

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
University Mohammed Boudiaf of M'sila
Faculty of Letters and Languages
Department of English



**The US invasion of Iraq (2003): An analysis of the political, economic,
and social impacts on Iraq**

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Master Degree in English
Literature and Civilization

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Academic Year

2019/ 2020

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
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Master Student's Research Achievement Report

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The US invasion of Iraq (2003): An analysis of the political, economic, and social impacts on Iraq

have already accomplished their research work and is of right to defend their work before a jury.

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BOUTKHIL Guemide
A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'B. Guemide', is written over a light blue background.

Dedications

To my parents,

To my brothers and my sisters,

To my two sisters- in- law for their greatest help, support,
and encouragement,

To my partner Imane,

To my friends, colleagues, and my classmates.

Djouabi Khirour

To my lovely parents,
To my best sister, Chems,
To my partner Khairour.

Bensalama Imane

Acknowledgements

We thank almighty Allah for providing us the volition and strength to accomplish this work.

Our special thanks and sincere gratitude go to our dear supervisor Mr. Boutkhil Guemide for his time, guidance, patience, and constructive criticism. We really appreciate his tremendous efforts. Our words cannot express our thanks to him.

We would like to thank the members the Jury for their precious time in reading and evaluating our work.

I would like to thank my teachers for their knowledgeable lectures and my classmates for the nice time that we spent together.

Declaration

We hereby declare that this dissertation is our own original work, which we have created ourselves.

All the literature we used is properly quoted and is listed in the References.

We declare that we worked on our final master's dissertation on our own using only cited literary sources, other information and sources in agreement with the disciplinary regulations for the Faculty of Letters and Languages at the University Mohammed Boudiaf of M'sila and with the regulations and laws of research of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in Algeria.

We agree with the storage of this work in the library of the Faculty of Letters and Languages at the University Mohammed Boudiaf of M'sila and making it accessible for study purposes.

Imane Bensaada

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Khairour Djouabi

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M'sila: 31/ 08/ 2020.

Abstract:

The present study represents the outcome of years of illegal war which was conducted by the United States, and the coalition forces, against Iraq in 2003. The invasion came as a reaction to 9/11 attacks which made the US change its policy in relation to the Global War on Terror. The Bush Doctrine advocated the spread of democracy and peace in the world.

Although Saddam Hussein was proved not to have direct links with Al Qaida and that Iraq did not possess Weapons of Mass Destruction that threaten US and global security, the US invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam's regime. Moreover, it caused Iraq to undergo political, economic, and social upheaval. Unfortunately, Iraqi policymakers failed to establish strong, independent government, as well as maintaining peace, security, and order in the country which had fallen apart because of increasing violence, ethnic divisions and cleansing, and sectarian conflicts. Moreover, the Iraqi governments were unable to improve the conditions of living for the Iraqi citizens.

The present research analyzes the main causes and consequences of the US Invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. Furthermore, it establishes a direct link between the impacts of the war and the major changes that started to occur in the Middle East after the US Invasion of Iraq, which is part of the US post-invasion strategy of remodeling of the Great Middle East. The latter is based on Constructive Chaos and Blood Borders' theories.

Key Words: The War on Iraq, US Invasion, Saddam Hussein, the Middle East.

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List of abbreviations:

US	United States
UN	United Nations
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
NPT	Non- Proliferation Treaty
IAAE	International Agency for Atomic Energy
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
CFLCC	Combined Forces Land Component Command
IMEF First Marine	Expeditionary Force
3ID	Third Infantry Division
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
4ID	Fourth Infantry Division
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
UK	United Kingdom
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
PNAC	Project for the New American Century
IGC	Iraq Governing Council
TAL	Transitional Administrative Law
INA	Iraqi National Accord
CFLCC	Coalition Forces Land Component Command
CJTF-7	Combined Joint Task Force-7
INFC	Iraqi National Foundation Congress

AQI	Al Qaeda in Iraq
JTJ	Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
USF	US forces
MSC	Mujahideen Shura Council
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
SFA	The Strategic Framework Agreement
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SA	Security Agreement
IS	Islamic State
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CBN	Cost of Basic Needs
IOCs	International oil companies
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
SBAH	State Board for Antiquities and Heritage
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds

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General introduction:

1. Background of the study:

The War on Terror was the crucial reason that led the United States (US) to engage in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, in retaliation to the attacks of 9/ 11. As the main rationale for a pre-emptive invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration cited the possibility of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi President, acquiring weapons of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; and thus posing a direct threat to the US. In addition, Saddam Hussein was suspected to have direct ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist organization founded by Osama bin Laden which carried the attacks of 9/ 11. As Iraq had been destroyed by the US invasion of 2003 politically, socially, and economically, it is clear; in fact, that there have been other hidden reasons for the US invasion of Iraq.

2. Statement of the problem:

The US invasion of Iraq was as a response to the attacks of 9/ 11 attacks that led US President George W. Bush to declare *War on Terror*, and to irradiate Al-Qaeda. The Bush administration claimed that Saddam Hussein supports Al-Qaida and that the US aimed to spread democracy and eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Iraq's liberation was not the reason for going to war. The official purpose of the invasion was to remove any threat posed by Iraq's presumed arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Regime change was a consequence, and although Iraq's citizens are freer now, they are by no means

more pro- American. However, the invasion caused serious consequences: increased violence, the rise of extremist groups, and instability in the country.

3. The literature review:

The invasion of Iraq 2003 was a crucial event which took place in Iraq that change the geopolitics of the Middle East. A decade after the onset of the war led by the coalition of the United States and the United Kingdom to invade Iraq, there had been a sizeable literature discussing the issue of the invasion of Iraq of 2003, focusing on both political and economic aspects. In addition, the core of the studies has largely investigated on the reasons of the war. The main concerns of a number of studies were petroleum supply from or across this vital region.

In this regard, Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. and Lawrence Davidson, in their book "A Concise History of Middle East", emphasized that the US main intention from invading Iraq was to control Iraq's oil, and that the US pressured the UN security council to pass a resolution calling for rejection of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in Iraq.

In his article "The American invasion of Iraq: causes and consequences", Raymond Hinnebusch viewed the US invasion of Iraq aimed at reshaping the Middle East, as well as the unconditional support for Israeli policy.

Youssif Bassil's article "The 2003 Iraq War: operations, causes and consequences. He illustrated the main reasons behind US invasion which were: (1) fighting terrorism, eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, and (3) liberating Iraqi people from the chain of dictatorship.

In his book "Iraq in Crisis", Anthony Cordesman's explained that the Iraqi situation after the withdrawal of the US troops caused a civil war, ethnic and sectarian divisions. i. e. Shi'ite, Sunni, and Kurds, government failure to restore stability, and threats of Al- Qaeda and other extremist groups.

Bob Woodward's book Plan of Attack 2004 purports to disclose how flawed intelligence service was misused by President G. W. Bush and his top aides, as well as the war council of his administration, through exercising disinformation and deception for the public opinion of Americans and the whole world, to take the nation to the war. Besides, he gives an authoritative narrative of behind the scenes and maneuvering over many years, researching and exploring the consequences and causes of the greatest controversial war in the world.¹⁰

Besides, James P. Pfiffner and Mark Pythia's Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives 2008 showed how both the US and the UK justified their intervention in Iraq by shedding a humanitarian cover of the war. Moreover, it explains the consequences of the 2003 Iraq war, as well as the very controversial decision to go to the war.

As seen above, the data provided in the literature examined different perspectives of the US Invasion of Iraq in 2003. Therefore, the present study has been made to examine the political, economic, and social consequences of the US Invasion of Iraq, and finds out the post invasion US strategy in Iraq.

4. Research questions and hypotheses:

The present research addresses to the following questions:

- ✚ What prompted the US to invade Iraq?
- ✚ What are the political, economic, and social, impacts of the US invasion of Iraq?
- ✚ What is the post invasion US strategy?

Based on the above mentioned research questions, it is hypothesized:

- ✚ The US invaded Iraq because the latter was a threat to the national security of the US as it possessed Weapons of Master Destruction;
- ✚ Iraq had links with Al- Qaeda;
- ✚ The US invaded Iraq to have control of its vital interests in the region;
- ✚ The US objectives were to make Israel more stronger in the region;
- ✚ The US intended to reshape the Middle East;

5. Aims and objectives of the study:

The objectives of the present research are as follows:

- ✚ To illustrate the influence of 9/11 attacks on declaring war;
- ✚ To investigate the reasons behind the US invasion;
- ✚ To identify the impacts of US invasion;
- ✚ To determine the new strategy of the US in the region after the war;

6. The significance of the study:

The main point that makes the present paper significant is that it shows the change in the US foreign policy into a more regressive manner after 9/11 attacks. In addition, it analyses the US strategy in reshaping the Middle East by protecting Israel and its own interests.

7. The research methodology :

Searching for the causes of the US invasion of Iraq and its impacts as well as the role of the USA in the Middle East during and after the invasion requires the use of analytical and descriptive approach. For accomplishing this research, the researchers will fall back on using books, videos, and articles, archival and historical documents to collect the necessary data to fulfil the requirement of this study.

8. The structure of the dissertation:

The present research paper is entitled: "The US invasion of Iraq (2003): an analysis of the political, economic, and social impacts on Iraq". It is divided into three chapters. The first chapter provides a background of the War on Iraq. It illustrates the main causes of the US invasion following 9/11 attacks. The second chapter provides an analysis of the political, economic, and social impacts of the US invasion after the withdrawal of US troops. The third chapter analyses the US post-invasion strategy in Iraq as well as its significant role in reshaping the Middle East.

Chapter One: The US invasion of Iraq (2003):

Introduction:

The invasion of Iraq (2003) was an important staple in the *War on Terror*, which was initiated by the US President George W. Bush in his doctrine. Being commonly known as *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, it was a coalition war that was waged by the US and its allies against Iraq in response to 9/ 11 attacks. Moreover, the US administration claimed that Saddam Hussein had strong links with Al Qaeda, a jihadist organization which was responsible for 9/ 11 attacks, and the Iraqi nuclear program was still active. However, it was clear that the US administration invaded Iraq as a first step to rebuild Iraq on western liberal values, reshape the Middle East, and control Iraqi oil reserves.

The present chapter provides a historical overview and the strategic geographical location of Iraq, being a Middle Eastern country that is rich in natural resources, particularly oil. In addition, this chapter illustrates the causes of the US invasion of Iraq, and how did the US plan and launch the major combat operations of the war.

1.1. A brief historical overview of Iraq:

Iraq is often referred to *Mesopotamia*, the ancient region which means "land between two rivers". The region is part of the *Fertile Crescent* wedged between the *Tigris* and *Euphrates*, which gave birth to some of the most early and advanced of ancient civilizations, and; thus, being called the *Cradle of*

Civilizations.

Throughout history, the ancient Iraqi people stood behind the noticeable cultural development and progress in Iraq. That people had been the locomotive of the development of society and its historical transition from its nomad status to civilization through the development of life styles. The land had witnessed successive civilizations. Because of its fertile lands and water resources that it contained, the country fell into the Persian control, and; then, it became a part of the Islamic caliphate. When the Abbasid dynasty rose to power and formed their caliphate, Baghdad became the capital city of the Abbasid Caliphate, which was the golden age of Islam. However, this great Islamic caliphate was completely destroyed by Genghis Khan's grandson, Hulagu, in 1258. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, it became a British protectorate during the First World War, in 1917, until it gained its independence in 1932 and became a constitutional monarchy (Melaragno and Ollunga, 2003, p. 2).

Although Britain re-occupied Iraq after pro-Axis coup during Second World War, the monarchy was overthrown in 1958 in a left-wing military coup led by General Abd- Al-Karim Qasim. As a result, Iraq left the pro-British Baghdad Pact. In 1963, Prime Minister Qasim was ousted in a coup led by the pan-Arab Baath Party. In 1968, a Baathist led-coup put Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr in power. After nationalizing the Iraq Petroleum Company, a coup d'état was led by Saddam Hussein who took over from President Al-Bakr in 1979 (Melaragno & Ollunga, 2003, p. 3).

Since Iraq has been an important country with its huge water and oil resources and the crossroad of different civilizations, it has been subjected to scramble since earlier times. In addition, Iraq has been regarded as the navel, or the center of the globe. So, whoever succeeds in taking control of it, he will succeed to take control of the world (Munif, 2000, p. 12).

1.1.1. The strategic location of Iraq:

The Republic of Iraq is an Arab nation located in southwestern Asia, at the head of the Persian/ Arabian Gulf. Iraq is bordered by its Arab neighbors Kuwait, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria and by non- Arab Turkey and Iran. The capital of Iraq is Baghdad. The land area measures 438,446 kilometers (175,378 square miles) (Phebe, 2011, pp. 8- 9)

The country is comprised of 18 administrative units, or governorates, further divided into districts and sub districts. Iraq is a nation of varied ethnic groups and cultural heritages; Iraqis of Arab descent comprise 75.8 percent of the population, while Iraqi Kurdish population number 15 to 20 percent. Turkomans, Assyrians, and other groups compose the remaining 5 percent of the population. The three governorates of Arbil, Sulaymaniya, and Dohouk form the Kurdish Autonomous Region, an area of limited self- rule by Iraq's Kurdish minority. Kurdish is the official language of the Autonomous Region and is widely used as the language of educational instruction in the area (Phebe, 2011, p. 11).

Nearly 97 percent of Iraq's people are Muslim, along with tiny groups of Christians, Jews, and Yezidis. The Muslim population is split into the *Sunni* (32

to 37 percent) and the *Shi'a* sects (60 to 65 percent). Approximately three-quarters of the population speak Arabic as their native language. Arabic is the official language of Iraq, with Kurdish, Assyrian, and Armenian spoken among their respective ethnic groups (Phebe, 2011, pp. 13- 4).

Iraq rests at the heart of the Middle East. It is wedged between large and small powers alike. The country is divided into three topographic zones: The river lands of Mesopotamia (the land between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers), the western and southern deserts, which reach into Saudi Arabia and Syria, and the highlands of Kurdistan region. The southern deserts shield Iraq from attack, while the northern highlands impede any attempt at conquest from Anatolia. However, the open Syrian Desert provides a route into Iraq from Syria, especially along the Euphrates River, and the country's eastern frontier has few natural barriers to prevent invasion from Iran. The flat river lands are similarly vulnerable to incursion from any power able to land an army from the Persian Gulf (Malinowski, 2002, p.13).

Historically, foreign forces have used these routes as a means to penetrate Iraq's borders. In pre- modern times, Iraq's wealth came from its agricultural core, which forms the heart of the Fertile Crescent and stretches to the Persian Gulf. The country's 37 million of inhabitants are still mostly concentrated in these farmlands today. But the discovery of oil in the north, east and south have shifted Iraq's economic core from the agricultural river lands to the northern highlands and the Iranian border, bringing prosperity to cities such as Mosul, Erbil and Kirkuk (Malinowski, 2002, p.44).

Iraq has been dominated by its neighbors, which have left behind unique cultural, religious and ethnic legacies. The Sunni Ottoman Turks and the Shiite Safavid Persians helped produce the country's modern Sunni and Shiite communities, while the sparsely inhabited western desert continues to have tribal and sectarian links to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. Some of these groups have kept their relationships with Iraq's neighbors, which leverage those ties for their own strategic purposes. Meanwhile, in Iraq's northern highlands, the indigenous Kurds have managed to maintain a cohesive identity throughout centuries of foreign domination (Malinowski, 2002, pp. 47- 8).

This isolation occasionally gives rise to Kurdish secessionism. As the northern highlands drift further from the central government's control, the Sunni, Shiite, Christian and other communities of the river lands and deserts jockey with one another for dominance of the state. Iraq's geographic challenge is therefore to protect its vulnerable oil fields while managing a diverse population that is susceptible to external influence (Malinowski, 2002, p. 89).

Iraq's natural resources give it the potential to be one of the wealthiest nations in the region and the world. When massive oil reserves were discovered there, the U.S. State Department described the petroleum of the region as "one of the greatest material prizes in world history". A founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Iraq possesses more than 112 billion barrels of oil- the world's second largest proven reserves. Iraq also benefits from its geography, unique in the region; two great rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, converge in the nation's heart, creating a fertile alluvial plain

and generous tract of cultivatable land (Phebe, 2011, p. 12).

1.1.2. The Iraqi regime after the Coalition War (1990- 1):

When Saddam Hussein came into power in 1979, he intended to eliminate his enemies that might threaten the Baathist regime. The success of the Islamic Revolution experience in Iran, Iraqi neighboring country, was horrifying to Saddam Hussein: He feared that the Islamic Revolution might be exported to Iraq. The desire of Iraq to be the dominant country in the Middle East led to the Iraqi- Iranian War (1980- 8) after long history of border disputes. The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein attempted to restore both of Shatt- Al Arab and of Khuzestan from Iran, since they were originally Iraqi provinces. The Iraqi- Iranian War was the longest and most brutal conflict than both World War I and II. It is worth to mention that Saddam Hussein used chemical and biological weapons against both Iranian troops and civilians. The Iraqi– Iranian War (1980- 8) cost billions of dollars, millions of deaths and casualties in both countries, and a total destruction of Iraqi economy. Saddam Hussein’s persecution continued after the war. Now, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the Kurds in Northern Iraq where 5,000 civilians were killed and more than 10,000 were injured (Fattah, 2009, pp. 225- 7).

In August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait with an ambition to annex it to Iraq. UN Security Council considered Saddam and his Baath regime not only regional to its neighboring Arab countries, but also a threat to the international community. Saddam’s refusal to withdraw from Kuwait made the

UN Security Council impose economic sanctions on Iraq. In addition, the US President George H.W. Bush announced *Operation Desert Storm* to free Kuwait. The invasion of Kuwait led to Iraqi defeat by the coalition forces, led by the US, in February 1991 (Goldschmidt and Davidson, 2005, pp. 400- 4).

After the Coalition War, the UN restriction searched their highest level by limiting Iraqi arms, reducing the Iraq military, forcing Iraq to accept inspections and monitoring, and preventing the rebuilding of Iraqi military capabilities after the Coalition War by prohibiting the import of materials and technologies for developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Phebe, 2011, pp. 185- 6).

In response to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the UNO, led by the US, effected a complete trade embargo on Iraq that has crippled its economy. This embargo, a form of international sanctions, legally prevents Iraq from exporting oil or importing any products, save for a small amount intended for humanitarian supplies, aka *Oil for Food*, and reparations to Kuwait (Phebe, 2011, p. 221).

The sanctions have become the key factor preventing the Iraqi government from recovering from its costly conflicts, rebuilding its infrastructure, and providing for its population. The sanctions prevent Iraq from selling oil and, thus, sever the most significant part of the Iraqi economy (Hunt, 2005, pp. 101- 2).

Consequently, Iraq's economy has shrunk by two- thirds; inflation reached 135 percent in 1999. More than 150,000 Iraqi people died as a result of the Gulf War; more than 1 million more have perished as a result of the sanctions, which some have described as genocide. The mortality rate for young children has

more than doubled since 1989. Iraq's health care, social infrastructure, employment, and its ability to extend educational opportunity to its citizens, a primary goal of the Iraqi government since the late 1960s, have all been paralyzed by the trade embargo (Hunt, 2005, p. 103).

Since UN inspections ended in 1998, Iraq kept developing its chemical and biological weapons. Iraqi growing ability to sell oil illegally increased Baghdad capability to finance WMD program. The US President George. W. Bush blamed Iraq for 9/ 11 attacks; therefore, he declared the US invasion on Iraq on Mar. 2003, as a major step in the War on Terror (Hunt, 2005, p. 105).

1.2. The causes of the US invasion of Iraq:

The War on Iraq, aka the Third Gulf War, started with the military invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the US and its allies. Being commonly known as *Operation Freedom Iraq*, the overall invasion intended to free the Iraqi people from the chains of dictatorship and tyranny of both Saddam Hussein and the Baathist regime.

The main cause of the War on Iraq was the global War on Terror that US President George W. Bush declared in his doctrine in response to 9/ 11 attacks. The events of this war were both brutal and severe on the Iraqi side, since it resulted in the defeat of the Iraqi army and the execution of President Saddam Hussein, in addition to thousands of casualties and trillions of dollars expenses, in the US side.

Moreover, the Iraqi regime was suspected to have links with Al-Qaida, a jihadist organization which was the perpetrator of 9/ 11 attacks, terrorist attacks in Khobar, an eastern city in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the attacks on US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es- Salam, Tanzania. In addition, Iraq was accused by the Bush administration of possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that threatened the US. Finally, the US administration intended to free the Iraqi people from tyrannical rule and dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and his Baathist (Bassil, 2012, pp. 2- 3).

1.2.1. The impacts of 9/11 attacks:

On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists of Al Qaeda hijacked four US airplanes which crashed in the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon, while the fourth crashed in an open field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

As a result of these attacks, considerable physical damages on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center were noticeable. New York attacks affected the surrounding buildings due to the collapse of the Twin Tower; many physical assets were destroyed; such as, electrical power, water supply, transporting systems, and other infrastructure. Moreover, the Pentagon's building was partly damaged and burned deaths of 3,000 people. As a result, 9/11 attacks led the US administration to initiate measures to fight terrorism, as stated and defined by the US President George W. Bush.

In response to 9/ 11 attacks, it is worth to mention that the aforementioned attacks gave birth to the Bush doctrine which was used in the fight against terrorism. The *Bush Doctrine* describes various related foreign policy principles initiated by the ex- US President George W. Bush. It centered on the policy of the US right to secure itself from countries that harbor, or give aid to terrorist groups, which was used to justify the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and later the War on Iraq in 2003 (Goldschmidt & Davidson, 2005, pp. 419- 420).

The main elements of the Bush Doctrine were delineated in the National Security Strategy of the US, published on September 17, 2002, in which George. W. Bush stated the US foreign policy to fight terrorism as follows:

The security environment confronting the US today is radically different from what we have faced before. Yet the first duty of the US ... remains what it always has been: to protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction– and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent

right of self- defense. The United States will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. Our preference is that nonmilitary actions succeed. And no country should ever use preemption as a pretext for aggression. (National Security Council, 2006)

The *Bush Doctrine* has been formulated as a collection of strategy principles, practical policy decisions, and a set of rationales and ideas for guiding US foreign policy. The main pillars are identified for the doctrine: (1) Fighting terrorism, (2) fighting countries that harbor terrorist organizations, (3) fighting countries that develop WMD, (4) acting unilaterally in the fight against terrorism, (5) using preemptive strikes against potential enemies, and (6) promoting democratic regime change (Kaufman, 2007, p. 200).

1.2.2. Destroying Iraqi WMD program:

On October 29, 1969, Iraq signed the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), pledging not to produce nuclear weapons and agreeing to place all its nuclear materials and facilities under International Agency for Atomic Energy (IAAE) safeguard. However, Iraq breached its NPT obligations by secretly continued a multi-billion-dollar nuclear weapon program. Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapon before the Gulf War that focused on producing weapons using highly enriched uranium ('A Brief History of Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Program- Part I', 2002, para. 1).

The most successful weapons were the electromagnetic isotope separation and gas centrifuge program. In addition to Iraq's renewed chemical weapons, including: mustard, taurine, GF and VX gas, these weapons were used during the Iraqi- Iranian War (1980- 8), slowing down the Kurdish uprising in Halabja (1981), and when invading Kuwait (1990) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002, p. 5).

After the end of the Gulf War, The UN Security council passed a series of resolutions establishing the authority of UNSCOM and IAEA to practice the work destroying Iraq's arsenal of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs and long-range ballistic missiles. The following resolutions were passed by the UN Security Council to authorize the use of military forces to enforce its resolutions:

- ✚ **Resolution 687:** authorizing that Iraq eliminate all of its biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, in addition to all of its ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than 150 kilometers,
- ✚ **Resolution 707:** demanding unconditional access to all sites and declaration by Iraq of its WMD suppliers,
- ✚ **Resolution 715:** The monitoring program, accepted by Iraq in November 1993, consisted of verification and technical supervision of about 300 sites,
- ✚ **Resolution 1051:** states that Iraq should declare shipment of merchandise which could be used for WMD program,

- ✚ **Resolution 1284:** this resolution called for inspectors to set what WMD tasks remain within 60 days of reentering Iraq, and to publish reports every three months,
- ✚ **Resolution 1441:** This resolution declared Iraq in material violate of pre-existing resolutions, provide Iraq a time (until December,8,2002) to give a full declaration of all WMD programs, demanded a new inspections to start by December, 23, 2002, and that it announces all sites, Including presidential sites that are subject to unconditional inspections. (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002, p. 4)

The inspections conducted in Iraq after the Gulf War proved Iraq's breach of the Non- Proliferation Treaty. From May 1991 until December 1998, UNSCOM and IAEA's team on Iraq controlled 300 inspections at over 1,000 facilities. IAEA inspections revealed a Manhattan-Project-like nuclear program. The UN inspections of Iraqi WMD programs continued after a 4-years break. The UN security council resolution 1441 provided Iraq with a final chance to disarm which gave Iraq's history of thwarting WMD inspections. The new inspections have enforced authorities under the new UN resolutions including, easy access to all sites and interviewing Iraqi's officials privately and they use new technologies. Inspections could support defectors to provide critical information and simplify hidden links between WMD and Terrorism (Squassoni, 2003, p. 2).

Inspectors destroyed 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents, and 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals (but the fate of about 31,600 chemical munitions, 550 mustard gas bombs, 4,000 tons of chemical precursors and Iraq's capabilities in producing VX agent are still unknown). In spite of the conduct of Iraqi authorities toward them, both UNSCOM and IAEA action team have a valuable role in discovering and exposing Iraq's biological weapons program and destroying a large quantity of chemical weapons stocks and missiles in addition to infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons program (Squassoni, 2003, p. 8).

After years of UN inspections and a thorough 15-month search by the Iraq Survey Group, following thousands of investigations and interviews with almost ten thousand US military, intelligence and scientific researchers, it was certainly confirmed, and eventually stated by President George W. Bush, that Iraq has no WMD programs. This; in fact, posed the key question: who supplied the fabricated evidence in the Bush administration, and for which purpose? The Bush apologists' main response was to attribute the fabrications to "bureaucratic errors" and "communication weaknesses" or, as then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, cynically argued to the need to "protect a consensus for war policy". George Tenant, the CIA Director, was the self- confessed scapegoat for the mistake. However, as the investigations proceeded, testimony from a multitude of high- level sources in the regime identified two networks of policy making and advisors: The formal structure consisting of military and civilian technical professions in the Pentagon and State Department, and a

parallel structure within the Pentagon consisting of political appointees (Petras, 2006, p. 19).

From all available facts it was the "unofficial" political advisors organized by Wolfowitz, Feith, and Rumsfeld at the Office of Special Plans (OSP) that were the origins of the fabricated evidence, which was used to "justify" the invasion and occupation of Iraq (Petras, 2006, p. 20).

The US invasion of Iraq (2003) was turned and made into the famous movie of *Green Zone*. During the occupation, a team of US Army was in charge of inspecting about WMD which were believed to be stockpiled in the Iraqi desert. Lt. Roy Miller is responsible for finding the weapons of mass destruction that led to the war. However, the missions are linked without result. In doubt, Miller is; then, contacted by a CIA agent Martin Brown, who intends to take care of Saddam Hussein's former allies in order to restore peace in the country. For her part, Lawrie Dayne, a journalist, tries to discover the truth while a government representative distills her with false information. The movie depicts the myth about Iraqi WMD which do not exist. The neoconservative members in the Bush administration fabricated false intelligence and lied about WMD programs because it was the only fact that both US public opinion and international community will believe. Also, the real cause behind the US invasion was install a new Iraqi government which will not constitute a real threat in the Middle East, especially to Israel (Greengrass, 2010).

1.2.3. Saddam links to Al Qaeda:

In the case of invading Iraq and ousting Saddam Hussein from power, the Bush Administration asserted that the regime of Saddam Hussein had a working relationship with Al- Qaeda terrorist group. The US administration argument for an Iraqi- Al Qaeda alliance was based on major allegations: Firstly, there were connections between Iraqi intelligence and Al- Qaeda which dated back to the early 1990s, including Iraqi's support to Al- Qaeda in deployment of WMD. Secondly, an Islamic group, namely Ansar Al- Islam in Northern Iraq, had ties with the Iraqi regime. Thirdly, Iraq was involved in 9/ 11 attacks (Katzman, 2007, pp.3- 6).

According to press accounts, some Administration evaluations of the available intelligence, including a reported draft National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) circulated in October 2002, interpreted the information as inconclusive, and as evidence of sporadic but not necessarily ongoing or high- level contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Some CIA experts reportedly asserted that the ideological differences between Iraq and Al Qaeda were too large to be bridged permanently. For example, bin Laden reportedly sought to raise an Islamic army to fight to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion in August 1990, suggesting that bin Laden might have viewed Iraq as an enemy rather than an ally. It is also evident in his statement referring to Saddam Hussein's regime- dominated by his secular Arab nationalist Baath Party- as "socialist and infidel" (Katzman, 2007, p. 8).

Despite the US administration's argument on Iraq ties with Al-Qaeda, the issue is still debatable. The 9/11 commission report has proved no evidence of a "collaborative operational linkage" between Al- Qaeda and Iraq. In their book, *At the center of the storm*, Bill Harlow and George Tenet claimed that the CIA view considered the contacts between them for the purpose of taking advantages from each other rather than for collaborating purposes (Katzman, 2007, p. 7).

1.2.4.Preparing for regime change:

The Bush administration's policy towards Iraq became more decisive after 9/11 attacks, asserting that containment was inadequate and that a regime change is necessary. Instantly, after the US- led war on Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan began in 2001, speculation started building that the administration might attempt to change the Iraqi regime through direct use of military force as a second phase of the War on Terror. Some US officials believed that the US should respond to 9/11 attacks by removing all regimes that support terrorist groups, including the Iraqi regime. In the President Bush's state of the Union message on January 29, 2002, he characterized Iraq as an "axis of evil", along with North Korea and Iran. In March 2002, the vice president Cheney visited the Middle East in order to consult regional countries about the possibility of confronting Iraq militarily, although the Arab leaders opposed war with Iraq and insisted great US attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute (Katzman, 2003, p. 19).

1.2.5. Taking control of Iraqi oil reserves:

Paul Wolfowitz, US deputy defense secretary, said that the Iraq war was all about oil. Therefore, oil was the main reason for military action against Iraq. Paul Wolfowitz, who already undermined Tony Blair's position over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by describing them as a "bureaucratic" excuse for war, has now gone further by claiming the real motive was that Iraq is "swimming" in oil (Wilson, 2012, p. 94).

This statement was made by Paul Wolfowitz at the IISS Asian Security Summit in Singapore on May, 31, 2003, when he said:

Let's look at it simply. The most important difference between North Korea and Iraq is that economically, we just had no choice in Iraq. The country swims on a sea of oil. ... for reasons that have a lot to do with the US Government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on: weapons of mass destruction. ... If we should decide to go to war with Iraq, it will not be a war against Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass destruction, or terrorism ... it will be about oil. ('Paul Wolfowitz and the reasons for invading Iraq', 2003)

Iraq is the second world largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia, Iraq's oil is of a good quality, it exists in a great quantity and it is very cheap to produce. According to the US Department of Energy, Iraq reserves are estimated more than 112 billion barrels. Saddam Hussein used oil as power to threat the western countries. One of the main economic objectives of the US hegemony on Iraq's

oil is the protection of oil wealth for reconstructing the country and to put an end to the black market .therefore, the main of controlling Iraq is to emphasize a continued flow of oil from Persian Gulf countries because they are a good source of petrol for the US (Yergin, cited in James, 2002, para. 1).

1.3. The US invasion of Iraq (March- April, 2003): Operation Iraqi Freedom:

Operation Iraqi Freedom was a coalition war that was waged by the US and its allies against Iraq in response to 9/11 attacks, it started on March 20, 2003 and ended on April 26, 2003. The bush Administration divided this operation into two phases: The immediate goal (short- term) was to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime and to destroy WMD. While the broad goal (long-term) was to build a new Iraq that is characterized by welfare, security, stability and freedom for all Iraqi people. In 2002, Congress had authorized to use force against Iraq and to protect the US National Security against the threat posed by Iraq (Dale, 2008, p.2).

1.3.1. War planning:

According to Karl Von Clausewitz, the military theorist, war planning includes articulation of both intended goals and how they will be achieved. War planning deals with how to fight in the battles; weather and ground, the movement of troops, use of weapons and other resources on the battle field (Dale, 2008, p. 32).

The planners relied on major factors to determine the number of troops that would deploy before the attack. Logistic requirement for large Army and Marine Corps formation and relatively limited strategic lift argued for intentional deployment, strategic surprise argued for no-notice deployment. From that pressure flowed three options: a deployment plan mutual to that of Desert Storm; a no-notice deployment in which the war would launch with very few forces on the ground in Kuwait; and a hybrid that combined elements of both approaches (Fontenot et al., 2003, p. 85).

1.3.1.1. Strategic objectives:

The US administration's goals for Operation Iraqi Freedom were both short-term and long-term goals. The former was initiated in President Bush's address to the nation in which he mentioned, "It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in power". He insisted on removal of the regime in Iraq and he promised the Iraqis to get rid of the dictator Saddam Hussein. The latter was stated by the US President Bush when he declared that the US would help the Iraqi people to establish a new Iraq that is stable, democratic, free as well as peaceful to its own citizens and neighbors. Therefore, the US strategic objectives in the region is an Iraq that is secure, unified, self-governed and is a partner in the Global War on Terror (Dale, 2008, p. 32).

1.3.1.2. Military objectives:

CENTCOM planned military operations in Iraq in order to support the announced US strategic objectives. It described *Operation Iraqi Freedom* to achieve the following military objectives: (1) ending Saddam Hussein's regime, (2) eliminating WMD, (3) ending terrorism, (4) collecting intelligence on terrorist networks, (5) securing Iraq's oil fields, (6) providing humanitarian aids, (7) ending sanctions, and (8) helping Iraq to achieve a representative self-government (Dale, 2008, p. 33).

1.3.1.3. Planning for major combats:

Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on Mar. 20, 2003, with the immediate goal of destroying WMD in Iraq, removing Saddam Hussein from power, and replacing the Baathist regime with a democratic government supported by the Iraqi people. Operation Iraqi Freedom plan enjoyed the advantage of an intensive focus on the Persian Gulf region for more than a decade. In 2001, the US President George W. Bush requested his Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to design a plan for a regime change in Iraq. Accordingly, Rumsfeld selected General Tommy Franks as Commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM) to lead *Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Dale, 2008, p. 34).

Key disputes in Operation Iraqi Freedom major combat planning was concerned with the size of troops, for the timeline of the action and synchronization of ground and air power. The War Plan 10003-98 provided a military force numbered between 400.000 and 500.000 of US troops with a long

time line for the deployment and build-up of forces in advance (Dale, 2008, pp. 34- 5).

In Jan. 2003, at the CENTCOM Component Commanders Conference held by General Franks in Tampa, the plans joined around an amended version of “Generated Start”. Their initial air campaign was quite short, including bombs and missiles. The ground campaign would start with two three-star-led headquarters; US Army V Corps, the I Marine Expeditionary Force, and some of their forces entering from Kuwait into Iraq, while additional forces continued to pour into the battlefield. Meanwhile, the fourth Infantry Division would open another front by entering Iraq from Turkey (Dale, 2008, p. 36).

1.3.1.4. Major combat operations:

After the fall of the Iraqi regime, the US President George W. Bush announced on May 1, 2003 the end of the major combat operation. Iraq witnessed an aggressive resistance during the occupation between the US- led coalition military and anti-coalition forces. This led to the rise of insurgency and terrorism in the country. Therefore, the US forces and its allies planned many combat operations to face insurgency and achieve stability in the country. The US combat operations were as follows:

- ✚ **Operation Iraqi Freedom (March, April, 20- 6, 2003):** The Bush administration aimed at overthrowing Saddam Hussein and his regime, destroying Weapons of Mass Destruction and bringing stability and freedom for the Iraqi people,

- ✚ **Operation Viking Hammer (March, 28, 2003):** It aimed to eliminate Ansar al-Islam terrorist from its base in Iraqi Kurdistan,
- ✚ **Operation Desert Scorpion (June, 29, 2003):** was a major U.S. operation to identify and eliminate anti-coalition forces while delivering humanitarian aid. the purpose of this operation was to defeat remaining enemy non-compliant forces,
- ✚ **Operation Red Dawn (December 13, 2003):** It was a military operation that took place in Al- Dawra town (Iraq), which led to the capture of president Saddam Hussein,
- ✚ **Operation Black Typhoon (September, 9- 12, 2004):** It was a major military operation that was launched against Tal Afar. Terrorists had changed the local Iraqi Security forces and the city had become a suspected haven as well as staging grounds for insurgents,
- ✚ **Operation Matador (May, 9- 19, 2005):** was also named The Battle of Al-Qaim. It was a military offensive that focused on eliminating insurgents and foreign fighters in Iraq's northwestern Anbar (Godfroy et al., 2019, pp. 135-460).

1.3.1.4.1. Early infiltration:

The CIA's early penetration into Iraq had begun as expected, including the so called Northern and Southern Iraq Liaison Element (Nile and Sile), whose mission was to gather intelligence, establish relationships, and lay the groundwork for the early entry of Special Operation Forces. Before the official

launch, Special Operation Forces had entered Iraq. which had several missions such as securing bases in AL Anbar, securing alleged WMD sites, followed some of the identified “high-value target”, collaborated with the Peshmerga, Iraqi Kurdish forces in northern Iraq, to assault the terrorist organization “Ansar Al-Islam”. Special Operation Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom were unified with forces from the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland. Defense expert, Andrew Krepinevich claimed that about 10,000 SOF participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Dale, 2008, p. 43).

1.3.1.4.2. The launch:

Before launching Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US President George W. Bush had stated “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict” (Bush, 2003). *Operation Iraqi Freedom* was officially launched on March 20, 2003, soon after the expiry of the 48- hours ultimatum given by the US President George W. Bush to the Iraqi Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq (Dale, 2008, p. 43).

After months of debates over both air and ground campaigns’ strategies, the planned sequence changed at the last minute in two major ways. At the beginning of 2003, military plans of the operation demanded a commencement with a brief air campaign, followed by the ground invasion. The timing of the ground-forced launch was changed into an air campaign due to Iraqi regime decision to destroy its southern oil fields (Dale, 2008, pp. 43- 4).

Then, the CIA received what seemed to be credible information about Saddam Hussein's position at Dora Farms near Baghdad much closer to the launch time. That assault followed closely a barrage of Tomahawk missiles launched from ships at key Baghdad leadership locations. A pair of F-17 aircraft attacked the position in the early hours of 20 March, just as the ultimatum expired. The coalition ground forces crossed the starting line from the Kuwaiti desert into southern Iraq at night. The next day, carried from both Air Force and Navy assets the larger- scale "shock and awe" attacks on Iraqi command and control and other sites. Early Iraqi responses involved setting fire to some oil wells and launching some poorly directed missiles into Kuwait, most of which were successfully thwarted by Patriot missiles (Dale, 2008, p. 44).

1.3.1.4.3. The ground campaign:

The ground campaign was commanded by US Lt- Gen. David McKiernan, Commander-in- Chief of the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), a vital component of CENTCOM. The strategy was; in fact, two-pronged attack from Kuwait to Baghdad through southern Iraq (Dale, 2008, p. 44).

Under CFLCC, the ground "main efforts" have been led by the US Army V Corps, under Lieutenant- General William Scott Wallas. The V Corps was given to lead the western route up to Baghdad, west of Euphrates River. Meanwhile, Lt- Gen. James Conway led the first Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) and he was assigned the eastern route, closer to the Iranian frontier. From a tactical

view, this was a very long projection of force for both the Army and the Marines, more than 600 kilometers from Kuwait to Baghdad, and more for those units, which advanced further north to Tikrit or Mosul. Reportedly, such long distances stressed capabilities including infrastructure (Dale, 2008, p. 44).

The Marines were allocated the eastern route up to Baghdad with more urban areas than the western route of the Army. The basic strategy also required a fast move to Baghdad. IMEF took the far south port city of Umm Qasr just across the border to Iraq (Dale, 2008, p. 45).

The British First Armored Division's mission took command of the city of Al Basra. The British Division faced resistance from Al Fedayeen, a paramilitary force set up by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and others troops which remained loyal to Ba'ath Party. To limit casualties in the large urban area, rather than enter the city directly in full force, the Division used a more organized removal of enemies, along with outreach to the community to justify their intentions. IMEF supported the Division's use of a slow and deliberate tempo. The Division advanced into Basra on Apr. 6, 2003 after several weeks of gradual reduction (Dale, 2008, p. 45).

The main IMEF force has encountered some resistance as they pushed north, especially at the geographic choke point of Nasiriyah town. There, the Marines have suffered from an incident of friendly fire with Apaches. When reported previously, the 507th Maintenance Company of the Army lost its way in the area and walked into an ambush in which some people were killed and others were taken hostage. Fierce desert sandstorms have blanketed the city

and the Saddam Fedayeen presented a strong resistance. Evidence suggested that more Iraqi troops, encouraged by the Fedayeen's attack, came to join the fight from Baghdad to Nasiriyah. Upon overcoming the resistance at Nasiriyah, the Marines moved up to Baghdad (Dale, 2008, p. 45).

The third Infantry Division (3ID) quickly led the western move to Baghdad, going fast through the south, and on April 4, entering Saddam International Airport. The division launched its first “thunder run”— a fast, armored strike — into Baghdad on April 5, and the second on Apr. 7. The purpose of the first strike was to create confusion in the city while the second to make sure that people knew Baghdad had fallen and charged by the US army (Dale, 2008, p. 45).

The 101st pursued the 3ID up the western path through southern Iraq, overcoming resistance in southern cities and making the 3ID move as fast as possible. Soldiers from the 101st faced combat in main urban areas— Hillah, Najaf, Karbala. The division arrived just after mid-April and set up its headquarters in Mosul, in northern Iraq (Dale, 2008, p. 46).

About 1,000 troops from the 173rd Airborne Division, part of the Southern European Task Force of the Army headquartered in Italy, parachuted into northern Iraq on 26 March 2003. They began their mission by securing an airfield so they could land cargo planes carrying tanks and Bradleys. Once on the ground, OIF's northern front was expanded by the 173rd, working closely with the air and ground Special Operating Forces and with Kurdish peshmerga troops (Dale, 2008, p. 46).

Initial plans for an alliance had called for the Strong Fourth Infantry Division (4ID) to open the northern front by crossing Turkey into Iraq. The primary mission planned was to threaten regular Iraqi army forces located above Baghdad. A more indirect secondary objective was to set limits on future Kurdish attempts to occupy further territories in northern Iraq, thereby providing Turkey's government some reassurance and preventing it from sending Turkish forces into Iraq to suppress the Kurds (Dale, 2008, p. 46).

1.3.1.5. The Disposition of the Iraqi army:

In the early 2003, the Iraqi Army was consisted of 375.000 troops, divided into five corps. There were eleven infantry divisions, three mechanized divisions and three armored divisions. The Iraqi forces were partly prepared for the invasion due to Saddam's assumption that the US led coalition would not invade Iraq; Saddam started preparing to defend against the enemies just weeks ahead of the actual invasion. Saddam's Republican Guard forces were oriented to the west (Jordan), the first Army Corps in Kirkuk, The fifth Army Corps in Mosul and the remained forces in the East (Iran). However, the US forces attacked Iraq from the south, exactly from Kuwait (Godfroy et al., 2019, p. 83).

The Iraqi army did not fight and offered a little resistance to the invasion as the US coalition forces expected. The Iraqi Army had effectively resolved by the time coalition forces reached Baghdad. Although there were relatively few formal Iraqi surrenders. Allied forces out of a combined enemy army of some

350,000 prisoned just some 7,000 This is in compared with more than 85,000 Iraqis captured by allied troops in the Persian Gulf War (Hosmer, 2015, p 226).

The failure of Iraqi army significantly weakened by war pressure, lack of resources , and lack of other facilities resulting from the blockade ,this led to the disbanding of the Iraqi army immediately on May 23, 2003 by the head of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Paul Bremer declared that the first step in forming a national self-defense ability for a free Iraq is creating a new Iraqi force in the near future, and that forces will be professional, military, effective and representative of Iraqi people Speaking to journalists in 2005, Bremer stated that the dissolution of the Iraqi Army was probably the most significant decision that he took (Godfroy et al., 2019, pp. 140- 3).

1.3.1.6. The fall of the Iraqi regime:

One of the main reasons Iraq failed to adopt the more defensive measures that Saddam Hussein miscalculated the expectation of conflict with the United States and Saddam's misjudgments about coalition intentions and abilities shaped Iraqi behavior before and during the 2003 conflict. Saddam Hussein was the dominant decision maker in Iraq, these miscalculations formed Iraq's political- military responses to the crisis over Iraq's performed possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)and the coalition's imminent Saddam's major strategic decisions were made by authorization, often without consultation or reflection (Hosmer, 2015, pp. 225- 6).

During the invasion, the coalition aircraft inflicted a heavy damage on the Republican Guard Units around the capital. The US forces continued their advance within a week, and on April 4 they took control of the international airport of Baghdad. Iraqi resistance, was highly disorganized, and over the next day's army and Marine Corps' units strike raids into the heart of the city. Resistance in Baghdad collapsed On April 9, and the US soldiers controlled of the city and the old regime ended. The coalition accomplished a quick and decisive military victory that not only resulted in the destruction of the Iraqi military, but also caused the corruption of the command and control capacity of the Iraqi government. On Ap. 9, 2003, the Baathist regime declined after governance of 24 years (Godfroy et al., 2019, p.102).

1.3.1.7. The end of the Invasion and the US occupation of Iraq:

On March 20, 2003, the US and the Coalition forces invaded Iraq and removed the regime of Saddam Hussein. They declared to bring peace, prosperity and democracy. However, ever since, violence, civil conflict and economic collapse have ruined the land. Thousands of innocent people were dead and wounded, millions are displaced, several of Iraq's cities lie in ruins, and enormous resources have been wasted. In the first days of the occupation, the Coalition released the Iraqi police force and army, laying open Iraqi cities to looting and damage while the Coalition military stood by. Seventeen government ministries were removed, while Coalition forces protected only the Oil Ministry. The coalition was formally an occupying force. Shortly after the end of major

combat, in May 2003, the United Nations Security Council recognized the United States and the United Kingdom as “occupying powers,” together with all the “authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under international law” that this designation entails (Dale, 2008, p. 49).

The rapid and decisive defeat of the Iraqi military forces, and the advance to Baghdad, Tikrit, Kirkuk, and Mosul, clearly showed the dominance of the coalition militaries on the battlefield. The campaign plan’s success during major combat operations confirmed that coalition forces at the same time, attacked Iraqi forces throughout the depth and breadth of Iraq, including major operations in the north with the Kurds, in the western desert, along the eastern border with Iran, and throughout the central Tigris-Euphrates Valley from Umm Qasr to parts of the Sunni triangle north of Baghdad. At the beginning, most Iraqis viewed coalition forces as liberators. However, an organized resistance started to undermine the early military success and erode Iraqi public support. From May 2003 to July 2004, an insurgency increased within Iraq. The new enemy, consisting of coalitions of former Baathists, Iraqi Islamists, and foreign fighters, launched a harsh war against coalition forces and the new Iraqi government by assaulting Iraqi infrastructure, government officials, civilian targets, and coalition military. As of June 2004, the Iraqi resistance had conducted over 13,000 attacks against US and coalition forces. Furthermore, by June 2004, the majority of the Iraqi people considered U.S. military forces as foreign occupiers rather than liberators (Bensahel et al., 2015, p. 361).

In May 2003, the Administration appointed Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to replace Garner by leading a "Provisional Coalition Authority" (CPA) with a focus on political reconstruction. Bremer radically restructured Iraq's public institutions and the Iraqi economy, he gave a publicity to a new created Iraq stock exchange, Iraq's banking system was ineffective, its industry destroyed, and even its vital oil sector was sinking. Unemployment and poverty increased steadily .The conflict continued for much of the next decade as insurgency emerged to oppose the occupying forces and the post Iraqi government, the mismanagement of the Coalition Provisional Authority led to spread civil war between Shias and Sunnis, Iraq held multi-party election in 2005.The US involvement in Iraq accelerated under President Barack Obama .The US formally withdrew all combat troops from Iraq by December 2011 (Dale, 2008, p. 52).

1.3.1.8. The US invasion of Iraq and the International Law: The truth about the war:

In September 2002, The US President George W. Bush in his speech to the UN characterized the possible use of force against Iraq as necessary to enforce existing Security Council resolutions and eliminate a threat to international peace and security. as a response the security Council adopted Resolution 1441, which viewed Iraq to be in violation of previous Security Council resolutions (National Security Council, 2006).

The US claimed the right to launch a pre-emptive war against Iraq, relying on intelligence reports, that Saddam would wage an attack against the US using weapons of mass destruction. pre-emptive war under international law demand the use of force in self-defense in a case of an armed attack. It may also be in the case that force is permitted in imminent attack (Simpson, 2005, p. 6).

Regarding the legality of the US- UK led war on Iraq in 2003, the UN Secretary- General claimed that the use of force without the UN Security Council's approval "would not be in conformity with charter", and several legal experts still view the US- UK attack as an act of aggression, breaching the international law. Experts also view to illegalities in the US conduct of the war in the violations of Geneva Conventions by the US- UK of their obligations as an occupying ('War would be illegal', 2003, para. 2).

The US development of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) programs are justified by the need to protect itself from the so-called "rogue states"; such as, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. This argument requires an assumption that these states will soon be able to launch nuclear attacks against the US using long-range ballistic missiles. Neither North Korea nor Iran have tested nuclear weapons or missile with the range required to attack the US. There is no proof that any weapons or missiles are underway for a crash program. There is no evidence that either Iran nor Korea are run by the governments that act irrationally or that they would have any rational excuse to use nuclear weapons against the US even if they should acquire a capability to do so. There is no

need to expect deterrence to serve for countries with large nuclear weapons arsenals but not for countries with limited inventories (Pike, 2000, para. 2- 4).

Supported by UK and Spain, the US started seeking a second UN resolution to declare Iraq, in substantive breach of its obligations to disarm. France, Russia, and China as well as a number of other members, favored veto- wielding permanent members to give inspectors more time on the presumption that inspections were effective. The 15 UN Security Council members did not authorize the attack on Iraq on 19 March 2003. It unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 on November 2002, calling for new investigations aimed at the identification and removal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (United Nations Security Council, 2002, pp. 3- 4).

A summit of Arab foreign ministers has called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal US and British forces from Iraq. The ministers of the Arab League meeting in Cairo adopted a resolution calling for a war against Iraq as a "violation of the UN charter" and "a danger to world peace". The resolution was adopted unanimously by 22 League members, except Kuwait and Libya (Saikal, 2006, p. 190).

Ideologists within the Bush administration wanted a strategy of preemptive strike to be legitimate, and an effective attack on Iraq could inaugurate and normalize the strategy. Some of the same repressive unilateralists in the Bush administration conceive of U.S. global control, Elder Bush's "New World Order," with the US becoming the global dominant military power (Kellner, 2004, p. 6).

Increased control of the world's oil reserves provided the former oil executive who held key positions in the Bush administration with an enticing reward. In addition, key members of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) constituted a neo-conservative clique in the Bush administration linked to Israeli radical Likud Party that worked hard to destroy the regime, which was toppled by Saddam Hussein, because he constituted a real a threat to Israel and the entire Middle East (Kellner, 2004, p. 6).

Conclusion:

The War on Iraq has become the largest and the executive use of military forces by the US and its allies. The war was brutal and bloody, it left thousands of killed, injured and a large number of homeless people. This assault also caused a big damage in the infrastructure; the war also breached the human rights with weapons, torture and starvation that are banned according to the international law. In addition, the US coalition war led to the emergence of sectarian conflicts, violence and the spread of terrorist organization, unlike the justification of the Bush administration to justify the war by spreading democracy and freedom of Iraqi people.

Chapter two: The impacts of the US invasion of Iraq:

Introduction:

The words 'invasion' and 'occupation' have always negative connotations; for the consequences and the impacts that the invaders bring with them. Occupation and invasion are associated with damage and destruction. The damage created by the US invasion and the problematic subsequent occupation has had significant impacts on not only Iraq, but the US foreign policy, international community, and the Middle East as well.

The present chapter focuses on describing the impacts of the US invasion of Iraq. It describes the political, economic, and social impacts of the War on Iraq, and how the country changed into a new status after the invasion.

2.1. The political impacts:

Iraq had been a weak territorial state after being created by UK, with built-in tribal divisions and instability. A model for peaceful and stable Iraq was found only after several decades of struggle: a ruthless strongman ruling through a semi-totalitarian party and depending on one of Iraqi communities against the others. The US has deconstructed this state without having, or even expected, a suitable alternative for it (Hinnebusch, 2007, p. 9).

One of the political goals of the Bush administration after eliminating Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party from power and halting the terrorist threats was to: (1) establish a transitional government that identifies the people in a democratic

government as a representative of all Iraqi groups, including the Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds, (2) arrest members of the Ba'ath Party, and (3) try them their dictators for violations of human rights (Bassil, 2012, p. 2).

The US established an occupation structure after the fall of Saddam's regime, based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor the establishment of Islamist and pro-Iranian factions over nascent pro-Western secular parties. The US administration, under the request of President Bush, appointed Ambassador Paul L. Bremer as the President of the Provisional Coalition Authority in May 2003, which was recognized as an occupation authority by the UN. Bremer abandoned a tentative political transition process in July 2003 and created a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory body, the 25-member "Iraq Governing Council "(IGC). Meanwhile, a "Transitional Administrative Law" (TAL), which came into effect on March 4, 2004, was drafted by US and Iraqi negotiators, advised by a wide range of international officials and experts. On Jun. 28, 2004, US Ambassador Paul Bremer designated an interim Iraqi government after almost one year of the US occupation. That date encountered the TAL-appointed deadline of Jun. 30, 2004, for the end of the occupation period (Katzman, 2014, p. 5).

Ayad Allawi, the Iraqi Prime Minister, and the Iraqi President Ghazi Ajil Al Yawar, a Sunni tribalist, led the interim government designated by the Provisional Coalition Authority. He was the leader of the Iraqi National Accord (INA), a secular, non-sectarian party that objected Saddam Hussein for several

years. Allawi is a Shiite Muslim, but his followers are mainly Sunni Arabs, including a few former Baath Party members (Katzman, 2014, p. 5).

2.1.1. The collapse of the Iraqi state:

After the fall of the Iraqi regime, and the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, Iraqi citizens started wild celebrations in the streets of Baghdad and other liberated cities. The coalition troops have been unprepared for the subsequent utter dissolution of public order. Within days from the collapse of the regime led to Baghdad and other parts of Iraq falling into chaos. Looting and arson started almost immediately in Baghdad, and disorder spread all over southern Iraq as well as in Kirkuk. Opportunists exploited and devastated the Ba'ath Party and facilities of the Iraqi government, important infrastructure facilities, public houses and residences of wealthy Ba'athists who had escaped. The Iraqi police structure was badly damaged, as well as the destruction of several police stations. The plundering of hospitals contributed to the loss of much-needed pharmaceuticals. The Baghdad National Museum and ancient Iraqi artifacts were also plundered (Godfroy, Morton, Powell, and Zais, 2019, p. 112).

In certain parts of the country, the April 2003 looting was accompanied by riots that were unable to allay the small number of Iraqi police who remained at their posts. By the end of April, uprisings in Baghdad, Anbar and some cities in southern Iraq were gradually rising. At some of those uprisings, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) units claimed that anti-coalition

protestors in the crowds were aiming to incite coalition forces into a violent response to put responsibility for the coalition's turmoil. Uprisings emerged as Iraqis started competing for political power and offices in hurriedly structured governance systems among themselves (Godfroy, et al. 2019, p. 112).

2.1.2. Dismantling Iraq into federation and the call for Kurdish independence:

The Sevres Treaty of 1920, which created the modern states of Iraq, Syria, and Kuwait, was to involve the possibility of a Kurdish state in the region. However, it was never accomplished. Following Kemal Ataturk's overthrow of the Ottoman Caliphate. Iran and Iraq have all agreed not to recognize an independent Kurdish state. The Kurds suffered brutality and mistreatment from the Turkish government, which sought to deprive them of Kurdish identity by identifying them "Mountain Turks," prohibiting their language and banning them from wearing traditional Kurdish costumes in the cities, a direct assault on their culture. The government also supported Kurds to migrate to the cities to reduce the population in the hills. Turkey is continuing its policy of refusing to recognize the Kurds as a minority group. The Kurds encountered similar repression in Iraq. In the Iran-Iraqi War (1980-8), after the Kurds supported Iran, Saddam Hussein retaliated, razed villages and targeted peasants with chemical weapons. After the end of the Iran- Iraqi War, the Kurds rebelled again only to be crushed again by Iraqi forces. Around two million of the Kurds fled to Iran; five million now live

in Iraq. The US has aimed to establish a safe heaven within Iraq for the Kurds by imposing a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel (Roy, 2011, para.2)

Just a few months after the U.S.-led forces moved victoriously to Baghdad, Leslie Gelb, a former editor of the *New York Times*, expressed his opinion on the Kurdish issue in September 2003. He suggested the only suitable strategy to move toward a three-state solution in stages: The Kurds in the north, the Sunni in the center, and the Shiites in the south. He advocated the US administration to be very hard-headed in planning this division, insisting that the only realistic solution was to divide Iraq into three states. He clearly called for Iraq to be divided into three sectarian areas: Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. Partitioning Iraq into three states in 2003 was unthinkable. Neither the US, nor the Iraqi government would have consented to such a concept. Such partitioning had been opposed by the Iraqi people, particularly the Sunnis. The Arab countries have repeated their support for Iraq as a unified country at their latest conferences (EL- Shibiny, 2010, p. 36).

The collapse of the Ba'athist regime marked the beginning of a new era in Iraqi politics. In forming a new post-Saddam government, the US focused on creating an inclusive representative government of the diverse population of Iraq, providing new opportunities for participation in the political process to Kurds, Shi'as and many other historically marginalized groups. For the Kurds taking political decisions in Baghdad has enabled them to impact Iraq's policies on Kurdish autonomy (Alireza, Hanauer, Brenna, and Scotten, 2016, p. 50).

The Kurds used their influence to achieve concessions that limited Baghdad's authority and control in northern Iraq as the Transitional Administrative Law and new Iraqi Constitution were crafted in 2004 and 2005. The new Government's Sunni boycott ended in May 2005, and as the Sunni and Shi'a political parties became more organized, Kurdish political power was diluted. Therefore, a number of Kurdish leaders, such as Nechirvan Barzani, Barham Saleh, Jalal Talabani, and Fuad Masum, were still influential in national issues (Alireza, Hanauer, Brenna, and Scotten, 2016, p. 50).

2.1.3. The rise of Iraqi resistance and reprisals:

Following the fall of the Iraqi regime, former Ba'athist leaders, the Badr Corps, the Kurds, and Islamic terrorist groups joined the power vacuum to pursue their own separate interests, many of which stood in opposition to the coalition's objectives for Iraq and also paved the way for a bloody struggle for dominance in post- Saddam Iraq (Godfroy et al., 2019, p. 169).

In the summer of 2003, when anti-coalition violence escalated, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) claimed that the adversary they encountered was rooted in a previous Sunni Ba'athist resistance movement with some participation of international terrorist organizations and Ansar Al- Islam's resurgence. However, this explanation greatly oversimplified the nascent organizations of resistance and militias establishing footholds in the broad swaths of uncontrolled territory of Iraq (Godfroy, et al., 2019, p. 169).

The origins of Iraq's disorder in the summer of 2003 were much more difficult than the Ba'athist and international terrorist organizations to which the violence was attributed by CENTCOM and CJTF-7. Previous Ba'athist resistance groups, led by Izzat Ibrahim Al-Douri and Mohammed Yunis Al- Ahmad, a senior Ba'athist leader, have planned assaults against coalition targets in northern and western Iraq during the summer of 2003. At the same time, terrorist organizations; such as, Ansar Al Sunna, and Tawhid Wa Al- Jihad, led by the Jordanian Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi concentrated on breaking up international coalition help by waging attacks against allies, and the UN. Sunni rebels have started threatening and killing Iraqi Interim Government officials (Godfroy et al., 2019, p. 169).

2.1.3.1. Iraqi popular resistance:

On April 18, 2003, many impoverished neighborhoods of the capital were taken out by Iraqis to join popular demonstration. Over 10,000 people celebrated the fall of Saddam Hussein, but unlike the crowd that had watched the US tanks overthrow Saddam's statue two days earlier, the protesters raised a new demand: no to the occupation (Alexander and Assaf, 2005, para. 2).

In many places in Iraq, people started resisting; both the Sunni and Shiaa regions consider coalition forces as occupiers. Resistance is motivated by the local population's direct experience. This creates a cycle of raids and retaliations that has developed a momentum of its own in some regions. Fallujah is one of the clearest examples of this, starting with April 2003 killing of thirteen unarmed

protesters by US forces. In April 2004, the Iraqi resistance faced a fundamental transition, becoming a national popular resistance for the first time (Alexander & Assaf, 2005, para.3).

From an upward curve of attacks on the occupying forces over the summer, associated by an intense US raids. The people in Fallujah had enough of their own justification to take up arms against the occupation without having to look for motivation to Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi. Other major areas that formed a similar process include Baaqubah, Ramadi, Sadr City, Samarra, Tel Afar and Mosul (Alexander & Assaf, 2005, para.63).

US forces fighting a combined Shia and Sunni insurgency were having an immense political impact. Solidarity protests all across Iraq crashed repeatedly with military forces and local police. Tens of thousands of Sunnis and Shias filled the Sunni Umm Al- Qura Mosque in Baghdad for collective prayers, and more than 200,000 demonstrated in Baghdad on April, 9, 2004 in the greatest protest in the recent history (Alexander & Assaf, 2005, para. 66).

The symbol of solidarity was organized by groups behind the Iraqi National Foundation Congress (INFC), a broad coalition of Iraqi political forces that some see as a possible nucleus for the rise of a united front against occupation. Founded in May 2004, INFC is an umbrella group that includes leftists, nationalists, and Islamists from all walks of life who opposed Saddam's regime and refused to be part of any US- based political body. Membership in the US Congress is open to all those who subscribe to its minimum basis of unity: a clear call for the withdrawal of the occupying forces and opposition to any

possible division of the territory of Iraq and of people on a religious or sectary basis (Docena, 2005, para. 2).

INFC is a deliberate project to bring together Sunni and Shia Muslims, Arabs, Kurds, Turks, Assyrians and other minorities. The INFC condemned the US-led offensive against both the Shi'ite town of Najaf and the mostly Sunni town of Falluja. It has also been instrumental in defusing the sectary tension of the highly charged Kirkuk and Mosul. Claiming not to have an armed wing, INFC explicitly supports the right of the Iraqis to resist "by all means necessary" even as it has condemned murders, hostage-taking and the killing of non-combatants (Docena, 2005, para. 4).

2.1.3.2. Al Qaeda's resistance in Iraq:

The group that would later become known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq was founded in 2002 and played a major role in the Sunni resistance to the US occupation of Iraq and political domination by the Shiite majority of the region. At its height, Al-Qaeda had an estimated 5,000–10,000 members, a big number of which came from outside the country. The ideological fanaticism of AQI, the presence of foreign fighters and the use of extreme violence by the organization motivated a revolt in Sunni communities (Gold, 2017, p. 13).

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was formed in 2003 by Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi who created the vision of a pure Sunni caliphate cleansed of all infidels that continues to pervade Islamic State doctrine. Zarqawi was a Jordanian-born militant who fought in Afghanistan, where he formed Jamaat Al-Tawhid Wa Al-Jihad (JTJ)

in 2000 in Herat. After the US invasion of Iraq, he established JTJ in Iraq with the goal of forcing US forces (USF) to withdraw, removing the government in Baghdad, targeting Shiite civilians, leaders, and militias, and establishing an Islamic state (Morgan and Virginia, 2016, p. 10).

In coordination with Al Qaeda, which had prompted Muslims around the world to travel to Iraq to fight the pending invasion, Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi mobilized his network of safe houses, weapons caches, and intelligence networks to prepare a snare for the coalition forces. After the invasion started, Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi implemented a highly structured four-pronged plan to vanquish the US-led coalition. It went as follows:

- ✚ First, by targeting their international and coalition partners, he intended to isolate US forces; for example, the UN headquarters truck bombing in Baghdad in August 2003;
- ✚ Second, by attacking police stations, recruiting centers and Iraqi leaders, he intended to prevent Iraqi cooperation with the transition process;
- ✚ Third, through high-profile attacks on civilian contractors and humanitarian aid workers, he targeted the reconstruction processes.

Finally, he sought to ensnare the US troops in a civil war between Sunni and Shiite by attacking Shiite targets and provoking sanctions responses against Sunni communities. Among the more significant examples in Zarqawi's strategy

of this final dimension was the assault against Shiite leader Sayyid Muhammad al-Hakim in the holy city of Al Najaf (Kirdar, 2011, pp. 3- 4).

The Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), an umbrella organization led by a council of member group leaders from which Zarqawi was excluded, subsumed Al Qaeda and five other terrorist groups affiliated to it. Despite an isolated attempt to reaffirm its leadership, on June 7, 2006, Zarqawi retained a significantly reduced profile until his assassination by a US- led airstrike (Kirdar, 2011, pp. 4- 5).

Although the death of Zarqawi served the group an emotional blow, it seemed to have little effect on the pace and brutality of their operations. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi was quickly substituted by Abu Hamza Al Muhajir- aka Abu Hamza Al Masri-, an Egyptian senior Al Qaeda leader, with longstanding ties to Al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman Al Zawahiri as the emir of the group. Violent incidences remained consistently high during 2006 and the first half of 2007. Crimes and terrorist attacks decreased by only 6 percent between 2006 and 2007, from 6,631 to 6,210, compared to 3,438 and 3,256 in 2005 and 2008 respectively (Kirdar, 2011, p. 5).

In addition to other terrorist attacks that Al Qaeda had committed in Iraq in February 2006, Al Qaeda proceeded with bombing of the Shi'ite Samarra mosque in Iraq. It was only the most noticeable sign of the tendency toward sectarian conflict which started in 2004. As the trend became standard in 2006, the insurgency conflict slowly shifted from one of the tactical victories against the US to one of the other sectarian groups to control economic and political

area. This development characterized the "war after the war" and still included all Iraqis whose end result would eventually be shaped by their decision to support sectarian groups (Cordesman, 2007, p. 63).

Similar studies revealed that Al Qaeda, under the leadership of Al Zarqawi, focused primarily on remarkable suicide bombings that aimed to cause mass Shiite casualties, or destroy sited and sacred cities to Shiites to implement its strategy. In 2005, several suicide bombings were committed against Shiite celebrations which resulted in mass casualties. The most significant attack the Shiite "Golden Mosque" bombing in Sunni-inhabited Samarra on February 22, 2006 generally referred to Al Qaeda. The assault completely destroyed the mosque's golden dome. It affected widespread Shiite reprisals against Sunni nationwide and is generally believed to have launched the "civil war" that raged from the time of the bombing until late 2007, when it began to crush. Al Qaeda's most fierce attack, and the war's single deadliest attack to date, was car bombing of Yazidi villages near Sinjar in northern Iraq in August 2007, which murdered at least 500 people, mostly Yazids (Katzman, 2008, p. 14).

On October 12, 2006, the successors of Zarqawi declared the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), later the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The group proclaim a structure of cabinet and governance, and stated authority over areas of western Iraq, which was majority Sunni territory. ISIS claimed authority covered the provinces of Anbar, Baghdad, Diyali, Kirkuk, Salah Al- Din, Nineveh, and parts of Babel and Wasset provinces. This was the

first time Al Qaeda' associate has declared territorial control and political rule (Gold, 2017, p. 21).

2.1.4. The deteriorated security in Iraq:

The post- invasion period of the War on Iraq was the least well- planned US military campaign since Somalia in 1993, with much worse consequences for the country than any military mistake since Vietnam. The US military were clearly not prepared for the major aim that the US had to fulfill after removed the current government of Iraq, to provide stability, and always the first responsibility of any sovereign government, or occupation. Lack of planning amongst military and foreign policy experts, as well as the US military, made the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the rest of the Bush administration firmly believed on going to war with too few forces, and that optimistic perspective of what would occur in Iraq once Saddam was toppled (O'Hanlon, 2005, para.1-2).

In May 2003, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) quickly evaluated that the security situation was getting better with a calm settlement of the country. The accounts of looting had dropped significantly, as were unplanned acts of aggression and repression. This relative peace gave way to assaults toward coalition military objectives that slowly increased in size and scope during May and June. Until early June, the majority of coalition soldiers passed through Iraqi cities in soft-skinned cars, mostly lightly armed with handguns and without helmets. Soldier in Baghdad was fired at point- blank

range in the back of his head while shopping. The Baghdad incident accompanied more missile-propelled grenade attacks, truck ambushes, and assaults against coalition troops and joint operations with the Iraqi police during the summer. The most contentious regions were Baaqubah, Tikrit, Anbar, Falluja, Habbaniyah, Ramadi, and Hadithah; but insurgent influences have interrupted the security situation (Godfroy et al., 2019, p. 154).

Across Iraq, the deposition of the Ba'ath Party and Saddam from power has opened the door to a more open expression of religious freedom, even though Islamic fanaticism has increased with that freedom. In addition, in many areas, women have started to fear kidnapping and rape and have avoided going to work or school because of the danger. Many Iraqi Salafis have been virulently anti-coalitionists, calling for and launching attacks on allied forces. Indications have emerged that Ansar Al-Islam, having survived the coalition attack on it in early April, has started to rebuild itself in northern Iraq with the backing of al-Qaeda. In June, coalition units indicated that local radio stations had started to broadcast anti-coalition propaganda, while imams continued to broadcast anti-coalition messages during their Friday sermons. In May, Combined Joint Task Force- 7(CJTF-7) units found graffiti indicating that Baghdadis seemed to lose trust of US forces to control the situation (Godfroy et al., 2019, p. 155).

2.1.5. The re-building of Iraqi state:

The main goal of the US War on Iraq was to bring change: toppling Saddam's regime and replacing it with one less prone to violent adventurism, domestic

repression, and developing weapons of mass destruction. The breakdown of the state's internal institutions in the aftermath of the victory created a more sustained problem of restoring all government systems throughout the state. Building a new political order means leading Iraq towards a government that is in total agreement with US foreign-policy objectives. This will certainly minimize the role of members of the old regime, identifying, and marginalizing other political forces that might undermine a pro-US agenda. In admission of regime change, the government must be legitimate, both internationally and domestically. This will include, giving support to Iraqi governing élite either popularly elected, or which can mobilize a significant section of Iraqi popular opinion in support of the government rule (Dodge, 2005, p. 17).

For state building to be successful, institutional rule must replace force. In a sovereign government, power must be centralized, administrative, but not military. The sovereign body at the head of a state generates instructions for broader government structures and laws for the population. Yet, the efficiency of government is secured in the ability of its peak to oversee the achievements of these directives throughout the whole of its administration. This can be completed by creating a regularized administrative staff, organized in a hierarchy of government offices. Efficient administrative capacity is accomplished and infrastructural power established if the population realize the state as an essential and a legitimate presence in their daily lives. Its rule of society is then accepted as a necessity. This is the bureaucratic process that

has to be occurred for regime change in Iraq to be successful, and for the US to leave behind a lasting and legitimate state (Dodge, 2005, p. 18).

2.1.5.1. The failure of Nuri Al Maliki's transitional government:

In a measure to strengthen the bi- lateral relations with the new government, the US President George W. Bush addressed to the new Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal Al- Maliki with a letter in which he stated the following:

Like you, I am deeply concerned about the slow pace of government formation and hope for rapid progress in the coming days. . . . Working together, we want to help build a democracy that respects the principles of majority rule with ... respect for minority rights, as ... in Iraq's constitution. Iraq needs a strong, effective Prime Minister to lead it at this turning point in history. . . . Iraq needs a Prime Minister who can unite the nation We would not support a Prime Minister who cannot garner the necessary support across communities to meet the constitution's requirements and... would not be capable of leading a united Iraq. (Bush, 2006, p. 556)

In his letter, the US President George W. Bush wished that Al Sistani would use his influence to encourage Iraq's leaders to take brave and decisive steps to demonstrate their commitment to a strong, unified Iraq.

Nuri Al- Maliki was raised in a small, middle-class neighborhood near Karbala. After earning his B. A. degree in theology and MA degree in Arabic language and its Literature, he worked sector of education. When the Iran- Iraq war started, Al- Maliki joined the Da'wa Party in 1970; then, he escaped to Syria. He left Syria to Iran in order to fight against the Iraqi regime in 1982. Following the US invasion, Al- Maliki returned to Iraq, where he became a senior Da'wa Party Member of Parliament. On May 20, the Iraqi Parliament agreed on the premiership of Maliki and a council of ministers that included 8 Sunnis, 7 Kurds, 21 Shi'aa, and 1 Christian. With a parliamentary support base composed of more Sadrists (30) than members of his own Da'wa Party (28), Maliki became reliant on Moqtada Al Sadr first to form and then to maintain a government. As a result, the Sadrists gained cabinet posts as the Ministers of Health, Transportation, and Agriculture. The Sadrists' powerful role within Maliki's cabinet would have far-reaching effects, as well as the support for coalition operations against Shi'aa militias could result in Maliki's ruling coalition falling apart (Godfroy et al., 2019, pp. 555- 6).

Al- Maliki was elected as Prime Minister in 2006, and for two years. He appeared to be a weak prime minister who headed a deeply divided government. During this period, violence was rose and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were unable to impose the rule of law. In 2008, Al- Maliki led a military campaign against the Mahdi Army, a paramilitary force created by Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, which controlled Basra. He managed to force Sadr to remove his militia so that he appeared to be a strong leader, which most Iraqis desired.

This coincided with the success of the US- supported Awakening groups; which were provincial security-building coalitions formed in 2008 among tribesmen in Sunni areas, in defeating Al Qaeda in Anbar and several Sunni areas, consequently reducing sectarian violence. With these achievements, Al-Maliki considered himself as a “state builder” whose main aim was to establish the rule of law and restore the power of the state. He adopted a more brave and confident discourse, criticizing the ethnic and sectarian distribution of power and, especially those who “opposed the government from within.” In 2009, he established the State of Law Coalition, distancing himself from the broader Shia community and managing to achieve a significant victory in provincial elections (Al- Qarawee, 2014, p. 6).

Iraq held successful provincial elections in 2009 and several provinces in like Baghdad and Basra experienced peaceful transitions of government from one a Political party to another. The end of the civil war provided stability to many parts of the state, yet Iraqis had been strong after the civil war and continued to hold elections and reconstructing their institutions. Some sought to use civil war violence as justification of democracy being inadequate for the country, but the number of voters proved otherwise.

The violence did not affect the whole state, since many of the southern and Northern provinces avoided conflict. Violence occurred the most in the western Sunni- Arab region of Iraq; elections were held in Sunni majority provinces such as Anbar and Salah Al Din, where their candidates were free to run for elections and hold the position of governor (Haddad, 2016, p. 31).

The following federal elections took place in 2010, and Iraq would undergo a more difficult transition of power than its provincial elections. The current Prime Minister Nuri Al- Maliki would win the most individually votes in the country, but his party would have two less seats than the party of Ayad Allawi. Although Allawi had won the most seats (91 seats in contrast to Al- Maliki's 89), Al- Maliki was able to form a larger block with his 89 seats and was granted the right to form a cabinet, which was subject to a vote in parliament and required two-thirds approval (Haddad, 2016, pp. 31- 2).

The second term of Al- Maliki would take a wrong path and it would never recover its balance. The two previous years that were considered as the best couple of years in Iraq's history since pre-Baath Iraq, would be neglected and the effect of the Syrian civil war will make the situation worse. ISIL militants would enter the country and conquer many Iraqi-Sunni towns leading to the fall of Fallujah and Mosul on 10 June 2014. Consequently, many anti-war critics argued that this was a huge failure in democratizing Iraq, claiming that the country's second-largest city, Mosul, would never have fallen to ISIL militants if democratization had been stable (Hadad, 2016, p. 32).

2.1.6. The US- Iranian strategic competition in Iraq:

Iraq has become a key focus of the US- Iranian strategic competition. The history of this competition was shaped by the Iran- Iraq War (1980- 8) and the Gulf War (1991). Broadly, the US-Iranian competition has played out at the political, security, economic, and diplomatic levels in Iraq. At the political level,

the US attempts to create a stable and inclusive governance have struggled with the Iranian efforts to support Iraq's Shiites. Iran's efforts enjoyed a mixed success, as Shiite political fragmentation and an anti-Iranian popular revolt have complicated its significant ability to bring important players together in coalition. At the security level, Iran has implicitly supported attacks on American, coalition, and government forces by a strong military unit, the Quds Regiment of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The US and Iran have fought for influence within the Iraqi Security Forces and for hegemony in the post-invasion violence (Loi, 2011, p. 8).

The creation of a new government in Iraq and withdrawal of US troops by the end of 2011, changed patterns of the US- Iranian competition. As a reaction, Iran sought to increase its political and economic influence as the US role had been decreased, worked with Iraq Shiite and other political leaders to establish a new government in 2010, and had continued to support Sadr and various Shiite militias. Iran intended to make it difficult for Iraq to help Western attempts to contain it. Although there were still border tensions, Iraq's reduced military capabilities make it dependent on US aid, and unable to defend itself from outside attack or from the unlikely case of an Iranian attack. The balance of influence was also shifting when America's assistance packages were decreasing rapidly as the US economic crisis, debt issue, and the Afghan War made the US Congress less willing to make appropriations for providing financial aids to Iraq. Whereas Iran's considerable aid and widely expanded commercial ties to Iraq made Iran one of Iraq's most important trade partners. Iraqi imports

of Iranian goods could reach \$10 billion by 2012, and Iraq is also dependent on Iranian energy supply (Loi, 2011, pp. 8- 9).

Iran's goals for Iraq are quite different from those of the US. It aimed to ensure that Iraq is not serving as a base for the US, serving US interests or re-emerging as a threat to Iran. Iran shares with Iraq a long and porous border, and aims to create a stable ally, not a competitor (Mausner et al., 2012, p. 14).

In the US perspective, this competition has been shaped by two major agreements signed in November 2008: The Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) and the- Security Agreement (SA) often referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The SOFA imposed rules and procedures for US staff working in Iraq and the role of the US military in countering threats. It provided a timeline for the removal of US troops from Iraqi cities starting in 2009 and ending with the complete withdrawal from Iraq no later than 31 December 2011. In contrast, the SFA outlines wider bilateral relations between the two countries, including the political, cultural, economic, and security interests. This includes programs that support cultural exchanges, political institutions, human rights and social welfare, the rule of law, and forms of bilateral trade. It does not set specific levels of US assistance (Mausner et al., 2012, pp. 23- 4).

During 2011, the US failed to reach an agreement on continuing to deploy some US troops in Iraq. Initially, the US commander in Iraq wanted to maintain some 30 000 troops. This goal was not approved in Washington, and was cut to 9,000-11,000 in the 2011 spring and summer. The US stated in September 2011 that it was in negotiations with Iraqi leaders to keep US troops after the

withdrawal deadline of December 2011. The Obama administration expressed a willingness to preserve a force of 3,000 to 5,000 troops to pursue "training missions" for Iraqi forces. It was a much smaller number than previously proposed by US military and political leaders. Iraq's political leaders agreed in October 2011 to keep US military trainers in Iraq but failed to grant US troops protection from Iraqi law. The US said that any such restriction would stop an agreement from going forward (Mausner et al., 2012, p. 24).

2.1.7. The emergence of ISIS and the counter- insurgency policy in Iraq:

Al Qaeda affiliate is the most violent component of the 2014 Sunni rebellion, which became a major threat to Iraq's stability. Very often cooperating with members of the group operating in neighboring Syria, the group worked in Iraq and Syria under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Eventually, it changed its name to Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham (ISIS) in April 2013. ISIL was led by Abu Mus'ab Al- Zaraqawi until his assassination in 2006. It was also a successor to Al Qaeda in Iraq. Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi was the leader of ISIL who was active in both Iraq and Syria; he envisioned an Islamic Caliphate spanning the Islamic world. A report study on terrorism published by the US State Department suggested that there might be around 1,000- 2,000 ISIL militants in Iraq. Even though ISIL focused on Iraq and Syria, Jordanian authorities disrupted an alleged plot by ISIL in October 2012 to bomb multiple targets in Amman, Jordan, possibly including the US. Embassy. The

group had been widely regarded as an Al Qaeda affiliate, in spite of disagreements with the current senior Al Qaeda leaders who assumed mostly still in Pakistan. It refused Al Qaeda leadership again on June 30, 2014 by building on its June 2014 achievements in Iraq to declare a “caliphate” based on control of territory in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the group changed its name to the Islamic State (IS), and declaring Baghdadi as the “Commander of the Faithful” (Katzman, 2014, p. 13).

ISIL-initiated attacks grew rapidly after an assault on Sunni protesters in the town of Haouija incident on April 23, 2013. By 2013, ISIL increased its activity level to nearly 40 mass casualty attacks per month, far more than the ten per month of 2010, including attacks covering multiple cities. At the same year, ISIL claimed territorial control, including operating several training camps in areas near to the Syrian border. Group assaulted the Abu Ghraib jails and released over hundred suspected members of ISIL. On November 14, 2013, the director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center, Matt Olsen, informed Congress that ISIL is the strongest since its peak in 2006. During his visit to Washington D. C., Nuri Al- Maliki related violence in Iraq to "terrorists" affiliated with ISIL, and ignored broader Sunni resentment. Since then, ISIL-led fighters have took control of significant territories (Katzman, 2014, p. 13).

In June 2014, ISIS made another major advance by seizing Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul .The group murdered more than 1,500 Iraqi security force recruits in Tikrit, in what would be known as the Speicher Massacre. ISIS soon took control of major urban areas in Sunni provinces, oil fields, military bases,

police stations, and the critical Bayji refinery. At the beginning, Iraqi security forces proved to be incapable of defending their country. As ISIS reached the outskirts of Baghdad in 2014, Shi'aa Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani issued a call for Shi'aa to organize and join militia forces to defend Baghdad and Shi'aa areas. This resulted in the growth of Shi'aa militia groups known as *Al Hashed Al Shaabi* who helped stem the Islamic State's advance while they became even more powerful than the Iraqi army and police (Jones et al., 2017, pp. 106- 7).

ISIS's control of Iraq expanded dramatically but then started to contract. It threatened the Kurdistan Regional Government capital of Erbil and captured Anbar's provincial capital, Ramadi. By late 2015, ISIS had suffered some setbacks but remained control over large part of Iraq. By 2016, the Iraqi security forces became more effective with the US airstrikes aid, while ISIS had lost cities like Ramadi and Fallujah. By 2016 to 2017, the Iraqi security forces aided by Sunni, Shi'aa, Kurds, Iran, the US, and other allied forces regain territory from an exhausted ISIS in Mosul, Sinjar, Bayji, Tikrit, Ramadi, and other provinces. Eventually, ISIS declined as its territorial control decreased to 1.1 million people (6.3 million people in 2014) (Jones et al., 2017, pp.107- 9).

2.2. The economic impacts:

The economy of Iraq is dominated by the oil sector, which accounted for most Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Any increase in price or exported volume of oil is reflected in high nominal GDP, regardless of whether domestic consumption or investment increases. Oil revenues provide funds that can be invested, consumed or may even be collected as financial assets (Youcif, 2012, pp. 2- 3).

After the Iran– Iraq war, Iraq's economy was affected by inflation, gradual demobilization, unemployment, high debt, low oil revenues, currency depreciation, and non- responsive private sector, low production, deteriorating in living standards, general impoverishment, and lack of reconstruction funds. However, the Iraqi government did not focus seriously on the economic challenges that it will face by the end of the war in 1988; Increasing military spending, heavy dependence on oil, lack of improvement of unemployment were some of the factors that caused real GDP to decline by 9 % in 1989. The Iraqi government recognized that it could not fund its ambitions or serve its debt obligations and needed inflows of revenues, which it could not accomplish with its oil Exports. The need for more oil revenues made the Iraqi government invade Kuwait with an ambition of taking control of its oil resources. However, Iraq occupation of Kuwait led to its military defeat by the US led coalition. This defeat worsened Iraqi economy and led to economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council in 1991 preventing all transactions with Iraq and sealed the economic fate of Iraq for years to come (Ozlu, 2005, p.14).

2.2.1. The destruction of Iraqi economy: Being a consumer economy:

The end of the Gulf war resulted in an international embargo that isolated the Iraqi economy from all the kinds of international transactions. The UN Secretary-General's mission assessed that the Iraqi people could "soon face another imminent catastrophe that could include epidemics and famine, if massive life-supporting needs are not met rapidly". The negotiations between the international community and Iraq to open limited exports of oil for basic foodstuffs and medication in 1991, resulted in the establishment of the "oil-for-food" program in 1995, which provided Iraq with the opportunity to sell oil to finance the purchase of humanitarian goods, and various mandated United Nations activities (Ozlu, 2005, p. 14).

During the time of economic sanctions regime, Iraq was fully dependent on imports for essential foodstuffs and medicine. Even though, the program was necessary for maintaining a vast majority of Iraqis' mere livelihood, it could not keep Iraq from being reduced to a low-income economy as of 2000. The sanctions regime strangled all commercial activity except oil production in Iraq. Since Iraq's only export item was oil, all other industries, especially agriculture, were abandoned. According to the UN Statistical Yearbook, Iraq's GNP in 1989 amounted to \$26.9 billion, and in 1996, it reached a low of \$6.5 billion. In comparison, population growth for the same period had been increased from 17.5 million to 21. GDP per population for this period declined from \$ 1, 537 per capita to \$ 343 (Ozlu, 2005, p. 16).

The most serious economic legacies headed by the Ba'ath party regime was oil over- production and the worsening condition of oil fields. There has been considerable optimism in the international community for the economic reconstruction of Iraq based on the estimates of its oil reserves. What the coalition noticed on the ground was running down oil fields because of the excessive oil production and water injection, the lack of suitable technology and maintenance (Ozlu, 2005, p. 17).

The Iraqi government used the oil revenues to give the needed support to private and government consumption; this was facilitated by Iraq's large public sector. Since 2003, the pay of public sector increased steadily. The liberal import regime that came with the cancellation of sanctions ensured that real consumption would rise on average especially for tradable goods. However, the vast migration proved that some Iraqis lost access to government jobs. In general, there has been growth in both public and private consumption (Youcif, 2012, p. 5).

The inability of Iraq to spend the allocated expenditure became a matter of discussion during the US presidential elections in 2008. When the US presidential candidate Obama raised the logical question of why Iraq, which had accrued fiscal surpluses, could not pay for its own reconstruction and security. Actually, the US, as occupying power, is the only responsible of providing security under the international law. In spite of the US policies of reconstructing the economy and providing security, the promoted insecurity explains why reconstructions proceeded very slowly. Only by 2008, capital formation was

accelerated by increasing security instead of expanded oil revenues (Youcif, 2012, p. 6).

2.2.2. Corruption, fraud, and malfeasance:

After capturing Baghdad, a massive reconstruction programs were launched by US commanders and political leaders to stabilize Iraq and bring the country to a new level of prosperity. However, corruption, fraud, and theft have ruined these programs, and money was completely diverted to 'security.' malfeasance started in the earliest days under the US- run Coalition Provisional Authority. Corruption has revealed the greed of the occupiers and the highly corrupted governing system they formed ('Corruption, Fraud and Gross Malfeasance'. (n. d., para. 10).

The aftermath of the 2003 invasion was marked by the massive influx of reconstruction and the state building resources, encouraged by lifting international sanctions. The massive influx has overwhelmed the spending and oversight capabilities of the damaged and deeply disorganized Iraqi public sector. The phenomenon was not limited to the Iraqis, as American plans for reconstruction have encountered significant oversight problems. The US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) states that 40% of the reconstruction projects evaluated had significant insufficiencies, including overcharging by sub- contractors, uncounted expenditure, waste and fraud (Agator, 2013, p. 2).

As Paul Bremer and his CPA team distributed hundreds of millions of dollars in cash, small companies and individuals saw advantages for rapid richness. Many of these small-timers, detecting that accountability was weak, cash widely available and rules easy to bend, engaged in fraud, theft, bribery, and different kinds of corruption ('Corruption, Fraud and Gross Malfeasance'. (n. d., para. 15).

A small US firm, Custer Battles, won early contracts for airport security and other services in Baghdad. Its rapid growth ended less than a year later when company principals left a computer spreadsheet after a meeting with US administration contracting personnel. The spreadsheet showed that the company was largely inflating costs in its cost- plus contracts and deceiving the US government of at least \$6.5 million. The company was found guilty of 37 counts of fraud, as well as establishing false firms in for a false billing ('Corruption, Fraud and Gross Malfeasance'. (n. d., para. 12 & 3).

A number of people were accused of conspiracy, money laundering, bribery, and other illegal activities. Robert J. Stein, the CPA's of Comptroller and Funding Officer, was blamed for \$82 million in cash and gave it to friendly contractors in return for cash, supplies and other favors. Stein have stolen at least \$ 2 million, received \$1 million in cash bribes and adding an extra \$683,000 in jewelry, cars, money and other favors. In January 2007, he was sentenced to nine years in prison. It is never known how many military and civilian personnel were involved in these corrupt acts and how much altogether was stolen, but it is clear that malfeasance was widespread ('Corruption, Fraud and Gross Malfeasance'. (n. d., para. 16).

Corruption, as a threat to state building efforts, has been called “the Nation’s second insurgency” by the Prime Minister Al-Maliki in 2006. Therefore, the country has consistently performed poorly in the past decade in most global corruption indicators. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI), has consistently rated Iraq among the worst-performing nations. Iraq was ranked 169th out of 175 countries in the 2012 CPI, getting a score of 18 out of 100. In line with these conclusions, Iraq had been ranked in the bottom 10 percentile in terms of controlling corruption in the World Bank's 2011 Worldwide Governance Indicators (Agator, 2013, p. 3).

Both of Iraqi government and CPA have established an anti-corruption bodies; such as, the Commission of Integrity, the Board of Supreme Audit, ministerial Inspector Generals, and the Iraqi Joint Anti- Corruption Council. Yet, they were unable stop the rising corruption, nor were able to track corrupt practices involving US or other foreign contractors ('Corruption, Fraud and Gross Malfeasance'. (n. d., para. 18).

2.2.3. The loss of purchasability:

A sharp decline in GDP and its most significant component, export earnings from the petroleum industry, resulted in a rapid increase in inflation and food prices for non- purchased goods via ration and a rapid decline in per capita products. Before the Gulf War, petroleum sales generated 62 percent of Iraq’s GNP. Unauthorized oil sales, the stimulation of some import substitution industries, and the expectation of an infusion of capital and goods from oil for

food contributed to an easing of the economic recession by 1996. In the mid-1990s, the purchasing power of an Iraqi salary was around 5 per cent of its worth before 1990 (Garfield, 1991, p. 29).

The price movements in Iraq were affected mainly by three factors: short-term local shortages, quantity restrictions on the supply of imported goods due to sanctions, and depreciation of the unofficial exchange rate of Iraqi dinar. The first factor was obviously at work during the war, when frequent air raids and extreme shortages of petrol interrupted the transport system and helped prevent the normal functioning of the markets. Though no price surveys were carried out at that time, unreliable evidence suggested that the localized shortages and failures resulted in massive rise in food and other price (Drèze and Gazdar, 1992, p. 6).

After the war, persistently high food prices have been widely attributed to import quantity limits imposed by sanctions, leading to supply constraints. This explanation is persuasive for the period preceding the lifting of food import restrictions in April 1991. The average price of wheat flour reached six dinars per kg in March, according to a market survey undertaken by the World Food Program. Since then the current level of 2- 2.5 dinars has declined. Yet this price remains 45 times higher than it was one year ago and since April there has not been any movement (Drèze and Gazdar, 1992, p. 7).

With the sanction's imposition in August 1990, the private sector became for the first time a competitive importer of food. Traders needed to find their own sources of hard currency, and this was only possible through unofficial

rates (the price of the Iraqi dinar rated \$3.2, while in the black market four dinars would exchange for one dollar). The dinar have lost value, and the current rate for eight dinars is around a one dollar. For imported goods that had been priced previously using the official exchange rate, market prices can be expected to rise about 2.5 times since August 1990 because of exchange rate movements alone. In fact, there were considerable increases observed for some items; such as, wheat and flour. That was mainly due to the loss of government support, which aggravates the effect of exchange rate movements. Comparing market prices between Jordan and Iraq for other staple foods, we find arbitration at an unofficial exchange rate almost complete. It is an important point, suggesting that nutritional deprivation in Iraq is not a matter of insufficient food availability but rather insufficient purchasing capacity (Drèze and Gazdar, 1992, p. 8).

2.2.4. The increase of the poor in the Iraqi society:

After 1990, the state institutions have been deteriorated and reduced in effectiveness, and were exposed to disruption and weaknesses. The limited state resources for social spending and services, especially on food and medicine. The cycle of poverty expanded, and an atmosphere of insecurity and instability grew at both the individual and the public levels. Furthermore, the sanctions period aggravated the imbalance in the distribution of national income, widening income differences within population groups, and increasing the gap between rich and poor (AL-Kozaay, 2016, p. 4).

Iraq has been classified as a middle- income country; however, the special circumstances witnessed over the past quarter century have made people even poorer as a result of a decline in average per capita of gross national income. This has been associated with a low social welfare. The distribution of people according to the average per capita expenditure has shown that the majority of Iraqis are centered on the poverty line, and some of them fell from the line. It means that a reduction in income or a rise in consumer demands has the power to push a large portion of the non-poor under the poverty line. If the poverty gap was estimated at 4.5%, this puts the consumption level of the majority of the poor extremely close to the poverty line. It would also mean that they might be lifted out of poverty by a relative improvement in their income or an increase in their share of government spending on public services (AL-Kozaay, 2016, p. 9).

The World Bank has found that poverty in Iraq is significantly higher among larger households, those with less educated heads and varies by the head of household's employment sector. It is also said that the face of poverty, insecurity and inequality in Iraq is primarily youth and females. As a result, trafficking and sexual exploitation of women and girls has increased to escape poverty. The poverty rate is also higher among youth than the overall rate, although there are differences between the governorates (Rohwerder, 2015, p. 3).

The available indicators showed that poverty is widespread. The per capita income is estimated to have fallen by almost 50 percent since 2001, and that despite of some recovery, it was only \$780 in 2004, which places Iraq in the low-

income counties category. According to recent studies, a quarter of the population almost depends on the monthly food rations given by the state for them. Iraq adopted the Cost of Basic Needs CBN method based on the calculation of the cost of basic food needs and the cost of basic non-food needs. Moreover, the determination of the national poverty line relied on the scale of national poverty (Iraq) conducted by the Central Agency for Statistics and Information Technology of the Year (2009) calculated the amount of poverty level in Iraq (22.9%) that is around a quarter or a fifth of the population is located under the poverty line. Rural areas are considered as the region most vulnerable to poverty spread (39%) compared with (16%) urban areas. That is related to the country's social and economic condition, and is a generating environment of poverty given the high fertility rate, as growing population is 3.5% of the country while it is 2.7 % of the city population (AL-Kozaay, 2016, p. 11).

The World Bank report on poverty in Iraq between 2007 and 2012, suggested non- labor income components and public and private transfers including salaries and domestic remittances that led to poverty reduction. International and domestic remittances accounted for 13% of the overall poverty reduction, mainly from domestic remittances. Pensions and other public transfers such as social security net compensation accounted for almost 27 per cent of poverty elimination (Rohwerder, 2015, pp. 9- 10).

The National Strategy for Poverty Reduction focuses on improving the productivity of the poor to address low salaries leading to poverty; strengthening public health services to prevent poverty exacerbation; introducing compulsory

education to the intermediate level and improving its quality in order to improve educational returns; expanding the availability of affordable houses and providing better living standards for the poor; enhancing social protection programs directed to the poor; and reducing the inequalities between men and women to counter the low female labor force participation (Rohwerder, 2015, pp. 10- 1).

Until now, Iraq has not witnessed any serious attempts to solve the poverty problem. Everything achieved was an effort to cope with symptoms by establishing social aids and funds, without resolving the real problem (AL-Kozaay, 2016, p. 13).

2.2.5. Extensive exploitation of Iraqi oil by US oil companies:

Due to the economic sanctions and Saddam Hussein's preference for investors from other countries; such as Russia, France, Germany and China, Iraq was restricted to Anglo-American International oil companies (IOCs) prior to the US invasion of Iraq and the subsequent regime change. Thus, many critics argue that a new friendly government different to that of Saddam's regime, would favor US and UK companies at the expense of Russian, French, Chinese and other companies that signed oil exploration and production contracts with Saddam Hussein between 1991 and 2003. The starting point of these critics is that the interests of the US and UK governments are closely linked to those of major IOCs with headquarters in these two countries. In recent years, many have indicated a strong relationship exists between the Bush

administration and the oil companies mainly because many high-profile politicians in this administration, in the past have served for and appear to be closely related to the energy industry (Vivoda, 2007, p. 8).

Many further analyzes indicated that the major American IOCs have seized the new administration and used it to promote their interests. At least, the Bush administration is closely allied and acted in concert with the IOCs. Undoubtedly, because of these special interests, the new Iraqi regime opened up Iraqi oil industry to foreign investment under US and British pressure, which favored the Anglo-American IOCs. According to one analyst, the 2007 draft Iraqi Oil Law was "drafted, behind locked doors, by a US consulting firm hired by the Bush administration and then carefully retouched by Big Oil". It would also be extremely profitable for Anglo-American IOCs, as they will obtain access to at least 64% of the major fields in Iraq and benefit from profit rates of up to 75%. Iraq's oil wealth will go through "no less than institutionalized raping and pillaging. Big Oil has been described as ecstatic "as it was placed to" profit handsomely and long-term (minimum 30 years) with fantastic rates of return (Vivoda, 2007, pp. 8- 9).

2.2.6. The absence of foreign investors:

Violence in Iraq, lack of oil laws and well-structured investment laws. The risks of high taxes and the loss of land ownership rights all combine to prevent foreign companies from investing in Iraqi petroleum until they can reach a deal that eliminates such risks. A number of politicians in the Iraqi parliament

continue to support the principle of nationalizing the oil industry, which is of no benefit to foreign investors, and that the Iraqi government is unlikely to draft an oil law before the new government settles in. Almost all legislations were canceled until the formation a new government (Cordesman, 2010, pp. 17- 8).

Iraqi legislators in the Council of Representatives have been strong supporters of state ownership of petroleum reserves, trade unionists and local politicians. In comparison, Prime Minister Maliki and Oil Minister Shahrستاني have shown stronger interest in bringing as foreign investment, aid and technologies as quickly as possible in attempt to increase oil and gas export revenues. Although Nuri Al Maliki appeared to support independent foreign efforts, Unlike Shahrستاني who has concentrated heavily on developing a domestically controlled, state-owned industry- driven initiative. As a result, the Iraqi Oil Ministry has signed contracts with many international companies to improve Iraq's oil fields without the approval of the Council of Representatives, leaving serious ambiguities over taxes, security, land rights, and how future governments would treat contracts (Cordesman, 2010, p. 18).

Iraq has few business laws in its archives and does not have a strong history of operating international business transactions. For a variety of reasons, foreign investors may have reservations about doing business in Iraq including:

- ✚ Firstly, no immunity from Iraqi laws; the Security Agreement of 2009 claimed that foreign companies must abide by all Iraqi laws;
- ✚ Secondly, owning property; foreigners are banned from owning property in Iraq;

- ✚ Thirdly, Tax payments; all Iraqis and non-Iraqis residing in Iraq must pay taxes on income earned from commercial activities in the country or activities of a commercial nature;
- ✚ Finally, concerning political risks the country still suffers from frequent attacks, in addition to some antagonism from political leaders and militias toward foreign companies operating in Iraq. (Cordesman, 2010, pp. 18-9).

The Iraqi government had passed the Hydrocarbons Law that will eliminate many of the uncertainties that plagued Iraq's oil sector. If disputes between the central government and the regional government, and between the executive branch and Parliament, would be avoided by sticking to the regulations, then the process of approving and executing contracts will be much smoother. These kinds of disputes construct an unstable business climate where only few companies are willing to operate in. Moreover, the lack of transparency in Iraq's oil industry and the inconsistencies in the Iraqi government's actions caused problems for international industries. Norwegian company DNO, one of the first companies to sign an exploration deal with the KRG, saw its shares fall by 50 per cent on the Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo Børs). After an insider trading scandal involving Ashti Hawrami, the KRG minister of natural resources. Hawrami was accused of playing intermediary in a \$29.7 million sale of DNO stock to the KRG- contracted firm Genel Enerji of Turkey (Cordesman, 2010, p. 19).

The Iraqi government has also taken actions to ease investment laws in order to attract foreign business. In October 2006, the Iraqi government enacted the National Investment Law providing 10 years of tax-free status to foreign companies, ensuring complete repatriation of investment profits in approved projects and providing firms a three-year exemption for import duties for equipment needed for projects. The regional Government of Kurdistan also has established its own Investment law, with much gentler conditions for foreign companies. Furthermore, at the end of 2009 the Council of Representatives approved an amendment to the National Investment Law, which enables foreign companies and individuals to own land in Iraq (Cordesman, 2010, pp. 21- 2).

As this analysis confirmed, foreign direct investment in Iraq's oil industry has been Small and limited. Despite the strong potential of such a country to attract foreign capital. Most of FDI In the oil- sector is in Iraq's Kurdistan Region. There exists a considerable foreign commercial investment in Iraq, but very few projects can classify as FDI (Hanna, 2014, p. 10).

2.3. The social impacts:

On March 20, 2003, the US, UK and a Coalition of alliances invaded Iraq, and overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime. They were allegedly bringing peace, prosperity and democracy. However, ever since, the country was wracked by violence, civil strife and economic hardship. Thousands of innocent people were dead and injured, millions displaced, and many other cities in Iraq were ruined (Paul and Nahory, 2007, p. 17).

2.3.1. The huge number of Iraqi war's deaths and losses:

When the US invaded Iraq, US officials were at great fear to underscore their commitment in preventing harm to Iraqi civilians. Shortly before the US invasion of Iraq, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that "if force became necessary, it is obvious that coalition forces will be taking special care to avoid civilian casualties". When the US occupied Iraq, the President Bush said, "I want the Americans and the whole world to know that all efforts will be taken by the coalition forces to spare innocent civilians from harm." Nearly two years after the war, President Bush admitted, "30,000, more or less, have died from the initial incursion and continued violence against Iraqis" (Crawford, 2013, pp. 1-2).

The US- led military operations in major cities have resulted in many civilian deaths and injuries. People were killed as a result of ordnance explosions, collapsed buildings, sniper shots, fires and many other reasons. Though Coalition Forces claimed that the majority of those killed in the attacks are military- age men, many witnessed that most of the victims in these operations have been children, women, and the elderly. A 2005 UNAMI report revealed that "The United Nations was unable to collect accurate numbers on civilian losses following such operations, but reports received from civil society groups, medical sources and other observers confirm that they are significant and include women and children (Paul and Nahory, 2007, p. 74).

The absence of data makes it almost impossible to know exactly the causes of the huge deaths in post-war Iraq, which included armed conflict, destruction of infrastructure, limited access to food and water, illness, and internal displacement. The 2003 war devastated essential infrastructure for water, food, and sanitation, which was already weakened by the Gulf War and thirteen years of sanctions. Nevertheless, armed violence has undeniably been the leading cause of excessive death since 2003, whether from the Coalition's military operations, insurgent operations or, violence by armed sectarian militias, death squads and criminal gangs. UNAMI's report of October 2003 noted that according to the Iraqi Ministry of Health, 7,054 civilians were killed violently (More than 4,984 in Baghdad only), most of them as result of gunshot wounds" (Paul and Nahory, 2007, p. 74).

An aggravating factor has been the disintegration of Iraq's health system. The Iraqi medical services had thus degraded to an extent that they could no longer meet the needs of the people. Due to the security crisis, many Iraqi physicians have left the country, leaving hospitals with under-staff or doctors who do not have much experience or the needed skills to manage emergencies. Therefore, hospitals and clinics lack basic medical supplies including equipment and drugs. In the early days of the invasion, the US declared that it was rebuilding and re-equipping Iraq's hospitals and primary care clinics. However, poor planning and corruption-riddled rebuilding projects failed to reach this promise (Paul and Nahory, 2007, p. 96).

Therefore, the overall number of direct military deaths for Iraqi citizens and military is about 165,000. The number of those who died due to the indirect effects of war cannot be measured. When we add the almost 5,000 coalition soldiers, journalists and aid agencies who died in Iraq, then the entire war took at least 170,000 lives in direct violence (Crawford, 2011, p. 24).

2.3.2. The rise of sectarian and ethnic cleansing in Iraq:

The insurgency in Iraq became a “war after the war” that threatens to divide the country and create a full- scale civil war. It has caused sectarian and ethnic violence that defined the struggle to reshape Iraq as a democratic state, has emerged as a major threat to the Gulf region and therefore has linked to the larger Sunni- Shi'ite Islamic struggle. The nature of the fighting in Iraq has changed from a war between the Coalition forces and the former regime loyalists to a much more complex conflict, including a number of Sunni groups, Shi'ite militias and foreign extremists, which have expanded to become a widespread civil war (Cordesman, 2007, p. 8).

Sectarian and ethnic divisions grew to become popular movements. Even though most Iraqis still expressed support for national unity in public opinion polls, the basis for violence and cleansing widened to include more and more people in sectarian and ethnic tension and violence. This increase in tensions was highly common where militias and regional defense forces gave the only real security, young men had little jobs, and the struggle for controlling villages, towns, and neighborhoods became struggles for housing, jobs, and the right to

live an ordinary life. In 2006, the UN declared that Iraqi civilian deaths averaged 94 a day (Cordesman, 2007, p. 20).

The Pentagon's August- November Stability and Security in Iraq report outlined the security environment as follows:

- ✚ Baghdad became the core of much of the violence in Iraq, but it was also significant in the provinces of Diyala and Anbar, and in the cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, Basra, Amara and Balad;
- ✚ The Violence in Anbar was completely launched by Sunni extremists and targeted at Coalition forces. However, al-Qaeda in Iraq and affiliated Sunni extremists have been attempting to intimidate the local population. Such efforts caused a backlash. Several tribal representatives and leaders of the Sunni Rejectionist Group began localized attempts to regain control of their territories;
- ✚ In Diyala, and recently in Balad, a sectarian struggle for power and influence was part of the conflict between al-Qaeda in Iraq and Jaysh al-Mahdi. In Diyala, sectarian violence dropped significantly in September, because of a successful series of operations by Iraq's army and coalition forces, which significantly degraded AQI Activity. Yet, the number of casualties increased in October, as AQI continued sectarian attacks;
- ✚ The conflict in Basra, Amara, and the south was described by tribal competition, growing intra- shi'a competition, and assaults on coalition troops operating in the country. (Cordesman, 2007, p. 20)

As the insurgency transformed into a civil conflict, the number of attacks in Iraq became less important. The growing control of local populations by sectarian armed groups was much important. Nationalists were either eliminated in the sectarian struggle or pressured into taking a side. Ethnic groups established local security structures to win the trust and political support of members of their respective sects. The armed groups used threats, physical intimidation, blackmail, seizure of property, home and business raids, use of checkpoints to force other groups out, kidnappings, misuse of government offices and disappearances to conduct a soft ethnic cleansing operation towards others. In early 2007, a soft sectarian cleansing had all but eliminated nationalist views, even though Iraqi government and security forces openly expressed their commitment to unity. The fact was that increasingly the Iraqi population have linked themselves to a number of local armed groups who have all fought for political and economic space (Cordesman, 2007, p. 22).

2.3.3. The collapse of educational system and its impacts on the Iraqi society:

The educational system of Iraq, once vaunted as the most advantageous in the region; however, it has suffered a patterned process of deterioration and dismantling. Iraqi schools and universities were bombed and damaged during the invasion. According to a UN report, some 84 percent of Iraq's higher education institutions were burned, looted, or destroyed. About 2.000 laboratories need to be re-equipped and 30.000 computers have to be obtained

and installed nationally. Like many higher education institutions across Iraq, University of Baghdad survived the bombing nearly unharmed. Twenty of the capital's colleges were destroyed during the subsequent looting and burning. No institution escaped: The Faculty of Education in Waziriyya was raided daily for two weeks; the Veterinary College in Abu Garaib lost all its equipment; two buildings in the faculty of arts stand smoke-blackened against the skyline (Adriaensens, 2013, p. 1).

According to recent analysis, the Iraqi society contains 40 percent of its total population of the Young people (above 15 years old). If the education system does not improve significantly, it will create a staggering population of young, uneducated, and jobless men and women, who have always been the largest source for insurgent groups. In addition, if the government succeeded in stabilizing the security situation in Iraq, it would still face more difficulties if it could not educate and hire its young people. A limited number of Iraqi students gain grants from government and other countries to obtain their bachelors and masters degrees abroad. After graduation, those students are supposed to return to Iraq, but many want to continue living abroad rather than returning to their homeland. Therefore, The Iraqi government must take efforts to channel funds toward Iraqi schools in order to produce a more educated population that can contribute back to the economy and help stabilize the country (Cordesman, 2010, p. 50).

Since the occupation of Iraq by the US forces in 2003, 80% of educational institutions were destroyed and the educational process collapsed. Illiteracy rates rose to 60% and the level of student enrolment is 55% and 74% of those between the ages of 15 and 24 were still able to read and write. The deteriorating security situation has prevented many students from attending school which led to the postponement of school attendance for several days due to the curfew, which could last for many days. The curfews were frequently on several occasions in the year leading to the end of the school year without finishing the school curriculum. In Madrid International Seminar on the assassinations of Iraqi academics (2006), it was proven that more than 180 academics, from a wide range of academic and scientific fields of study from all parts of Iraq, since the US invasion, were murdered and many other hundreds were forced into exile. The way of assassinations to those academics appeared to proved claims that a campaign existed and had been conducted to erase a key section of the secular middle class in Iraq (Jamil and Issa, 2010, p. 5- 6).

Iraqi professors blamed the US invasion of worsening the situation in Iraq. Iraqi professors were being murdered, and no steps, or measures were taken to punish the murders. Dr. Saad Jawad, an Iraqi professor of Political Sciences said: "Nothing has been done". A US soldier was kidnapped, and Baghdad was on full alert, but the killing of an Iraqi professor? None of this happened. Omar Al Hajj, a professor at the University of Technology, said: "Death squads suspected of killing Iraqi experts and scientists are the same forces that attacked Iraq, looted its museums and looted its banks, and they are

also the same parties that kidnap businessmen and foreigners for high ransoms" (Adriaenssens, 2013, p. 6).

2.3.4. The destruction of the Iraqi cultural heritage:

The cultural heritage of Iraq, particularly its archeological and historical heritage, is of great importance for understanding global-scale development in human history, including some of the world's oldest examples of agriculture villages, cities, literature, science, empires and many other human societies' socio-cultural attributes. For decades, Iraq's cultural heritage had suffered from a series of destructive impacts that have gained widespread coverage in international press. The geopolitical roots of these impacts over the past 30 years include: The Iran- Iraqi War (1980– 8), the Coalition War (1990– 1), the 1991 Spring Rebellions in southern and northern Iraq, the imposition of oppressive UN sanctions against Iraq (1990– 2003), the US invasion of Iraq 2003, the fall of Saddam's regime, and the occupation of many parts of north and west Iraq by ISIS (2014– 7) (Matthews. et al., 2020, p. 2).

The most imminent and serious threats to Iraq's cultural heritage were in areas recently controlled by ISIS, particularly in the city and region of Mosul, the Sinjar region, the province of Anbar, the northern and eastern province of Salah Ed- Din and parts of Divala. In the south of Iraq and in the Kurdistan region to the north and east, cultural heritage is threatened more by persistent under-investment and economic instability than through systematic destruction and looting. Of the four Iraqi sites currently on the UNESCO World Heritage List

(Ashur, Hatra, Samarra, Erbil Citadel), the first three are listed by UNESCO as World Heritage Sites in danger, consequently causing a serious and approaching risk to their integrity as places of major cultural heritage (Mühl, n. d., p. 7).

The Museum of Mosul had suffered severe depredations of its exhibitions and collections. In addition, various cultural sites of value to Iraq's ethnic and religious groups, including churches, mosques, minarets and graves, have been eliminated and damaged by ISIS in its effort to eradicate the rich cultural and religious diversity that has differentiate this region of the Middle East. Religious buildings of all denominations were the primary target of destruction, particularly historic buildings with a strong symbolic and interreligious meaning, most revered by the local community (Mühl, n. d., p. 8).

The collapse of Islamic period architecture in Mosul has both catastrophic and irreversible impacts for the world cultural heritage and the urban integrity of Mosul. Almost all of the architectural landmarks that shaped the city's exceptional panorama were removed (the Mosque of the Prophet Yunus in Nineveh, the Shrine of Imam Yahya Ibn Al-Qasim, the Mosque of the Prophet Seth and the Mosque al- Khidr). In addition, medieval architecture 'Mosul Architecture,' has been deleted from the city. This school represented an architectural combination of Christian and Shi'ite styles, rare in the Islamic world and very little investigated by scholars. The systemic destruction, of cemeteries and places of worship has been used as an effective means of humiliation and

cultural disintegration in the continuing ideological struggle with local communities and the larger world (Mühl, n. d., pp. 8- 10).

In order to protect the archaeological sites, historical and heritage value, the Iraqi government, through the State Board for Antiquities and Heritage (SBAH) and its Local Antiquities Directorates, had employed a national system of salaried site guards whose role was to secure sites under their control. This system, which had been quite efficient, collapsed after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Kurdistan region has succeeded in sustaining a network of government- employed site guards. Yet, current economic adversity had once brought this system under threat and is likely to lead to renewed episodes of illicit looting of archaeological sites for financial gains (Mühl, n. ., p. 11)

Conclusion:

The aim of a regime change in Iraq was made to create a stable and legitimate state, also a state that is friendly to the US. The outcome, however, appeared to be a failed state plagued by prolonged insurgency, leading to a civil war, and most importantly to the formation of ISIS. The failure of the US to provide security and to apply a counterinsurgency policy led to the rise of corruption which damaged both of the Iraqi economy and infrastructure. In addition to the US foreign policy became evident through its extensive exploitation of the Iraqi oil (Oil for Food program and preventing Iraq from foreign investment) and the destruction of religious building (to spread its ideologies).

Chapter three: The US post- invasion strategy in Iraq:

Introduction:

The US War on Iraq lasted for almost ten years (March 2003- December 2011). The events of this war were violent, bloody, and brutal. The War on Iraq resulted in a terrible number of deaths, destroyed infrastructure, weak governmental structure, and a large number of refugees. The withdrawal of the US forces in 2011 had worsened the Iraqi crisis, which led to rise of sectarian conflicts, emergence of extremist groups; such as, Al- Qaeda and ISIS in Iraq. All these consequences led the falling of the country in a state of disorder and turmoil. Before the US invasion in 2003, the US administration had promised the Iraqi people to rebuild a new Iraq with strong institutions and a legitimate government. However, contrarily, the US troops left the country worse than before. The intervention of the US in Iraq again in 2014, which had been associated with the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), had contributed largely in the collapse of Iraq, and other countries in the Middle Eastern region.

In this context, Chomsky (2014) stated that the invasion of Iraq is the most important factor for the rise of ISIS in the Middle East. Therefore, the *Bush Doctrine*, which was initiated shortly after 9/ 11 attacks to fight global terror, was not effective. The US administration had not the mission accomplished and has failed in achieving its objectives. Moreover, he described the US as the greatest

Evil Empire in the world and the leading terrorist state in the world (as cited in Qaraman, 2016, p. 47).

The present chapter analyzes the US post- invasion strategy in Iraq in the light of the aforementioned impacts of the US War on Iraq, as well as its significant role in reshaping the Middle East, taking into account the reasons which prompted the US administration to map the new Middle East and the strategies to do so. It describes the use of *Constructive Chaos Theory* to destroy and rebuild Iraq for the sake of re- establishing the new Middle East Road Map. Moreover, the destruction and rebuilding of Iraq was executed in favor of making Israel the greater and strongest country in the Middle East, since it has US unconditional support. In addition, amongst the aims of the US post- invasion of Iraq is to threaten Iran's expansionism in the region.

3.1. Using Constructive Chaos Theory to destroy and rebuild Iraq:

The Theory of Chaos is unpredictable course of events. Some nonlinear and complex linear systems have been called chaos as the chaotic and unpredictable progression of time. Chaos is best demonstrated by the Popular Butterfly Effect of Lorentz who explained the term as 'the idea that a butterfly which stirs air in Hong Kong will turn storm systems next month in New York'. For example, the concept of deterministic chaos shows the prediction in the form of a model which is very responsive to the initial condition (Jørgensen, 2008, para. 1).

The Constructive Chaos, or "Creative Chaos" is a strategy, used by the US administration, in which the US tries to destroy nations in sharp contrast to its aims and interests. As a matter of fact, the US administration uses a range of tools; such as, media propaganda as well as, domestic and international lobbyists to cause creative chaos in an attempt to achieve its goal in other nations. It is worth to mention that the theory of Constructive Chaos was introduced by Condoleezza Rice, a former US Secretary of State during George W. Bush's presidency, for the sake helping the US administration to implement its strategy of re- building the Middle East.

The theory of Creative Chaos is; in fact; a series of instructions in policymaking on which the US administration relies to execute its policies in order to achieve its objectives and aims in the Middle East (Awaght, 2016, para. 2 & 3). The concept was; in fact, introduced by Condoleezza Rice during her press briefing at the State Department, on July 21, 2006, when she was questioned on the initiatives she intended to take to bring peace back to Lebanon. She responded:

I have no interest in diplomacy for the sake of returning Lebanon and Israel to the status quo ante. ... I think it would be a mistake. What we are seeing here, in a sense, is the growing- the birth pangs of a new Middle East and whatever we do we have to be certain that we're pushing forward to the new Middle East not going back to the old one. ('Special Briefing on Travel to the Middle East and Europe: Secretary Condoleezza Rice', 2006)

Seen from the US perspective, what happened in Lebanon in 2006 (the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah) had no relation whatsoever with the recovering of soldiers captured by the Hezbollah. What was at stake was the carrying out of the long nurtured theory of *Constructive Chaos*. According to the adepts of philosopher Leo Strauss (1899- 1973), German- American political philosopher and a 'neo- conservative', real power cannot be exerted from if one remains in the status quo, but only, quite the contrary, in the act of destroying all forms of resistance. It is by plunging the masses into chaos that the elites can aspire to ensure the stability of their position (Meysan, 2006, para. 3).

The Theory of Constructive Chaos has the aim of fragmenting large countries into smaller ones as a way of constructing a more divided, weak states with fragile political institutions. Moreover, these new states will be always dependent of strong foreign countries for help.

Taking into account the case of nowadays Iraq, there has been an impending collapse of the Iraqi government, which lost its power and influence in the Iraqi political arena. Consequently, its weakness led to establish an integrated government that caused Iraq to lose control of its institutions and security services. Moreover, it would inevitably damage the existing state structure. The Iraqi forces failed to suppress ISIS, in addition to its incapability to prevent the Iraqi government from controlling the sectarian conflict between the Shiite and Sunni people (Mitchell, 2014, p. 3).

As a matter of fact, the aforementioned theory has been best implemented by the US policymakers in Iraq. After 9/ 11 attacks, the US used those attacks as a pretext to fabricate reasons about the threat that Saddam Hussein posed to both the US and global security with his WMD programs and his links to Al-Qaeda, a jihadist organization which was responsible of 9/ 11 attacks, in order to invade Iraq in the so- called *Iraq Operation Freedom* to liberate Iraq from the chains of tyranny and authoritarianism of the Baathist regime, and build a new Iraq. In fact, the overall aim of the US invasion was to re- build a new Iraq with a secular and liberal ideology that would not threaten the US interests in the region and Israel. Furthermore, it would establish strong bi- lateral relations with Israel in the Middle. Eventually, what is witnessed in reality is that since the US invasion Iraq had never been stabilized. The successive governments in Iraq had been; unfortunately, unable to restore peace and security in Iraq, as the sectarian conflicts had been stiffened between the major ethnic divisions in the country on one hand, and; on the other hand, between the Iraqi army, *Al Hashed Al Shaabi*, and ISIS. Therefore, since Iraq undergoes chaos and lack of order, the only way to solve the country's political and social problems is to divide the country into three newly- constructed states: A Kurdish state in the North, a Sunni state in the Middle part of the country, and a Shiite state in the South.

3.2. 'Blood Borders': Re-establishing the new Middle East Road

Map:

Since the Middle East is the most strategically important area in the world, the US strategy towards the Middle East has been shaped by a certain strategic world order framework that is generally accepted, although there are tactical disagreements; often sharp ones. According to the US President Eisenhower, the primary significant interest of the US in the Middle Eastern region has been to (1) be the major actor and player in the Middle East, and (2) to maintain its pro- relations with Israel. In addition, the US President Harry Truman stated that the US unconditional support to the Israeli expansion in the Middle East focused basically on the military success of Israel for the fact that Israel could become a strategic asset to protect US interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (Chomsky, 1991, pp. 10- 1).

After the end of the Coalition War (1990- 1) against Iraq and 9/ 11 attacks, the US has changed its foreign policy and security strategy in the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf region. The strategy of *dual containment* towards both countries of Iraq and Iran was an important staple of US foreign policy and military planning in the region. During this period, the US interests focused primarily on preserving its sole access to Gulf oil resources at reasonable prices (Sokolsky, 2003, p. 12).

This point of view had been advocated by MacMillan (2003) who stated in his book *US Interests and Objectives* that oil had been a US national security. Therefore, depending on that important criterion, the US ensured its presence

in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf through maintaining the unhindered flow of oil to world markets at stable prices. It is worth to mention that assuring the flow of oil in both regions has been the primary motive for the US to change its foreign policy in order to re- establish the new Road Map of the Middle East (p. 18).

In fact, the Middle East today witnesses a state of stasis, chaos, and tension in the process of changing structure and order, or creating a new one. Whether the Gulf countries; such as, Saudi Arabia and its allies agree to such challenge or not, it is a real problem. The issue of the Middle East involves Iran's nuclear and non- nuclear ambitions and its Shiite proxies, the disaffiliated nations, ISIS threat, also foreign presence in the region (mainly the US, UK, Russia, China, and Turkey). Moreover, the economic crisis, political instability, violence, conflicts, the effects of the Arab Spring, and the fluctuating oil prices help accelerate tensions and instability which lead to destroying the Middle Eastern order (Bardaji, 2016, p. 85).

Relying on its global hegemony, the US intends to reshape the Middle East for several causes: (1) protecting the oil reserves concentrated in the Persian Gulf; for oil is a strategic commodity, (2) assuring US military presence in the Middle East and the Gulf to guarantee the flow of oil to the world economy, (3) fighting global terrorism and jihadist organizations in the region, (4) deterring states and regimes that sponsor terrorism, and (5) containing Iran and its proxy allies in the region.

Since the US has been the sole global power, it has the duty of maintaining its global hegemony. After the collapse of the Evil Empire, the US is seen to face the threat of global terrorism in the Middle East. However, according to US policymakers, terrorism is much related to Islam; although Islam denounces terrorism and violence. The US has listed some organizations; such as HAMAS and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations in the region; for being proxy allies to Iran which is considered a state- sponsor terrorism in the region. Therefore, the presence of terrorist organizations in the region threatens both the US and Israeli interests.

Securing the US global hegemony and protecting its interests in the Middle East requires from the US administration to maintain its constant support to Israel, and its changing policy towards the Arab countries. The US has a commitment to engage in the Arab- Israeli conflict to end the conflict and engage in the peace process in favor of Israel. However, the Zionist lobby in the US administration which strongly advocated the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is pushing the US to re- draw the map of a new Middle East for the sake of fragmenting the whole region into small, weak states which will constitute further threats to Israel and the US in the region (Hinnebusch, 2007, p. 2).

Together with their counterparts in the Middle East, the Israeli policymakers have been working hard to implement their colonization project in the Middle East, which was written in 1996 under the title of *A clean break: a new strategy to secure the Kingdom of Israel*.

The strategy called for:

- ✚ the canceling of the Oslo peace agreements;
- ✚ the elimination of Yasser Arafat;
- ✚ the annexation of the Palestinian territories ;
- ✚ the overthrow of Saddam Hussein to destabilize, Syria and Lebanon in a chain of events ;
- ✚ the dismantling of Iraq and the creation of a Palestinian state in its territory ;
- ✚ the utilization of Israel as a complementary base for the US Star Wars program. ('A Clean Break : A New Strategy for Securing the Realm', 1996)

That viewpoint concurs with that of the US administration. The control of areas rich in hydrocarbons defined by Zginiew Brzezinski and Bernard Lewis as the "arc of crisis", ie. The arc reaching from the Gulf of Guinea to the Caspian sea going through the Persian Gulf, demands a redefinition of borders, States and political regimes : a "remodeling of the Greater Middle East," as expressed by the US President George W. Bush (Meysan, 2006, para. 6).

The idea is simple: substitute to the States inherited by the collapse of the Ottoman empire, smaller entities of mono-ethnic character, and neutralize those mini-states by setting up them permanently against each other. However, in order to define new states, the existing ones must first be destroyed. That is

what the Bush Administration and its allies had been doing since five years with a great enthusiasm. The results were obvious:

- ✚ Occupied Palestine's territory has been reduced by 7%; the Gaza strip and the West Bank have been separated by a wall; the Palestinian authority has been ruined;
- ✚ The UN has ordered Lebanon to disarm, expel the Syrian forces and dissolve the Hezbollah;
- ✚ The Saddam Hussein dictatorship was replaced in Iraq by a still more cruel regime responsible for more than 3000 dead per month; in total anarchy, the country is on the verge of fragmenting into three distinct entities. (Meysan, 2006, para. 7- 8).

The idea of remodeling of the Greater Middle East has been originally published in a strategic study by Ralph Peters entitled *Blood Borders: How a better Middle East would look*, in the *Armed Forces Journal* (2006).


In his article, Ralph Peters (2006) believed that international borders are never completely just; The degree of injustice they inflict upon those whom frontiers force together, or separate makes an enormous difference- often the difference between freedom and oppression, tolerance and atrocity, the rule of law and terrorism, or even peace and war. The borders in the Middle East are unjust, as he claimed, and this issue generates more trouble than can be consumed locally. While the Middle East has far more problems than

dysfunctional borders alone- from cultural stagnation through scandalous inequality to deadly religious extremism (para. 1 & 2).

Believing that no adjustment of borders could make every minority in the Middle East happy, Peters (2006) stated that ethnic and religious groups live intermingled and have intermarried. He further added:

Reunions based on blood, or belief might not prove quite as joyous as their current proponents expect. The boundaries projected in the maps ... redress the wrongs suffered by the most significant "cheated" population groups, such as the Kurds, Baluch and Arab Shia, but still fail to account adequately for Middle Eastern Christians, Bahais, Ismailis, Naqshbandis and many another numerically lesser minorities. (para. 4)

In fact, the map, which was planned a long time ago, involved establishing a crescent of insecurity, disorder, chaos and violence in order to affect the Middle East countries, starting from Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. Therefore, the new map of the Middle East would assure protection for the US and Israel from future rebellions or resistances that would threaten their interests. The changes throughout the region are shown in the map below:



Map 1: A New Middle East Map Proposed by Ralph Peters. (Source: brilliantmaps.com)

According to the new borders of the Middle East proposed by Ralph Peters (2006), the changes shown in the map would make the whole Middle Eastern look like as follows:

- ✚ **Israel:** Returns to its pre-1967 borders.
- ✚ **Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq** All lose territory to create a Free Kurdistan.
- ✚ **Free Kurdistan:** New state created for the Kurds.
- ✚ **Greater Lebanon:** a reborn Phoenecia that also gains territory at the expense of Syria.
- ✚ **Greater Jordan:** gains territory at Saudi expense.

- ✚ **Sunni Iraq:** One of three successor states to Iraq, this one would obviously be primarily Sunni.
- ✚ **Arab Shia State:** Another successor state to Iraq, would house Iraq's current Shia population along with gaining territory from Iran.
- ✚ **Islamic Sacred State:** A new state that would act as an Islamic Vatican carved from Saudi Arabia.
- ✚ **Saudi Arabia:** Loses territory to Jordan, Arab Shia State, Yemen and the Islamic Sacred State.
- ✚ **Yemen:** Gains land from Saudi Arabia.
- ✚ **UAE:** Loses territory to Arab Shia State, although Dubai likely to remain an independent playground for the rich.
- ✚ **Kuwait and Oman** would retain their current borders.
- ✚ **Azerbaijan:** Gains territory from Iran.

Actually, there are winners and losers in the new map of the Middle East. In contrast to all Arab countries who will lose most of their territories, the main winner in the region is Israel which will rise as a stronger and powerful nation and the major player in the region.

3.3. US unconditional support to Israel: The making of greater and stronger Israel in the Middle East:

The US administration believed that the War on Iraq will affect the Arab-Israeli conflict and bring positive changes in the peace process. Moreover, it will assure that Israel will not be threatened by its neighboring Arab countries, and make both the US and Israel control the peace negotiations and impose its rules and conditions on Arab partners. Actually, this what the US administration, under President George W. Bush, has planned for: The making of Israel as the sole winner and the most beneficent from the War on Iraq. The collapse of Iraq as a regional power in the Middle East turned the balance of power in favor of Israel, in addition to the decrease of the strategic status of Syria. All these facts served the Israeli interests in the region (Hinnebusch, 2007, pp. 12- 4).

It worth to mention that the consequences of the US invasion of Iraq were: (1) re- shaping the Middle East, supporting pro- US currents, (2) removing the extremist jihadist organizations, and (3) strengthening the power of Israel. In this same context, Melaragno and Ollunga (2003) stated that the US and its allies had feared that the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would attack the US pro- ally in the Middle East: Israel (p. 17). Accordingly, Petras (2006) illustrated that "Israel receives favorable treatment and special benefits under U.S. assistance programs that may not be available to other countries".

In addition, the US contributed widely in the development of the Israeli military defense system through the following measures:

- ✚ \$625 million to promote and deploy the Arrow anti-missile missile;
- ✚ \$1.8 billion to promote the Lavi aircraft. "On August 20, 1987, the Israeli cabinet voted to cancel the Lavi project, however required the United States for \$450 million to pay for canceled contracts. The State Department agreed to increase the FMF spec for providing in Israel from \$300 million to \$400 million to pay Lavi cancellation costs;
- ✚ US military aid for military purchases in Israel (26.3%). This meant that in 2004, \$568 million in military aid could be spent in Israel. (Most US military aid is for purchases of US arms). (p. 38)

Furthermore, during Bill Clinton's presidency (1993- 2000), the US administration had presented unconditional support for Israel in order to establish the Middle East strategy approximate with Israeli foreign policy that was linked set of policies; such as:

- ✚ Damaging the military and economic power of Iraq; the principal enemy of Israel;
- ✚ Supplying and arming the Israeli expansion and controlling of Arab Palestine;
- ✚ Maintaining economic sanctions on Iran and Libya which were pro-Palestinian supporters. (Petras, 2006, p. 45)

The US influence on Middle East issues in favor of Israel completely is implemented by both a US neo- conservative members in the US administration and the Zionist lobby's agenda. In fact, the Zionist lobby is more influential in both US politics and the US administration through several organizations and think- tanks which influence the US public opinion through mass media, and promoting their war propaganda in favor for US support of Israeli Middle East agenda (Petras, 2006, p. 46).

3.4. Threatening Iran's expansionism in the region:

The relations between the US and Iran had been hostile and conflictual since the success of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 which overthrew the Shah Ahmed Reza Pahlavi and his regime and established a purely Islamic governmental model through the Islamic Republic of Iran, governed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Al Khomeini. Following its establishment, the Islamic Republic of Iran intended to export the Iranian Islamic revolutionary model to its neighbors in the Middle East. This; in fact, constituted a direct threat to the established monarchies of the Gulf countries and the US interests in the region. The first direct confrontation between the US and Iran in the region took place during the hostages' crisis of 1979, which was resolved in 1981 in Algiers.

The US administration has listed Iran as a state- sponsorship of terrorism, since it supported jihadist organizations; such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, and other militant armed group in the Middle East, which constituted a significant threat to US interests and its allies in the region. Furthermore, issues escalated

when Iran develop its nuclear program in 2002. The US administration attempted to deter Iran through imposing economic sanctions. According to the US perspective, the Middle East region, including the Gulf region, should be a free zone of WMD proliferation, except Israel (Katzman, 2020, p. 4).

According to Richards (2015), the development of the Iranian WMD in the region is considered as a significant factor to its objectives for achieving global hegemony in the Middle East. Iran aims to impose itself as a dominant power in the region through the use of political means; such as, supporting Shiite Islam, promoting Iranian Islamic revolutionary ideology, and supporting financially and militarily Arab and non- Arab leaders, and conducting proxy wars in the region. In addition, Iran has taken steps to expand its influence and protect its interest in the Middle East through direct support of jihadist organizations and establishing military capabilities which aim to threaten the US and its allies in the region. In fact, the trend of antagonism and mistrust between the US and the Islamic Republic of Iran has been continuous for over thirty- five years, and the diplomatic bi- lateral relations between the two countries were deteriorated from 1979 to present day (pp. 28- 9).

Like the US and Israel, the Iranian expansionist policy in the region is better known of its reactivity and flexibility where Iran intends to further its influence through economic, political, and military means in order to achieve its regional objectives. This has been obvious and clear when Iran has fully exploited its foreign policy during the Syrian civil war, as well as fighting against the ISIS, which aimed protecting its sphere of influence in the Syrian scene,

Lebanon where Iran has strong ties with Hezbollah, and in Iraq. It is worth to mention that Al Quds Regiment, led by Gen. Qassem Soleimani (1957- 2020), had been influential in both Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq who worked hard to fight US and Israeli presence in the region, and to ensure Iran's hegemony in the Middle East. However, the Iranian expansionist policies in the Middle East is met with a great resistance from the US, Israel, and their Gulf partners who work permanently to deter Iran (Richards, 2015, p. 44).

The US invasion of Iraq (2003), the US incapability, together with its allies, to deter Iran from filling the vacuum of power, and the creation of a Shiite-dominated Government in Iraq prompted an increase in Iranian influence, as well as increase in the Iranian military capabilities, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Moreover, the Arab Spring, which took place in most Arab countries of the Middle East, created opportunities for Iran to expand its sphere of influence in the countries where fragile governments exist; such as Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. In Addition, the withdrawal of the US from Iraq provided Iran with an excellent opportunity to spread its ideology and influence policymaking in Iraq, while the Iraqi government approved the Iranian support (Jones, 2019, pp.4- 5).

Conclusion:

The US Invasion of Iraq (2003) had particularly altered and changed the Middle East. Relying basically on the *Bush Doctrine*, the US administration engaged in the War on Iraq in order to fight global terrorism and the several jihadist organizations in the region, destroying Iraqi WMD; which threatened US and global security, and liberating Iraq from tyranny and authoritarianism. However, the impacts and the problems that occurred after the US invasion of Iraq were too big to handle and to solve by the successive Iraqi governments.

Iraq, after the US invasion of 2003, became no more a safe country for peace, security and the rule of law both its citizens and foreigners. The country suffers from revenge killing, ethnic divisions, and sectarian conflicts that have been stiffened. There is direct relationship between the political, social, and economic impacts which occurred after the US invasion in Iraq in 2003 and the US post- invasion strategy. The US declared that *Operation Iraqi Freedom* sought to re- build a more developed Iraq; as well establish a powerful government. However, the US invasion served to implement its strategy to remodel a greater Middle East according to the maps of both 'Constructive Chaos' and 'Blood Borders' theories. Actually, the US Invasion of Iraq (2003) served both the US interests and its pro- ally Israel in the Middle East.

General conclusion:

Since 9/ 11 attacks, the world has witnessed lot of changes in terms of international relations. These attacks has given birth to the *Bush Doctrine* which influenced greatly the US foreign policy by making a strong staple on it: fighting global terrorism, which the US administration labelled it the *War on Terror*. Also, it gave the right for the US to act unilaterally and use pre- emptive strategies to fight global terrorism and countries which develop WMD.

As the *War on Terror* went into effect, the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and engaged in fighting both Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In 2003, the US declared War on Iraq as a staple of the *Bush Doctrine*. It is worth to mention that the US used huge propaganda to justify its war: destroying Iraqi WMD, Saddam's ties with Al Qaeda, and regime change. However, all the reasons given by the US administration have been proven false. The Baathist regime had no links with Al Qaeda, a jihadist organization which was responsible for 9/ 11 attacks. No WMD were found in Iraq according to UNSCOM inspectors who visited Iraq many times before the US Invasion. Moreover, the US Invasion did not lead to regime change and it did not bring peace, stability, and security in Iraq. However, the Iraqi political arena had been worsened, and the country had been deteriorated by sectarian conflicts and the political and economic and social problems which resulted from the invasion.

The present study focused on analyzing the political, economic, and social impacts of the US Invasion of Iraq (2003). In relation to the aforementioned questions, the consequences left by the US Invasion were dramatic and too big

to handle by the Iraqi governments. The US administration had fabricated false proofs about Iraqi WMD and its links to Al Qaeda to justify its invasion. The primary goal of the US to invade Iraq was to take control of its oil reserves, as a part of the US strategy in Iraq and the Middle.

Moreover, the research has proven that there has been a link between the US Invasion of Iraq (2003) and the US post- invasion strategy in Iraq, in particular, and the Middle East, as a whole. The consequences of the War on Iraq created a state of turmoil, disorder, instability, vacuum of power, ineffective governments, and ethnic cleansing and other economic and social problems which made the country fall apart.

However, the impacts of the US Invasion of Iraq (2003) were part of the US strategy of re- making of the Middle East. This grand strategy of Great Middle East were initiated in the theories of *Constructive Chaos* and *Blood Borders* which aimed at re- establishing the great Middle East by fragmenting it into small States restricted by definite borders and governed by ethnic hegemony. According to US policymaking, this new Middle East serves best the US interests because it (1) ends extremism and terrorism in the Middle East, (2) protects Israel from unexpected threats from its neighboring Arab countries, and (3) makes Israel greater and stronger in the Middle East. In fact, it is a joint US- Israeli agenda which implemented by the Arabs themselves.

The limitation of the study:

Because of COVID- 19, confinement, the new regulations, and the protocol made by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, were unable to develop and elaborate some information in the present research.

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Resumé:

La présente étude représente le résultat d'années de guerre illégale menée par les États-Unis et les forces de la coalition contre l'Irak en 2003. L'invasion est venue en réaction aux attentats du 11 septembre qui ont amené les États-Unis à modifier leur politique en matière de la guerre mondiale contre le terrorisme. La doctrine Bush prônait la diffusion de la démocratie et de la paix dans le monde.

Bien qu'il ait été prouvé que Saddam Hussein n'avait pas de liens directs avec Al Qaida et que l'Irak ne possédait pas d'armes de destruction massive qui menacent la sécurité américaine et mondiale, les États-Unis ont envahi l'Irak et renversé le régime de Saddam. De plus, elle a provoqué des bouleversements politiques, économiques et sociaux en Iraq. Malheureusement, les décideurs irakiens n'ont pas réussi à établir un gouvernement fort et indépendant, ni à maintenir la paix, la sécurité et l'ordre dans le pays qui s'était effondré à cause de la violence croissante, des divisions et nettoyages ethniques et des conflits sectaires. De plus, les gouvernements irakiens n'ont pas été en mesure d'améliorer les conditions de vie des citoyens irakiens.

La présente recherche analyse les principales causes et conséquences de l'invasion américaine de l'Irak et de ses conséquences. En outre, il établit un lien direct entre les impacts de la guerre et les changements majeurs qui ont commencé à se produire au Moyen-Orient après l'invasion américaine de l'Irak, qui fait partie de la stratégie post-invasion américaine de remodelage du Grand

Moyen-Orient. Ce dernier est basé sur les théories du chaos constructif et des frontières du sang.

Mots clés: La guerre contre l'Irak, l'invasion américaine, Saddam Hussein, le Moyen-Orient.

الملخص:

تتناول الدراسة الحالية حصيلة سنوات من الحرب غير الشرعية التي شنتها الولايات المتحدة وقوات التحالف ضد العراق عام 2003. وجاء الغزو كرد فعل على هجمات 11 سبتمبر التي جعلت الولايات المتحدة تغير سياستها فيما يتعلق الحرب العالمية على الإرهاب. دعا مذهب بوش إلى نشر الديمقراطية والسلام في العالم.

على الرغم من أنه ثبت أن صدام حسين ليس له صلات مباشرة مع القاعدة وأن العراق لم يكن يمتلك أسلحة دمار شامل تهدد الأمن الأمريكي والعالمي، إلا أن الولايات المتحدة غزت العراق وأسقطت نظام صدام. وقد تسبب الغزو الأمريكي في خضوع العراق لاضطرابات سياسية واقتصادية واجتماعية. كما أدى الى فشل السياسة العراقيون في إقامة حكومة قوية ومستقلة، فضلاً عن الحفاظ على السلام والأمن والنظام في البلاد التي انهارت بسبب تزايد العنف والانقسامات والتطهير العرقي والصراعات الطائفية. علاوة على ذلك، لم تتمكن الحكومات العراقية من تحسين الظروف المعيشية للمواطنين العراقيين.

تحلل هذه الدراسة الأسباب والعواقب الرئيسية للغزو الأمريكي للعراق وتداعياته. علاوة على ذلك، فإنها تؤسس لصلة مباشرة بين تأثيرات الحرب والتغيرات الرئيسية التي بدأت تحدث في الشرق الأوسط بعد الغزو الأمريكي للعراق، والتي تعد جزءاً من استراتيجية الولايات المتحدة بعد الغزو لإعادة تشكيل الشرق الأوسط الكبير المبني على نظريات الفوضى البناء وحدود الدم.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الحرب على العراق، الغزو الأمريكي، صدام حسين، الشرق الأوسط.