeat ISIS completely, and not to fall into direct and open confrontation with the Iraqi government, as well as to avoid additional confrontations with the US military. In contrast, the US had to assume that Iran's thinking could change if it compromised by a threat to its interests (Mills, 2018, p. 1). Moreover, Iran and its proxies have increasingly focused on establishing a foothold along the Syrian border with Israel which will allow them to exert more pressure on the latter (Turak, 2018, p. 1).

Theoretically, The US could not engage thoroughly into the Syria conflict because it had been proven to be costly for the US military. Therefore, they should focus only on fighting ISIS in Iraq and reducing tensions with Iran. On the other hand, the US European and Arab allies and Turkey were accustomed to the US new strategy, but disagreed on the fact not to give up Syria completely; for it was contrary to the long-term interests of the US and its allies especially Israel, as it claimed by Mohamad Bazzi (2017) as follows:

Iran and its proxies have increasingly focused on establishing a foothold along the Syrian border with Israel, allowing them to exert pressure In the meantime, the presence of Iran and its allies in the region may increase the risk of conflict between the Israeli forces and Iran's proxies, which, in turn, could lead to further conflicts and

destabilize the region. Furthermore, the US may have expected all these results as the Trump administration largely followed Obama's policy and left Iran without any annulment in Syria. (Bazzi, 2017, p. 1)

On the other hand, the US has put pressure on Iran on a larger scale. The decision not to ratify the joint comprehensive plan of action and the extension of sanctions on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards is one of the most significant steps for these efforts (Bazzi, 2017, p. 1)

It is worth to mention that the nuclear agreement has created a solution to one of these problems: Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. So, undermining this agreement will further complicate the policies of both the US and Iran in the Middle East. Under the new sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on the Revolutionary Guards. The nuclear agreement has become one of the most important elements of US influence in the context of its relationship with Iran, and when this agreement is abandoned, the said influence will fall; although more pressure on the Revolutionary Guards is logical (Drezner, 2018, p. 1).

Actually, the US intentions have become more ambiguous following the sanctions on Iran's Revolutionary Guards as well as the non-ratification of the nuclear deal instead of building a consensus against Iran's destabilizing activities in the Middle East. Trump's refusal to ratify the agreement reduced the responsibility that would have rested with Iran. Moreover, this decision made the US administration being portrayed and seen as a non- trust- worthy actor not

only for foreign governments, but also for the Iranian people. In contrast, Tehran seemed more prudent and responsible. If the US wants to defeat the Revolutionary Guards, it must target the source of the regional group's strength, and Syria may be the place to start with (Kardioglu, 2018, p. 1).

In the meantime, this does not mean that the US has to engage, or escalate with Iran on behalf of the rebels. However, a clear and consistent reaffirmation of the US interests of the and its allies with regard to the future of Syria does not mean establishing a permanent security presence for foreign militias along the southern border of Syria. If this presence is established, it will lead to more conflicts with Israel and can, probably, extend to Lebanon. So, in order to avoid these serious consequences, the US should take the initiative and ensure that the post- state period in Syria will not contribute in destabilizing the region. This, undoubtedly, requires strong diplomatic efforts with Israel, Jordan, Russia, and Turkey to ensure that Iranian- backed groups will not use the Syrian battle ground as a base for military operations against any neighboring country. Thus, the main preoccupations of the US in Syria are clear: to provide a basis for a more coherent and effective strategy towards Iran (Borghard, 2015, p. 3).

In fact, the US policy towards Iran can be negative, as the US should encourage compromise solutions. It should also be recognized that Iran has a vital role to play in the region, because of its strong relations with Syria and Iraq, which cannot be overlooked. The legitimate activities of Iran in the areas of trade, diplomacy, and business investment should; therefore, be respected, while its covert operations and attempts to destabilize neighboring states should

be vigorously resisted. On the other hand, the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement may increase the severity of Iran's position towards any compromise, as well as the fact that it does not help in the face of its activities that pose a threat in the region (Assoudeh, 2017, p. 2).

The idea that Iran will in one way or another prove that it will be able to focus peace and stability in the region is false. In other words, the US strategy and its regional allies should be based on Iran, and not on a hard-liner approach. However, the US should pursue the most important interests of its deterrence policy of keeping Iran without nuclear weapons, and preventing its proxies from gaining on the Syrian border along with confronting Tehran's aggression in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the US needs a strong diplomatic strategy backed by military power, together with its commitment to the agreements it has already concluded (Depetris, 2017, pp. 2- 3).

3.1.1. Iran's expansionism:

As for Iranian objectives and intentions in both the Middle East and the Gulf Region, Iran has already confirmed its military, political and security actions against the Arab countries in general. Accordingly, a number of Iranian officials expressed the Persian expansionist ambitions. In this context, Ayunis, the councilor of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated explicitly that "the entire Middle East is part of Iran..." (Barfi, 2015, p. 3).

This statement corresponds to earlier one that was stated by Ayatollah Al Khomeini shortly after the success of Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) when he stated, in a speech directed to the Gulf countries, that they should be ready to Persian rule from now on. So, after the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the true leadership of Imam Al Khomeini, Iran became the home of Islam. i. e. It became the new Umm Al- Qura. It has the duty to lead the Muslim world. Therefore, the whole nation has the duty of its mandate (Al Alami, 2016, p. 18). In Febtuary, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani considered that many of Iran's neighbors were; in fact, "parts of the Iranian territory and were cut off from the motherland," including all Gulf countries and parts of Iraq, Turkey, Kurdistan, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Caucasus, and Central Asia. President Hassan Rouhani claimed so in a way to exaggerate Iran's national sentiment in an expansive tone when he delivered a public speech in Tehran on the day of celebrating 40 years after the success of the Islamic Revolution (Al Zahid, 2019, p. 1).

He stressed that "Greater Iran" promoted by the Persians nationalists, trying to gain their support for the religious regime which promoted through the slogan of the "Islamic International" for four decades. In this context, he claimed that "Our people know very well that 205 years ago, during the rule of the traitorous kings of Qajar, large parts of the northern Iranian territory and the Caucasus were separated", he further added that "191 years ago, they separated another part of the motherland, and 172 years had cut a large part of northwest Iran, too". i. e. the republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia that

gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s (Al Zahid, 2019, para. 2- 3).

It clear that from his speech that Iranian President Hassan Rohani did not differ much from extremist Persian nationalists who oppose the actual religious regime. This discourse revealed to the Iranian regime's supporters the expansionist strategy of Iran, based on the centrality of Iran, which is called Islamic Umm Al-Qura. In addition, extremist Persian nationalists, with Aryan tendency, who still promote 'Greater Iran' do not differ much with Hassan Rouhani, especially in their hatred towards the Arabs, and this tendency will continue to fuel conflicts with the neighboring countries (Al Zahid, 2019, para. 10).

Following the Islamic Revolution, Iran started building its military arsenal for expansionist objectives to export the Islamic Revolution to the neighboring countries and the Gulf region in order to set up true Islamic regimes to be loyal to Iran. In fact, Iran became the largest and most military powerful Shiite state; it succeeded to influence the Arab world in order to achieve Iran's objectives. In its strategy, which was built for 50 years earlier, Iran sought to control all Arab states within five stages of ten years each. According to the aforementioned strategy, the pillars of the Iranian strategy depended on (1) political authority, (2) science and knowledge, and (3) economy and wealth (Baer, 2018, p. 1).

Iran has planned to target these three pillars in the Arab countries through the strife between those parties, in addition to the movement of government through the customers, the movement of Scientifics and clerics

against their government, buying properties, establishing parties, spy cells and military militias. If Iran's moves and policies are dropped in the Arab region, it will be clear that the tools and methods of that strategy, which Tehran has divided into five stages, has been fully implemented in some Arab countries; such as, Iraq and Yemen; and partially in Syria and Lebanon. Although, Iran's strategy succeeded in these countries, it failed in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Sudan (Tarock, 1998, pp. 41- 2).

According to Robert Baer (2018), the difficulty of Iranian expansion in the direction of the East and the North West to a large extent seemed the only way open to Iran towards the Arab world. It has succeeded in setting up its first foothold in Iraq as a result of the great hostility between Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President, and Hafiz Al- Assad, the Syrian President. Syria has become an ally of Iran. In addition, the Syrian regime helped Iran to sponsor Hezbollah into a major political and military force which threatened the northern border of Israel. Moreover, two other major events contributed to the expansion of Iranian influence in the region: The end of the Iran- Iraqi War in 1989, which coincided with the end of the Lebanese war (1975- 1990). i. e. It ended shortly with Iraqi invasion of Kuwait which weakened the Iraqi government and overthrown Saddam Hussein by the US in 2003. Consequently, Iraq had fallen under total Iranian influence (Bear, 2009, p. 3).

Furthermore, Iran found in the Arab Spring uprisings a chance to expand further. What happened in Bahrain was one of its aspirations for hegemony. As a part of its expansionist ambitions to the Arabian Peninsula which consider its

competitors to use the uprising in Bahrain for its own benefits before Saudi Arabia suppresses popular movement and undermines Iran's ambitions to gain influence in the small kingdom. After the Houthis took control of Yemen in 2014, Iran quickly implemented the Anaconda Plan with the aim of besieging Saudi Arabia and isolating it completely from its surrounding by moving northward towards Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and then eastward towards the Gulf region to the Arabian Sea (Bear, 2009, pp. 4- 5).

After, the Iranian Anaconda plan failed, Iran with all its weights has sought to fight against terrorism to maintain its military presence in the Arab region. The border areas between Syria, Iraq and Lebanon have recently witnessed a fierce struggle to control these areas from the Iraqi city of Al Qaim through Deir al-Zour to the areas of Jorud Arsal and Baalbek in Lebanon (Tarock, 1998, pp. 43-4).

Iran is trying hard through its militias to open a land way extending from Iran through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to the Mediterranean as part of the corridor plan drawn up by Tehran to achieve its expansionist objectives in the Arab region; where Iran was able to dominate some Arab countries and the large incursion in some others due to several factors the most important of which is the duplication of the international community in dealing with the crises in the region and the absence of an Arab project to face the challenges and risks that plague the region. Since no party can reach its goals in most wars and battles expect through comprehensive knowledge of the adversary and its weaknesses

no one has been able to approach Iran's deadly vulnerabilities (Tarock, 1998, pp. 49- 50).

3.1.2. Conducting proxy warfare in the region:

The world has not experienced a conventional war between two or more countries since the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, the Middle East has known several other types of warfare, including proxy wars, where a state relies on an arm, or arms to carry out, or threaten armed operations in another country or countries. Iran has used this type of war regularly, having invested in local groups in some Arab countries (Mumford, 2013, pp. 40- 2).

Proxy wars are a type of conflict characterized by an internal conflict at its core while many camps or actors overlap, as a part of a competition between forces, or external actors. Although proxy wars have been waged throughout history, identifying them is one of the facts that reveals the nature of the world and the reality of the geopolitical situation of the proxy war zone. (Wyss, 2016, p. 10).

In fact, most of the armed conflicts involve both internal and external actors. While external actors usually have a series of interests, including economic, energy and geostrategic within the territory of the conflict at pro-active stage, external actors choose to ally themselves with an internal actor that is appropriate and serves the interests they have identified on the ground of conflict. These aspects of the nature of proxy wars are some of the dynamics

of competition and confrontation between two local, or global actors at least (Wyss, 2016, p. 11).

In proxy wars, military strategies are attractive to countries that try to avoid the high human and economic costs of direct participation in armed conflict. In this context, Fawaz Gerges (2013) believed that it is difficult to envisage a large-scale conflict between the US and Russia, or between Saudi Arabia and Iran. So, no one can ignore the rivalry between these historic adversaries; moreover, each of these countries considers it more comfortable and practical to take this competition away from their borders, where they will be able to reduce direct military intervention through the support and alliance of local factors, by transforming the conflict into a different field from their main geographical area (p. 2).

Moreover, Daniel W. Drezner (2018) claimed that Syrian nightmare destroyed the positive change of Arab uprisings. The Arab Spring's promise has given way to violence in Syria, the focus on international intervention and most importantly the proxy war strategy. Accordingly, Drezner suspected that proxy warfare is likely Syria-specific and the situation was more complicated when the civil war turned into a proxy war led by the world's most powerful countries of Iran, Russia, Turkey, and the US (p. 3).

In general, proxy war is not a conventional war, although this type of war usually engages armed forces in the war; such as, Assad's army in Syria supported by Russian air troops. However, non-typical actors can be found to

be involved in this war, this aspect once again demonstrates the complexity of these conflicts (Wyss, 2016, p. 12).

Jan K. Gleiman (2014), as cited in Oakford and Salisbury, stated the Obama doctrine' when he believed that "we have to insist that all parties recognize a common humanity and that nations end proxy wars that fuel disorder" (p. 3). So, global trends indicate that future conflicts will be characterized by rebels and militias. These groups increasingly appear and rise to fill the security gaps of failed states. He also claimed that it is clear that Russia and Iran regard proxy wars as part of their military strategies. It is; therefore, necessary for strategists to understand non-conventional warfare and how to confront it because this war works, and enemies will be happy to use it against the other side (Oakford and Salisbury, 2016, p. 4).

In the case of the Syrian conflict, Daniel Bayman (2018) believed that the war was the bloodiest in the region, and much of the blame could be channeled to Syria's neighbors and the major powers which swept into the conflict: France, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, UK, and the US. Using the Syrian battlefield, these countries bombed their enemies and provided money, weapons, and training to either governmental troops, or rebel groups. In addition, they provided safety for combatants and pressed for its preferred issue in international forums; such as, the United Nations, and used their authority to help a local group acting as its proxy (Bayman, 2018, pp. 1- 3).

The Syrian conflict is not exceptional. In fact, all major wars that are taking place today in many parts of the world are, in essence, proxy wars. In Ukraine, Russia supported rebel groups that officially announced the inclusion of the two republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. In Libya, Russia, Saudi Arabia and UAE support local militias led by Khalifa Haftar who seeks to take control of the country, the US formally recognizes the rival government in Tripoli. However, it works on a daily basis with militias to fight ISIS troops (Bayman, 2018, p. 3).

Yemen has suffered from the conflict, as Barak Barfi asserted (2015). Since 9/11, the presence of Al- Qaeda has raised concerns among policy-makers in the US administration. Saudi Arabia and UAE support mixed military units of the former regime, Southern separatists, and tribal groups against Iranian- backed Houthis forces. Accordingly, Yemen became the center of the war of the Saudi- Iranian proxy war that swept the region. Moreover, Yemen is a battle ground that the Saudis cannot lose unless the Saudis conjure up a heretofore absent genie the Iranian juggernaut will likely prevail (p. 2).

According to Daniel Byman (2018), despite all its advantages, proxy wars have lot of risks, despite inconsistency power. Agents always act according to their own interests and motives (Bayman, 2018, p. 3). In this context, Pfaff and Granfield (2018) believed that the risk of proxy wars comes from diffusion, where the US supplied weapons to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. This; of course, helped in getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan. However, they ended up with the rise of terrorist groups in Bosnia, Irak, Kashmir, Tunisia, and Palestine (Pfaff and Granfield, 2018, pp. 2- 3).

Sabera Azizi (2017) claimed that in Afghanistan, Pakistan has always supported the Taliban which has also received support from Iran and Russia from time to time. In fact, Pakistan has great interests in supporting the Taliban; for the Taliban took control of most of the country's wealth. Moreover, all Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan can only be achieved through support and sponsorship of the Taliban (pp. 1- 2).

The use of proxy wars is amongst the tools used in the US foreign policy. Despite their differences in foreign policy, Donald Trump and Barack Obama, US Presidents, have not made large-scale deployment of US troops, although their promises to fight global terrorism (Bayman, 2018, p. 1).

All in all, a proxy war is not an exotic phenomenon in the 21st century. Nowadays, it is likely to imagine a large- scale conflict between world powers; thus, in order to understand the nature of a proxy war, it is necessary to analyze the current international situation and the future of the world which is full of several actors with conflicting interests everywhere (Wyss, 2016, pp. 7-9).

3.1.3. Iran's cyber arsenal:

In his work, Mark Thompson (2016) explained that the first nation war took place between soldiers on the ground, and then ships in to the sea. However, in the 20th century, battles moved to the sky. For more than 10 years, war tactics have become more effective and less human engagement. They become electronic wars, or cyber wars because of their effectiveness are measured on the extent of harm to the enemies, in addition to the ability of the infiltrator not

to detect them and to benefit from their presence within enemy systems and networks as soon as possible (Thompson, 2016, p. 1).

Elif Selin Calik (2019) believed that while international public opinion and major powers were preoccupied with Iran's nuclear crisis and its missile arsenal, Iran has been secretly developing its cyber-military capabilities at an accelerated pass to launch attacks against its enemies to become one of the most influential countries in the field of electronic warfare. As a result, Iran developed its capabilities of striking long- term targets in the systems of Western countries and destroy them (p. 1).

It is worth to mention that Tehran has developed a number of internal bodies to enhance its electronic capabilities, both offensive and defensive ones, which placed Iran within the strongest electronical four countries in the world after Russia, the US, and China (Calik, 2019, p. 1).

Iran has been characterized by the fact that most of the countries in the region are self- reliant on several technologies and developments, including electronic and technical warfare. Iran is classified as having the largest electronic army in the world since President Hassan Rohani has been elected. Accordingly, Iran has invested more than 75 million riyals to create a strong electronic army in competition with the security forces in Russia and China. Young people have been trained by Iranian and Russian experts on security methods, techniques, and penetration. Moreover, Iranian officials have been trained on the latest computer technologies and electronic warfare, in addition to supporting the most important universities in Iran with specific disciplines in

electronic warfare, network security, site security and security programming languages, as well as permanent competitions and challenges. Thus, Iran has now become a strong government with the largest electronic army which is characterized by its strength, size, and electronic efficiency (Karizianis, 2018, p. 3).

In addition, there are three most important professional teams supported indirectly by the government: (1) the Hackers Iranian Security Team, (2) the Electronic Security Hackers, and (3) the Hackers Babylon Security Team. Each of them has many agents who are eager to protect Iran's interests everywhere (Thompson, 2016, p. 4).

Although Iran's expansionist policies have attracted the attention of a large number of media, political analysts, and researchers, Iran's electronic program and its indirect effects on global security and other international interests had smaller aspect of this attention. This electronic warfare program, which began in 2012, is managed by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace which was ordered by supreme leader Ali Khamenei. The council has become a cornerstone of the Revolutionary Guards and a tool of Iranian foreign policy (Jones, 2018, pp. 2- 3).

Iran has been developing its electronic capabilities since the establishment of the aforementioned council. Taking advantage of these advances in technological breakthroughs and improving citizen's lives, the Iranian regime used several programs to launch cyber-attacks and carry out cyber-espionage operations in an attempt to damage both the financial security

and political infrastructure of its enemies. Most of the members of the Iranian electronic army have experience in all operating systems; such as, Mac, Windows, Cisco, iPhone and Android as well as high level programming and penetration (Calik, 2019, p. 5).

Taking into account the unprecedented escalation of Iranian capacities in electronic warfare, they have emerged in the intensive attacks launched by Iran on the space of enemies and opponents of electronic and neighboring countries. In 2012, Iran's electronic army attacked the Saudi Arabian- American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Also, Iran has launched several cyber- attacks on the US targets, most notably the attack on the US Marine Corps in 2012. Other cyber-attacks caused internal network breakdown, and disrupted computer systems in US banks (Calik, 2019, p. 1). In 2013, Iran's cyber- attacks hurt US infrastructure and energy companies- gas, oil and power lines, as well as attacks on US postal offices, accounts and contact sites in November 2015. The Iranian regime has tried to infiltrate the US infrastructure over the internet and cause great harm to Americans (Starks, 2019, p. 2).

Electronic attacks are less expensive that engage in direct military confrontation with their adversaries, especially when their military capabilities are less than their enemies from the Iranian policy- makers point of view; so, the alternative to actual warfare is the virtualization that offers the advantage of anonymity as it is very difficult to be held accountable (Starks, 2019, p. 2).

Iran has found in privacy and electronic war a new way to harm its enemies without the use of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, or military troops. Iran's electronic capacities are growing at a rapid pace and need to be addressed by regional and international power. It will not hesitate to use electronic war to attack and harm the US (Starks, 2019, p. 2).

3.1.4. Nuclear/ Ballistic missile proliferation:

Despite the international community's efforts to combat nuclear proliferation, the glamour of the nuclear bomb has not yet been decided. Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine were attacked following the abandonment of their nuclear arsenals, where these countries concluded that nuclear weapons are the best way to fortify the regime and protect the country from any foreign threat. Nuclear proliferation is not limited to nuclear weapons; however, it includes short and long- range (Davis and Martini, 2011, p. 7).

The military strategies, arms, and defense plans in the Middle East have undergone drastic changes since Tel Aviv, the capital of Israel, was bombarded by Iraqi missiles during the Gulf War (1991). Ballistic missiles have been able to impose new equations on the Arab-Israeli conflict so that geographical zones no longer play a large role. Therefore, countries with nuclear ambitions; such as, Iran have sought to move from short- term (SRBM), to medium range (MMPM), above medium range (IBM), and long range, intercontinental (ICBM), or sub marine ballistic missile (SLBM) (Davis and Martini, 2011, p. 9).

Iran's nuclear program began with a plan to build 20 nuclear reactors two of them in Bushehr on the Arabian Gulf Coast. Although the nuclear non-proliferation treaty allows the peaceful transfer of nuclear technology to non-nuclear weapon states, the US has strongly opposed the Iranian- Russian agreement, and considered nuclear energy unnecessary in a country that has such as large oil reserves; for it threatens the deal and could be used a covert plan to transform Iran's most sensitive nuclear technology, and train Iranian nuclear specialists who could be used to support a nuclear weapons (Davis and Martini, 2011, pp. 12- 4).

In February 2003, Iranian policy- makers announced a new plan to develop a nuclear power unit using purely domestic sources. This development is especially important given to the direction of the secret sites. The US believed these sites could contribute to Iran developing a full nuclear fuel cycle that could enable it to build nuclear weapons without importing nuclear material from abroad (Hildreth, 2012, pp. 3-4).

On that basis, the US is trying to persuade the European Union to abandon its support for the Iranian nuclear deal of 2015 by using the threat of secondary US sanctions to pressure EU companies not to conduct business with Iran (Hildreth, 2012, p. 5). Consequently, the US President Donald Trump announced that the US would violate the Iran's nuclear agreement almost three years after the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) (Hildreth, 2012, pp. 6- 7).

As for the US side, it is worth to mention that despite the fact that Iran has acted as stipulated by the nuclear agreements, the Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has incited US President Donald Trump to withdraw from the nuclear deal with Iran. He strongly welcomed all economic sanctions proposed by the US President against Tehran. In this regard, Amos Harel, a military analyst in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, wrote that Netanyahu has been urging Trump since he has been elected as US President to take more aggressive measures against Iran in order to impose further concession on it in the nuclear program (Hildreth, 2012, pp. 8- 13).

While the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated that “I’m happy because the annoying object left the pyramidal”, he also added that “this is a psychological war, we don’t allow Trump to win... .” Moreover, Iran’s Parliament speaker said that “Trump only understands the language of force... .” Accordingly, Trump warned any country helping Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons, it will be severely punished; then, he signed on executive order imposing sanctions on any foreign company that continues to deal with Iran (Hildreth, 2012, p. 14).

According to Steven A. Hildreth (2012), a specialist in missile defense, Iran through its allies and lobbyists had skillfully persuaded the Obama administration to separate the nuclear issue from other issues; such as, Iran’s ballistic missile development where republican Presidential candidates announced to reveal Barack Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran if they were elected to the White House. However, they have so far had little power to stop this

agreement. Now, it is clear why Iran insists that the nuclear deal is not negotiable, as Iran seeks to build long- range missile. This; in fact, is threatening the West, and could endanger the security of UK, according David Cameron, the ex- Prime Minister (p. 12).

On previous information and other reports from research institutes interested in the field of weapons of mass destruction, Iran's nuclear capabilities can be summarized as follows:

- There is a huge nuclear development program to create power reactors for civilian power generation with a Russian aide.
- American and Israeli officials believe Iran is seeking to acquire the possibility of building nuclear weapons. (Hildreth, 2012, p. 12).

The development of Iran's missile program at the end of the decade after the nuclear deal when Iran is freed from it, it will boost its current range of 3.000 km to much more, since the nuclear deal allowed Iran to carry out nuclear research on its territory it would have a bomb because it possesses the necessary technology and also is ready to launch missile system (Hildreth, 2012, p. 12).

Iran has already the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East; the Islamic Republic has developed the only capacities in the region to launch satellites alongside Israel. The Iranian missile program is relatively advanced and in progress. It includes engineers and skilled technicians working under the air and space industry organization of Iran's politically powerful ministry of

defense; Iran with its degraded air force and symbolic water capabilities relies heavily on ballistic missiles for its long-range strike capability (Davis and Marrini, 2011, p. 29).

It is unlikely that military and missile defense activities will be accepted, especially missile defense which is available only to countries that can develop missile defense capacities on their own, or use another country's capabilities and systems. However, if missile defense is a way to counter the proliferation of missiles, it will unlikely to authorize deployments. On the contrary, all indications suggest that missile defense would result in more vertical proliferation of missiles or countries try to refute these systems with huge numbers of missiles or other counter measures (Hildreth, 2012, p. 8).

3.1.5. Iran's special ties with regional competitors of China, Russia, and Turkey:

The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 was the first successful Islamic Revolution in modern times: It was an event that has had the greatest impact on its foreign policy because of the radical change within Iran and its vision of the outside world: the Islamic Revolution sought to change the map of allies and adversaries in both international and regional levels. In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraqi War, Iran's foreign policy has helped to achieve economic goals in an attempt to develop trade and foreign investment that Iran desperately needed to rebuild what the war had destroyed (Efegil and Stone, 2001, pp. 353- 4).

In retrospective, relations between China and Iran were greatly enhanced after the 1979 Islamic revolution, despite the isolation of the Islamic Republic on the international scene after the US embassy hostage crisis and in the Iran- Iraqi War (1980- 8). China was an important source of arms for Iran during the said war (Harold and Nader, 2012, pp. 3- 4).

At a time when the US and Europe began waving sanctions against Tehran, in an attempt to halt its nuclear program, China maintained its economic ties and vital trade exchanges with it, allowing the Iranians to obtain goods that other countries refused to sell (Harold and Nader, 2012, p. 7).

In March 2017, China and Iran signed their first commercial deal to redesign and renovate the Arak- Heavy water production plant in Tehran. It was an important step towards developing the reactor to benefit from power generation, while Washington was increasing its pressure on the Islamic Republic even after Trump pulled out of the nuclear deal signed in 2015. China was among the first countries to declare its support for the Iranians. At the time when the US administration intensified its calls for boycotting Iran, the volume of Iranian exports to China reached 17 billion dollars during the first months of 2017 up 28.8 per cent from the corresponding period in 2016 (Esfondiary, 2015, p. 3).

Thus, the relations between the two countries are mutually beneficial and not one-sided as some would expect. While Iran has broken its isolation and sold its oil, China has obtained a plentiful supply of energy and market where its products are sold without rival which has long been a concern for China over

the past years as global oil markets fluctuate and its expansion strategy was maintained (Esfondiary, 2015, p. 4).

Indeed, despite the cooperation between Iran and China in the fields of energy, trade, and geopolitical interests, they have divergent interests on a number of issues which may limit the scope of their future cooperation. Although China and Iran appear united in their opposition to US hegemony, their unilateral interests are sharply different from the US. China relies on the US for economic growth, while Iran is completely separate from the US economy and faces severe international sanctions posed by the US (Bliler, 2015, p. 2).

Economic relations between China and Iran have also caused some violent reactions to the relationship and dissatisfaction among some Iranians. There seems to be growing number of Iranians who believe that Iran's economic relations with China are largely due to China's purchase of Iranian oil, gas, and raw materials as it plunges into the Iranian market with cheap and low- quality goods manufactured in China at the expense of economic development in Iran (Bliler, 2015, p. 2).

The Iranian- Chinese partnership are as stronger as Iran's relationship with Russia. However, it is not partnership based on distinctive cultural, religious, or ideological harmony; so, it is strongly influenced by international and domestic factors of Iran and China; for these changes in the two countries and their relations with the US will change the nature of the Chinese- Iranian relationship, and advance the policies of the US as a strong point of influence (Katz, 2010, pp. 3- 4).

In this context, Katz (2010) believed that relations with Russia are of particular importance to Iran for the following reasons:

- ✚ Firstly, Russia has represented at least for the last decade an international backbone for Iran if it has not escalated the international pressure imposed on it to the extent that it could not have absorbed it;
- ✚ Secondly, Moscow helped Iran maintain its interests in many regions and countries in the region, especially in Syria when it increased its military involvement in the Syrian conflict in September 2015 to the extent that it changed the balance of power in favor of the Syrian regime, and prevented within the Security Council against the abuses committed by the regime. With the help of Iran and the sectarian militias, it has created and trained using Russia's veto power many times;
- ✚ Thirdly, the expansion of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in many areas, particularly military and technological, where Russia supports Iran's plans to develop some of its nuclear facilities in the Bushehr area. Iran received the first batch of the new system on April 2016; however, many trends within Tehran remain skeptical about the possibility of relying heavily on Russia as an international power that can strengthen Iran's position in the face of international pressure, especially after the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and the re- imposition of US sanctions in two stages on August 7 and November 5, 2018. (p. 3).

Despite the fact that Iran has always shown doubts in the Russian ally, but this has not prevented it from developing its relations with Russia in various fields. This is partly because in the past Iran has been trying to secure the Russian could be called a veto in the security council to strengthen its efforts to continue and expand its regional role in the region. Through its Russian veto, Iran has sought to ensure that its regional intervention continue not only in crisis countries, but also within some neighboring countries without risking an international stand against it, or US sanctions which aimed at curbing its regional ambitions. It is also keen to cooperate specifically to expand the use of Russian expertise and capabilities in the construction of new nuclear facilities in Iran (Heistain and Sahpir, 2016, p. 4).

Russia declared that it will not only reject the sanctions imposed by the US on Iran, but also help Iran to counter these sanctions by supporting its efforts to continue exporting oil which Iran relies heavily on as one of the most important sources of national income. Although Iran has shown special interest in developing its relations with Russia in various field especially military, political and technological, it does not deny that the former still adopts a cautious policy mostly with regard to the extent to which it can rely on Russia as a strategic ally to strengthen its position in the face of US pressures and sanctions (Heistain and Sahpir, 2016, p. 5).

Relations between Iran and Russia are likely to face several strategic benefits in 2019 which may have a significant impact on their potential tracks chiefly as tensions between Iran and Western countries escalate over the

nuclear deal and the prospect of finding solutions to the political process in the Syria crisis (Katz, 2010, pp. 5- 6).

As for Turkey, Iranian- Turkish cooperation has increased significantly in the last decade. Turkey's need for Iran's abundant energy of oil and natural gas has been an important motive for Turkish- Iranian cooperation because Iran is the second largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey after Russia. Also, Iran is also an important exporter of crude oil; however, the degree of cooperation between the two countries should not be overstated. Historically, both of Turkey and Iran have been competing rather than being close partners. While they may share some economic and security interests, their interests contradict many from all over the Middle East. The two countries have different political identities as well as radically different ideologies (Kibar Oglu and Caglar, 2018, pp. 60- 1).

Relations have been strained by a number of issues: The most important factor contributing to the growing tension in relations was Turkey's support for the Syrian opposition against Syrian President Bashar Al- Assad. Syria is Iran's sole ally in the Middle East; therefore, the fall of Assad would be a serious strategic blow to Iran, and could lead to increase influence of Turkey. Iraq has also become a field of growing competition between the two countries. The withdrawal of US troops from Iraq has led to a power vacuum that Iran has tried to fill. The sectarian conflict between Shiites and Sunnis has made Turkey and Iran at odds in the Iraqi conflict. The Palestinian issue comes as another level of competition between Turkey and Iran. Iran sees its opposition to Israel as

boosting its popularity in the Arab world but the firm support of Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for the Palestinians has robbed the rug from under Iran's feet, and has been an important factor contributing to the deterioration of Ankara's relations with Israel (Krisci and Keane, 2014, p. 1).

Turkey's main fear is that Iran may acquire nuclear weapons which could lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. This, in turn, could increase pressure on the Turkish government to consider developing its own nuclear weapons. Given the fact that its dependence on Iranian energy especially natural gas, Turkey has a strong interest in preventing the deterioration of relations with Iran significantly. Ankara will seek to maintain some flexibility on its policy toward Iran and may be reluctant to support some states initiatives the United States for Iran if it considers it to be in conflict with broader Turkish national interests (Kibar Oglu and Caglar, 2018, pp. 60- 1).

In the face of strengthening the Turkish- Israeli relationships in light of US sanctions, the Iranian government has moved closer to the Arab countries in an attempt to pressure the axis of Ankara-Tel Aviv which is from the point of view of Iran, an axis to change the political arena and security in the Middle East, especially since Iran's many attempts to strengthen relations with Turkey did not have the desired results (Kibar Oglu and Caglar, 2018, pp. 69- 70).

3.2. The Jewish lobby's strategy in US foreign policy towards Iran:

According to Mearsheimer and Walt (2006), the US formulated its foreign policy on the basis of its national interests. The remarkable factor is that the

strategic relationship between Israel and the US has been the cornerstone of US policy toward the Middle East through which the Jewish lobby was able to direct US foreign policy for the purpose of protecting their interests, while the US policy-makers were convinced that both the US and Israel share essentially the same interests (pp. 111- 2).

The Israeli political and military elite have been threatened for three decades by the Iranian danger, particularly Iran's nuclear program. It is worth to mention that that Barak Obama, ex- US President, had openly declared that he was ready to use force against Iran to defend US interests if necessary. Accordingly, this elite agree sharply on the Iranian nuclear issue and the relentless attempt to involve the US and the West in a war that depends on Iran's progress and possession of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Obama expressed to AIPAC by stating that he would not use the policy of containment in relation to Iran's nuclear- armed program. In contrast, he stated that his measures included (1) Dragged the US to fight a war against Iran, (2) Sabotage of the Iranian nuclear program, and (3) Pressure on the US and the West to impose economic sanctions (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, p. 112).

For many years, Israel has been trying to drop the US into a war against Iran that takes on the character of international war. In this context, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister, stated that "it is the interest of the US to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon ... in which the Israeli strategy is firm, but ... faces a categorical rejection of the Obama administration which does

not want to wage a war against Tehran whose results and extensions are not known” (Cornwell, 2015, p. 2).

On the other hand, Obama’s stated that “I will not hesitate to use force when it is necessary... .” However, Benjamin Netanyahu wanted Obama to use force if Iran would go beyond the red lines agreed to develop its nuclear program. Within the US rejection, the Obama administration drew some red lines for Israel in some issues related to Israeli military action against Iran (Cornwell, 2015, p. 3).

The Israeli lobby which has become insulting and unacceptable is reflecting in Obama’s abstention from congress decision to lighten sanctions on Tehran under the pressure of the Jewish lobby. In fact, the Jewish lobby considers any Muslim country in the Middle East which possesses nuclear weapons is a real threat to Israel. However, Iran seems to be determined to acquire a nuclear arsenal. As a result, the Jewish lobby stepped up pressure on the US administration which boosts everything in its arsenal of strategies, and tricks are currently being warned of the imminent dangers that occur in the world if Iran has nuclear weapons (Shakoori & Heiderpour, 2016, p. 132).

The Jewish lobby did not have a great influence towards the US foreign policy towards Iran because of the fact that the US has its own reasons to prevent Iran from acquire nuclear weapons. Although Iran’s nuclear ambitions do not represent a major threat to the US if Washington, there is no doubt that it cannot co-habit with a nuclear Iran. For this reason, the Jewish lobby


maintained a continuous momentum of pressure on US policy- makers to confront Iran (Shakoori & Heiderpour, 2016, p. 133).

Indeed, Iran and the US would not have been allies if the Jewish lobby had not existed, but without the said lobby, the US foreign policy would have been more moderate, and pre-emptive war would not be a serious choice for the US (Shakoori & Heiderpour, 2016, p. 134).

3.2.1. Composing a neo-liberal conservative staff in the Trump administration:

The National Security Strategy of the Trump administration advocated for a strategy of “principled realism” — it is realistic because it acknowledges the central role of power in international politics and that “the American way of life cannot be imposed upon others, nor is it the inevitable culmination of progress. It is principled because” (The White House, 2017, para. 4).

The strategy is animated by four principles

 **Sovereignty:** the preservation of American freedom of action and the unwillingness to cede control of decisions to multilateral organizations. This view has deep roots in American conservative thinking, including skepticism of the United Nations. Instead, Donald Trump is wary of any separation of policy decisions from democratically elected leaders. His criticism of the European Union is rooted in a view that it diminishes popular democracy by undercutting the sovereignty of its member states. He is willing to

work through such organizations, but his north star is whether these organizations produce actions consistent with U.S. interests and values (Schadlow, 2018, para. 2).

✚ **The need to respond to a world defined by competition:**

Trump's National Security Strategy put competition front and center. Trump came into office suspicious of what one observer has referred to as "the unrestrained optimism of the era of globalization in the 1990s" (Kaplan, 2018, p. 6). He called out the competitions that were unfolding across political, economic, and military spheres, all accelerated by advances in technology. Trump sees the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be (Smith, 2018, p. 1).

✚ **The emphasis on catalyzing change:**

Trump, conscious of the costs of ambitious policies, is cognizant that the United States cannot and should not bear undue burdens. He believes America's agency is limited. Also, even as the United States remains the world's sole superpower, it is not a hegemon capable of controlling all outcomes. He therefore believes that realism requires a new emphasis on catalyzing actions by others. (Schadlow, 2018, para. 5). In this respect, the Trump administration actively seeks cooperation, in security matters as well as trade, but demands reciprocity. The president has reached out to modernize America's alliances, even as he forcefully argues that these allies must meet their defense spending obligations.

✚ **An unabashed confidence in the US:** Trump believes in American exceptionalism. “America,” he has stated, “has been among the greatest forces for good in the history of the world.” He sees a restoration in American confidence at home— through, for example, a growing economy— as an essential foundation for an effective foreign policy. He knows that the free world cannot stand up to revisionist powers without the leadership of a confident America, though he does not believe this means the United States should be a policeman in all the world’s hotspots or should impose its values on others (“Trump’s UN Speech Transcript,” 2017).

These principles come together to support a strategy that focuses on geopolitical competitions in regions central to U.S. interests, particularly Europe, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere. Trump sees the global competition with revisionist powers as playing out in these regions. He places priority on these contests, even as he recognizes that the United States will continue to play a role in other regions as well (Schadlow, 2018, para. 6).

3.2.2. Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability:

Iran is a more serious strategic challenge for the U.S. and Israel, because there are three fundamental differences between Iran and the other countries.

✚ First, Iran is searching to master the full nuclear fuel cycle. This would give her the capability to build weapons. It is also developing

missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads against its neighbors including Israel. Iran will not be capable to lockout the American native land with nuclear missiles anytime soon, but not the same thing for weapons, any weapons it might be evolved there could be used against U.S forces established in the middle East, or against European countries (Mearsheimer, 2007, p. 292)

- ✚ Second, some of the Iranian leaders and the president Mah-Mouh Ahmadinejad at the first place have made deeply disturbing remarks questioning both the occurrence of the holocaust and Israel's right to exist (Schadlow, 2018, para. 3).

- ✚ Third, Iran considered as the most powerful Islamic state in the Persian Gulf and has the possibility to control that oil-rich areas. (Mearsheimer, 2007, p. 292)

Over the past fifteen years, Israel and the lobby have pushed the Unites States to follow a strategically unwise policy toward Iran. Specially, they were considered as the central forces for using military force to break down Iran's nuclear facilities (Mearsheimer, 2007, p. 294).

Unfortunately, behavior makes it harder, not easier at all to ban Iran from going nuclear. And this confrontational formula for dealing with Iran's nuclear program has vied with a second strategy, this the last asserts that it would be better for the U.S. if Iran didn't acquire nuclear weapons, because Iran would be contained and deterred. It also argues that the best way to stop Iran from

building nuclear weapons is to engage it diplomatically and attempt to normalize its relationship with the United States (Mearsheimer, 2007, p. 297).

3.2.3 Thwarting Iranian terrorism:

Iran's terrorist activities can be split into several primary categories. First, Iran actively seeks to undermine prospects for Israeli-Arab peace. Second, Iran sponsors terrorist groups of global reach, including funding, training, arming and providing safe haven to their members. Third, Iranian intelligence operatives are themselves engaged in terrorist activity on their own and in cooperation with terrorist groups, including surveillance of U.S. interests at home and abroad. This includes efforts to destabilize regimes not to Tehran's liking, particularly in the Middle East, as evidenced most recently by Iranian activity in Iraq (Levitt, 2005, p. 2).

The US accuses Iran of being a state sponsor of terrorism. In light of the US fight against international terrorism, this accusation is clearly problematic. The United States must decide whether it is ready to fight with Iran because it practically supports terrorism, or if it can accept that the supposed support of terrorism is just an instrument of Iranian policy to enhance its bargaining and negotiating position (Parsi and Rydqvist, 2011, p. 85).

In other words, if Iran is ready to give concessions, the United States might want to look at the relationship from a different perspective. In particular, the United States accuses Iran of providing support to Hezbollah, Hamas and al-Qaeda. Iran was first designated a state supporter of terrorism in 1984 and

has remained on the US State Department list since then.¹⁶¹ In 2006 the State Department declared Iran the most active state supporter of terrorism (Parsi and Rydqvist, 2011, p. 84).

3.2.4. Containing and rolling back Iranian hegemony in the region:

Iran's growing power is not good for the United States, which has long sought to prevent anyone from establishing a hegemony in the Persian Gulf.

The US also has strong incentives to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Israel is equally averse to seeing Iran dominate the Gulf, because a regional powerhouse of that sort could be a long-term strategic threat. The prospect of a nuclear Iran is even more worrisome for Israeli leaders, but Israel is not the only Middle East country that is now worried about Iran. Many of Iran's Arab neighbors are also concerned about this nuclear ambition as well as its growing influence in the region, they fear that an especially powerful Iran might someday try to coerce them or even invade their country, they are also somewhat suspicious of Iran because it is Persian rather than an Arab country, and because they care about the balance of power within Islam between Shia and Sunnis (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2008, p. 281).

The US, Israel, and Iran's Arab neighbors, including many of America's Gulf allies, have an independent interest in keeping Iran non-nuclear and preventing it from becoming a regional hegemon. Unqualified support from the Arab world would make it easier for the U.S. to preserve the balance of power

in the Gulf, and obtaining that support requires an effective strategy (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2008, p. 282).

3.2.5. Utilizing economic sanctions and political pressure to deter Iran's malign nuclear-related and regional activities:

US sanctions policy against Iran over the past two decades has proved to be nothing more than a series of “regrettably short-sighted” policies, to use Madeleine Albright’s expression.

The freeze of 1979 and the subsequent Algiers Accord resulted in short-term gains for U.S. corporations. But as the sanctions expanded, many of these same corporations called foul and scrambled to renew ties with Iran. The dual-containment policy of the early 1980s and its associated sanctions went hand in hand with helping Saddam Hussein start a war with Iran, propping him up throughout the war, and ultimately fighting on his side (Parsi and Rydqvist, 2011, p. 64).

The result of this policy was massive human toll and suffering in Iran and Iraq, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, further loss of innocent Iraqi lives, and more than a decade of continued skirmishes between the United States and Saddam Hussein. Allowing the likes of AIPAC and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy to formulate sanctions made U.S. and Israeli policy toward Iran virtually indistinguishable (Parsi and Rydqvist, 2011, p. 65).

This policy backfired in a number of ways:

- ✚ First, if the aim of Israel and its U.S. allies was to wreck or at least weaken Iran's economy to the point that the Islamic regime would be overthrown, the aim failed miserably. Not only did the sanctions not cause the Iranian economy to collapse, but the effect of the sanctions on Iran's economy appear to be, notwithstanding the exaggerated claims of pro- and anti-sanction economists, marginal.
- ✚ Second, the Israeli-U.S. alliance seems to have actually strengthened the hand, and lengthened the life, of the most fanatical faction of the Islamic regime, which has used this alliance to justify its own existence.
- ✚ Last, by making Israeli demands a precondition for removing the sanctions, U.S. policy had become so severe that even the wrath of U.S. corporations and their frantic efforts could not reverse it.

As a result, at the end of the Clinton era, the United States had nothing but an inconsistent and incoherent policy toward Iran that tried to reconcile the irreconcilable aims of Israel and corporate America. While the effect of the change from the Clinton to George W. Bush administrations on U.S. economic sanctions policy against Iran is beyond the limited scope of this article, it appears that the initial euphoria of U.S. corporations for a rapid alteration in policy was quite premature.

The new administration, even though top-heavy with former oil executives, could not withstand the organized forces of the Israeli lobby in the U.S. Congress and within the administration itself. On 3 August 2001, President Bush signed a bill submitted by Congress that renewed ILSA for the next five years. Subsequently, the events of 11 September 2001 created a favorable atmosphere to start a courtship dance between certain factions in the new administration and the Iranian government. The dance, however, came to an end as the entrenched forces consolidated and called a halt to any rapprochement between the United States and Iran.

3.2.6. Pushing the U.S. administration to withdraw from the nuclear deal:

The nuclear deal is The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was a two-year-long diplomatic initiative from Iran and a group of countries known as the P5+1 – the members of the United Nations Security Council (the US, UK, France, China, Russia) along with Germany. It ensured that Tehran would abandon any attempts at creating a nuclear arsenal and ended 12 years of deadlock over the issue (Mckernan, 2019, para. 7).

The US and the European Union have often differed over Middle East policies. The current dispute over Iran, however, which broke into the open with US President Donald Trump's May 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or nuclear deal with Iran, goes deeper and could have more far-reaching strategic implications for the trans-Atlantic

relationship than previous dis•agreements on how to deal with Tehran or other Middle East matters (Perthes, 2018, p. 1).

Mr Trump said that he believes the Iran nuclear agreement to be a bad deal long before he ran for office. Critics admit it is only a medium-term plan and it also does not address Iran’s non-nuclear weapons and missile programs (Perthes, 2018, p. 2).

The president’s foreign policy has so far been marked by a significant ratcheting of tensions with Iran, driven by his administration’s noted friendliness towards Israel, which opposes the deal, and the appointment of Iran hawks to prominent positions in his administration. The deal is also noted as former President Barack Obama’s greatest foreign policy achievement. In his first year in office Mr Trump has moved to dismantle several Obama-era laws and policies (Mckernan, 2019, para. 9).

3.2.7. Funding full security assistance to Israel and cooperative missile defense programs:

The US has long defined Israel’s survival and security as important to its national interests. Israel faces an unprecedented magnitude and variety of threats stemming from the growing instability and chaos gripping the Middle East. Accordingly, America provides Israel— the sole democracy in the Middle East— with annual security assistance to help it defend itself, by itself, against mounting threats across the region (Sharp, 2018, p. 10).

Congress and successive Administrations have demonstrated strong support for joint U.S.-Israeli.

Missile defense projects designed to thwart a diverse range of threats. The range spans from short range missiles and rockets fired by nonstate actors, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, to mid- and longer-range ballistic missiles in Syria's and Iran's arsenals. Congress provides regular U.S. funding for Israeli and U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs in defense authorization and appropriations bills. Israel and the United States each contribute financially to several weapons systems and engage in codevelopment, coproduction, and/or technology sharing in connection with them (Sharp, 2018, p. 11).

Conclusion:

As with U.S. policy toward the Palestinians, the tragic decision to invade Iraq, and the conformational approach to Syria. The Israel lobby's influence on American policy toward Iran has been harmful to national interest.

By opposing any détente between Iran and the United States, much less cooperation, the lobby has also strengthened Iran's security problems worse.

Iranian decision-making is affected by the relationship with the West in many respects but in the majority of cases conflict and contention is in focus. What frightens the Iranian leadership most is the possibility of a severe decline in public support for the regime. A regime security guarantee would be what the radicals might be looking for before they make any commitment to better relations.

General conclusion:

The present dissertation analyzed the role of the Jewish lobby in influencing the US foreign policy decision making towards Iran. The main point of the present paper that is shows the influence of the Jewish lobby in US foreign policy decision- making towards Iran. Also, it illustrates the support of the US to Israel. More importantly, it shed lights in the influence of the Israeli lobby on US politics, which is in fact purely external as special relationships based on mutual interests in foreign policy rooted in shared values.

Looking at the special relations established between the US and Israel, the present research addresses to the following questions:

- How powerful is the Israel lobby in the US?
- What are the roles and the mechanisms of the Jewish lobby in US foreign policy- making?
- What are the interests of the Jewish lobby in exerting influence in US foreign policy- making?
- How does the Jewish lobby intervene in US foreign policy- making towards Iran?

As a matter of fact, the Israeli lobby has been involved in acquiescence of US policies towards the strategic benefits and survival of Israel in a manner that undermines US national interest. This they have managed to fulfill through exhaustive multi-dimensional means of monetary, organizational and psychological persuasions.

Israel's tyranny of the US has dire consequences for world peace and war, the stability of the world economy and the future of democracy in the US. The issues raised by the despotism of Israel and the proxy lobby on US policy in the Middle East are too dangerous to be dealt with, because of fear of ostracism by pro- Israel, this is particularly the case for some American thinkers, among these thinkers is Noam Chomsky, Who criticized American Jewish lobbyists who use their resources to fund reelection campaigns and "practically send legislation to congressional offices". A statement that demonstrates the great influence Israel practices on the US decision making.

The goal of US Jewish lobby is not merely to pressure congress to seek financial aid in the US budget, limited tax exemptions or legislation to achieve specific economic or regional interests, but its goal is to ensure American support for Israel's hostile wars against Arab states.

The interests of the Jewish state override the interests of America in the Middle Eastern region and thus all policies of the United States towards Middle East are regulated by the Lobby in order to ensure maximal survival of the state of Israel and support towards this cause. In fact, the Israel Lobby is a more powerful model than the White House as far as the policies towards the Middle East are concerned.

The Israeli lobby has exerted influence of the United States towards Iran in order to singularly maneuver policies in the favor of the Jewish state, as has it done for other war afflicted Middle Eastern states.

AS the US- Iranian relations are in constant tensions as a result of the divergent policies used and executed by both countries especially in the Gulf and the Middle East, this; in fact, reflected the overall stability in both regions, and especially Israel. In addition, the Iranian nuclear issue reveals the nature of US-Iranian relations. The US concerns about its strategic interests in the energy- rich Gulf region and the security of Israel were threatened by Iranian nuclear activities; however, the military option is not the best solution for the US in the face of Iran's nuclear ambitions.

There were many threats posed by Iran on both the US and Israel in the Middle East and the gulf region. Iranian officials often used inflammatory language to describe various possible responses; firing a barrage of rockets into all over Israel, launching attacks on neighboring countries that support such an attack including the Gulf Arab States and Turkey. And other attacks on US bases in the region in Iraq and Afghanistan, kidnaping American citizens in the region, close the strait of Hormuz and launch attacks on US interests in the Middle East and the Gulf region.

The Israeli lobby sought to pressure the US to abort the nuclear weapons project, the bush administration responded to the lobby's pressure and continued its efforts to abort the Iranian nuclear program. As a result, the Zionist lobby stepped up its pressure on the US government, using all its strategies. The editorials and articles that warn of the imminent dangers that occur in the world if they possess nuclear weapons, and warn the international community and fear of the danger of the *terrorist* regime. So, the Israel lobby was behind

every decision making, especially several sanctions, of the US foreign policy towards Iran.

The Limitations of the Study:

During the conduct of this research, the lack of written sources and access to internet sites make it somehow difficult to get the full image about the topic processed. Such topic requires a very intensive reading of at least seven books from different parts to get a clearer view about the different features' techniques used to depict this relation, but time went too fast.

Our treatment to this large topic was restricted into studying the influence of the Jewish lobby had on US foreign policy as far as the latter US relations with Iran in concerned. Thus, more attempts should be done in order to reveal other facts about the realities of the US and Israeli strong and deeply rooted relationship.

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Resumé:

Cette étude vise à souligner l'importance du rôle du lobby israélien dans la prise de décision en matière de politique étrangère des États-Unis à l'égard de l'Iran, en se référant plus particulièrement aux études de cas de la guerre en Iran. Les différents types de groupes de lobbyistes juifs et la manière dont ils exercent une influence sur la Maison Blanche et les présidents en particulier ont également été abordés afin d'enquêter sur les raisons de l'influence massive du lobby juif dans le processus de décision des États-Unis en matière de politique étrangère. Cette étude établit l'importance des intérêts juifs dans la politique des États-Unis envers l'Iran et les guerres internationalistes libérales que les États-Unis ont menées au Moyen-Orient. La conviction que les intérêts américains dans une alliance israélienne englobent le fait que le gouvernement israélien joue le rôle de chien de garde du Proche-Orient pour les États-Unis a également été boudée et le fait que la politique américaine au Moyen-Orient est singulièrement gouvernée par les intérêts d'Israël et non par les intérêts de l'État. L'Amérique a été établie.

Mots clés: lobby juif, États-Unis, Iran, politique étrangère, processus décisionnel, Israël, Moyen-Orient.

الملخص:

تهدف هذه الدراسة الى تسليط الضوء على أهمية دور اللوبي الإسرائيلي في اتخاذ القرارات المتعلقة بالسياسة الخارجية الأمريكية تجاه إيران ، مع الإشارة بشكل خاص إلى دراسات الحالة الخاصة بحرب إيران. تمت مناقشة الأنواع المختلفة من جماعات الضغط اليهودية والطريقة التي تمارس بها نفوذها على البيت الأبيض والرؤساء على وجه الخصوص من أجل التحقيق في الأسباب الكامنة وراء التأثير الهائل للوبي اليهودي في صنع القرار في السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة. تحدد هذه الدراسة أهمية المصالح اليهودية في سياسات الولايات المتحدة تجاه إيران والحروب الدولية الليبرالية التي أجرتها الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط. الاعتقاد بأن المصالح الأمريكية في تحالف إسرائيلي تشمل أن حكومة إسرائيل بمثابة حراسة شرق أوسطية للولايات المتحدة قد تم تجتئها وأن سياسات الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط تخضع بشكل فردي لمصالح إسرائيل وليس مصالح إسرائيل. تم تأسيس أمريكا.

الكلمات المفتاحية: اللوبي اليهودي، الولايات المتحدة، إيران، السياسة الخارجية، صناعة القرار،

إسرائيل، الشرق الأوسط.