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The US foreign policy of anti- Communism in Latin America under the Eisenhower administration (1953- 1961).

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Dedications

With my humble gratitude to Allah, this dissertation is dedicated with sincere feeling of gratitude to:

My parents, for their continuous love and affection, and their support that made all of the present work finalized, may Allah belss them,

My sisters and brothers,

My friends and relatives,

My teachers.

Wafa Chellali

Through the tiredness of the last five years, I dedicate this work as gift to:

My beloved parents, Brahim and zahia, for their endless love,

My brothers Mohemed, Fatih Ali, Rayan,

My husband Dehimi Oussama Amir,

My little son Amdjad Nidhal,

My soulmate and dear sister Hodnia,

My best friends: Yasmine Rokbi, Amal Torki, and Salima Mozaache.

Karima Kabouya

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Our appreciation to our University techers for giving us the opportunity to conduct this research.

Declaration:

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own original work, which I have created myself.

All the literature I used is properly quoted and is listed in Bibliography.

I declare that I worked on my final master's dissertation on my own using only cited literary sources, other information and sources in agreement with the disciplinary regulations for the Faculty of Letters and Languages at the University Mohammed Boudiaf of M'sila and with the regulations and laws of research of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in Algeria.

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

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

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Abstract:

During the second World War, both the US and the ex- USSR united their efforts, and were committed to face their common enemy: the German Nazi regime which threatened to destroy global security and alter the world order in that epoch. However, after the war was over, their commitment was dissolved. When the Cold War began, both superpowers had different agendas, as they thought of struggling to reach many parts of the world to promote their ideologies, and win spheres of influence. Ideologically, Communism, headed by the ex- USSR, constituted a real danger for the US, which sought to promote its liberal ideology throughout the world. As the Russians reached Latin America, which was a fertile ground for receiving Communist ideas, the US administration felt that the 'Red Scare' would overwhelm Southern America and; therefore, it would lose this important part of the continent. Accordingly, the US adopted several means and strategies in its foreign policy to conter Communism promotion in Latin America during the Cold War era. The present dissertation examines the US foreign policy of anti– Communism in Latin American under the Eisenhower administration in the period 1953– 1961. It highlights how the the US administration, under President Eisenhower, became interested in Latin America; as Communism started to penetrate in Latin American countries. In addition, the study examines how the US used its ideology to counter the spread of Communism in the region, and what were the strategies used by the US President Eisenhower towards Latin America in the conflict.

Key words: Communism, Eisenhower, US foreign policy, Latin America.

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List of abbreviations

US United States of America

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UN United Nations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

AIS American Intelligence Service

NSC National Security Council

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SS Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron)

SA Sturmabteilung (Assault Section)

FCC Federal Communications Commission

NDO National Defense Operations

UFCO United Fruit Company

OAS Organization of American States

TIAR Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca (Interamerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance)

FDR Franklin Delano Roosevelt

OPEC The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countreis

TUC Trade Union Congress

General introduction:

1. Background information:

The Cold War is a term refers to an ideological conflict between two superpowers of the United States (US) and the Soviet Union, which began in the post– war world two. This make both of them built up their own zones of influence, dividing the world into two separate camps. The cold war was therefore a global struggle that affected many countries all over the world.

The main purpose of the US was to preserve its interests abroad also to contain the spread of communism in the world by using different economic and political means in holding the Russian expansion because the American represented communism as a devil that must not be spread to other countries and this lead to shape the US policy. However the purpose of the Soviet Union was to expand diplomatically and peaceful competition with the capitalist power in an atmosphere of easing cold war attention.

Dwight Eisenhower was President of the US at the begining of the Cold War; the period which witnessed geopolitical tensions between the US and USSR. His aims in Latin American were to prevent communism from going foot hold and pursuit of national security aims and was accompanied by a quest to expand the US economic system throughout the region.

2. Statement of the problem:

In the early years of the Cold War, President Dwight Eisnhower and the US administration did not pay much attention to Latin America. However, as a result Communist movements which spread quickly in Southern part of the American continent, most Latin American countries started to adhere Communism and turned towards the USSR for political and economic support.

With the Communist penetration in the Latin American countries, it had become a serious threat to the US. As a result, the US administration, under President Eisenhower, started to adopt effective strategies to combat the spread of Communism in the region.

Believing that Latin America had lost confidence in the US, as he recalled "we frantically wooed Latin America"— but after the war the Truman administration "proceeded to forget these countries just as fast," and "terrible disillusionment set in throughout Latin America." The US reneged on promises to cooperate economically with its neighbors. The result was economic distress, "followed by popular unrest, skillfully exploited by Communist agents there," Eisenhower promised change. Moreover, Eisenhower did not propose any new policies for Latin America. He implied; however, that he would return to the principles of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy and discard the practices of the Truman administration.

The present research paper analyzes the foreign policy adopted by the US administration under President Eisenhower in Latin America to resist the spread

of Communism. It highlights the early years of the Cold War, and sheds light on the US reaction towards communist penetration in Latin American countries.

3. The literature review:

The Cold War was a lengthy struggle between the US and the Soviet Union that began shortly after the end of WWII. It was characterized by the increasingly divergent ideologies, means, and strategies which created rifts between the two global powers. The US and the USSR gradually built up their own zones of influence, dividing the world into two opposing camps. The Cold War was; therefore, not exclusively a struggle between the US and the USSR, but a global conflict that affected many countries, particularly Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

As the Cold War escalated between both super powers in different times, this important historical period in the world atrracted scholars and researchers who examined and analyzed the events of the Cold War, and how did they affect their bi- lateral relations and many parts of the world. Also, scholarly researches and publications examined the Cold War in Latin America, as Communism tried to win spheres of influence there, and threaten the US at home. The literature cites the US administration’s commitiment and engagement to combat the spread of Communism in the countries where the US interests were vital. The US anti- Communism policy had been declared by President Eisenhower who stated that the US warned that Communist aggression constitutes a serious

threat to its vital interests. Moreover, he declared the US readiness to use its armed forces to respond directly to this aggression.

Stephen Rabe (1988) examined President Dwight D. Eisenhower's foreign policy towards Latin American, and assessed the President's actions in the light of recent "Eisenhower revisionism." As a matter of fact, Eisenhower paid little attention to Latin America, but his objective there was clear: to prevent Communism from gaining a foothold. The US administration, under President Eisenhower, was reday to cooperate with authoritarian military regimes, but not to fund developmental aid, or vigorously promote political democracy.

Through his book *Giant's Rival* (1987) in which he surved the Soviet relations with Latin America, Blasier provided a concise account of Soviet diplomatic, economic, and political- military involvement in the region. Blasier viewed the origins of the Sandinista revolution, and its relation to international Communism, and how the Nicaraguan government has grown dependent on Soviet oil, arms, and economic and political assistance. He also described the growing relations between the New Jewel Movement in Grenada and Moscow before it was toppled by the US invasion. Blasier explained how US policies have affected Soviet outcomes and makes proposals for protecting and advancing US interests.

In the *Exiting the Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (2001), Pastor explored the continuities and the changes in US foreign policy toward Latin America. Whereas many foreign policy volumes neglect the role of Congress, Pastor explained how it has shaped policy. Next,

he looked at the recurring challenges that have often pulled the US into the destructive whirlpool— how the US has tried, but often failed to manage succession crises, pre- empt or undermine revolutionaries, promote or manipulate elections, and encourage or neglect the region's economic development. Pastor offered a series of far- reaching policy recommendations for exiting the whirlpool and forging a hemispheric community of democracies within a free trade area.

Gaddis (2005) believed that the US administration, under President Eisenhower, could not afford to continue spending at that level. After a review of defence strategy, US President Eisenhower adopted a new strategy which centered on nuclear deterrence which allowed for sharply reduced spending on conventional arms and military personnel. Accordingly, this strategy, known as the New Look, called for the US to deter Soviet, or Chinese aggression with an expanded nuclear arsenal, while relying on local allies and covert action to counter communist advances on the ground.

Andrew Defty (2013) highlighted that during the Cold War, Britain was the first country to formulate a coordinated global response to communist propaganda. In January 1948, the British government launched a new propaganda policy designed to oppose the inroads of communism by taking the offensive against it. A small section in the Foreign Office, the innocuously titled Information Research Department (IRD), was established to collate information on communist policy, tactics and propaganda, and coordinate the discreet dissemination of counter- propaganda to opinion formers at home and abroad.

Silvio Pons (2014) established, in his published book *The Global Revolution : A History of International Communism 1917- 1991*, a relationship between the history of communism and the main processes of globalization in the past century. Drawing on a wealth of archival sources, Silvio Pons analyses the multifaceted and contradictory relationship between the Soviet Union and the international communist movement, to show how communism played a major part in the formation of our modern world. He presented the argument that during the age of wars from 1914 to 1945, the establishment of the Soviet state in Russia and the birth of the communist movement had an enormous impact because of their promise of world revolution. Such perspective appeared even more plausible in the aftermath of the Second World War and of revolution in China, which paved the way for the expansion of communism in the post-colonial world. Communism challenged the West in the Cold War- by means of anti- capitalist modernization and anti- imperialist mobilization- showing itself to

In his book, Bevan Sewell (2016) stated that the US, in the 1950s and 1960s, wanted to prevent a new communist regime in the Western hemisphere at any cost. Under President Eisenhower, the US pursued a policy of support for dictators, the economic shoring up of regimes that impoverished their own people and sanctioned direct interventions such as the overthrow of the Guatemalan government in 1954. When John F. Kennedy came to power, he promised a reset of relations and set about pouring aid into Latin America. Yet, in 1961 Kennedy also attempted to intervene in Central American domestic politics with the Bay of Pigs operation. Moreover, Bevan Sewell showed how

Eisenhower's strategic stance on the Cold War became increasingly detrimental to Latin America over time, and how similar policies were continued by the Kennedy administration.

4. Research question and hypotheses:

The present paper addresses to the following questions :

- How were the relations between the US and the Latin American countries after the end of WWII?
- What were were the major policies adopted by the US administration in Latin America?
- How did Communist ideologies succeed to venture into Latin American countries?
- How did the US administration, under President Eisenhower, implement its anti- Communism policies in Latin American?

In the light of these questions, it is hypothesized that:

- Because of the "balance of terror" between the two great powers, and the fact that the US neglected Latin American countries, they became closely tied with the USSR; which threatened the US hegemony and its interests in the region.

5. The significance of the study:

The topic is significant and important because it discuss the atmosphere of great war (cold war)in Latin American .Also, it discuss the strategies that US under Eisenhower presidency followed to attacked the communism in Latin American ,and why the relation between USSR and latin American was bad for US.

6. The purpose of the study:

The main aims of the present study are:

- To have a comprehensive overview of the US foreign policy of anti- Communism in Latin American,
- To illustrate strategies used by the Eisenhower administration (1953-1961) towards Latin America,
- To indicate the impacts of the US strategies of anti- Communism on Latin American countries.

7. The research methodology:

Since the present research is a purely historical study, the nature of the study employed the use of descriptive analytical approach in order to identify (1) the Cold War as an significant historical period, (2) the conduct of the US foreign policy of anti- Communism towards Latin American countries, and (3) the steps used by the Eisenhower administration to contain the spread of Communism in Latin America.

Analytical approach:

In order to gather data for our investigation, the researchers will perform analytical approach on analysis on how was the US foreign policy of anti-communism toward Latin American countries, and why it threatened to the US. The analytical approach is useful in this line of present study which aims to find out what were the steps used by Eisenhower administration (1953- 1961) to contain the spread of the aforementioned phenomenon. Also, this approach is vital in order to present credible arguments and conclusions.

Historical approach:

The historical approach is used and adopted because of its suitability and its validity in relation to the research questions. The historical approach will help to examine the background and the development of specific phenomenon. Since the present dissertation aims to conduct an investigation in the US foreign policy of anti- Communism in Latin America under the Eisenhower administration (1953- 1961), and attempts to explain the Cold War, the use of the historical approach will be used to clarify and clear all research questions related to the present study.

8. The structure of the dissertation:

The present dissertation analyzes the US foreign policy to counter Communism in Latin America. It consists of three chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the US- Latin American countries relationships prior to

the second World War. Also, it highlights the German interests in Latin America, and how the US reacted to the German policy of dividing Latin America into four German reighs.

The second chapter explains the beginning of the Cold War between the ex-USSR and the US, and both superpowers shaped their ideologies to gain footholds in Latin America. In addition, it highlights the Soviet strategies to promote their Communist ideology in Latin America as a way of reaching the world.

The third chapter examines US reaction to Communism promotion in Latin America. Moreover, it anayzes strategies taken by the US administration, under President Eisenhower, to counter Communism in Latin America.

Chapter one: Overview of the US– Latin American relations (1933-1953):

Introduction:

The promotion of US political and economic interests can be seen as contributing to intervention in Latin American; the US intended to improve its relations with the neighbouring Latin American countries in a time of escalated international competition with their Russian counterparts during the Cold War period. For more than 50 years, the US administration policy has been to promote democracy in Latin American.

In the years leading up to World War II, the US foreign policy approach towards Latin America underwent a change. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office, his administration was more concerned with economic recovery policy of the Great Depression; he had a personal preference for friendly relations with other countries. During President FDR's inaugural address in 1933, he stated that in foreign affairs he would "dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbour – the neighbour who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors" (Duiker and Spielvogel, 2007, p. 648).

For Latin America, the *Good Neighbor Policy* signified and ends to US direct intervention in regional affairs, but also consisted of initiatives that promoted collaboration and economic expansion. Between 1933 and 1945, the US signed 15 reciprocity agreements with Latin American countries, which aided in

gathering support for US policies in a specific period to reach their implicit aims. The Second World War brought the United States and most Latin American nations together.

The present chapter highlights a historical overview about the relationships between the US and Latin American in the period between the two world wars (1914- 1918 and 1939- 1945). In addition, it sheds light on the US interests and plans made for Latin America during World War II, including the German clandestine activities in South America. In addition, the chapter analyzes the US policy towards Latin America.

1.1. A brief history of the US relations with Latin American countries:

Since the Latin American countries consolidated their independence from the Spanish Empire in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century, their links with the leading country in the north of the hemisphere had been asymmetrical, dependent, and of secondary importance for policymakers in the US. Exceptions to this are only found under certain ‘crisis situations’ that quite occasionally take place in Latin American countries. The rest of the time, a routine course prevails in which decisions are left to middle rank officials at the US State Department who handles the situations faced by the diverse governments of the south on a case-by-case basis.

The *Monroe Doctrine* of 1823 that rejected any presence of the European powers on American soil was; thus, a true reservation clause to make future

operations possible. All the invasion and annexation projects for Cuba, or Jamaica proposed mainly by the Southern states were rejected at that time of prevailing internal tensions, only solved by the Civil War and the victory of the North in 1865. As of that moment, the foreign policy of the US began to be constructed, establishing the bases for the first imperial expansion which took place via the war against Spain in 1898.

1.1.1. Theodore Roosevelt's Big Stick Diplomacy:

In the twentieth century, the US hegemony could be viewed as a genuine practice of its foreign policy as principle of their interest, with President Roosevelt applied a historical and effective policy that aims to revolutionize US foreign policy. In addition, the US foreign policy changes the nature of the world and uses this policy discretion as a successful tool to reach its objectives in Latin America.

While President McKinley ushered in the era of the American empire through military strength and economic coercion, his successor, Theodore Roosevelt, established a new foreign policy approach which was based on a favorite African proverb, "speak softly, and carry a big stick, and you will go far." At the crux of his foreign policy was a thinly veiled threat. Roosevelt believed that in light of the country's recent military successes, it was unnecessary to use force to achieve foreign policy goals, so long as the military could threaten force. This rationale also rested on the young president's philosophy (Tindall and Shi, 2007, p. 881).

Roosevelt believed that while the coercive power wielded by the US could be harmful in the wrong hands, the Western Hemisphere's best interests were also the best interests of the US. He felt, in short, that the US had the right and the obligation to be the policeman of the hemisphere. This belief, and his strategy of "speaking softly and carrying a big stick," shaped much of Roosevelt's foreign policy (Tindall and Shi, 2007, pp. 881- 2).

Theodore Roosevelt's policy went as follows: 'Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far' (Suzy, 1993, p. 123). It means negotiating peacefully, but also having strength in case thing go wrong simultaneously treating with the big stick or the military. Roosevelt advocated the US engage in diplomacy also maintain a strong military readiness to back up US goals (Nolan, 2004, pp. 103–4).

After the War with Spain ended, with a new treaty signed, Theodore Roosevelt knew his administration had to pay close attention to Latin American affairs. First, the greatest success in Latin American affairs for President Roosevelt centered on the Panama Canal. The construction of the Panama Canal provided for a connection of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans for quicker access. In this context, Hill (1965) believed that "Nothing in his public career seems to have given Roosevelt more gratification or have been regarded by him as of greater importance than the construction of the Panama Canal." (p. 30).

Since the US interest in creating a canal began before the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt, a strong believer in the Navy, believed that it was the nation's duty to expand, and this would occur with a canal. Roosevelt viewed

the importance of a canal by providing the Navy with equal facilitation of the eastern and western coasts of America. A few months after taking his oath of office, Roosevelt saw through the ratification of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. This treaty provided the US to work around the Clayton- Bulwer treaty and enable the US to construct an “interoceanic” canal (Hill, 1965, p. 35).

Movement on the US taking over construction of the canal came to a head. The US paid Colombia ten million plus an annuity. However, the Columbian government rejected the Hay- Herran Convention. Roosevelt saw it as the US responsibility to protect their investment in the Panama Canal. Roosevelt declared “That national interests and safety necessitated the policy which he adopted” (Hill, 1965, p. 64). Roosevelt believed that the policy and interests in Panama were called upon by civilization itself. In directing the construction of the Panama Canal, ultimately the US pushed the “New World” of the Western Hemisphere forward in congruence with the “Old World.” The Panama incident became the first of several incidents that categorize with President Roosevelt’s “Big Stick” policy in international affairs. This policy continued to influence Latin-Americans and brought friendly relations eventually with United States and Latin- Americans (Hill, 1965, p. 68).

Roosevelt’s *Big Stick Policy* was able to keep the US out of military conflicts by employing the threat. President Theodore Roosevelt framed the *Big Stick Policy* to advance the US interests and to restrict European influence in the American Continent.

1.1.2. Franklin Roosevelt's foreign policy towards Latin American countries:

In 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt's was the 32nd US President. Although he presided the US in the midst of the Great Depression and implemented his New Deal recovery policies, he created a new vision in foreign policy to make the US a global power. In addition, his leadership made a great transformation of the US, which became a powerful and strong nation with an influential international status. As a President, he based his new foreign policy on inter political implication adopting diplomacy and power. During the 1930s, the US relationships with Latin America were destructed. The US military intervention was the only the means to maintain its influence in Latin America and gain a training of national guards, economic and cultural penetration, and political domination.

1.1.2.1. The Good Neighbor Policy and trade:

When Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in 1933, he promised "bold, persistent experimentation" and pledged to abandon the failed policies, and failed ideas, of the past. His New Deal promised not only a new relationship between the American people and their federal government, but also new relationships between the US and the nations of Latin America.

In contrast, he pointed to the "good neighbor" policy among the nations of the Americas as an example of international cooperation: Throughout the Americas the spirit of the good neighbor is a practical and living fact. The twenty-

one American republics are not only living together in friendship and in peace; they are united in the determination so to remain. Even though Roosevelt argued for peace and US neutrality in any forthcoming conflict, he concluded the speech by warning that “if there are remoter nations that wish us not good but ill, they know that we are strong; they know that we can and will defend ourselves and defend our neighborhood” (Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1936, p. 3).

The *Good Neighbor Policy* was the type of foreign policy of the US administration that President Franklin D. Roosevelt who he directed the US during the Great Depression. The Good Neighbor Policy’ s main principle was that non-intervention in homeland issues of Latin American this means avoid interfering in the affair of foreign nation but still remain diplomacy and trade. It also confirmed the idea that the US would be a Good Neighbor for Latin American countries (McPherson, 2014, p. 625; Rabe, 2006, p. 47) Roosevelt administration‘s main purpose was create new economic in Latin American and reassert the impact of the US there (Gilderhus, 2006, p. 6).

Indeed, the Roosevelt administration was predictable that this new policy would establish different economic fortuity in the form of alternate commerce accord and reaffirm the impulse of the US in Latin America. However, lot of Latin American governments were not persuaded. The *Good Neighbor Policy* emerged when the US withdrew its Marines troops from Haiti and Nicaragua in 1934; so, it was from both the invalidation of the Platt Amendment, and the arbitration of reparation for Mexico’s acculturation of foreign estate in the oil industry in 1938 (Scheuneman, n. d., p. 47).

Moreover, after the end of World War II, Latin America expressed its locality of the world most encouraging of US policy. This *Good Neighbour* policy ripe by President Franklin D. Roosevelt describes the special aims of the aforementioned policy. Through maintaining its security issues, the US would reach its interests and objectives in Latin America. Thus, specific differences are also identified between the US and Latin America.

1.1.2.1.1. The end of the US Marines' occupation of Nicaragua (1933):

The US Marines occupied Nicaragua, a Latin American country located in Central America, from 1912 to 1933. In order to insure the continued internal stability of the small country. The US Marines is a branch of the Unites States Armed Forces responsible for conducting expeditionary and amphibious operation with the US Navy as well as the Army and Air Force. The US aimed to accomplish tow main objectives in establishing the National Guard: (1) to replace old army with a well- equipped military force, and (2) to conduct free and fair election in 1928 and 1932 these election led by the US. It viewed democracy as the complete solution to the entire problem in Nicaragua society. The US Marines were ordered to stop the ongoing civil war, protect US subjects, and secure US economic interest (Zaremba, 1992, pp. 1- 2).

The absence of the US support commensurate with the withdrawal of the Marines threatened the destruction of the democracy in Nicaragua. Following the US Marines' departure, Nicaraguan Guardia national became the finest

military organization and a partisan organization that was used to further the political ambitions of its director, Somoza. The US Marines gave Nicaragua an opportunity to implement a true democracy, but the withdrawal of US allowed Somoza to use the Guardia National to consolidate both his political and military power and to pervert democracy, too, in Nicaragua (White, 2011, p. 14).

Before the US left in 1933, it formed the Guardia National, a powerful combined military and police force, trained by the Marines and they designed to be loyal to US interests. Nevertheless, Nicaragua continued to be in struggle between liberal and conservative forces (Glass, 2019, para. 7).

1.1.2.1.2. The end of the US occupation of Haiti 1934:

In the early 20th century, the Haiti endured from a riotous political lifetime and from deep- seated economic maladministration, many of Haitian allocation went to duty employment, and US administration professional were implicated that financial contrast to its own citizens might not be collected. These implications; in fact, were intense after World War I, when Haitian dominion fell down into fierce sectional encounter in the summer of 1915; thus, the US determined to take action when the US began a military occupation of Haiti to prevent any European intervention. In addition, the Haitian administration stood in place, but was a case to US conduct. However, Haitian citizens benefited from the end of aboriginal political strength and from the building of roads, bridges, and ports as well as from corrected admission to health care (Heinl, 1996, p. 791).

The US occupation was deeply recoiled during Haitian society, and many of its accomplishments did not long bear its completion in 1934. Once firmly established in the major population centers, US officials quickly ensured the election by the Haitian National Assembly of an amenable president, Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave, who had served as the president of the Haitian Senate. As a result, of continuing unrest, Admiral Caperton also established censorship and promulgated martial law. These emergency measures were not rescinded for over ten years ('US Occupation of Haiti, 1915- 1934', 2020, para. 3).

In another move to ensure an orderly government, the US presented the Haitians with a treaty that permitted a full withdrawal from Haiti, since the US troops suffered minimal casualties. Complaints of brutality against native Haitians led the US Congress to conduct hearings on Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1922. The onset of the Great Depression and declining markets for Haitian goods, especially coffee, produced economic affliction and grant to elevated trouble among a population long denied a political position (Best, 1994, p. 3).

Haiti suffered from anarchy since it was occupied by the US from 1915 to 1934. They formed a puppet government, supervised the Haitian economy, and administered both the Haitian police and military. The US President Hoover, who did not support the occupation, used the *Cayes Massacre* as a justification to the US withdrawing of Haiti. Also, the US occupied administration never fully understood Haitian society, this strains let to disturbance late in 1934 (Best, 1994, p. 3).

On other hand, the Great Depression obliged the US to leave Haiti because the American subjects wandered about their administration's objectives and why they spent much money for Haitian society who was never happy with the US occupation. The US President Hoover met with Borno and decided to hold new elections in Haiti and begin the process of withdrawing administrators and US forces from Haiti (Schmidt, 1995, p. 232).

1.1.2.1.3. The Annulment of the Platt Amendment (1934):

The US foreign policy towards Cuba made its relationship not stable, precisely when Cuba get its independence from the Spanish colonization. In addition, all the relations in different field between Cuba and US was burned from being intimate to become putrid and later on even substandard. This spot topped with the concern of the economic interdict, and later on the missile turning point and the Bay of Pigs attack, all these events formed their relationship over time.

The US- Cuban relationships' history underwent many changes. The Cubans suffered from mistreatment and abuse during the Spanish annex; they struggled for their independence for a long time. However, for different reasons the US engaged in the conflict and supported the Cubans (Ferguson, 2006, pp. 6- 7).

The US project in intervening between Cuba and Spain, is get more claim and power over its rivals. From its own perspective, the US had no goals to employ its authority, or control over Cuba, but rather had an accord with Cuba. The Cubans had suffered to become relieve of imperialism and the US act

negatively towards Spain and Cuba. Moreover, the US administration sneaked itself into Cuban affaires, thus causing much harm to the country and the people at once (Tindall & Shi, 2007, p. 866).

Later, the US assumed the Joint Resolution for War with Spain and covered the Teller Amendment where the US took control over Cuba for other than truce aims, but; in fact, the US have to control four new territories: Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam, and also Hawaii, Samoa and Wake Island. This made Cuba obtain its independence from the Spanish colonization, but at that time the US flag was relief rather that of the Cuban one in Havana. For, for that it can be seen another level of relationship and the social and economic future of Cuba will be change (Hitchman, 1971, pp.115- 6).

The Platt Amendment was a treaty between the US and Cuba that attempted to protect Cuban independence from foreign intervention. This Amendment had many conditions this are the most important: Cuban did not have the right to entry into any treaty with foreign power; Cuban gave the US the right to intervene to preserve Cuban independence (Hugh, 1971, p. 472.).

With the rise of Cuban nationalism in 1934 and widespread criticism of Platt Amendment, Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin American countries led to the repeal of the Platt Amendment, in the hopes of improving the US relation with Latin American countries (Tucker, 2009, p. 504)

1.1.2.1.4. Mexico’s nationalization of foreign- owned oil assets (1938):

Although explorers drilled Mexico's first petroleum well in 1869, oil was not discovered until after the turn of the twentieth century. Commercial production of crude oil began in 1901. By 1910, prospectors had begun to define the Panuco- Ebano and Faja de Oro fields located near the central Gulf of Mexico coast town of Tuxpán, and systematic explorations by foreign companies came to supersede the uncoordinated efforts of speculative prospectors. Mexico began to export oil in 1911 (Mina, 1963, p. 1217).

Under Article 27 of the constitution of 1917, the Mexican government was given a permanent and inalienable right to all subsoil resources. The government's efforts to assert this right produced a lengthy dispute with foreign oil companies that was not resolved until the companies were nationalized in the late 1930s. The 1923 Bucarelli Agreements committed the United States and Mexico to regard titles held by foreign oil companies as concessions by the Mexican government rather than as outright ownership claims. In 1925, President Plutarco Elías Calles decreed that foreign oil companies must register their titles in Mexico and limited their concessions to a period of fifty years (Merrill and Miró, 1996, para. 2).

Despite disruption caused by the Revolution, Mexico's oil production peaked in 1921 at 193 million barrels (some 25 percent of world production), largely as a result of increased international demand generated by World War I. During much of the 1920s, Mexico was second only to the United States in petroleum

output and led the world in oil exports. By the early 1930s, however, output had fallen to just 20 percent of its 1921 level as a consequence of worldwide economic depression, the lack of new oil discoveries, increased taxation, political instability, and Venezuela's emergence as a more attractive source of petroleum. Production began to recover with the 1932 discovery of the Poza Rica field near Veracruz, which became Mexico's main source of petroleum until the late 1950s (Merrill & Miró, 1996, para. 3).

The Mexican oil expropriation was the nationalization of the all petroleum reserves, facilities, and foreign oil companies in Mexico on March18,1938 by the president Lazaro, it was the first large- scale non– communist expropriation of foreign owned natural resource assets. President Lazaro announced mineral and oil reserves found within Mexico belong to the government. The government established a state- owned Petroleum Company (Maurer, 2011, p. 590)

In addition, Mexico has become one of the foremost countries of attention that was fighting for independence from OPEC. Simply, because it was one of the extensive manager of petroleum in the world. Therefore, the US support it to diminish magnitude from OPEC. Mexico has also applied a policy that keep itself from OPEC cost management and control. Thus, the agency of intensity was fabricated an instrument to separate Mexico against the belongings to gain in the world price of natural gas. In addition, this policy, claimed in January that found a compare for elect association to acquire a natural gas at a determined price to be the state oil appropriation.

1.1.2.1.5. The Montevideo Convention on the Right and Duties of State:

The Montevideo convention is an agreement signed in Montevideo on Dec. 26, 1933. This convention established the standard definition of a state under international law. The convention confirmed that all states were equal sovereign units consisting of a permanent population, defined territorial boundaries, a government and an ability to enter into agreement with other states. Among the convention there were no state has the right to intervenes in the internal or external affairs of another and that all disputes should be settled peacefully.

The convention sets out the definition, rights and duties of statehood. Most well- known is Article 1, which sets out the four criteria for statehood that have been recognized by international organizations as an accurate statement of customary international law: The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states (‘Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933’, n. d, para. 1).

Furthermore, the first sentence of Article 3 explicitly states that "The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states." This is known as the declarative theory of statehood. It stands in conflict with the alternative constitutive theory of statehood: a state exists only insofar as it is recognized by other states. It should not be confused with the Estrada doctrine.

"Independence" and "sovereignty" are not mentioned in article 1 (‘Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933’, n. d, para. 3).

An important part of the convention was a prohibition of using military force to gain sovereignty. According to Article 11 of the Convention, the contracting states definitely establish the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or advantages that have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The Montevideo convention affirmed that the political continuation of the state is detached of appreciation by the other states. Therefore, before this process, the state has the right to protect its principles and self- determination, in order to contribute for its protection and success, as a result, organizing itself as it sees attack (‘Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933’, n. d, para. 11).

The US signed the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, which affirmed that the US government policy and position towards any essential condition of international relationships in this hemisphere have to infrequently be contrived more clear and definite. Moreover, the process of rights has no other control. In addition, the exercise of the rights of other states depended on the international law. The abridge states clearly would promote the correct commitment to contain in arms’ engagement, in minatory diplomatic depiction, or in any other active intimidating evaluate.

1.2. Latin American countries during World War II:

The Second World War was; in fact, a global war that involved many countries. The war influenced the entire world. Even citizens and countries in territories where no battles took place or that were not central to the actual conflict had their society and their history significantly modified as The Latin American states (Leonard and Bratzel, 2006, p. 1).

The Second World War conjured up theatres of fighting in Europe and Asia; however, McConahay (2018) confirmed that the Latin American territory was ready to take over it. In addition, she wrote that “both The Axis and the Allies contested for the hearts and minds of the continent’s people, for their sea passages and natural resources […] in order to feed their war machines” (p. 31)

The Second World War involved more than arms action between the Allies and Axis powers. In Latin America, it mainly altered pre- existing diplomatic, economic, military, and political plans. For a variety of causes, individual Latin American republics reacted differently to the struggle. The war often touched various constituents in different ways within each country. Still, World War II generated unmistakable changes with lasting results. Many governments ameliorated their diplomatic relations with the US. The few that combated US leadership- notably Argentina and Chile- loosed material advantages. Many countries used the war to professionalize their armed forces. Brazil and Mexico joined the combat coalition overseas. Others made material supports to hemispheric defense. Wartime economic circumstances destroyed certain sectors of the regional economy, for example, ruined the Central American

banana industry with widespread economic, political, and social effects (Coleman, 2007, p. 955).

World War II at the same time encouraged the reinforcement and actualization of profitable activities, like Venezuelan oil production. Throughout, Latin Americans founded innovative inter-American commercial networks to recover for the loss of European and Asian markets. Politically, the war increased centralizing, state- building projects in countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil. World War II allowed labor organizations and political interest groups within the Americas; Allied ideology directly contributed to the disappearance of several high profile dictators, including Jorge Ubico (Guatemala), Maximiliano Hernández Martínez (El Salvador), and Getúlio Dornelles Vargas (Brazil). Somehow, World War II was a decisive moment for Latin America (Coleman, 2007, p. 956).

1.2.1. The German interests in Latin America:

By 1939, many groups of German citizens had settled in various countries of Latin America; such as, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Germany preserved close contact with these emigrants through commerce, German diplomatic representatives, and the pro- Nazi social organizations. German commercial interests depended to largely on trade with Germany in Latin America, and different business organizations were imported into the National Socialist fold by appeals to patriotism and by threats of stopping trade. This large pro-German, if not necessarily pro-Nazi, expatriate community supplied a fertile

territory for the planting of spy organizations by the German intelligence services– the Abwehr and, later on, the Reich Security Administration. These two organizations were responsible for Germany's espionage works before and during World War II. Latin America was probably their main theater of operations; however, similar espionage organizations were founded all over the world (Mowry, 1989, p. 1).

Latin America had already been significant in several ways in the Nazi planner for hegemony. For Nazi Germany, Latin America was important for its raw materials, as a market for German goods, and a destination for German immigration. Most of the Germans were in organizations guided from Berlin. Economic permeation had been interlocked with propaganda agendas designed to provoke enmity against the U.S. that were publicized through German companies , schools, cultural centers, press agencies, radio stations, and other societies (Bosemberg, 2009, pp. 2- 3).

Through Rockefeller's visit to Latin America in 1938, he observed how German immigrants had settled on the continent, married natives, build businesses, and worked as agents and distributors of German products, however Americans came only for business, were not enduring settlers, did not interest themselves in the countries in which they lived, and did not ingest with the local population. Accordingly, those immigrants became the center of Nazi penetration (Bosemberg, 2009, pp. 2- 3).

1.2.1.1. The German secret plan to divide South America into four Nazi territories:

During the autumn of 1941, the US had yet to enter World War II. Whereas President Franklin Roosevelt confront strong 'anti- interventionist', feelings at home in spite of the growing Axis threat abroad. Hitler's combusting Panzers menaced Moscow, and German submarines threatened to cut off Britain, now fighting alone in the west (Bratzel and Rout, 1985, p. 167).

The British found out a secret map in October 1941 while searching an irreparably ruined German trawler that held the ability to shift alliances in Latin America .the geographical map was a hypothetical atlas of South America divided into massive states to be administered by Nazi Germany: Brasilien, Argentinean, Neu- spanien. It was an invaluable index of Nazi aggression directed consciously across the Atlantic, touching its closest neighbors. The later hypothetical state involved the Panama Canal Zone to be completely annexed. Other information was discovered in the secret document detailing Lufthansa passages from Europe to South America, extending into Mexico and Panama (Vasey, 1980, p. 218).

According to the US President Franklin. D. Roosevelt, the map took fourteen Latin American republics and reduced them to 'five vassal states' as a way to bring the whole continent under the Nazi domination. Accordingly, this considered a real threat not only to Latin America, but the US as well, since it covered even the Panama Canal which was seen as the great life line for the US (Bratzel & Rout, 1985, pp. 167- 8).

The history of the hidden map is even more bizarre than the Hyde-Stevenson accounts would suggest. Sandstede was; in fact, involved. As Auslands Organisation chief for Argentina, he was party to, if not responsible for, the decision to put up a huge map of Latin America in the Buenos Aires Nazi party headquarters in 1940-a map reputedly showing some provocative territorial rearrangement. Incorporated into Argentina were the Islas Malvinas (Falk land Island), Paraguay, Southern Bolivia, and Uruguay. Brazil was given Slice of northeaster Argentina (Misiones Province) and the rest of Bolivia, as well as Dutch and French Guiana. Panama was added to Colombia; British Guiana, to Venezuela. In addition, Ecuador was shared by Peru and Colombia. What the map implied was clear: If Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela cooperated with the Nazis; they might expect support for their territorial ambitions once Germany won the war (Bratzel & Rout, 1985, p. 170).

For decades, historians could only speculate concerning the origins of Roosevelt's secret map. In 1963, Montgomery Hyde, a previous British intelligence agent, provided the first report of how the US President Franklin. D. Roosevelt received the secret plan. In his book *Room 3603*, published in 1962, he stated that it had been purloined from a German Courier, whom he met accidently. William Stephenson (codename: intrepid), chief of British security coordination, took the map and passed it on to William Donovan, the US Coordinator of information. Donovan; then, had given the map to the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt. A year later, William Stevenson confirmed most of Hyde's account and added that Gottfried Sandstede was the luckless

'German courier'. According to Stevenson, Sandstede paid for his bungling with his life: his identity as the source of information found its way back to the German Gesapo agents in Buenos Aires. They had Sandstede murdered in yet another of the many 'accidents' that marked this secret conflict (Bratzel & Rout, 1985, pp. 171- 2).

1.2.1.2. The German clandestine activities in Latin America:

During the Second World War, Germany engaged in intensive efforts to obtain military, economic, and political information from the US. In order to increase this effort, it recruited many secret agents to operate within the US and founded extensive espionage networks in other countries of the western hemisphere.

Following the beginning of World War II in Europe, and especially after the fall of France, it became very important for Germany to acquire intelligence on the nature and extent of instruments being sent to Great Britain, data on ship sailings and the war capacity of the US. Much of this was easily available from the press and other open sources in the US to German diplomatic personnel. To complete these sources and escape from the British censorship, the Abwehr established spy networks in Mexico and other Latin American countries, which passed information from the US to Germany by radio and other clandestine communications. Among the most active of these, was a group in Mexico administrated by Georg Nicolas. Nicolas, whose practices extended from 1940 to his arrest in 1942, was a qualified individual. He had served with excellence

in the German Army in World War I, then spent many years in Colombia, and got back to Germany in November 1938. In January 1939, he was re-commissioned within the Army and allotted to Ast Hanover of the Abwehr (German Espionage and Sabotage, 2017, prar. 3).

Late in 1939, he was ordered to Mexico to establish an espionage system. During his 2 years of work in Mexico, Nicolas organized a large network that preserved contact with other groups in South America and sought to obtain information from the US. While technical data was extracted or photographed from US publications and some general data got from contacts in the US, once more there is no proof that Nicolas was effective in laying his hands on any vital military secrets. He was successful in leaving behind the nucleus of an organization that was capable to keep up some activities all over the war, although this was of little value to the adversary other than its annoying value in occupying the interest of US counter intelligence agencies (German Espionage and Sabotage, 2017, prar. 4).

During this same time- between the eruption of war in Europe and Pearl Harbor- the Abwehr succeeded in establishing a variety of spying networks in Latin America. These were focused in Brazil, Chile and Argentina, with ramifications in other countries. Until their liquidation, two teams in Brazil, headed respectively by Albrecht Gustav Engels and Nils Christian Christensen, were the most significant and successful. Through organizations in Brazil itself, staffed by members of the well-entrenched German colony, data was collected

on British shipping and forwarded by secret radio to Deutschland (German Espionage and Sabotage, 2017, prar. 4 & 5).

Similar data from the River Plate region collected by agents in Argentina was relayed through the Brazil stations. The Brazil group too acted as relays for data of a lot of general nature, as well as intelligence originating within the United States, forwarded by such agents as Nicolas in Mexico, Walter Giese in Ecuador, and the so-called PYL cluster in Chile. The cluster also had its contacts on ships between the US and Brazil. Through the use of channels on the West coast of South America and links with Europe via clandestine radio and the Lati airline, these scattered however interrelated clusters were able to escape British censorship and maintain safe and fairly speedy contact with Abwehr stations in Hamburg, Cologne, and Berlin (Kahn, 1978, pp. 553- 4).

Throughout 1940 and 1941, these groups must be credited with achievements that were probably important to Germany. Not only did they forward an amount of basic economic information beneficial to Nazi analysis, however, the shipping data provided resulted in the loss of British submarines and Allied ships. Interestingly, Nicolas, Engels, and Christensen were all sent out by Group I (Wi) of the Abwehr (economic espionage), however, while the war progressed their activities became more and more focused on maritime and naval intelligence. Generally, this period was the most successful period of a German spy in the Western Hemisphere; after Pearl Harbor the Abwehr was never able to create intelligence on a similar scale (German Espionage and Sabotage, 2017; para. 6).

The activities of those spying groups in Latin America had not gone ignored by the United States and British counter-intelligence agencies; however, before Pearl Harbor there was little that might be done concerning them. Throughout the first months of 1942 active steps were taken to correlate this data, determine those agents who were still obscure, and convince native police authorities to arrest, intern, or deport them. Because of these efforts, the leaders of the Brazilian rings were arrested in March 1942 and Germany was no more fortunate in establishing an effective spying service in Brazil. Before their liquidation, but, the Brazilian groups had made hard efforts to get military data from the United States. For example was the recruiting of a Brazilian Air Corps officer, who was arriving at this country on an official assignment under the auspices of the US Military Attaché to visit several aircraft factories. However, the Office of Naval Intelligence could determine this officer's connections shortly before his leaving and his trip was canceled (Lardner, 2002, p. 12).

In most different Latin American countries, pressure from the United States succeeded in eliminating the very grave German agents by mid-1942. This victory was tempered by continued toleration of active German spying on the part of Argentina and Chile. Each of these countries drew the support of Axis agents from massive resident German colonies with powerful local links, from the continuance of diplomatic relations until a comparatively late date, and from the agreement of native responsible. After the separation of the Brazilian groups, the organization in Argentina became the most necessary in South America. Between January 1942 and the spring of 1945, the German spying

network in Argentina went through a variety of changes some of them obliged by the arrest or exposure of its operators, but was always able to protect a nucleus from which to create a new and to continue forwarding data to Germany (Lardner, 2002, pp. 13- 4).

Throughout 1942, the predominant individual was Capt. Dietrich Niebuhr, the Naval Attaché, who had pair essential assistants: Hans Napp and Ottomar Mueller, and also recruit the services of some individuals who had get away from Brazil at the time of the arrests there. The activities of Niebuhr and his immediate assistants were exposed within a note handed by the United States Ambassador to the Argentine Government late in 1942 and a reorganization became necessary. This was achieved by Gen. Friedrich Wolf, the Military Attaché, together with Johannes Siegfried Becker, an S.D. officer sent secretly to Argentina from Germany in January 1943. These two had at their disposition, for both individuals and funds, agents connected with the previous groups still at large, the facilities of the German Embassy, German firms, Spanish shipping circles, and Argentine nationalists (German Espionage and Sabotage, 2017, para. 7- 8).

From these various elements Wolf, and more especially Becker who was a very strong person, succeeded in weaving a net that had threads running into Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Mexico, and keep fairly regular contact with Germany by radio and courier. As a consequence of the arrest of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth by the British, an agent on his path to Germany from Argentina, in late 1943, data on the spying activities of this cluster was furnished the Argentine

Government which lead to the break of diplomatic connections and the arrest of some of the most active agents. Becker survived from this crisis. during two months his organization had worked again and in June 1944, received help from Germany by two agents landed secretly on the coast of Argentina from an auxiliary yawl which had passed over the Atlantic from the French coast (Lardner, 2002, p. 15).

The network suffered extra problems from arrests in August 1944, but it could keep some activities until the end of the war. From the preceding it will be seen that the Germans succeeded in maintaining an intelligence organization in South America, and communications between it and Germany, during the war. In addition, they were supported by native elements in both Chile and Argentina. Much of the Data was in general concerning industrial production within the US, political and economic trends, labor problems, and exports of raw materials from Latin America. This information were not obtained by "Mata Haris" from clandestine sources but from the careful perusal of thousands of US publications, both general and technical, and from regular communication with Latin American individuals, both official and private, who were in a position to get data about the US. The consequences were not dramatic; however, they provided the raw material that any intelligence agency needs to formulate its vision about the enemy (German Espionage and Sabotage, 2017, para. 11)

1.2.1.2.1. SARGO:

Johannes Siegfried Becker (SARGO) was the major figure in the plan and the responsible for most of the organizing espionage operations in South America. Becker was an effective operator who gathered a large network of agents that result in sleepless nights to the FBI and OSS made his superiors in Germany glad with his massive and detailed reports (Mowry, 1989, p. 7).

Johannes Siegfried Becker was born in October 1912 in Leipzig. After his graduation from Gymnasium he worked in a series of commercial apprenticeships. In 1931-32, as many Germans during the Great Depression era, Becker was jobless. He joined the Nazi Party and the SA in 1930 and then the SS in 1931 (McGaha, 2009, p. 211).

Becker learned at Leipzig University from 1931-32 without gaining a degree. In his declaration to the Argentine Federal Police in 1945 Becker asserted he joined the German Army, becoming a military instructor and he was commissioned as a second lieutenant. He also claimed that in April 1935 he left the army and accepted a position with the National Socialist Popular Welfare. Nowhere did he reveal his membership in either the Nazi Party, or SS (McGaha, 2009, p. 212).

At first, Becker was sent to Buenos Aires by the SD in May 1940. Shortly after he was followed by Heinz Lange (JANSEN), Becker's original job was sabotage. In August, because of protests by the German embassy, this was modified to one of spying only. Becker and Lange were quickly fixed by the

authorities as agents, and in September 1940 shifted to Brazil where Becker communicated with Gustav Albrecht Engels (Mowry, 1989, p. 7).

In1939, Gustav Albrecht Engels (ALFREDO) had been inducted by Jobst Raven of Abwehr IW in order to supply economic information about the Western Hemisphere to the Abwehr where he had founded an economic spying institution which give reports to Germany through the radio transmitter. Becker changed Engels's organization into an espionage organization reporting on all matters that interest the German intelligence. In the middle of 1941, Engels's radio center that was situated in Sao Paulo, Brazil, was working with agents in both Brazil and the US. It transmitted information on shipping, economic and industrial business, war fabrication, and military activities in the US, and political and military growth in Brazil (Mowry, 1989, p. 7).

1.2.1.2.2. Operation Joelle:

The first traffic moved from Buenos Aires interested in finance the organization of the South American network, Argentine politics, and the institution of a courier system between Argentina and Spain employing crewmembers on board Spanish merchant marine. Once the network got into full operation, traffic quantity raised to fifteen messages a day. In January 1944, the Argentine Republic government stopped an amount of German and Spanish secret agents, and Becker and Franczok were obliged into hiding. Transmissions were interrupted for a month and never back again to the previous level. Once communications were reestablished, Becker requested

Berlin for radio instrumentality, money, and secret ink materials. This order lead to operational JOLLE (Mowry, 1989, p. 9).

It had become very hard to continue providing the agent organizations in South America with funds and crypto material. Like the primary technique of finance agent operations, Commenter agents between the wars, was through the importing of precious gems that may then be sold to get operational funds. Furthermore, the importing of high- priced medicine by Germans that may promptly be sold on the black market. The gems and the pharmaceuticals might be transmitted via couriers who travelled through the Spanish ships. Otherwise, this was not an adequate technique for conveying crypto equipment and keying materials, for displacing agents in and out of target countries, or for shipping enormous reports back to Germany until that time, the normal strategy employed by Department VI to bring up agents into neutral or hostile countries had been to land them from submarines. This had not been particularly effective and, with the growth of Allied hegemony over the sea, ways of transport was becoming problematic. Likewise, the courier system was at risk because of Spanish awareness that Germany was failing in the war. Because of these factors and of the issue of avoiding Allied patrols within the Atlantic those operations like Mercator and JOLLE were formed (Mowry, 1989, pp. 9- 10).

1.2.1.2.3. Mercator I and Mercator II:

The boat used was a thirty-six-ton ketch called Passim. On her initial voyage, codenamed MERCATOR I, Passim had navigated from Brest to Southwest

Africa holding three agents. Two of them had been arrived north of Hollams Bird Island, while the third close to Sao Paulo de Loanda. She then came back to Bayonne once 142 days at sea and was sent on to Arcachon for repairs (Mowry, 1989, p. 10).

On her second trip, codenamed MERCATOR II, Passim sailed from Arcachon on 09 June 1943 and submitted two agents, Wilhelm Koepff (HEDWIG) and William Baarn, to Brazil. Wilhelm Heinrich Koepff was a German, man of affairs who had settled in Peru after the First World War, in which he had served within the army. He was a zealous Nazi, and his reputation as an activist Nazi lead to put his firm in a blacklisted by the British and the Americans in 1941. This had a calamitous result on his finances. once the occident countries broke off relations with Germany in 1942, he organized to have himself repatriated in Germany where he volunteered for service within the Abwehr as a spy. After strong training, he reported aboard Passim on May, 15, 1943 to get together with his partner, William Marcus Baarn who was recruited by the Abwehr and trained in radio operation and cryptography for four months (Mowry, 1989, p. 11).

Passim navigated from Arcachon on twenty-three May 1943. On the night of 9-10 August 1943, the two agents were placed on Gargahu Beach, close to Sao Joao da Barra in Brazil. Although the elevated hopes of the Abwehr, both men give up to Brazilian police within one day. The Brazilian authorities “turned” Koepff and used him as a controlled agent until March 1944. He and Baarn were tried in March 1945 and punished to 25 years in jail (Mowry, 1989, p. 11).

1.3. US foreign policy towards Latin America during World War II:

Inter- American friendliness and cooperation were very obvious at Pan-American conferences, that convened at the capital of Peru in December 1938 during the peak of diplomatic confusion in Europe over the Munich Crisis and at Panama city in September 1939 shortly once the eruption of war in Europe. Though the public opinion in the US and Latin America preferred Great Britain and France and considered Germany as the troublemaker of the crises that caused a war in Europe, there was no big diplomatic or public pressure to participate in the conflict. In fact, governments and military leaders were very cognizant of their relative military weakness and unwell readiness for war. Therefore, they reacted to the outbreak of war in Europe with declarations of neutrality (Smith, 2005, p. 102).

The US joined the war in Dec 1941 because of the Japanese aggression on the US Pacific fleet situated at Pearl Harbor. A Pan- American conference of foreign ministers to debate procedures of common western protection was forthwith programmed and organized at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942. A mood of crisis reigned. For American diplomats, Japanese aggression had definitively brought a fast finish to neutrality and placed the security of the hemisphere within the balance. With the exceptions of Argentina and Chile, the Roosevelt Administration was happy with the cooperation that it received in Latin America for its policy of making a united hemisphere during the war against the Axis powers (Smith, 2005, p. 103).

Though Latin American diplomatic encourage war against the fascist dictatorships was actually valued, the US took the action in arranging the functional measures for hemispheric defense throughout the Second World War. Once the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States navy took the duty for the defense of the sea-lanes within the Caribbean and approaches to the Panama Canal. In 1942, an Inter-American Defense Board was set up in Washington to direct military plantations and strategy where Latin American military attachés served on the Board. Although restricted principally to an advisory perform, the Board supplied a symbol of inter-American unity and military cooperation. In fact, all military aspects concerned in prosecuting the war effort were set strongly under American control. Just as the First World War, little was desired within the manner of a Latin American contribution to actual military operations within the Second World War. Latin American militaries would focused rather on their native defensive functions. In fact, only Mexico and Brazil truly sent combat troops abroad. Mexico sent an air force troop to the Philippines whereas Brazil sent an army unit division of infantry to combat below American command in Italy. Many thousand Latin Americans, mainly from Mexico, involved the US armed forces as volunteers (Smith, 2005, p. 106).

The policy of close cooperation approximating on subordination to the United States included distinct material advantages at the period of war. This was significantly exemplified by Brazil. American perception of Brazil's strategic importance was significantly altered by the eruption of war in Europe. The geopolitical reality was that Brazil was the biggest and, because of its long

coastline bordering the Atlantic, the most exposed of the Latin American countries to external attacks. In fact, the US administration, under President Roosevelt, became anxious that Brazil's fascist sympathies would possibly result in a potential alignment with the Axis powers, or once the collapse of France in 1940, that Germany would possibly use the French colonies in West Africa to an occupation of north- eastern Brazil with the intention of advancing effective to the US via Central America and Mexico. Moreover, the outbreak of war and the ensuing disruption of trade with Europe heightened Brazil's worth as a significant source of agricultural merchandise, raw materials and minerals, particularly rubber, iron ore and quartz crystals. The Latin American countries were once more extremely valued as providers of strategic raw materials, particularly oil, tin, manganese and copper. For some merchandise like rubber, the importance of Latin American production was greatly increased by the closure of access to provide in South-east Asia because of Japanese military invasion. In addition, the US recovered for the severe decline of the region's pre-war trade with Europe by getting big quantities of Latin American agricultural produce, involving sugar, coffee, tobacco and fruit. The American role was fundamental (Smith, 2005, p. 107).

1.3.1. US counter clandestine German operations in Latin America:

Before the beginning of the war, American diplomacy had in private tried to help American business to contend with its Axis rivals in Latin America. Economic warfare took a more clear form in July 1941 when the state

department published a ‘Proclaimed List of some Blocked Nationals’ popularly called the ‘Black List’. The Black List consisted of the names of suspected pro-Axis corporations and people with whom American corporations and citizens were informed not to do business with. ‘It is a policy created by us to assure the annihilation of trade and financial of persons resident in, and doing business according to the American republics' laws and against whom we feel that those countries will take no procedure’. Explained by Philip Bonsal a responsible in the state department official.

Agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were sent to Latin America to help governments in determining local Axis agents and sympathizers and limiting their activities. In what would supply an outlook of future American secret operations, at the end of the war there were 360 FBI agents in Latin America, usually managing separated investigations instead of collaborating with local authorities. The application of the Black List, particularly the give of many German nationals for the period of war internment within the US, often caused massive dissatisfaction in Latin America (Smith, 2005, p. 109).

The Roosevelt Administration was additionally determined to decrease the impact of Germany and Italy on the Latin American military. An aware effort was made to convince Latin American governments to change any existing military delegations from the Axis powers with advisers from the US. In 1938, American military missions were appointed to only five Latin American countries. American advisers were formally joined to the military of every Latin American nation in December 1941. Throughout the war, the US was too permitted to

found large air and naval bases, especially in Brazil, Mexico and Ecuador, to be used in the emergency of an Axis conquest. In return, the Latin American governments gained substantial economic advantages. At the same time, American military missions focused on developing programs to assist modernize the military and police forces in terms of their training and tools (Smith, 2005, p. 110).

1.3.1.1. The US Navy in Colombia and Ecuador (1940- 1):

In 1938, a US naval mission arrived, charged with planning for the protection of the Panama Canal in case of German attacks. This mission was followed in the 1940s by the establishment of air and naval bases on Colombian areas and Colombia's involvement in the Inter-American Defense Board (Hudson, 2010, p. 287).

On September 1939, after news of the beginning of the European war arrived in Bogotá, the majority of Colombian Congress voted to support Santos's security program, as well as cooperation with the US to defend the Panama Canal (Coleman, 2008 (b), p. 9).

In fact, in 1939 the Colombian Army, the biggest branch of the military, counted just eighteen thousand troops and needed proper equipment and training. US advisers found that the Colombian naval and air forces in a bad situation. Colombian and American military personnel treated these problems during World War II (Coleman, 2008 (b), p. 22).

The Navy's initial experience with Axis secret communications commenced in 1940. In May and June of that year, the Ecuadoran government intercepted a variety of transmissions from unknown stations, seemingly on the Ecuador, passing four- letter and two-figure encoded transit and some apparent German normal text. Being worried of Axis clandestine activities, Ecuador required from the United States for technical support in locating unlawful radio transmitters in their nation. This demand was for instrumentation only, however, Boaz Long, the US ambassador in Ecuador, urged that additionally to the Adcock DF (direction finding) instrumentation requested, 2 radio receivers and 9 radio staff be sent. At around the same time, Colombia submitted an identical request because of a conference early in 1940 between the American minister at the Colombian capital, the US Army delegation in Colombia, and the Colombian administration. This order was switched to the Navy Department, as no alternative branch of the US government had any high-frequency direction-finding instrumentation or technical information on the subject (Mowry, 1989, p. 35).

The Ecuadoran intercept had been the primary tangible proof of the presence of a Nazi radio network in Latin America. Commander Safford, to whom the request had been referred, thought that on the principle of the frequency data provided by Ecuador, it might that there was a continent-wide radio network in immediate communication with Germany. Safford believed that the Adcock direction finders were unappropriated to the land found in Colombia and of Ecuador unless extremely trained operators were also supplied. The Navy

offered to assist in searching for transmitters, by the use of direction finders existing in US possessions, if data were provided regarding the schedules and frequencies of secret stations. Such data was not provided, however, the American minister reduplicated his recommendation and therefore the Colombian government made a direct demand for the help. Upon the advice of the State Department and the approval of the president, the Navy Department allowed providing by the instrumentation requested to indicate token cooperation with the Latin American countries (Mowry, 1989, pp. 35- 6).

1.3.1.2. The Establishment of the AIS clandestine Radio Locator Net:

The American intelligence Service (AIS) was an agency of the Intelligence cluster, Military intelligence service, assigned with the gathering, accomplishment, and initial analysis of military, political, economic, and psychological information which concern the hemisphere south of the United States. One amongst its specific duties was to keep up a branch for Special Intelligence, involving the files on recognized subversive suspects in Latin America and studies and analyses of enemy spying systems in Latin America. It was under this mission that United States Army intercept and DF activities directed opposed to Axis secret radio operations fell (Mowry, 1989, p. 44).

Next the fall of France and the Netherlands, the American government started to fret that Dutch or French possessions within the western hemisphere, or some isolated land like the northern Amazon, could be used as military bases

from which to initiate a surprised aggression the Panama Canal or the United States. Furthermore, there was an anxiety that with the initial Axis prosperities in North Africa, a military positioning in some area could be tried on the northeast coast of Brazil. An Axis “fifth column” in Latin America could increase such actions (Mowry, 1989, p. 44).

1.3.1.3. The creation and implementation of the concept (Dec. 1941- End of the WW II):

With the US participating in the war, increased scares of Axis clandestine activities in the Americas lead to a 30 December meeting at the State Department to debate prohibiting clandestine radio. At that meeting, State Department representatives pointed out that the issue of clandestine radio was dangerous, including a chain of communications all over the Western Hemisphere directed to the Axis nations through Martinique and Dakar. Any try to determine, locate, and close down forbidden transmitters would thus have to be a hemisphere-wide one. This needs the collaboration of local authorities, because although DF operations could be managed from the US, the bearings obtained would not be sufficiently exact for the aim. The location of the transmitters would necessitate the foundation of local DF units (Mowry, 1989, p. 44).

Admiral S. C. Hooper, Administrator of the Radio Liaison Division in the office of the CNO, suggested that a decision be introduced at the Rio Conference, to be held from 15 to 28 Jan., 1942. This resolution suggested that the nations of

Central and South America accept with suppress secret radios and to collaborate with other countries to that end; to form a committee of representatives from the countries concerned for the exchange of technical information, and to form a technical committee for planning purposes. Implementing such an operation would need buying portable direction-finding instrumentation to be utilized in each country and 10 fixed-site, long-range direction finders to be placed as required. Moreover, the resolution invited every country to send one or more representatives to the US for training by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in direction finding and intercept (Mowry, 1989, p. 44).

The meeting also agreed the proposition by Thomas Burke, of State Department's Division of International Communications, that a committee be formed composed of representatives of the Federal Communications Commission and the War and Navy Departments under the leadership of Admiral Hooper, to find out all the needed technical details concerning the instrumentation to be purchased. This board met in Admiral Hooper's office on Jan. 1, 1942. Resources had already been gathered in the US for the aim of suppressing secret radio operations inside the Western Hemisphere. Each of the Coast Guard Intelligence Unit and the FBI were assigned with the cryptanalytic part of the problem, and the Federal Communications Commission was actively intercepting secret circuits (Mowry, 1989, pp. 44- 5).

Later in 1941, the National Defense Operations Section (NDO) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was intercepting Axis clandestine

operative circuits between Lisbon and Portuguese Guinea and between Lisbon and Mozambique, moreover transmitters operating with Rio de Janeiro and Valparaiso. The NDO had determined the place of 75 individual clandestine stations, four of them in Brazil. The Navy had noted clandestine code transmissions from South America to Germany, starting around the middle of 1941. By mid-February 1942, five special teams had been noted, two of them working out of Brazil and one out of Chile. Because of discussions with representatives of the BSC, British Army, and the British government, the Navy had deduced that the British were intercepting a similar traffic. After the first January meeting, Admiral Hooper informed the State Department of the DF instrumentation needed to hold out the counter clandestine operation. At a minimum, any institution that would be founded would need 50 automobile-mounted mobile DF units, four mobile units, and 10 fixed-site DFs to be used as base stations (Mowry, 1989, p. 45).

The required resolution was presented at the Rio Conference and was adopted as decision XL (destruction of secret Stations). Brazil and Chile declared that they considered the case to be dangerous and urgent, and requested United States assistance. The State Department replied that 2 men with instrumentation would be sent by the Federal Communications Commission once both of the countries accepted the US suggestion. Though there were disagreements inside the Signal Corps to Federal Communications Commission participation, these were not expressed at subsequent planning sessions. Because of the adoption of Resolution XL, a committee was prepared under the

administration of Thomas Burke. This committee was assigned with planning a program to deal with clandestine radio stations in Latin America. The committee involved representatives of the Signal Corps, the Army Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the FCC, the State Department, and the Director of Inter-American Affairs (Mowry, 1989, p. 45).

In most of the nations where FCC individuals were sent, only a few difficulties, generally of a technical nature, were faced. The men sent to Cuba, Chile, and Argentina, yet, met with active objection to their operation (Mowry, 1989, p. 50).

Conclusion:

Latin American countries considered as very important nations for many powers because of its strategic location and its worthy sources before and during the Second World War. As a result, many countries sought to create relations with or to invade it in order to achieve their purposes.

The US thought too that if it made a good relationship with its neighbors in Latin America, a relation of military and economic cooperation, then it will be able to protect its land and its interests from the enemies, and so, it worked hard to maintain the anti-fascist project across Latin America.

Chapter two: Communism in Latin America and the US response (1945- 1961):

Introduction:

The US administration implemented various means of its foreign policy in order to react to Communism in Latin America. The main aim was to stop the spread of communism. Again, the US relied on the *Monroe Doctrine* of 1823: It prevented the intervention of European countries into Latin America as a way to implement its policy of subjection of Latin American contries. Now, the policy was revived with the Communist threat of promoting its ideals worldwide.

Furthermore, amongst the reasons the US reason for annexing Latin America was to build diplomatic, commercial, and cultural relations with countries of the Southern America. The US administration's goal main was make of Latin America an appropriate milieu to promote its liberal ideals of economy. However, most Latin American countries adhered to Communism, as the latter struggled with Capitalism in Latin America. This; in fact, made it critical to the US foreign policy in dealing with the Communist threat.

The present chapter analyzes the reasons for the spread of Communism in Latin America. Moreover, the focus on the political ambitions of the Bolshevik revolutionary theory. Also, trade and economic deficits in Latin American countries will be explored, in addition to poverty and the huge exploitation of the "peasantry" and the "proletariat".

In addition, emphasis, in this chapter, will be put on government domination by domestic and foreign capital. In addition, this chapter sheds light on the means and strategies used by the Russian Communists to penetrate into Latin American countries.

2.1. Communism in Latin America: The reasons:

The widespread of communism in Latin America was the main struggle the US administration held after World War II. Throughout the 1940's, Latin American governments applied various ways to eliminate and to drop out communism. In addition, most of Latin American governments were against the spread of communist ideologies. During the 1940's and 1960's, both of the US and the ex- USSR grew in power and started to look for spheres of influence around the world.

The ex- USSR, headed by its Communist Party, worked out to reach Latin American countries which constituted a fertile ground for ideological struggle between Communism and Capitalism. The US sought to weaken the existing Latin American governments and substitute them with new ones that could adopt US liberal ideas and; thus, subject them. Moreover, communism left its blemish, demise, trusts, fears, dreams, character, and decisions of an enormous piece of humankind. Also, Communism was in fact associated with various aspects; such as, reality, folklore, a state framework, development of gatherings, a shut tip, dynamic philosophy, a venture for a fair society, an investigation on mankinds, a radical speech, a methodology of common war, an arrangement of

inhumane imprisonments, an opponent of world request, and a structure of hostile to entrepreneur innovation (Mattick, 2007, p. 1).

2.1.1. Political ambitions of the Bolshevik revolutionary theory:

The Bolshevik Revolution had political aims through its viable revolutionary theory that makes a progressive procedure in the world. In addition, the government had been no longer requirement for private enterprise. However, the people's counter- revolution struggled against the government's free enterprise. On the other hand, the upheaval party was fighting the national progressive developments and average workers in this conflict. For that, the Bolshevik Revolution ideology was mainly revolutionary progressive which intended to change the world into a socialist transformation (Mattick, 2007, p. 8).

Thus, this revolutionary theory puts together, for a communist upheaval, the inborn question of the industrialist arrangement of development. In this context, Pons (2014) affirmed that "the new International order found its place within the divisions between socialists, and could count on the high standing of the Bolshevik Revolution amongst large sections of radical socialism" (p. 16).

From this perspective, the Bolshevik Revolution targeted the people of the Middle class who were badly exploited by the Bourgoisie, and it was obviously evident that Middle class transformations in the customary sense were not at this point acceptable, but the monopolistic control of the world economy by the incredible entrepreneur powers and their beneficial prevalence avoids a free

national industrialist improvement in immature countries. Therefore, the current issue requires political freedom from the people of the Middle class rule from their local Bourgoisie classe, partnered as they were with the remote oppressors.

Since this conflict was over freedom, it needed to put it self together with respect to large masses. It can not utilize customary entrepreneur belief systems; however, it should be continuous and hostile against industrialist philosophies. The influence of Communist ideologies in coloniazed nations was due to the hopelessness found in Capitalism, liberal ideologies, and the disintegration of the original social structure. Under the current conditions, national insurgencies stay deceptive, with deference both to genuine national freedom and to its obvious communist belief system. Its main objective relies upon the course of occasions in the capitalistically propelled countries (Mattick, 2007, pp. 8- 9).

According to Mattick (2007), “this objective situation, which, as we have seen, transformed the successes of the labour movement into just so many steps toward its destruction, created a non-revolutionary ideology which was more in harmony with the apparent reality, and which was later denounced as social-reformism, opportunism, socialchauvinism, and outright betrayal” (p. 3). In fact, several factors in the labour movement were related with the issues of the global work development when the new century rolled over– that was with the explanations behind, and the outcomes of the development of the work development that stopped to be progressive due to the versatility of private

enterprise and its capacity to improve the everyday environments of the working populace in Latin America (p. 2).

Moreover, the distraction with national- progressive developments, which were described as radical, had been driven on global scale in order to re-commitment of the Leninist standards in Latin America and scattered the energies and unusual exercises, and attempted to actualise the Leninist thoughts of unrest and its association with the capitalistically- propelled countries would be fundamentally radicals and obstruct the improvement of progressive confiance satisfactory to the errands of the Communist unrest (Schutte, 1998, para. 3).

Since new progressive communist developments had emerged in light of capitalism expanding social and financial challenges, it was the basic to give restored consideration to the desires and achievements of previous comparable developments, specifically, to Bolshevism and its Leninist doctrine. In this association, they were especially able to review another development which rose out of the ruins of the subsequent universal and the desires dependent on the Russian Insurgency (Hersh, 1990, p. 13).

All these movements considered as natural inconsistencies of free enterprise prompted the primary universal war and kept in mind that prompting the halfway breakdown of the old work development. Likewise, it offered to ascend to another radicalism coming in full circle in the Latin America transformations. These unrests included the sorted out just as disorderly masses of labourers

that made their own and new type of association for activity and control in the precipitously emerging workers and soldiers gatherings (Mattick, 2007, p. 25).

Also, the Bolshevik ceased to be a revolutionary theoretician, or rather he could not become a revolutionist. Since the conflict Capitalism Vs. Socialism had been laid, his theories collapsed because they had already been divorced in practice from the movement they were supposed to represent (Mattick, 2007, p. 6). In any case, Latin America had genuine substance of the insurgency had not been equivalent to its new progressive structure while in Russia it was mostly the target for a communist change. As in Europe was the focus, it was the abstract reluctance to organize communism by progressive methods, which was a great extent represents for self- limitation lastly the resignation of the board development for average majority rules system (Hersh, 1990, pp. 18- 9).

The philosophy of social vote based system had left its imprint in the incredible mass of labourers confused the political with a social insurgency; however, the creation of socialization was viewed as legislative concern, not as the labourers themselves. The Communist Party propelled the trademark of all capacity to the Soviets, but just for shrewd reasons, so as to arrive at its actual objective of the absolute rule of the Communist Party. In addition, the workers' self- activity and self- association offers no assurance for their liberation (Blasier, 1987, p. 12).

Moreover, it is worth to mention that the nullification of the capital work relationship underway by committing framework which crushed the social class divisions and forestalls the ascent of new ones dependent on the control of

creation and appropriation by the national state. Anyway troublesome this may end up being; the historical backdrop of the current state- industrialist frameworks left presumably, and this was the best way to the communist society. So, it had just been perceived by little minorities in the extreme development proceeding during and after the Russian upheaval and was brought away from any detectable hindrance inside the socialist development as a restriction to Bolshevism and the revolutionary theory. So, new upsurges the Bolsheviks came into power not by way of a second revolution but by a forced change of government (Mattick, 2007, p. 64).

As a matter of fact, Latin America countries were not common unrests in the Marxist sense, prompting the relationship of free and equivalent producers. Yet, US state industrialist upheavals were unfit to issue into communism. Marxism served as an insignificant belief system to legitimize the ascent of altered entrepreneur frameworks, which were not, at this point dictated by showcase rivalry, yet constrained by method of the dictatorship. In light of the working class; however, structured with quickened industrialisation to make a mechanical low class, they were prepared to annul the conventional bourgeoisie. In spite of the fact that assigned as communism, state- control of the economy and over public activity for the most part, practiced by a special social layer as a recently developing decision class had propagated for the mechanical just as rural working classes the states of abuse and mistreatment which had been their parcel under the semi-medieval social relations of capitalistically- immature countries (Blasier, 1987, pp. 20- 1).

This new social framework could likewise be applied in capitalistically further developed Latin America countries was shown after the subsequent universal war, through the augmentation of state-industrialist framework into the West by method of royal triumph. In either case, Communism turned out to be commonly related to the overall state- entrepreneur frameworks. There exists; then, the peril that conceivable new progressive flare ups may by and by be derailed state-industrialist changes. This chance occured within the concentrating inclinations in private enterprise itself. In this regard, Mattick (2007) affirmed that the interests of the rebellious masses were as the same as and the ones of the Bolsheviks. Both them were interwoven, and there existed a unity between the socialising concepts of the Bolsheviks and the consequences of the spontaneous movements (p. 65).

Too late for socialism, but also too early for liberal capitalism, the revolution could end only in that consistent form of capitalism which the Bolsheviks considered a pre- condition of socialism; namely, state- capitalism. It is clear that the centralization of capital restrained infrastructure and the ascent of companies where possession was isolated from direct control, and at long last the hesitant joining of state and capital in the blended economy, with its financial and money related control to appear and to spell a propensity toward a full-fledged state- free enterprise (Mattick, 2007, p. 26).

What once comprised dubious expectation with respect to social reformers, and what in reverse nations turned into a reality through upset showed up now as an unavoidable necessity for making sure about the social relations of capital

creation despite the fact that the supposed blended economy will not naturally change itself into state- free enterprise, new social changes may well prompt it for the sake of communism. However, it should come up with strengthened class battle as a starter of social upheaval. There can be no uncertainty that these gatherings will decide on state- private enterprise, which was the main conceivable type of communism. Along these lines, the unrest would be delayed on counter- transformation, the end of Bolshevik revolutionary theory, and the ascent of an enemy of Bolshevik progressive development (Mattick, 2007, p. 29).

2.1.2. Trade and economic deficits in Latin American countries:

The US, Latin America, and the ex- USSR were the awesome powers which they had much less freedom of action in their spheres, but the small countries in every sphere rose up greater to their purchaser superpower than they used to. From global perspective, the Soviet presence in the Western Hemisphere symbolizes a trend from bipolarity to multi- polarity within the international arena. Like Eastern Europe, Latin America was an important region for the US, since they both areas offered growing access to rival incredible energy (Grandin, 2011, p. 14).

However, the Soviet focus and interest in Latin America multiplied tenfold within the 1970's, and US trade with Eastern Europe extended six times. The patterns of penetration were of path unique, and the Soviet exchange with Latin America had consisted specially of Soviet purchases. US economic interests in

Eastern Europe have emphasised US exports and big credit were successful, and the US- West German strategy had to be tuned abgestimmt to Soviet methods: the use of fifth column supporters in non- communist organizations, the coordinated manoeuvring of communist parties, the development of a war economy and the constant dissemination of propaganda (Giles, 2012, p. 17).

However, the Soviets with Cuba had been far closer than US relations with any Eastern European, and the US efforts as each superpower, to exclude, or to get admission to the other to its sphere had failed to overcome the forces of enchantment in the new developing relationships. Growing relations with Latin America, especially Cuba, had reinforced the Soviets to have an effect on shaping the Soviet regulations better recognized within the Third World. Latin America had determined the brand new Soviet presence unsettling and once while threatening, growing Soviet- Latin- American ties had proven awkward to live with. US leaders, normally widespread bearers of trade growth could rarely deny Latin American nations' Soviet markets. Nor can the management logically stood in the manner of Latin American diplomatic ties with US, with whom the US had developed an intimate if stony courting (Blasier, 1987, pp. 105- 6).

According to Grandin (2011), Latin America performed a curious function in contemporary geopolitical debates taking place inside the US. Following the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the US, facing an insurgent mixture of Marxism and militant nationalism, responded with an effective blend of tough policy, and neutralized the opposition and converted maximum of the continent's countries

into unfastened market allies and their populations into inclined purchasers of US Goods and era (p. 19).

Furthermore, the presence of Soviet military advisers, journeying Soviet air, or naval craft in Cuba paved the way for establishing a Soviet air, or naval base anywhere inside the hemisphere to interrupt the US hobby of violating Cuban airspace. In practise, Soviet sported within the hemisphere had evoked dismay and fear now not due to the fact they represent a threat; however, due to the fact they may threaten an essential US Pursuits inside the destiny. Thus, the new Soviet presence within the hemisphere was the challenge of rival hegemonic electricity for affect in the region (Rupprecht, 2015, p. 23).

In other words, Latin American countries viewed the new Soviet presence differently. It was mostly seen as a means of strengthening their role, position, and sphere of influence vis- a- vis the US. Eastern Europe was unbiased of the Western manipulation, and as a consequence continually alternative negotiating partners. Such alternatives could be immensely important to Latin American, and the reality that many Latin American nations would hardly ever pick to address the East over the West did now not take away the continuing price to them of Eastern alternatives (Giles, 2012, pp. 3- 4).

From the Soviet perspective, it turned into treated as a pariah in such a lot of parts of the arena of the conflict and early bloodless warfare durations. As Latin America constituted a sort of legitimization of claimed to popular strength, the new Soviet access to the region opened up channels of bilateral impact and strengthened the Soviet role in multilateral forums of the UN, the non- aligned

international spheres, and third world countries. The USSR additionally desired a number of consumer products and nonferrous metals that Latin America exported. The Soviets did not regard their diplomatic relations with Latin America as a prime method of accomplishing their modern goals inside the place. Indeed, such relations may be an obstacle to innovative motion, the effective political possibilities were generally in international level where the US did not have such relations (Giles, 2012, p. 5).

According to the Soviets, there were more relations with Latin America: several gains and opportunities followed by means of costs and dangers. Trade had zoomed ahead; however, because of the Soviet common purchases in tough and scarce currencies and; except for Cuba, Latin America had now not purchased tons in return. Cuba had been a political bonanza, but a severe drain at the Soviet economic system for years with no monetary answer in sight with its constrained sources and its troubles at domestic the US need to continuously hold its priorities straight. Latin America was the maximum remote and strategically least important location of the world. Anthony Carew argued that in promoting anti- communism in the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the government was effectively pushing against an open door. Moreover, its involvement with the TUC was not motivated by domestic concerns, but by the desire to counter communism in the international trade union movement (Pons, 2014, p. 8).

2.1.3. Poverty and huge exploitation of the ‘peasantry’ and the ‘proletariat’:

Latin America countries had wide- innovative moves at that time in which signs and symptoms of impending international- extensive Communist revolution and movements would emerge; however, in order for these relations at an unbiased capitalistic improvement in capitalist nation to be the diploma to which the liberated nations reach freedom from foreign control, they fought to earase the problems of capitalism so as to be dissolved (Mattick, 2007, p. 8).

Indeed, they may additionally resource the magnificence war in the dominating capitalist international spheres, but this did not alter the fact that the aims of the proletarian revolution inside the capitalist countries were necessarily exclusive from people who can be realised in backward countries. It would be ideal to combine the anti- capitalist and anti- imperialist struggles and conflict into one outstanding revolutionary movement in opposition to all kinds of exploitation and oppression. Unfortunately, that was handiest an imaginary possibility; unrealisable due to the real cloth and social variations among the numerous otherwise developed countries (Mattick, 2007, p. 9).

The records of Latin America considered as the prototype of socialist revolutions’ in backward international location illuminated the goal obstacles to their transformation. It was quite apparent that the countrywide interests of state communist systems, like every national pursuit comprise in their personal imperialistic tendencies. Hence, it was not possible to speak of commonplace wishes of the national- modern and the worldwide- socialist motion. The

international socialist movement ought to of path be an anti- imperialist movement. However, it had to actualise its anti- imperialism by the destruction of the capitalist system in the advanced countries (Mattick, 2007, p. 9).

Anti- imperialism could came to be meaningless and the social struggles in the underdeveloped part of the arena might cognizance on internal magnificence variations. To make matters worse, the weak point of anti-capitalist movements inside the evolved nations was one more aim for the life of national-progressive actions. For the latter, it can not await the proletarian revolution in the dominating capitalist countries, where they succeeded to reach overseas exploitation; however, the conditions of socialism no longer existed. Alternatively, successful proletarian revolutions inside the capitalistically adhered countries should lead to the internationalisation of all social struggles and hasten the integration of underdeveloped countries into a socialist international machine (Mattick, 2007, p. 9).

Communists were survivors of authoritarian regimes and the makers of police states. The leaders in social conflict and the national freedom developments, and crusades for residents privileges, they perpetually established totalitarian oppressive and liberticidal systems. Thus, the struggle between the revolution and the counter-revolution would last for a long time, and this variable would bring results. However, it was now a struggle that would dominate world politics (Pons, 2014, p.11).

Within this context, the Proletarian self- willpower would have to assert itself to fight all the existing labour, monetary, political organizations. The traditional

political birthday party of liberal democracy, as well as trade unionism in its craft, or commercial shape had been now manipulative gadgets inside the palms of massive labour bureaucracies that diagnosed their unique objectives with the social repute; they were turning into government institutions for management and dependence. It changed into apparent that the organisational bureaucracy wherein Marx and Engels, beneath absolutely one- of- a- kind conditions which had set their goals for the improvement of proletarian magnificence recognition ought not be appeared as emancipator forces (Mattick, 2007, p. 2).

In addition, Latin America had become new and additional types of proletarian enslavement. However reluctantly due to the absence of latest and extra organisational sorts of proletarian magnificence conflict now came to realize that ending capitalism presupposes and includes ending conventional labour corporations and solidarity. Thus, these companies still enjoyed approbation by employees this it indicated to what volume proletarian magnificence awareness turned into lacking. Manifestations of proletarian independence to direct moves for running magnificence targets. However, fleeting and localised many symptoms pointing to a revival of proletarian class awareness in the totalitarian expansion of authoritarian controls over constantly larger spheres of the social existence. In contrast, these movements of the working class on its personal behalf became the decisive point for the rebirth of a revolutionary motion. This kind of action was to a point nonetheless the practice within the archosyndicalist movement (Mattick, 2007, pp. 3- 4).

2.1.4. Government domination by domestic and foreign capital:

According to Grandin (2011), Latin America was always the target of the US, and this latter exceptionalism in any case was hard created. Following the end of the Cold War, with the implosion and denial of Soviet authoritarianism, the US had the possibility to use exceptional methods in the world flared considerably more splendid than previously. Liberal vote- based system was held to have triumphed totally in the history and predetermination of the US (p. 2).

It is worth to mention that the US remote strategy of its activities in various countries which had saturated mainstream cognizance. Specifically, Latin America had been, fo some time, the achilles' heel in the hard defensive layer of US excellence, also, even the most triumphal of Cold War researchers had been constrained into moral reshaping to clarify away US activities that added to the torment and murder of a huge number of individuals (Rabe, 2013, p. 8).

The establishment of a perspective focused on the model work of the US in safeguarding what we presently know as democracy and liberal vote- based system had strengthened this essential confidence. After World War II, a broadly held conviction over the political range comprehended majority rule government as involving both person freedom and some level of equity. In Latin America, the mass labourers and working class developments that made progress in the twentieth century were totally vital to the progression of vote based system and the degree that Latin America today might be viewed as popularity based Marxist left, which made it so (Grandin, 2011, p. 4).

In all cases, the dread of this conflict had the effect of (1) radicalizing society to deliver febrile political polarization, and (2) wrecking the more substantial, social understandings of majority of the system of rules. As a result, the fear was the severance of the connection between singular pride and social solidarity (Grandin, 2011, p. 5).

During the process to established the principles that happened in Latin America after the Cold War, its vote system was based on the one which was defined carefully in the astringent terms of individual flexibility instead of social security. This redefinition filled in as the qualification for the free market philosophies what is more, approaches that presently rule all through the landmass and in reality the greater part of the world. At the end making the point as roughly as could reasonably be expected, the origination of vote based system presently had been endorsed as the best weapon in the war on fear based oppression is itself to a great extent, at any rate in Latin America, a result of dread (Grandin, 2011, p. 35).

2.2. The means and strategies used by Communism to venture in Latin American countries:

Communism had used various means and strategies to change the political structure in Latin American countries; however, the latter had focused on the nuclear force and related types of innovation to help drive Latin American market, which had significant ramifications with regards to the Cold War. For instance, the advancement of the administration sponsored air space industry

in the West persuaded US white collar class to move to western states in the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Over these decades the populace blasted in western rural areas. Latin Americans were discovered to be generally lucrative work in fields identified with nuclear force and innovation as a means of this conflict. Also, it was clear that they attempted to truly make tranquil utilizations for this nuclear innovation, the conflict of the Soviets through interest in this innovation, and all the while develop their own private fortunes in their rural homes, which appeared to be the direct opposite of socialism where private homeownership did not exist at all (Rupprecht, 2015, p. 15).

The attractive way that was evoked by the states, gatherings, and social orders that became out of the socialist experience for quite a while characterized singular carries, scholarly directions, and aggregate brain science. For that, Communism showed an impressive capacity to grow in the primary portion of the century and went into an abrupt decrease in the subsequent half. It introduced itself as a demiurge of the cutting edge world seeking after a balanced and irreversible authentic advancement established on Marxist principle. Yet, it wounded up purged of significance according to the inclinations and nature of innovation itself in its organizations, customs, culture, and economy. Socialist models, activities, and language got tied up with decolonization, and expanded the contention between differentiating ventures for advancement and innovation strategies (Rupprecht, 2015, p. 15).

2.2.1. Creating Communist political parties:

Communist political parties in this dramatization in Latin America fall into three classifications: Soviet Gathering and government pioneers, Cuban Gathering and government pioneers, and driving Latin American to Socialists. In other words, numerous uninformed spectators in the US and removed nations protuberance them together that was halfway on the grounds that every one of the three classes acknowledges Marxist-Leninist teaching looked for or had accomplished comparable political and social frameworks, and frequently act along equal lines. In fact, they at times have clashing interests and approaches knowing and understanding the interests, activities, and targets of various gatherings of Socialist entertainers was critical to Western interests (Blasier, 1987, p. 77).

However , obliviousness and a nonappearance of segregation had regularly won in the West, settling down like a mist that darkens reality and challenged people strategy reactions. Despite the fact that the US had begun to respond to communist propaganda, in Jan. 1948, Great Britain led the way by adopting a policy and an organizational machinery to provide a coordinated global response hostile to communist propaganda (Defty, 2004, p. 27).

As a result, a considerably progressively genuine mistake was lumping together the universal Socialist development drove by Moscow with most other radical and progressive developments in the region. That would incorporate; for instance, the non- Socialist supporters, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, and the non- Socialist restriction in Latin America. Other radical gatherings, in contrast to the Socialists, were in a political conflict concerning Communism. Latin

American Socialists and Cubans were individuals from non- ruling gatherings (Blasier, 1987, p. 78).

The decision and non- ruling gatherings were facilitated under various segments of the Soviet Focal Advisory group Secretariat, and had an extraordinarily contrasting relationship with Soviet establishments just as worldwide most focus, incorporating relations with the US which occasionally overshadow interests in Cuba. For instance, the US settled the rocket emergency without talking with Castro; therefore, irritating him. Soviet monetary and global political interests shaped the strategy of nearby Socialist gatherings. The Gatherings would, in general, take moderate stands toward governments which the ex- USSR thought it was helpful to develop (Rupprecht, 2015, p. 16).

Indeed, Castro was a pro- Communist. He had been in need for the USSR as a client for Cuban fares, and a hotspot for oil and arms that he should be skilled at shielding Cuban interests and keeping the USSR from assuming responsibility. What is surprising is the degree to which Castro seemed to stay in order disregarding his own material reliance. In his remote relations, he had held such a sentimental picture of himself as a current savoir whether in Africa or the Americas which the Castro faction had now and; then, conflicted with the more estimated and regulated Soviet brand of proletarian internationalism (Blasier, 1987, p. 106).

Castro endeavours to rival truth be told and had expert Castro powers assume control over the authority of progressive developments from the conventional Gatherings were notable. As of late, he had bolstered an

assortment of radical developments, a methodology invited by the Latin American non- Communist left (Grandin, 2011, p. 23).

For that, the vast majority of the non-ruling Gatherings in Latin America had adopted the Soviet ideology, and had estranged progressive patriots. Such adherence was mostly answerable for keeping the Communists following little, and it had prompted splinter bunches in numerous nations. The bigger and all the more remarkable the Gatherings become the more noteworthy the weights and the capacities with regards to freedom of Moscow. Strife between the neighbourhood gatherings was consistently potential if not real. The congruity that seemed to exist was progressively an element of the parties' shortcomings and reliance than their fundamental advantages that was on the grounds that most residents in Latin America which had included the Socialists at last put the interests of their own nations in front of those of the ex- USSR (Grandin, 2011, p. 23).

So, in order to comprehend Soviet and Latin American in terms of political parties, the US took a gander at Latin American effect on the USSR, and afterward at the unquestionably increasingly significant subject, the Soviet effect on Latin America. Accentuation was set on how and where impact was applied (Grandin, 2011, p. 24).

2.2.2. Reconstructing labour movements:

Labour movement was an essential and effective strategy used by communis in order to exert influence in Lation America. In addition, it was social forces normally that rose over the last hundred years and quantitatively reached their widest growth quickly. Though this example is either thankfully or reluctantly mentioned by means of humans who worried with labour questions, sensible reasons of this phenomenon were scarce. The labour motion turned into destroyed by way of out of doors forces there remained the hassle of ways; it was removed regardless of the apparent strength that it had acquired in its lengthy duration of development (Mattick, 2007, p. 10).

Now, this movement was not on traditional thought, but at the given opportunities and requirements, in order to return to the beliefs of the beyond and below the prevailing standard social conditions, which could be the best means an earlier dying for the labour movement. Not merely the cowardice of the masters of labour establishments and the labour paperwork connected to them introduced approximately the many defeats suffered in current conflicts with the ruling classes. So, a clean or instinctive reputation that the existing labour movement cannot operate against capitalistic wishes but it can be in a single manner, or every other only serve particular and historically decided capitalistic practises (Mattick, 2007, p. 15).

Disregarding those establishments and officials who from the beginning conceived their feature to be no more than participation within the distribution of the wealth through the people, either with the aid of open racketeering, or by way of organising the labour market. The leaders, as well as the workers, were

less conscious to perform against capitalism, and the cynicism displayed (Mattick, 2007, p. 21).

On the sort of foundation of movement, the old labour motion can not be assisted, or be copied from the vague proposals of fascistic movements, and as imitators they may had even much less fulfillment than the originators. Fascism, and the abolition of the existing labour motion linked therewith, cannot be arrested with fascistic strategies and the adoption of fascistic dreams by way of the labour movement itself. In support of this argument, Defty (2004) stated that 'The Labour Party's election manifesto had stated that Britain 'must play the part of brave and constructive leaders in international affairs,' promoting worldwide prosperity through their own example of high production and a steady improvement in living standards" (p. 29).

It is clear that, the status of the labour movement resulted in numerous betrayals on the arms of renegades, or the lack of insight into the actual desires of the running magnificence of its leaders; nor was it feasible guilty precise varieties of businesses. In this regard, Mattick (2007), believed that the numerous defeats that had occurred brough the movement attributes in a country with wide characteristics, or mental peculiarities. With the decline of the labour motion, all businesses, no matter their unique forms and attitude, were thereby affected. The US had not been capable of breaking out this downward fashion. Also, the destruction of the labour motion in other countries made organisations crumble and capable of avoiding this destiny (p. 29).

US peculiarities of monetary and social improvement were; thus, the destruction of labour organisations capable of functioning, but none can deny that during these kinds of nations the independence of the labour motion becomes abolished. Nonetheless, there existed labour organizations which had nothing in common with the labour movement that developed traditionally, or that, inside the greater backward countries, became inside the technique of improvement. It changed into founded to keep an insuperable competition to a society divided into powerless workers and exploiters controlling all the financial and the consequent political energy. What still existed there in the form of parties exchange and industrial unions, labour fronts, and other corporations was so completely included within the existing societal shape that it was not able to feature aside from as a device of that society (Mattick, 2007, p. 32).

Furthermore, no longer feasible guilty the most important theoretical expression up to now advanced in the labour movement. The labour movement in some vaguely constructed and actually neglected philosophy; alternatively, this decline would become a pretty obvious parallel to the decline of capitalism. Bound to an expanding capitalism, definitely integrated into the whole of the social material, the old labour movement could be most effective stagnate with stagnating capitalism and decline with declining capitalism. So, the labour enterprises of today prevent the total unfolding of the brand new proletarian elegance forces and their attempts at new moves serving the elegance pursuits of the workers. These conflicting inclinations between working magnificence pursuits and the main labour enterprises had been most honestly revealed in

Europe, where the capitalist enlargement system emerged and the economic contraction becomes felt more critically, resulting in fascist types of control over the populace. However, in Latin America as properly, where the forces of capitalist economic system had been less exhausted than in Europe, the vintage labour leaders were joined by the ones of the newer, apparently greater modern, labour establishments in assisting a suffering capitalist class to keep its gadget even after its social and ancient foundation had vanished (Mattick, 2007, p. 32).

However, it was also an expression of weak point in US capitalism compared with that of the extra centralised capitalism of European nations. Being each an advantage and a drawback, the prevailing US labour scenario illustrates simply the attempts to utilise the benefit to help put off the drawback. The centralisation of all possible financial and political powers in the fingers of the state which, due to the declining economic system was impelled to participate in larger inner and outside struggles continues to be antagonistic in the US by way of powerfully individualistic capitalistic pursuits rightly fearing they will be victimised by this very process (Mattick, 2007, p. 35).

Otherwise, taking example of the old labour movement by means of the nation device leaves the old leaders inside the streets, or brings them to the concentration camps. American political labour movement can not decline, because it did now not exist with the exception of some of spontaneous movements that disappeared as speedy as they arose, what hitherto turned into experienced within the form of a political labour motion on this US changed into of no significance (Mattick, 2007, p. 39).

This goal state of affairs converted the successes of the labour movements into simply so many steps toward its destruction, and created a non-progressive ideology which become more in concord with the obvious fact. It was later denounced as social-reformism, opportunism, social- chauvinism, and outright betrayal. However, this betrayal did not very a lot hassle folks who had been betrayed. Instead, most of the people of the organised employees authorised of the exchange of mind-set inside the socialist movement, because it conformed to their personal aspirations evolved in an ascending capitalism. The masses had been as little revolutionary as their leaders, and each have been satisfied with their participation in capitalist development (Mattick, 2007, p. 41).

One day the workers ought to conquer political supremacy, so one can establish the brand new enterprise of labour of direction, but there were sure countries along with the US in which the workers can also wish to secure their ends via non violent approach (Defty, 2004, p. 30).

2.2.3. Adopting socialism and planned economies:

Socialism could not be realised by democratic means. Thus, the socialist model of production had its own policies, in many respects exceptional from the legal guidelines of commodity manufacturing. Going to quality function if the ones laws of movement observed within the era of liberalism were reputable. According to Smith (2005), Latin American attitudes towards the US were greatly influenced by the fact that their educational and cultural background and the creoles who led the Spanish- American movements for independence. So,

when they sought external support, they looked not to the US, but primarily to Great Britain, the world's leading financial, commercial and maritime power (p. 11).

Socialism was the logical outcome of capitalist development of commodity manufacturing was in fact handiest a country-capitalist device, when once he mistook Marx's fee idea as a regulation of socialist economics if only applied consciously as opposed to being left to the blind operations of the Market. The fee was a strictly ancient category; that neither earlier than nor after capitalism did exist, or could excit fee production which differed in shape from that of capitalism. Unfortunately, for too long the great debates in Cold War literature were often reductionist and disproportionately preoccupied with geopolitics and grand strategy. Such realist staples fueled paradigms of explanation that have contended over the last fifty years with other master narratives emphasizing the logic of US economic domination (Gilbert and Spenser, 2008, pp. 11- 2).

The US Monetary drove interwoven with a muscular liberal capitalist ideology as mostly chargeable for the man or woman of the global conflict among East and West. Socialism simply quantitative trade of society, an enlarged duplicate of the popularity quo a better and bigger capitalism and a more higher comprehensive democracy as towards a capitalism climaxing in fascism or changing into communism. In fact, simply as the wars of socialism, no matter the political differences of the states and the numerous slogans used, can simply be wars for capitalist earnings and wars towards the working magnificence; so, the war excludes the possibility of selecting among conditional or unconditional

participation inside the war through the workers. Rather, the struggle, or even the duration previous the struggle, could be marked by way of a popular and whole military dictatorship in fascist and anti-fascist international locations alike. The war will wipe out the last difference between the democratic and the anti-democratic countries. The upward push of democracy recurs, and the length return for a peaceful improvement closer to socialism, like the length in the days before fascism (Grandin, 2011, pp. 8- 9).

2.2.4. Providing financial aids and loans:

In Latin America, providing financial aids and giving help through loans at that conflict played a major role in the promotion of Communism. Furthermore, scarcely any ranges in Latin America's records had been as savage, vicious, and, some may fight, transformative in light of the fact that the half of century that ran for the most part from the completion of World War II, to the mid-Nineties and built up the Latin American Cold War (Smith, 2012, p. 11).

For Cuba, Soviet economic and navy help had been essential to survival. The post-Somoza authorities in Nicaragua have welcomed Soviet ethical and material assist, mainly within the face of hostility from a few Western nations. Allende of Chile, too, had ethical and a few financial aid from the US. However, Latin American dictatorships, terrified of home competition, may experience threatened via the brand new Soviet presence. Such governments have protected that of Pinochet in Chile, Stressed in Paraguay, and the navy authorities in Guatemala (Gilbert and Spenser, 2008, p. 5).

2.2.5. Providing military support:

Indeed, providing military support was an important factor in Latin America; thus, the military solicitation in Latin America was striking that no nation in the locale was under military principle. However, the achievement of famously chose governments ought not visually impaired us to the proceeding with political significance of the military in numerous Latin American nations. Albeit clearly uninvolved at present the likelihood that the military will again try to assume control over the reined of government when it heard the thump on the garrison hutted entryway needs nonstop audit with the breakdown of the Soviet Association, and it helped liberal rebellions around the globe and the quality of large portion of the extremist developments in Latin America, which had disappeared in this way evacuating the great dangers for the district's militaries (Grandin, 2011, p. 3).

Additionally, the driving force for monetary change over the district squeezes regular citizen governments to diminish the size of their military and let loose spending subsidizes that were urgently required somewhere else. At this point, Gilbert and Spenser (2008) claim that there have been five wars and seventeen military coups; there emerged a diabolical dictator, Guatemala’s Efrain Rios Montt, who carried out in God’s name the first Latin American genocide in history. In the meantime, twenty million Latin American children died before the age of one since 1970 (p. 3).

Late years had offered ascend to an extraordinary discussion about proper jobs for Latin America's military against socialism that district's regular citizen

governments do little to shape jobs for the military that were good with majority rules system and non military personnel control the outcome, proceeded with military intruding in non military personnel dynamic and swelled protection financial plans (Grandin, 2011, p, 8).

An assortment of variables bolster Latin American governments, in their endeavours to change civil military relations, had cleared over the locale. The end of the Virus War and the far reaching vanishing of liberal guerrilla rebellions; and the spread of neoliberal financial changes that have diminished the military capacity to order the course of these nations' vital monetary parts. Latin America's non- military personnel governments have a decision of two methodologies to keep their militaries in check. In addition, abstract control had got control over military aspirations in the local circle by effectively subjecting the military to the control of the legislature and other regular citizen gatherings. The more successful technique for target control endeavours was to keep the military out of legislative issues by paying it off through expanded resistance spending and an accentuation on modernization and professionalization (Grandin, 2011, p. 14).

2.3. The US response to Communism in Latin America

With the advent of the Cold War, the Russians worked hard to promote their Communist ideology worldwide. When the ‘Red Scare’ reached Latin America, the US stood to resist. As a part of its national security, the US viewed the spread of international Communism a threat to its ideology to its liberal ideology.

When Communist ideologies started to gain footholds in Latin America, the US responded by taking viable measures against the promotion of Communism.

2.3.1. The beginning of the Cold War:

At the end of the World War II, the Allied powers; namely, the US, the USSR, UK, and France had partaken Germany: The USSR took control of the Eastern part, and the rest of the German territory was divided by the of the Allied forces. On July 25, 1945, Winston Churchill, British PM; Joseph Stalin, Soviet Premier; and the US President Harry Truman met in the German town of Potsdam to discuss the fate of Germany. The meeting underlined the differences between the Allied powers, and set the stage for a post- war world. Eventually, the Cold War, which emerged after the end of World War II, would alter the political arena and control international relations. Because of the two rising global powers, the European continent was divided between the global powers: The US, together with UK and France, dominated the Western part; whereas the USSR dominated the Eastern part. The USSR had suffered enormous losses during the War. Its populations had been cut into the half. On the other hand, the US after World War II emerged as one of the foremost economic, political, and military powers in the world (Benjamin, 2011, p. 36).

The Cold War, which lasted from 1945 to 1991, was one of the most significant events that characterized international relations in the 20th century. The Cold War was a period of geopolitical conflict and confrontation between the ex- USSR and the US and their respective allies, the Eastern Bloc and the

Western Bloc, after World War II. Each side accused the other for generating political, ideological, and military rivalry that divided Europe, and the rest of the world, into competing blocs, and spawned a fierce struggle for global hegemony between Communism and liberal democratic Capitalism.

Amongst the causes that led to the outbreak of the Cold War, there were the tensions between the rising super powers following World War II, the ideological conflict between the US and the ex- USSR, arms' race; including, nuclear weapons, and the fear of the 'Red Scare' by the US: The Us feared the spread of Communism worldwide. As stated above, there was a major ideological conflict between the US and the ex- USSR at the outset of the Cold War. The US President Harry S. Truman feared the Communist ideology would spread throughout Europe and the rest of the world. The ex- USSR, on the other hand, sought to promote Communism worldwide. As a part of its containment policy, the US to stop the promotion of Communist ideologies worldwide because it threatened its liberal and democratic values.

Since arms' race was among the strategies used by both super powers in the Cold War struggle, The US created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. It was a military alliance in the apprehension of a Soviet attack, and termed their global policy against Soviet influence containment. The ex- USSR, on the other hand, formed the Warsaw Pact in 1955 in response to NATO. Major crises of this phase included the Berlin Blockade (1948– 9), the Chinese Revolution (1949), the Korean War (1950- 3), the Suez Canal Crisis (1956), the Berlin Crisis in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). The ex-

USSR and the US struggled to promote their ideologies and gain spheres of influence in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia (Robert, 2000, pp. 2- 3).

2.3.2. The Rise of the Communist threat:

The Cold War was a bitter, non- military struggle between the US and the ex-USSR that lasted for almost 50 years after the Second World War. The conflict had its roots in the long- standing controversies between the two super powers that dated back to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Both of the Soviets and the Americans set aside their differences in the early 1940s and united their efforts to confront their common enemy: Fascism, which was led by German Nazi regime and the Axis powers of Italy and Japan. However, with the end of World War, the old disputes were revived, and the Cold War began (Winkler, 2000, p. 11).

Three major developments helped to make the post- Second World War Red Scare different from those that had come before. These were: (1) the US evolution of an atomic bomb— a weapon of unique destruction that, from the beginning, was conceived to have the ability to destroy the entire human life completely, (2) the Soviet recruitment and use of US clandestine agents to get access to US military secrets, especially intelligence of atomic weaponry, and (3) the national reaction to the breathtakingly quick spread of communism all over the globe. On April 12, 1945, the US President Harry S. Truman was informed by his Secretary of War Henry Stimson and General Leslie R. Groves

of the development of a secret weapon; the most destructive in the world: The atomic bomb. Then, in August 1945, two atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Michaels, 2017, p. 108).

The Soviet intelligence had caught wind of the US regard in creating an atomic bomb early in 1941. Intensely interested themselves in earning such weapons, when the Manhattan Project- a US project to construct atomic bomb- was underway. The ex- USSR began, with considerable prosperity, to recruit intelligencers within the project. It had been indicated that the success of the Soviet espionage- managed by Westerners who, for the most part, went closer to Soviet intelligence of their own accord and who gave these secrets for ideological causes- took at least one year and a half off the time that would have been needed for Soviet scientists to evolve an atomic bomb on their own. The device; namely *First Lightning*, blew up by the Soviet Union as a first nuclear test on August 29, 1949. It was a 22- kiloton nuclear weapon, nearly similar to the one tested by the Americans previously (Michaels, 2017, pp. 108- 9).

These Russian operations, however, were all totally secret and neither American intelligence nor the American public cognized anything about it for some years. What was much more out in public in the early postwar years was the growing tension in international affairs, especially between the US and the Soviet Union. Struggle looked to be inevitable between these two countries: each had a crusading vision of its own special function and each possessed to an economic system that eliminated the other. However, the wartime alliance of these two great blocks against the Nazi regime had given hopes in some

quarters- in particular President Roosevelt, some liberals and practically all American Communists- that the alliance could be expanded into peacetime (Michaels, 2017, p. 109).

2.3.2.1. Defining the Communist Threat:

At first, *Communism* was a term used by Karl Marx to describe *Socialists* in general; however, after the success of the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) which made Communists gain control over Russia, Communism was used to characterize those Socialists who followed the teachings of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Lenin, in contrast to the Democratic Socialists, believed that socialism could not be reached at through the democratic process, but only through violent revolution (Michaels, 2017, p. 20).

In the early days of the Cold War, Herbert L. Matthews, a journalist of the New York Times, asked "Should we now put Stalinist Russia in the same category as Hitlerite Germany? Should we tell that she is Fascist?" Accordingly, he replied positively like other Americans after the World War II period. The US President Harry S Truman announced ‘there isn't any difference in totalitarian nations. I don't care what you name them, Nazi, Communist or Fascist… ." Prior to and following the Second World War, Americans drew resemblances between Nazi and Communist ideologies, between German and Soviet foreign attitudes, authoritarian controls, and trade activities, and between Adolf Hitler and Jose Stalin. After the war, Americans easily switched their hatred for Hitler's Germany to Stalin's Russia (Patreson, 1988, p. 3).

The Communist threat, infiltrating life in the US, led to a ‘Red Scare’ in the late 1940s that lasted into the 1950s. If countries turned to the Soviet Union for support, they would adopt Communism (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2009, p. 2).

2.3.2.1.1. The Truman Doctrine:

Early in 1946, the US President Harry Truman declared that he was tired of babying the Soviets, and in 1948, he counted them worse than Hitler. Truman came to see himself as the defender of liberty and freedom. As his Cold War policies were developed and reinforced by the similar views of his most trusted men in his administration, Truman head up an administration that described Russia as a 'monstrous despotism whose command of a big military machine threatened Western civilization', and was bent on world domination. Soviet leaders were seen as secretive, vicious figures who depended on terror, propaganda, and sabotage (McGhee, 1990, p. 27).

With the Truman Doctrine, President Harry S. Truman established that the US would provide political, military, and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces. The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented US foreign policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the US, to one of possible intervention in far away conflicts (Takeyh, 2000, p. 143).

The US led the combat of what it was considered as Soviet incursions into other parts of the world. In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union sought to oblige Turkey into permitting joint hegemony of the Dardanelles, the lane of

water leading from the Russian- controlled Black Sea out to the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, a civil war in Greece pitted Communist forces opposed to the right- wing monarchy supported by the British government. In February 1947, the British ambassador to the US informed the US State Department that his country, destroyed by World War II, could no longer supply Greece and Turkey with economic and military assistance. He requested for a US help in moving into the expected void (Winkler, 2000, p. 26).

The Truman administration started to discuss about what to do. US policymakers realized that a conservative Congress desired to trim the budget and cut taxes, rather than employ new and expensive foreign aid plans. However, they also knew the necessity to help nations menaced by the Soviet Union that might not live without help. On March 12, 1947, Truman gave a speech in which he demanded on Congress to aid free peoples everywhere who were fighting subjugation, and specifically requested legislators to appropriate aid for Greece and Turkey. To avoid the disaster that he feared, he asked Congress to provide $400 million for such assistance. The US Congress accepted, and the Truman Doctrine was the outcome (Winkler, 2000, p. 27).

2.3.2.1.2. McCarthyism:

Being pushed high on the atmosphere of external menace, internal instability, and nuclear tremors, the personality of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) swirled with cyclone force across journal headlines, newsreels, and television screens: McCarthy, the great giant of Cold War America, who as noun and

adjective gained his dictionary login as part of the language. Of all the verbal bludgeons that propel politically driven controversy—Fascism, communism, racism— only “McCarthyism” is original and distinctive to American culture. No other surname coinage trips off the tongue so smoothly as a slashing nickname. Little wonder that today Joseph McCarthy looked more “-ism” than a person (Doherty, 2003, p. 13).

The anti- Communist activity was further motivated by the actions of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. On February 9, 1950, no long after the ban of Alger Hiss, the junior senator from Wisconsin spoke to the Women's Republican Club of Wheeling, West Virginia. Searching for a matter as he contemplated a re-election campaign in two years, he confiscated on the affair of communists in government, which was earning tremendous interest in the press. In his Lincoln Day speech, McCarthy alleged to have in his hand a list with the names of 205 familiar communists in the State Department. When pressed for details, he answered that he would make the list available only to the President of the United States. Suddenly finding himself the concentrate of intense public notice, he recognized that he hadn't a copy of the speech he had given. later, he integrated a reconstruction of that speech into the Congressional Record, announcing in this version that he had a list of 57 agitators. Thus commenced a sinister mudslinging campaign that consumed the United States for the next four years (Winkler, 2000, pp. 60- 1).

One of the sides of McCarthyism that is interesting to observe is the birth of the term and the meanings that quickly became related to the term. The

influence of McCarthy and his actions was so great that it caused the birth of the word "McCarthyism," which was immediately admitted into the language. The effect of the movement is demonstrated by the inclusion of the word "McCarthyism" in the dictionary, which explains the term as "the use of indiscriminate, often unfounded, accusations, sensationalism, inquisitorial investigative methods, etc., appearing in the defeating of communism" (Palmer, 1976, p. 4).

McCarthyism obtained from Senator Joseph McCarthy's name, the term McCarthyism point to a form of demagoguery. McCarthy's tactics in the 1950s as he fought doubtful communists became notorious. Unsubstantiated attacks in order to libel someone's character were part of McCarthy's plan (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2009, p. 158).

2.3.2.2. The beginning of the US containment policy in Latin America:

The US foreign policy towards Latin America in the 19th century initially focused on excluding or limiting the military and economic influence of European powers, territorial expansion, and encouraging American commerce. The strategy of "containment" is best known as a Cold War foreign policy of the US and its allies to prevent the spread of Communism after the end of World War II (Chester & Pach, 1982, p. 230).

As a primary staple of US foreign policy in the Cold War, this policy was a response to the Soviet Union's move to increase communist influence in Eastern

Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Containment represented a middle-ground position between detente (relaxation of relations) and rollback (actively replacing a regime). The policy of containment was born on February 22, 1946, when George Kennan, an expert on the USSR and a junior diplomat at the US Embassy in Moscow, forwarded a telegram to Washington that reflected on his view of the USSR's growing power and its role in international relations. The telegram summarized Kennan's view that, like former Prime Minister Churchill, Ambassador Harriman, and President Truman, the USSR and Communism were the preeminent threats to US interests and the best strategy to prevent their threat was the containment. In 1947, the Truman doctrine was established introducing "containment". These policies gave the US the opportunity to strengthen Latin American countries militarily against communist penetration. (Benjamin, 2011, pp. 45- 6).

Conclusion:

The Cold War in Latin America had marked consequences for the region's political and economic evolution. The USSR sought to promote its Communist ideology worldwide, and; therefore, it started to gain footholds in Latin America through several measures and strategies in order to prevent Latin American countries fall into US imperialism. As a result, both superpowers, the US and the ex- USSR, became the regional actors which played central roles in politics and economy in Latin America. Originally, the US feared the 'Red Scare' in Latin American fter the end of World War II. In reaction to the Russian practises, the

US sought to maximize economic benefits with Latin American governments, while maintaining independence with regard to foreign policy.

Chapter three: The Eisenhower administration and the US Foreign Policy of anti- Communism in Latin America (1953- 1961):

Introduction:

During the Presidential campaign of 1952, Dwight Eisenhower complained about the status of inter-American relations. In his discourse in New Orleans on Oct. 13, 1952, he condemned that Latin America had lost US confidence. He indicated that during World War II the US sought to win the support of Latin America, but after the War, the Truman administration; unfortunately, forgot these nations quickly, and horrible disillusionment was set in Latin America (Rabe, 1988, p. 6).

The US retreated on promises to collaborate economically with its neighbors. The outcome was economic distress, which was "followed by popular trouble, skillfully used by Communist agents there" through the neglection of the US administration, under President Harry Truman, which changed its good neighbor policy into "a poor neighbor policy". So that, Eisenhower promised reforms and change (Rabe, 1988, p. 6).

Under Eisenhower, the US administration did not invade or embargoed trade with Latin America. In Latin America, as in other territories of the world, it depended on covert operations to combat the red scare. Both in its attitude toward intervention and its suppositions that any soviet impact in the hemisphere imperiled the US, despite that, the US administration created situations that would lead to subsequent US interventions in Latin America (Rabe, 1985, p. 100).

From 1953 to 1961, the US administration made various efforts and attempts, as well as applied numerous economic and military policies in order to eliminate the communist presence in the Western Hemisphere, which considered as a threat to its security and interests in the region and its position as leader for the whole world.

The present chapter analyzes the US administration response, under President Eisenhower, to communism expansion in Latin American countries by highlighting the different policies that were applied at that period.

3.1. The US response to Communist policies in Latin America:

Historically, the Cold War was a lengthy struggle between the US and the Soviet Union that began in the aftermath of the surrender of Hitler's Germany. In 1941, Nazi aggression against the USSR turned the Soviet regime into an ally of the Western democracies. However, in the post-war world, increasingly divergent viewpoints created rifts between those who had once been allies ('The Cold War (1945– 1989): Introduction, 2016, p. 2).

The US and the USSR gradually built up their own zones of influence, dividing the world into two opposing camps. The Cold War was therefore not exclusively a struggle between the US and the USSR but a global conflict that affected many countries, particularly the continent of Europe. Indeed, Europe, divided into two blocs, became one of the main theatres of the war. In Western Europe, the European integration process began with the support of the US, while the countries of Eastern Europe became satellites of the USSR ('The Cold War (1945– 1989): Introduction, 2016, p. 2).

Since the Cold War was an ideological conflict between the great powers, US presidents were committed to resist Communism, likewise the Soviet leaders. During the war, most US elites and much of the public believed a lot in the integrity of their issue and deeply feared and hated what they understood as communism. This ideology describes US military intervention, direct and indirect, and other aggressive US actions through the cold war (Bulmer and Dunkerley, 1999, p. 36).

Because of the outbreak of the Cold War struggle, the US foreign policy in the decade after World War II was truly international in its scope. Indeed, the US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere was actually safer than even before the conflict in that any foreign threat from the great European powers, either military or economic, was excluded for at least a decade. During the process, US political and public significance quickly decreased as Latin America was relegated to the periphery of US strategic interest. A policy of complacency mixed with indifference was adopted towards the area whose diplomatic support was taken for granted in general and not always given a big importance (Smith, 2005, p. 112).

As the Cold War progressed, the Latin American region was excluded once more to a very low priority in the foreign relations of the US. Unlike Europe, there was no Marshall Plan for Latin America, and economic support to the latter was very little. Nor, when Latin America became more closely involved with the Cold War, did relations with the US ameliorate. According to Parkinson, who examined the different stages of the Cold War, Latin America was influenced by the Cold War, and swept into the conflict between the superpowers. Accordingly, not only the reactions of Latin American governments as these developed, but also how cold war issues

affected intra- Latin American relations and domestic politics in each country. In the early phases of the Cold War, Latin America was 'a pawn of the world powers', but by the late 1960s, the Cold War was "largely out of the way "and a new diplomatic climate was starting to expand Latin America (Smith, 1976, pp. 141- 2).

3.1.1. Adopting the Hemispheric Defense Doctrine:

With the Good Neighbor Policy and; then, World War II, things altered. The US administration under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the US promised policies of nonintervention and pacific settlement, and the conflict brought new favors to the southern countries as the United States climbed to from a United Hemispheric front against fascism. Meeting in Havana in 1940, the 21 American republics accorded to consider an aggression on one as an attack on all. It seemed that the US was finally ready to allow the unilateral *Monroe Doctrine* to drop from its high place among US foreign policy strategies (Sessions, 1973, p. 259).

The aforementioned doctrine is usually posed as a statement in the tradition of Realpolitik- the first comprehensive statement by a US president suitable with neorealist expectations: the Monroe Doctrine intended to stop European intervention in the Americas (European countries could preserve the colonies they still possess).

However, when President James Monroe addressed to the US Congress on Dec. 2, 1823, he stated that:

> We owe it, so, to honesty and to the amicable relations existing between the US and those powers to announce that we have to consider any attempt on their part to expand their system to any portion of this hemisphere as a risk to our peace and safety. (Bulmer & Dunkerley, 1999, p. 36)

At the end of World War II, the US had become the leading proponent of internationalism. The *Monroe Doctrine*, with its long combination with involvement, isolationism, and neutrality, naturally vanished from the scene. Through the long growth of the UN from the Atlantic charter to the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the US rhetoric cast hardly a quick view in Monroe's direction. Latin America, which was caught in the whirlwind of an inconstant world, scared, strangely enough, that the US abandoned the *Monroe Doctrine*, with its anxiety for hemispheric relations in favor of an international organization of unsure effectiveness. Therefore, the US called for an inter- American conference to codify a hemispheric security system in return for Latin American's support in the establishment of the UNO (Sessions, 1973, pp. 260-1).

Cursory explanations of the remarkable stage in the evolution of the *Monroe Doctrine*, which the Rio Treaty revolved around the preceding nations about the direction of the US foreign policy since the war. It is certainly clear, for example, that the type of international threat the US faced in postwar Soviet expansionism and its consequent cold war changed the US world opinion. Moreover, the US looked to have

ignored its isolationism, and was convinced that it was necessary to surround itself with friends, as witness the different other treaty arrangements; such as, NATO which happened over the next few years. It appeared on a time or two, whereas the US took powerful action in 1953 in Guatemala, and in the 1960s with regard to Cuba and the Dominican Republic (Sessions, 1973, pp. 260- 1).

3.1.2. Creating the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR 1947):

The concept of Pan- American Solidarity has steadily acquired since the launching of the "good neighbor policy" and became of paramount significance with the beginning of World War II. The evolution can be noticed so clearly in the relevant decisions adopted in Buenos Aires in 1936, Lima in 1938, and Panama in 1939. The first climax was reached in Resolution XV of the Havana Meeting of foreign Ministers. Resolution I of the Rio de Janeiro Meeting of 1942 that was called after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor constituted a step backward. However, the Mexico City Conference of 1945 created the Act of Chapultepec, which, for the first time, went so far as a stipulate the "employment of armed force to stop or fight aggression". This Act, binding only "during the war", provided for the conclusion of a constant Inter-American pact to replace the law of Chapultepec "Following the establishment of Peace" (Kunz, 1948, p. 111).

Later on Sep. 2, 1947, the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was signed at the Inter American conference for the preservation of continental peace and security held in Rio de Janeiro, the agreement became effective on Dec. 3, 1948, when,

two- thirds of the American countries deposited their confirmations with the Pan American Union (Garcia- Mora, 1951, p. 1).

On Mar. 12, 1948, the Inter- American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance went into effect; thus, materializing the desires of many American countries concerning the adoption of a safety mechanism for the continent, as established in the agreement accomplished at the Inter- American Conference for preservation of Peace and Security of the Continent, which convened in Rio de Janeiro in February 1947. It is worth to mention that the interests pursued by the signatory nations of the mentioned treaty were diverse, as was the nature of each of their interests, even though it is also true that TIAR pursued common purposes for the American countries in the international context of the time. One of them was the application of an efficient mechanism that would produce a quick solution of conflicting situations resulting in acts of war and would prohibit the escalation of struggles between the contracting members. However, there was also a secondary objective that had emerged as a result of the recently ended World War II, one which had taught the lesson that the continent's nations might face extra continental armed offensives; for it was important to adopt a judicial mechanism ensuring the support of the countries under aggression from the rest of the American states (Mauricio, 2002, p. 4).

In those times, Communism was seen as the principal menace and; therefore, an attack from the ex- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) directly, or by third parties, against America was not a senseless assumption, having been interpreted as such by the majority of the countries represented in the Rio de Janeiro conference. The US, as the predominant power of the continent, had a specific interest in the

implementation of the treaty, vis-á-vis the Soviet threat. In this way, the US would have a tool justifying, if necessary, its intervention with the support of the other signatory members of TIAR, in such a way as to ban the expansion of Communism, which was explained as the common adversary, after Hitler's Germany had been defeated (Mauricio, 2002, p. 4).

TIAR is an Inter- governmental treaty; the formula" in the name of their Peoples" in the preface has, as in the UN charter, an ideological, but no lawful, importance. The Treaty consisted of a preamble and twenty- six articles that have been signed by nineteen states (Kunz, 1948, p. 114).

3.1.3. Creating the Organization of American States (OAS):

When the organization of American States (OAS) was founded in 1948, it was set as a mass security System for the Western hemisphere. Furthermore, it was intended also to concentrate on intra-continental relations. Its constitutive document indicates to the collective security concept when it states explicitly that aggression against one american nation will be considered as aggression against them all ('Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in the Political Practice of International Organizations', 1996, p. 33).

The Pan- American conferences started by the US administration in 1889 laid the establishment for the current Organization of American States. The International Union of American Republics, thereafter named the Pan-American Union, was founded during the first Pan-American conference held in Washington. The appearance of the OAS replaced the Pan-American Union. The previous organization had been originally formulated to fight Communism in the hemisphere during the cold war. According to

Wolf Grabendorff, since the establishment of the OAS, it worked hard to unite two opposite purposes. From the Latin American perspective, the OAS was a tool founded for cooperation and promoting economic development in the continent. However, from the US perspective, this organization was actually significant to consolidate the political stability of Latin America so as to guarantee its hegemonic position (Segovia, 2013, pp. 98- 9).

The Organization of American States has consisted of a variety of councils, committees, and other institutional organs, some of which are independent. There are three major bodies, yet, that are responsible for setting and Implementation of the schedule of the OAS: the General Assembly, the Permanent Council, and the General Secretariat. Accordingly, the target of the organization is to reinforce the peace and security of the continent; in addition to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention; also to the provision for common work on the side of those states in the case of aggression; furthermore, to achieve an effective restriction of conventional weapons that will make it possible to devote a big amount of resources to the economic and social growth of member states (Meyer, 2018, p. 3).

3.2. The US Cold War Policies in Latin America:

For many years, Latin America was said to be significant for the forward defense of the US against any possible military aggression by an extra-hemispheric power. When the Panama Canal was established in the early years of the twentieth century, permitting the US to project its naval strength in both the Pacific and the Atlantic, and

so to become a global power, a network of coaling stations and naval bases in the circum- Caribbean region that became a vital assets, protecting the Sea Lines of Communication. During both World Wars and the Cold War, the US military instructions gave elevated priority to securing this defense perimeter against Germany, the ex-USSR, or any other possible extra-continental enemy. Latin America was valued, also, as a fundamental source of strategic materials. Through the first half of the 20th century, Latin America was by far the paramount origin of imported petroleum for the US, and it was also the key provider of various other raw materials necessary for military objectives. Latin America was also a fundament of US diplomacy. The Western Hemisphere notion— that the countries of this hemisphere stand altogether and apart from the rest of the world, united by participated values and interests— was an essential idea of US foreign policy, and in effect of the policy of many Latin American countries (Lowenthal, n.d., pp. 1- 2).

Responding to crisis events in the Balkans, the US adopted its containment policy in response to growth, expansion, and promotion of international Communism. Despite the Western Hemisphere was seen to be completely different from the Balkans and the Middle East in not encountering a direct external Communist threat, US policymakers confidently presumed and expected that Latin America would play an encouraging role in the emerging Cold War. In the process, the Rio Pact and the OAS became part of the developing policy of the worldwide containment of international Communism. For example, Latin American nations were supposed to support the US at the UNO. They were also motivated to break off diplomatic connections with the Soviet Union. Five nations did so between 1947 and 1952. Only Mexico, Argentina, and Uruguay preserve

their relations with the Soviets in 1952. Furthermore, national Communist parties suffered severe limitations on their activities; they were declared unlawful in many countries (Smith, 2005, p. 117).

3.2.1. Free Trade and Investment Policies (1953- 4):

Since trade is the method through which a nation can enjoy different kinds of goods it need, while specializing in the production of those goods concerning which it has the greatest comparative feature, there is a large measure of accord that, in general, freer trade is better than the more restricted one ('World economic report', 1955, p. 4).

Between World War II and the Cold War, US political and business leaders chose to supply aids, like the Marshall plan, to devastating allies and defeated adversaries to recover and become full participants in the worldwide economy. However, there was another main aspect-the appearance of Cold War conflict with Soviet Russia. By late 1946, it was evident to US leaders that the wartime alliance binding the US, Britain, and Soviet Russia had ruptured. In place of global Peacekeeping solutions, the US had to seek territorial and bloc cooperation to contain the Communist expansionism threat (Lovett, Eckes, and Brinkman, 2004, p. 61).

US Presidents in the post- World War II era- from Harry Truman to George W. Bush, believed that the US had a responsibility to guide the world economy, placing the interests of the system before of US national interests. In the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union, foreign policy took high priority concerns. So, the President Dwight Eisenhower, a previous military leader, gave priority to strategic regards. He criticized protectionist businesses for shortsightedness bordering upon tragic foolishness. In

facing Communism, he believed freer trade fundamental to help other countries "create a living" "we are not speaking about trying to put American people out of work or undersell an American manufacturer and push him to the wall or anything else. We are trying to create a better globe for ourselves and our children.". United States President Eisenhower claimed that trade was significant to: (1) strengthen political relationships, and (2) to secure allied assistance for strategic export controls against the Soviet Union, the United States had to supply alternative markets in the hemispheric (Lovett, Eckes, and Brinkman, 2004, p. 62).

The US administration, under President Eisenhower, made the elimination of Communism its main foreign policy target for Latin America. Latin American countries did not; however, share the administration's great scare of a global communist conspiracy. They asserted that the region's essential need was for economic growth and development. The inter- American system should be a mechanism for economic assistance, not only an anti- Communist alliance. Because it desired to Latin America's cold war support, the US administration was forced to debate the economic requests of Latin Americans and to be present at the inter-American economic conference. In addition, it decided, as a Cold War strategy, to send economic aids to the leftist government of Bolivia (Rabe, 1988, p. 64).

Like his predecessors- from Woodrow Wilson through Harry Truman, the US President Dwight D. Eisenhower thought that the key to world peace and growth was free trade and investment. In Eisenhower's point of view, "general world comfort "meant" general peace and security". Therefore, wherever there was group injustice, mass poverty, or hunger of children, conflicts eventually emerged. In addition, the

Communists could be counted on to "reach out to absorb every region in which can be noticed the slightest dissatisfaction or any form of weakness". The US duty, with the world's most dynamic economy, was to decrease tariffs and to open markets. Free trade would "allow backward people to make a fair living ", even if only a lower one measured by American norms". Free trade would also ensure America's freedom (Rabe, 1988, p. 64).

Despite the fact that Eisenhower argued that the US should assume the load of world leadership and smooth international economic cooperation, he believed that there were limits to the part the US could play. The US president was not unalterably against foreign aid, in fact, between 1953 and 1961 the US provided loans amounted $ 50 billion in the form economic and military assistance to other nations. Nevertheless, as Eisenhower said to his brother Milton, Foreign aid was suitable only for those territories under direct offensive from "the Communist threat." Other areas could gather development capital by promoting foreign investment. US President Eisenhower applied these foreign economic policies to Latin America when he took office (Rabe, 1988, p. 65).

3.2.2. Military intervention in Guatemala: Operation PBSUCCESS (1953- 4):

During the period in which anxiety over the ‘red scare’, the ‘loss of China’ to Communism and the Korean War led to a public anti-Communist hysteria in the US in the form of McCarthyism, it was not unexpected that US officials were annoyed by any sign of alleged power for labor unions and expropriation of foreign companies was not

a new phenomenon and notably had been related with the Mexican Revolution earlier in the twentieth century. It was, yet, now simplistically and at times conveniently referred not to internal nationalist political powers however to the bad impact of an international Communist conspiracy led and organized by the Soviet Union. While US officials rejected the prospect of Soviet military aggression in the Western Hemisphere as unrealistic, the much more sinister utilization of secret political infiltration and sabotage by local Communists and their supporters was believed to be spreading. Indeed, the fascist danger of the 1930s and early 1940s was substituted by the Communist threat (Smith, 2005, pp. 117- 8).

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Latin American policies were characterized by the implementation of economic policies that permitted liberal foreign investments from wealthy nations like the US. Military dictators commanded a number of these Latin American governments. The United Fruit Company (UFCO), a very prosperous American owned and run company which benefited a lot from investments it made in Guatemala. The major product of the United Fruit was bananas, and from bananas, it had established a business empire all over Central American countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama (La Feber, 1996, p. 152).

The US administration was also interested in business of bananas, and had sponsored initiatives to encourage that fruit in the American diet. Guatemala became recognized as a “banana republic,” a disdainful expression for poor, developing countries that depended on a single cash crop, such as bananas, and were governed by corrupt regimes. Under the Guatemalan dictator Jorge Ubico, the United Fruit Company took hegemony over 42% of Guatemala’s land, and was excused from

paying taxes and import duties. 77% of all Guatemalan exports went to the US; and 65% of imports to the country came from the US. The United Fruit Company was, basically, a business empire within the Guatemalan state. It had not only Guatemala's banana production and domination over banana exports, but also owned the state's telephone and telegraph system, and most of its railroad track (La Feber, 1996, p. 152).

According to John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State, Latin Americans were 'people who have practically no ability for self-government and that they are as children'. The emotion of disappointment felt by American officials was most obvious in their policy towards Guatemala. In 1944, a left- wing political coalition had defenestrate the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico Castañeda in that country. Being inspired by the visionary and socialist thoughts of President Juan José Arévalo, the latter had begun a time of radical economic and social reform known as the Guatemalan Revolution (Smith, 2005, p. 118).

In November 1950 President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán won the presidential election and in 1952 proceeded to go further than his predecessor in achieving plans of major agrarian reform based on the expropriation of uncultivated territories in order to redistribution to peasant families. The expropriation included land possessed by the Boston-based United Fruit Company (UFCO). While the Guatemalan government proposed UFCO $1 million in compensation, the American company asserted that the value of the land in question was at least $16 million. UFCO was commonly and unflatteringly known as 'the Octopus' (el pulpo) and considered as the supreme symbol of American imperialism (Smith, 2005, p. 119).

In the context of the Cold War, it was not complicated for the US to insert geopolitical considerations into the reformist choices the Guatemalan Government was making. Guatemalan ground reform programs were soon confirmed to be communist intervention from the USSR. US intelligence agencies expressed anxiety that Soviet economic and political ideologies were infiltrating into what the US thought to be its own back yard– Latin America. CIA Director Allen Dulles supposed that Guatemala could become a communist beachhead in the western hemisphere (Plantamura, 2013, p. 64).

The expropriation of land through Decree 900 turned out to be a chance to combine economic and political interests, as submitted by CIA Director Allen Dulles, to his brother John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State. Territories expropriation was now being applied in anti-communist propaganda against the Guatemalan government. A disinformation campaign pushed President Eisenhower toward getting the US administration concerned in the private business dealings of UFCO that had called both the Harry Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower administrations to react against Decree 900 (Plantamura, 2013, pp. 64- 5).

In 1953, the Boston-based UFCO had asked that the Eisenhower Administration to confront Guatemala's government to cancel the aforesaid Decree. President Eisenhower was reluctant to join at first. To counter this, UFCO used the advertiser Edward R. Bernays, who is considered as the father of public relations. Regarding Bernays' campaign, a Harvard article indicated that "correct messages may even spark revolution". It went on to tell that "Bernays worked the press and skillfully used America's scare of communism". They claimed that partly because of Bernays' efforts,

the Guatemalan leftist regime was overthrown. Bernays' multi-media campaign to diffuse disinformation alleging that the Arbenz government was actually communist did in fact change American public point of view and also the President's policy. Eisenhower did not want to appear to be soft on communism, so the successful effects of this campaign caused him to get involved in this issue (Plantamura, 2013, p. 65).

Through a defamatory propaganda campaign and through an accusatory conspiracy aimed at destabilizing Guatemalan government's image, the CIA and key politico- economic actors in the US administration convinced the American president at the time Dwight Eisenhower to launch a military expedition in Guatemala to overthrow the 'pro- Soviet' Arbenz (Vassalli, 2014, p. 199).

A National Security Archive declassified document dated March 31, 1954 which was used in planning for Operation PBSUCCESS contained one of many assassination lists. This particular list is a request from a CIA division chief asking to obtain the names of Arbenz government leaders, communist party members, and persons "of tactical importance whose removal for psychological, organizational or other reasons is mandatory for the success of military action (Plantamura, 2013, p. 69).

In May 1954, "Operation Success" was ready and nationally approved, registering the highest expenditure' s fund ever spent on a CIA secret operation. Through arming Guatemalan exiles led by rightist Arbenz's most fervent enemy, the army officer Castillo Armas, and through continuous air raids in Guatemala City, the CIA began to break Arbenz's government apart, but victory was not close yet. In fact, America miscalculated the Guatemalan army and population unbreakable support to Arbenz, which, soon after the first US strikes in his soil, confessed to the nation the true

intentions of US actions. The Guatemalan President urged for diplomatic offensive, promptly ignored, by requesting the Security Council the immediate sending of an investigating team to his country; U.S. could not tolerate this situation any longer. More air support and the definitive invasion of Armas' small army from bordering Honduras were the final push for Arbenz's forced resignation. On Jun. 27, 1954, US fear of 'Communism spread' in Central America was finally over. "Operation Success" had the hoped result of pushing down the 'threatening' reformist government of Jacobo Arbenz and of installing, through Castillo Armas, the very savage continuative military dictatorship of Central America (Vassalli, 2014, pp. 202- 3).

3.2.3. The Castro– Communist Threat (1959- 1960):

Fidel Castro (1926- 2008), the Cuban leader, was born as Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz. He got degree in Law degree in 1950. Then, he head up a successful revolution against the government of Fulgencio Batista (Kaufman and Kaufman, 2009, p. 47).

In 1956, a dozen young men went in the Sierra Maestra, a mountain chain in eastern Cuba, and started a guerrilla war against the Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista. By Jan. 1, 1959, the dozen had doubled to several thousand, and Fidel Castro guide them into Havana, took over the government, and brought the cold war to the Western Hemisphere (Bourne, 1986, p. 137).

Castro sought to solve the dilemma of modernization as in many Latin American nations by establishing, with the aid of the Kremlin, an authoritarian country based upon a variety of communist models. Since Castro succeeded to get access to power, scare of Castroism has been an element -or advanced as a pretext– in the take– over

of at least five countries of Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Guatemala, and Ecuador by rightist military coups (Chomsky, 2015, pp. 45- 6).

Cuba; then, did not fall to Castro because of poverty- although many peasants hurt from widespread injustices, nor because of the disorder among its peasants and workers, compared to many Latin American countries, Cuba and its people were kind of well-off. Some critics of US policy toward Cuba have accused, therefore, that the US out of its dealings with Castro after he had come to power, obliged Cuba to move left, into the communist bloc (Chomsky, 2015, pp. 55- 6).

The proofs indicated; however, that the US administration, under President Eisenhower, leaned over backward to preserve friendly relations with the Castro regime: The US did not push Castro towards the Communist countries. It was one and one-half years before the US took any step against Castro. In spite of the fact that the Americans had been imprisoned without reason, Americans-owned property seized the US accused of all types of aggression, trade practically stopped between Cuba and the US, a vicious propaganda carried on against the US in Latin America and armed missions sent out from Cuba to try to overthrow other governments in Latin America (Chomsky, 2015, p. 57).

Shortly after the Cuban Revolution, New York Times journalist Herbert Matthews wrote that he doubts the historians will ever be able to accord on whether the Castro regime contained Communism willingly or was forced into a shotgun wedding. He stated that the "… one who gave a mighty push to the revolution when he said on the front page of the Times that Fidel Castro was alive and well in the Sierra Maestra, and who thereafter formed a strong relationship with Castro, Matthews argued that Castro

did not originally want to become communist, he was obliged to it through the massive pressures against him from the US policies in 1959-1960". Nowadays, analysts on the left assert that Castro was not originally a Communist; however, a nationalist who became a Communist as a reaction to the unwarranted hostility of the Eisenhower administration to his revolution and to his regime (Luxenberg, 1988, pp. 38- 9).

Castro came to power during the period of the Cold War, a time when the Soviet Union and the US were in a conflict that menaced nuclear war across the world. Cuba soon became involved in the struggle, since it was viewed as a growing threat to the United States because of the communist policies that were emerging since the revolution and the friendly alliance Cuba had with the Soviet Union after the victory of the revolution. Castro had to treat this increasing global threat. One of his biggest objectives was, as it was from the beginning to save the people of Cuba and defend his territories from foreign interests, particularly the threat of imperialism from the US once again. In fact, Castro was prepared to combat anyone in order to see his country defended and independent (McDermott, 2016, pp. 20- 1).

After the disintegration of the Batista regime in Cuba and the growing power of the 26th of July Movement headed by Fidel Castro, the US opposed Castro and his movement because it thought that the revolutionaries threatened the main US economic interests in Cuba, which amounted to over $1 billion in direct investments, and for the reason that it worried that communists had penetrated the movement (Rabe,1996, p. 59).

3.2.4. The Policy of New Interventionism (1960):

Since the third world was a battleground for the Cold War, US policies towards the underdeveloped areas became more and more militarized, culminating in the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the deployment of more than 500.000 soldiers to Vietnam. Soviet policymakers encouraged by the gains of the 1950s, diffused the Kremlin impact and supported revolutionary movements in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Cuba and China took on similar functions, supporting third- world revolutionaries and competing for power in the developing nations. Around the world, outside actors trying to constitute the internal development and external orientation of the south world. Latin America was at the center of this struggle responding to the trouble that had built during the 1950s, Moscow, Havana, and Washington D. C. involved in parallel quests to model Latin American politics and society. Havana and Moscow supported rebellions and looked to turn Cuba into what one soviet responsible called a "beacon of Latin American revolution". The US supported economic development and social reform via the Alliance for Advancement, and fought the left through counterinsurgency, secret operations, and military intervention. This strong competition informed the cold war's most dangerous moment- The Cuban missile crisis- as well as lots other confrontations, and gave essence to Kennedy's description of Latin America as "the most perilous region in the world" (Brands, 2012, p. 37).

The actions launched by the superpowers and Cuba followed similar arcs. Geopolitically, all three powers had done much to win the Latin American territory. Moscow hoped to hammer on an US weak point; Havana meant to gain allies and repose from US pressure; Washington looked to support its traditional hemispheric

buffer and contain or overthrow Castro's Cuba. In each of these cases, too, policy to Latin America moved through a strong ideological filter. The Modernization Theory, the intellectual framework that organized US foreign policy towards the third world during the 1960s, formed the Alliance for advancement in addition to certain aspects of counterinsurgency. Guevara's force theory, an attempt to bring out universal basics of revolution from the Cuban case, guided Havana's effort (Brands, 2012, p. 38).

For its part, Soviet policy was affected by Khrushchev's ideological predilections and Marxist-Leninist thoughts about third world growth. Importantly, each of these paradigms focused on a belief that the soviet, Cuban, or American course to economic development and social modernization could be replicated in other states. Moscow, Havana, and Washington looked to gain authority in Latin America by remaking the area in their own images (Brands, 2012, p. 38).

3.2.5. The War against Trujillo and Castro (1959- 1960):

In the period from 1958 to 1963, US policies towards Latin American Democrats, like Romulo Betancourt, and dictators, like Trujillo and his henchmen, depended, as the US President J. F. Kennedy confessed, on the tactical issue of which kind of government and leaders would be most effective in thwarting Fidel Castro (Rabe, 1996, p. 56).

In the mid-1950s, neither democracy, nor ethics characterized governments throughout Latin America. Dictators, like Trujillo and Batista ruled thirteen of the twenty Latin American countries. Under President Eisenhower, the US administration found no problem in dealing with these dictators, judging them as reliable Cold War allies.

The Latin American leaders vigorously supported the US in international arenas, collaborated militarily, and appreciated US trade and investment. The US President Dwight. D. Eisenhower once noticed to NSC that "in the long run the US have to support democracies". The US administration's confidence in dictators was suddenly destroyed in 1958. Throughout Latin America in the late 1950s, regimes started to disintegrate. The dictators had not been able to maintain the stability and economic development that they had promised (Rabe, 1996, p. 56).

The US administration wanted friendly relations with Trujillo since the Dominican Republic was in a strategic region. It allowed the US Air Force to employ a guided missile tracking base on its territory, and it supported United States Cold war policies in public. In November 1958, Secretary Dulles extended an olive branch, demanding the Dominican foreign minister to remind Trujillo that the US valued the Dominican Republic's anti-communist leadership in the hemisphere (Rabe, 1996, p. 59).

The rising power of 26 July Movement led by Castro threatened Trujillo who, in turn, he advised the US to lift its arms prohibition and bolster the Batista regime in order to stop the spread of international communism. In fact, Trujillo shipped small arms to the trapped dictator and, as he had done with Pérez Jiménez, at first, granted political exile to Batista. The Dominican correctly expected that a victorious Castro would soon attack him. Then, on Jun. 14, 1959, Dominican exiles whom led by Enrique Jiménez Moya landed in the Dominican Republic. Trujillo's army routed the invaders so fast. The exiles had been trained and organized in Cuba, and Jiménez Moya had served as an officer in the 26th of July Movement. Castro later admitted that he supported the invasion because of his relationship with Jiménez Moya and because he hated

dictators, especially Trujillo. Castro also knew that Trujillo's subordinates were training and preparing Cuban counterrevolutionary forces. Trujillo replayed to the invasion by menacing to revenge with air attacks on Cuba (Rabe, 1996, p. 60).

During the Cold War, Trujillo became a US ally and praised by anti- Communist hardliners due to his fixed stand against the communist menace, numerous businesses hailed the Dominican Republic as a US Investor's paradise. After Trujillo's death, John Bartlow Martin, the US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, stated that Trujillo was so dependent on US advocacy that he recalled: "Nobody realizes how many hundreds of thousands of dollars Trujillo used in the US, trying to affect votes in Congress, policy in the executive branch, and public opinion through the journalism." Martin also said; however, that the US never fully propped Trujillo because of his numerous human rights violations, and that the US administration had only used him to preserve stability within the Caribbean (Beshel, 2012, p. 14).

Trujillo's implicit US support did not last; his strong anti-communist activities were not enough to keep up this much- needed relationship for Trujillo. In Nov. 1959, after the Eisenhower administration decided it could not transact with Castro, State Department officials determined that the US could no longer bear Trujillo, who had once been viewed as a Caribbean ally, was now seen as a barrier. President Eisenhower declared that it was certain that US public opinion would not criticize Castro until they have moved against Trujillo. The communists and Dominican nationalists were intent to use anti-U.S. feelings among the Dominican people against Trujillo, and Eisenhower was not going to permit communism with or without him (Beshel, 2012, p. 14).

Not long after Trujillo missed support within the White House, the CIA started debating weapons' transfer deal to dissidents who promised to assassinate Trujillo. On January 3, 1961, Eisenhower allowed the go-ahead for the CIA's action committee 5412, which supervised secret operations, to send small arms to Dominican dissidents. On the night of May 30, 1961, disappointed military officers gunned down Trujillo, thus finishing his reign of terror. The men who killed Trujillo (in a gangland manner shootout on the side of the road, an operation many thought aided by the CIA, although never assured) had been approached to the dictator and complicit in his crimes, yet they had grown disillusioned with his harsh rule (Beshel, 2012, p. 15).

However, in the case of Cuba- and the war against Castro, the US imposed ban on US exports to Cuba, except medicine, and food. Moreover, the embargo spread to foreign subordinate of US companies. Also, it minimized the Cuban sugar quota in US market to zero, besides of blacklists vessels carrying cargo to and from Cuba from the carriage of US government-financed cargo after the sign of both Cuba and the Soviet Union a trade agreement in February,1960 in which the USSR agrees to buy sugar and other items from Cuba and to supply Cuba with crude oil (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Cosic, 2011, p. 1).

Apparently, neither side was ready to compromise or accommodate the other. Indeed, the growing enmity of the US was useful in aiding Castro to demonstrate his nationalist credentials and to gain popular assistance in Cuba for his revolutionary reforms. Eisenhower eventually ceased diplomatic relations in January 1961. He saw Castro as a pro- Communist and 'a madman' and earlier, in March 1960, had allowed the CIA to prepare a secret operation to overthrow him. The president conceived an

operation along the same lines as that successfully managed in Guatemala in 1954. In a similar style, a force of political exiles would be recruited, trained at a covert Central American area, and then supplied with logistic support in an invasion to overthrow the government. In the case of Cuba, the fundamental CIA plan was to make an amphibious landing to build a secure beachhead that would provide a combining point for a general rebellion against Castro. At a suitable time, a provisional government of Cuban exiles would be sent in from Florida and granted official diplomatic confession by the US (Smith, 2005, p. 112).

During the summer of 1960, a few hundred anti- Castro denied Cubans who were recruited by the CIA and taken initially to the Panama Canal Zone and then to Guatemala and later Nicaragua for training. The actual military endeavor 'to provide Castro the same Guatemalan treatment' was code called 'Operation Zapata' and was not willing for execution until after Eisenhower had ceded his presidential office to Kennedy in January 1961. After the hardline opinions that he had expressed in his presidential debates with Nixon and aware of current Communist compression in Berlin and South- east Asia, the new president viewed Cuba as a decisive battleground in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. While adopting Eisenhower's decision to overthrow Castro, Kennedy was well conscious that the suggested secret operation was inherently dangerous and that its success was by no means ensured (Smith, 2005, p. 112).

Conclusion:

Since the ex- USSR was interested in exerting much influence in Latin America during the Cold War in order to achieve an official presence in the Western Hemisphere, the US saw it as a very dangerous attempt and a threat to its hegemonic positions in the region. Consequently, the US administration, under President Eisenhower, used different means and policies to fight Communism, both economically and militarily. Moreover, the US made military interventions against whom it saw them as secret hands to the USSR, or any country that could menace its interests.

General conclusion:

The US- Latin American countries' relations had often been subjected to different circumstances and interests. Indeed, the dynamics of change caused World War II affected the International relations and world order in the political and economic levels.

The location of Latin American countries, together with its strategic and geopolitical position, has made of this region whose importance is determined by the confrontation of great powers. The vast southern part of the American continent, with its richness in oil, gas, and other natural resources, had been the focus of the German Nazi regime, and; then, the Russians who intended to have strong foothold in the region, as a part of the Cold War struggle, so as to win new spheres of influence worldwide. Therefore, Latin America constituted both a phase of the Cold War conflict, and a fertile groung for the ideological struggle between the US and the ex- USSR.

The present dissertation examined the US foreign policy of anti- Communism in Latin America under President Eisenhower in the period 1953- 1961. The main point of the parer is that it explored the means and strategies used in the US foreign policy to counter the spread of Communism in the region.

Looking at the relations established between the US and Latin America, the US established, during the 1930s and the World war II, commercial ties with the countries of southern America for economic and security reasons through the adoption of *Good Neighbor Policy*. These attitudes were increasingly pushed further after the Nazi invaded Western Europe that augmented the rate of fear of security issues in the Western Hemisphere. As a result, US Policymakers faced the German's plan in Latin America with counter clandestine operations to defend its land and its interests from enemies.

With the advent of the Cold War, the ex- USSR started following the same path as the German Nazis. Latin American countries were ready to engage with any global power, whether the US, or the ex- USSR, that could help, or support them with developmental policies to achieve progress and improve the political, economic, and social conditions which would impact the citizens' life positively. So, the ex- USSR hurried first to have strong footholds in Latin America and provided its various policies and strategies to spread its Communist ideology which; however, constituted a real threat to the US.

The Soviet Union was; therefore, conceived as a great, dangerous power that menaced peace, security, and stability in Latin America. Thus, the US administration, under President Eisenhower, felt the 'Red Scare' in the region, and reacted with a set of measures against the ex- USSR expansion in the region. Based on the *Monroe Doctrine* of 1823 which prevented European intervention in Latin America, the US felt it necessary to oppose the USSR, which began influencing countries of the region with its Communist ideologies. As a result, the US administration worked to counter Communism from gaining footholds in the region. The US cooperated with authoritarian regimes and supported military coups to promote its liberal ideology in countries of the region; for the relationships with its neighboring countries of Latin America had a great importance in preserving security and stability in the Western Hemisphere.

Latin Americans employed a combination of liberal and anti-imperialist discourses, balancing frequent calls for anti-Communist hemispheric unity with periodic diplomatic entreaties to the Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, US Cold War policies towards the region ranged from progressive developmentalism to outright military invasions, and from psychological warfare to covert paramilitary action. Above all, the US sought to shore up its allies and

maintain the Western Hemisphere as a united front against extra-hemispheric ideologies and influence. The Cold War was a bloody, violent period for Latin America, but it was also one marked by heady idealism, courageous political action, and fresh narratives about Latin America's role in the world, all of which continue to inform regional politics to this day.

The limitations of the study:

During the conduct of this research, we faced many problems as the global health issue of Covid-19 which obliged the researchers to quarantine and confinment. Thus, this; in fact, resulted in lack of direct supervision with the supervisor. Also, we struggeled with the lack of some valuable resources and access to internet sites make it somehow difficult to get the full image about the topic processed.

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Resumé:

Pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les États- Unis et l'ex- URSS ont uni leurs efforts et se sont engagés à affronter leur ennemi commun: le régime nazi allemand qui menaçait de détruire la sécurité mondiale et de modifier l'ordre mondial à cette époque. Cependant, après la guerre, leur engagement a été dissous. Lorsque la guerre froide a commencé, les deux superpuissances avaient des programmes différents, car elles travaillaient dur à atteindre de nombreuses régions du monde pour promouvoir leurs idéologies et gagner des sphères d'influence.

Idéologiquement, le communisme, dirigé par l'ex-URSS, constituait un danger réel pour les États- Unis, qui cherchaient à promouvoir leur idéologie libérale à travers le monde. Alors que les Russes atteignaient l'Amérique latine, qui était un terrain fertile pour recevoir les idées communistes, l'administration américaine a estimé que la 'danger rouge' submergerait l'Amérique du Sud et; par conséquent, il perdrait cette partie importante du continent. En conséquence, les États- Unis ont adopté plusieurs moyens et stratégies dans leur politique étrangère pour contrer la promotion du communisme en Amérique latine pendant la guerre froide.

Le présent memoir examine la politique étrangère américaine d'anticommunisme en Amérique latine sous l'administration Eisenhower dans la période 1953–1961. Elle met en évidence comment l'administration américaine, sous le président Eisenhower, s'est intéressée à l'Amérique latine; alors que le communisme commençait à pénétrer dans les pays d'Amérique latine. En outre, l'étude examine comment les États-Unis ont utilisé leur idéologie pour contrer la propagation du communisme dans la région et quelles ont

été les stratégies utilisées par le président américain Eisenhower envers l'Amérique latine dans le conflit.

Mots clés: Communisme, Eisenhower, politique étrangère américaine, Amérique latine.

الملخص:

خلال الحرب العالمية الثانية، وحدت كل من الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد السوفيتي السابق جهودهما، وكانتا ملتزمتين بمواجهة عدوهما المشترك: النظام النازي الألماني الذي هدد بتدمير الأمن العالمي وتغيير النظام العالمي في تلك الحقبة. ومع ذلك، بعد انتهاء الحرب، تم إلغاء التزامهم. عندما بدأت الحرب الباردة، كان لكل من القوتين العظميين أجندات مختلفة، حيث عملتا جاهدتين للوصول إلى أجزاء كثيرة من العالم لتعزيز أيديولوجياتهما، والفوز بمناطق نفوذ.

من الناحية الإيديولوجية، شكلت الشيوعية، بقيادة الاتحاد السوفيتي سابقا، خطراً حقيقياً على الولايات المتحدة، التي سعت إلى تعزيز أيديولوجيتها الليبرالية في جميع أنحاء العالم. وعند وصول الروس إلى أمريكا اللاتينية، التي كانت أرضًا خصبة لتلقي الأفكار والأطروحات الشيوعية، شعرت الإدارة الأمريكية أن "الخطر الأحمر" سيطغى على أمريكا الجنوبية. لذلك، ستفقد هذا الجزء المهم من القارة. وبناءً على ذلك، تبنت الولايات المتحدة عدة وسائل واستراتيجيات في سياستها الخارجية للتغلب على الترويج للشيوعية في أمريكا اللاتينية خلال حقبة الحرب الباردة.

تتناول المذكرة الحالية السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية المعادية للشيوعية في أمريكا اللاتينية تحت إدارة أيزنهاور في الفترة 1953-1961. وتسلط الضوء على مدى اهتمام الإدارة الأمريكية، في عهد الرئيس أيزنهاور، بأمريكا اللاتينية. حيث بدأت الشيوعية تتغلغل في دول أمريكا اللاتينية. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، تبحث الدراسة في كيفية استخدام الولايات المتحدة أيديولوجيتها لمواجهة انتشار الشيوعية في المنطقة، وما هي الاستراتيجيات التي استخدمها رئيس الولايات المتحدة أيزنهاور تجاه أمريكا اللاتينية في الصراع.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الشيوعية، أيزنهاور، السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة، أمريكا اللاتينية.