

**PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA**  
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FACULTY OF LETTERS AND FOREIGN LANGUAGES

DEPARTEMENT OF ENGLISH

N°



DOMAIN : FOREIGN LANGUAGES

STREAM : ENGLISH LANGUAGE

OPTION : LITERATURE & CIVILIZATION

**The Algerian American Cooperation in the  
Transnational War on Terror**

**Dissertation Submitted to the Department of English in Partial fulfillment  
of the Requirements for Master's Degree**

**Candidate**

**Miss. Nour El Houda DISSI**

**Supervisor**

**Mr. Mohammed SENOUSSE**

**2019/2020**

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**2019/2020**

## **DEDICATION**

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my mother first, the first supporter, to my supervisor Mr. Mohammed Senoussi for his patience, support, and guidance throughout the course of this research. And to everyone who helped me.

I would like also to thank the honorable board of examiners who accepted to read and evaluate this study.



## **Abstract**

This dissertation tries to put flesh on the bones of questions concerning the nature of the war on terror; it investigates the Algerian American cooperation though they have different experiences and perspectives. This study explores terrorism with its different definitions, its sources and its results. It offers the reader an overview of the Algerian experience with terror since the revolution war until the black decade; moreover, how the attacks of 9/11 changed the political map of the American policy of dealing with external conflicts and internal issues of other countries. This dissertation tackles also the Algerian American relationship after the events of 9/11 and how these terrorist attacks changed the relationship between the two countries from misunderstanding into political and military cooperation. And finally, it investigates the different approaches of fighting terror in the Sahel region and how the Algerian government deal with conflicts and accompanying the extremist thoughts and do's with minimum risks.

**Keywords:** Terrorism, war on terror, American Algerian cooperation, 9/11 attacks, Sahel region.

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# INTRODUCTION

The universe has always been under the fist of Mother Nature and the human being at the same time. Where nature seemed to be more tolerant , human made disasters brought more destruction and more damage to the planet, the world, and to the life of all creatures including the human being himself, one of these destructive hammers is violence, an interesting phenomena that was and still being under study and observation by many specialists for many years in order to extract the important lessons from it and identify any possible danger for future steps towards this problem, and by which they can prevent any more man made catastrophes that risk the peaceful life of the world.

Peace and harmony were and still one of the main concerns of the human being, and in order to provide these levels of stability anything will be considered even if it demands using force, which makes a contradiction: using violence to fight violence.

Terrorism is a pure human creation, although the definition of the subject is not globally agreed on, terrorism can be broadly understood as a method of coercion that uses violent acts in order to spread fear in societies and governments, these acts can be acted under religious, political, or ideological goals. The term has a long and significant history in various religious traditions, but the concept as distinguished from the phenomena is a recent development, a feature of the French revolution. When the term entered our language in 1795, terrorism was seen as the indispensable tool to establish a democratic order: ‘virtue or the terror’ (Yonah 26).

Looking through the rich history of Algeria, diversity is found inside the Algerian population during the colonial period. The Northern cities were dominated mainly by an Arab speaking population, the mountain valleys were dominated by a Berber-speaking Kabyle community, and lastly a French speaking community created by the French colonizers, eventually, Algeria was colonized by France from 1830 to 1962, the spirant and the

interaction between all of these different communities where each one comes from a different background made up a distinguished cultural and historical combination, moreover, the violent and brutal practices of the French colonizers against the Algerian population made it more clear that they need to pursue their freedom even, and bring back the traditional Algerian society where the Islamic values, the spirit of solidarity between all Algerians, and the original Algerian traditions are the only rulers of the Algerian state.

The movement of liberation started in 1954 and led by the National Liberation Front (FLN), the Algerians had suffered greatly during that period, after all, the country gained its independence and forced France to quit the land, the revolution eventually became a model for other anti-colonial movements. The decolonization trend started by Algeria and some other colonized countries cost France its other African colonies including Mali, calling for freedom was supported by both the US and the USSR. After the independence, a new era of rebuilding and reconstructing was waiting for both population and the new government, to get rid of the colonizer left overs and restore the real social and religious values of the true Algerian community, and through the process of building a new state, gaps appeared between the parties who wanted to lead the country, where each one of them wanted to impose his ideology and his beliefs, ended up by leaving gaps for radical Islam to appear in a period is known as one of the darkest times the Algerians have lived in: the black decade. The Algerian black decade has begun when radical Islamists made the decision to restore the armed struggle, however, the criminality of the period prove its break down, when the Jihadist organization had to change its target from national Jihad to global Jihad, transforming from "The Salafist Group For Preaching And Combat" to "Al Qaida In The Islamic Maghreb" morphing yet again into a new terrorist organization with a new name and a new outlook. The expansion was made first in the Sahara region by the GSPC, but it continued under its new iteration AQIM. The move to the Sahara Sahel region was largely due to the group's failure to achieve its objectives in the Northeastern Algeria. (Stephen 39)

On the other side of the planet, the United States of America was dealing with the aftermaths of the terrorists attacks by the so called al Qaeda on the world trade center on 9 September 2011, leaving more than 3.000 deaths and thousands of injuries.

The fight against terrorism suddenly became a prime American and global concern, furthermore, the United States understood well after the events of 9/11 that it was necessary to cooperate with Algeria with regards of fighting global terrorism, the events accelerated the rapprochement between the two countries, at least regarding cooperation in security matters.

The spread of AQIM into the Sahara-Sahel region influenced at first the appearance of other terrorist groups and strengthened the already existing ones, starting by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Murabitoun, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar ad-Din, Boko Haram, and various terrorist organizations who have declared loyalty and alliance serving the purpose of the Jihad. And since Algeria's military is the most capable of any country in North Africa, the US saw Algeria as a regional leader who is capable of coordinating the efforts of the Sahilian countries to address transnational security threats, the Algerian knowledge of conditions on the ground in northern Mali is invaluable to the US, however, the US interest in the Sahara-Sahel zone seemed to be more than just a promotion for a fight against terrorism, it included political and economic interests focusing on energy concerns and military/strategic and security. (Harmon 129).

## **1. Statement of the Problem**

Terrorism, one of the most widely discussed issues of our time, is also one of the least understood it threatens the whole world stability, and it touches all sectors, from policy, economy, security, and even religion. Terrorism has emerged in many different forms and out of such various motivations as religious protest movements, political revolts and social uprisings.(Walter 133)

Since 9/11, a disturbing trend of security challenges with global reach from non-state actors has emerged in the Maghreb, Sahel, and other parts of Africa. It has been brutally demonstrated by the escalation in violent attacks mounted by an expanding array of lawless transnational militant groups, ranging from Mali to Somalia and beyond. The militants, motivated by ethnic, racial, religious, tribal, and national ideologies, include extremist groups such as al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, Ansar Dine, Ansar al-Sharia (Yonah 16).

The attacks made USA feel urged to make an a quick move to try to solve this problem since it effects the American community at first, and brings harm to other countries which by consequence, would harm her in return. Algeria on the other hand had a valuable history with terrorism and violence, starting from the French colonization to the 90's period also known as ' the Black Decade'', where the country had suffered because of the decision made by radicalist Islamists to restore the armed struggle after the military intervention in 1992, after that the process transformed from national Jihad to global Jihad in Northern Algeria by 2006, making yet a new terrorist organization with a new name and a new outlook : AQIM.

The terrorist group had a vision of expanding into the Sahara and the Sahel region, believing that with overpowering new regions goals can be achieved easily, and indeed, the move was made into the Sahara-Sahel zone, and it was largely due to the group's failure to achieve its objectives in Northeastern Algeria, its original area of operations. The Salafist group for Preaching and Combat, which was the first establishment before AQIM, turned to al-Qaida's global Jihad for support and legitimacy largely because of the failure of its national Jihad agenda. By the early 2000s, the Algerian government had largely contained the Jihadist threat by capturing and killing key leaders, and most Jihadists had conceded defeat and put down their arms, accepting one or another of President Bouteflika's amnesty offers (Stephen 39).

The frontier area between Mali, Algeria, Libya, and Niger as a zone of permanent insecurity that had been infiltrated with GSPC activists since June of 2004. He called the Sahara a vast area of contraband in drugs, cigarettes, and arms as well as human trafficking. As a result of concerns arising from such reports, the US and its regional allies attempted to implement a series of securitization initiatives to address the linked issues of access to oil resources and protection of US and regional interests against increasingly active Islamist terrorist organizations in the Sahara-Sahel zone. These initiatives include the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), established in 2002; the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), established in 2005; and, finally, AFRICOM (Africa Command), a new US military command for Africa created during the last years of the Bush administration and the early years of the Obama administration (Stephen 39).

Going through all these concerns, this research accordingly, will investigate the nature of different levels of terror practiced by these groups in Algeria first, and the whole Sahara-Sahel region at the second place, this research will offer an over view of the relationship between the American and the Algerian governments, their co-operation in the transnational war on terror, and how this collaboration is giving birth to any efficient solutions.

## **2. Objectives of the Research**

The primary objective of this research is to shed light on terrorism the phenomena, the term, and the concept. The way it was introduced to the world, its growth through the years, and its negative impact on peacemaking process, economy, and religion. Besides, Algeria had an unforgettable experience with terror, moreover, this research aims at giving a deep insight inside the nineties period in Algeria, where the population have suffered from the rise of radical Islamists who practiced terror in the name of religion. This study also attempts at showing how the geopolitical map of the world has changed since the events of 9/11, and how the war on terror has become a prime priority to USA which led the latter to cooperate with Algeria as an experienced partner to fight transnational terror. Consequently, the analysis of

this cooperation between the two countries is an attempt to confirm the validity and the efficiency of the American initiatives, and the real intentions behind establishing military bases in countries like Mali, Niger, Libya, and some other African countries.

### **3. Research Questions**

This study intends to put flesh on the bones of several questions. The primary question that will guide this research is what strategies terrorist organizations use to over control more lands, in other words, what are the tactics used to expand from a region to another and get more civilian fighters to join what is called “Jihad”. Another important question is how Algerian policy makers found ways to cooperate with the US government in terms of fighting transnational war. Moreover, how Algeria managed keeping the security of its borders with Mali without allowing the US of having a military base on its land.

Hence, new questions come to the surface: first from which source these organizations get funded, how they manage keeping in touch with each other. What are the real intentions behind the US establishing military bases in different African countries, how can violence be fought with violence, and finally, are the initiatives made by the US and some European countries are considered as an effective ones to treat the issue from the roots or they focus only on military solutions trying to fight Jihadist groups because they form a threat to the American interests in Africa.

### **4. Literature Review**

Terrorism and counterterrorism has long captured the interest of governments, policy makers, historians, and even societies themselves, by the way it threatens the whole world stability, universal peace, in particular after the attacks of 9/11, USA sought a unity of powers since the latter had experienced a long track dealing with violence, terror and terrorists. Yahia H. Zoubir’s *the United States and Algeria: A new strategic partnership?* (2011) is perhaps a solid description of the nature of collaboration between the two countries .when he illustrated

how the events of 9/11 have opened a door to a very important bilateral military cooperation. His other working paper “American Policy in the Maghreb: The Conquest of a New Region? (2006)” gives a view of how the United States understood well before 9/11 that it was necessary to cooperate with Algeria with regards to global terrorism: Indeed, in March 2001, the director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, visited Algeria to request the assistance of the Algerian authorities in the fight against Osama Bin Laden’s network. The 9/11 attacks accelerated the rapprochement between the two countries, at least regarding cooperation on security matters. Despite of certain reservations, Algeria agreed to join the US-led international coalition.

Terror and Insurgency in The Sahara Sahel Region Corruption, Contraband, Jihad and the Mali War of 2012\_2013 (2014) by Stephen A Harmon is another interesting writing about the subject matter, spoke about “AFRICOM” a US military command established under the Bush and Obama administration, since Africa is known of running across the inconvenience of traditional regional breakdowns of the northern half of Africa, Since AFRICOM’s mission targeted the Sahara-Sahel zone that embraces both North and West African nations, one of the motives for the creation of the new command was to eliminate this artificial frontier.

Terrorism in North Africa and in the Sahel in 2015 (2016) by Yonah Alexander argues that since 9/11, a disturbing trend of security challenges with global reach from non-state actors has emerged in the Maghreb, Sahel, and other parts of Africa , he adds that . The militants are motivated by ethnic, racial, religious, tribal, and national ideologies, include extremist groups such as al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, Ansaru, Ansar Dine, Ansar al-Sharia, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MJUAO), Al Mourabitoun, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MLNA), al-Shabaab.

In Algeria, where the number of terrorist attacks fell to 12 in 2015 after 22 incidents in 2014, the country is still facing ongoing security challenges guarding its frontiers, particularly in the southwest, where AQIM and other militant and criminal groups engage in cross border arms and drug trafficking.

YasminaAllouche's "Africa: the playground of power players and counterterrorism guises" (2019) shed light on some very important ideas, the necessity of a re-evaluation of counterterrorism: There are a variety of factors that need to be improved upon in order for counterterrorism strategies to reap significant results. Above all, the factors that created spaces for radicalism and extremism to rise need to be addressed. State-building is a key in removing the presence of militant groups through the establishment of order and governance wherever they are lacking. States can be strengthened from being administratively or institutionally weak through the assistance of technology and intelligence, combined with skillfully managed political and diplomatic incentives which can have positive impacts on countries suffering from lawlessness where terrorists thrive

She pointed out to what extent it is problematic to rely on external help in fighting local issues, the population suspicious view to these kinds of help, and how the War on Terror has become a convenient shadow war for a monopoly over the continents' vast reserves between old and new powers to ensure their future in a world of shrinking resources.

## **5. Methodology Justification**

Since the research is putting the focus on studying the cooperative operations of fighting terror between the Algerian and the American governments, the foundation of terror and its spread through the different land and how political are dealing with this issue, the approach used in this research is political, based on analyzing security issues, and since the events of 9/11 changed the whole political, defensive, and military map of the world, this research is concerned with investigating historical and international data related to the involved parties in the war on terror, including USA, Algeria, Mali, Libya, and some European countries.

In addition to the political approach a descriptive method is applied in order to give an overview of the political and military background of Algeria and The United States of, as relations between Algeria and the United States. Furthermore, an analytical approach will be

used in this research to analyze the level of co-operational processes between the two countries in fighting terrorism, and how these operations are making a difference on the real playground.

## **6. Research plan**

This research shall be structured as the following: Chapter one: Historical and Political Context of Terrorism, Chapter two: Algerian American Cooperation in Fighting Terror.

The First Chapter attempts to give multiple definitions to terrorism as a phenomena, the historical background of its first foundation in the history and the different forms that it was introduced to the world, moreover, the beliefs and ideologies that are used as a cover for terrorism will be carefully examined in this part of the research, furthermore, the stages through which terrorism has developed through times and the strategies to gain more power to expand on more territories.

This chapter will also shed light on the Algerian experience with terror during the nineties period and how the government managed to find solutions to this issue, and more importantly, the way the events of 9/11 made the United States Of America ring the alarms and declare a global war on terror by encouraging the international community to be involved to combat terrorism.

This research is mainly concerned with terrorism in its raw formulation, the behind the scenes reasons that made groups of human beings make a decision to form organizations under specific thoughts which are mainly religious, and then transform these beliefs into practices of spreading fear and violence.

The Second Chapter's main concern is the cooperatives made between Algeria and the US in the Sahara Sahel region, the Algerian involvement in the American initiatives in Africa like AFRICOM, the problematic borders with Mali and Niger that made Algeria more

cautious about its security because of problems like smuggling, arm selling, kidnapping, then this chapter will present an overview on the policy of interventionism and its role on spreading terror in Syria, Libya, and other African countries

And finally, this chapter will provide a deep explanation to the extremist radicalism way of thought and hostage's policy both internationally and how the Algerian government deals with this issue.

# CHAPTER ONE: SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT

This chapter attempts to give an overview on the history of terror and terrorists; providing different perspectives and multiple definitions made by experts of what this phenomena represents to the world, and most importantly, emphasizing the impact of the violent acts on the progress of relationship between countries . Moreover, this chapter depicts the impact of terror on the Algerian society during the nineties and how extremism first appeared under different names. In addition, the importance of the 9/11 attacks on the United States political and military ties all over the world and how was its response to it.

## 1. Historical and Political Context of Terrorism

Peace and harmony were and still one of the main concerns of the human being, and are considered as the base that makes the world grow and develop and provides a solid ground for the prosperity of the human race, History shows irrefutably that enduring great societies are built on freedom of spirit and freedom of expression. Such freedoms can not flourish in the absence of basic standers of morality, and justice for all, but managing this level of stability had been proven over the years to be a hard task, the rise of new powers led different sides wanting to be parts of the game and gain more control, but winning sometimes may lead the players to use illegal paths ignoring its negative impacts as long as it lead them to the goal, using violence and spreading fear in societies through individuals, groups and even imperialist regimes, led to the appearance of a phenomena called “terrorism”.

Objectives, it can be understood as the use of violence to create fear in the larger audience to create a change in that large audience and it flourishes in environments of humiliation, despair, poverty, political oppression, extremism and human rights abuse; it also flourishes in contexts of regional conflicts and foreign occupation, and it profits from weak state capacity to maintain law and order.

The concept of terrorism as distinguished from the phenomena is a recent development, a feature of the French revolution. When the term entered our language in 1795, terrorism was seen as the indispensable tool to establish a democratic order. Moreover, “terrorism” and “terrorist” are of relatively recent date; the meaning of terrorism was given in the 1798 supplement of the Dictionnaire of the Académie Française as *systeme, regime de la terreur*. According to a French dictionary published in 1796, the Jacobins had on occasion used the term when speaking and writing about themselves in a positive sense; after the 9th of Thermidor, “terrorist” became a term of abuse with criminal (David 21).

Furthermore, various researchers on terrorism have found and created multiple definitions, Claridge defines it as the “systematic” threat or use of violence, whether for an opposition to established authority, with the intention of communicating a political message to a group larger than the victim group by generating fear and so altering the behavior of the larger group (Claridge 06).

Terrorism can be understood as the key that has seven key components. Terrorism is an intentional, rational act of violence to achieve a political goal by causing fear in the target audience or society in order to change behavior in that target or society. The terrorist is not driven by personal ambitions or desires, terrorist violence is a means to an end because the violence is less important than the result of the violence, it aims at spreading a state of panic to influence decision making, the psychological effect not the victim is the target because terrorist acts are directed towards political adversaries, not individuals. The victims bear the message that all places and persons are subject to attack (Ezledin 35).

Several attempts have been made by scholars and policy makers to generate working definitions of terrorism. Andrew Pierre described terrorism as the threat of violence and use of fear to coerce, persuade or gain public attention. Wilkinson described it as coercive intimidation, premeditated acts or threats of violence systematically aimed at instilling such

fear in the target that it will force the target to alter its behavior in the way desired by the terrorists. Similarly, Juliet Lodge conceives terrorism as the resort to violence for political ends by unauthorized, non-governmental actors in breach of accepted codes of behavior regarding the expression of disaffection with, dissent from or opposition to the pursuit of political goals by the legitimate government authorities of the state whom they regard as unresponsive to the needs of certain groups of people. Indigenous terrorism in her views sometimes transcends national boundaries in its exercise, effects, ramifications and prosecution (ACSRT 75).

Jakkie Cilliers identified the distinction between terrorism and other forms of common crime as the fact that terrorism is not motivated by financial gains (Okereke 3).

While terrorism generally is aimed at creating fear in a society to achieve a political goal, an act of terrorism can be understood as either being objective driven or terror driven. An objective driven act of terrorism is committed in order to get demands of a terrorist group met by a government. One example of objective terrorism is hostage taking. The taking of the United States embassy in Iran in 1980 was committed in order to make the United States to change its policy toward Iran, this type of act gives the government the time to negotiate or change policy. Terror driven acts of terrorism are committed as retaliation for a perceived wrong or as a warning of future acts of terror if the government does not change its policies. Moreover, modern terrorism includes the indiscriminate and indirect targeting of individuals, people who are killed in car or building bombings are not targeted specifically and have no specific interest to the terrorist. Terrorism is not an irrational act; targets are chosen because they will have a desired impact, they are not chosen randomly but the victims of terrorism are random and the appearance of randomness causes public anxiety. Terrorism is also a public act; the greater society must see and react to the attack. The terrorist chooses targets that have symbolic or economic value, such as the world trade center, or targets that have public value,

such as buses and restaurants, in order to get the society's attention and cause governments to change policies (Arthur 42).

## **1.1 The Origins of Violence in Algeria**

The Algerian experience with terrorism is heavy, but the most significant one that left a tremendous scar in the Algerians memory is that of the nineties. The horror began as a result of the decision by radical Islamists to resort to armed struggle after the military intervention in 1992. By 1997, it had claimed between 100,000 to 150,000 lives, mostly civilians. The Islamic extremists originated mainly from religious opposition parties within the country's undereducated and politically marginalized middle and lower classes.

The outbreak of the conflicts started mainly when the political Islamist movement was overshadowing the old socialist nationalist trend, more so when the FLN ( Le front de libération national) or national liberation front projects failed in the mid 1970's, Algerian non-elites started to organize; protesting against the cultural impositions by the government and the protest became more violent. Furthermore, the party that was mostly influential is named the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The FIS began as many political opposition movements in the 1970s and 1980s. Following the legalization of independent political parties in 1989, the FIS won most seats in Algeria's first multi-party municipal elections, The FLN, which had dominated Algerian political life since independence, had come in a weak third place with only a handful of votes, fearing a scandalous loss against the FIS, the nation's military canceled the second round of elections and effectively took control over the government via its high state, and after the resignation of the president Ben Jedid, the FLN was dissolved. The FIS was banned by the military and thousands of its members were arrested (Giuseppe 11).

In 1996, the passage of a new constitution allowed two-thirds of chamber members to be elected by the public, including members of moderate opposition parties. The massacres peaked in 1997 around the parliamentary elections, which were won by a newly created pro-

Army party, the National Democratic Rally (RND), The Islamic army of salvation, under attack from both the Algerian army and its Islamist competitors, conceded to a ceasefire with the government. In 1998, the GIA (the armed Islamic group) splintered, as some members objected to its massacre policy on ordinary civilians (Calvert 2; Hunt 2005, 6). Following the election of Presidential Alliance candidate Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999, a new law gave amnesty to most insurgents with large numbers to leave their Islamist groups and return to normal “civilian” life. From 1999 and 2002, insurgent violence declined substantially. And due to the amnesty program, the remnants of the fighting groups finally dissolved.

What can be said is the main reason of the conflict was of an economic unbalance more than a political one, most of the Algerian government believed that the problem in Algeria was not politics but mainly economy and that reviving economy and proceeding economic reforms is the key to undermine any gap that may Algerians fall in. but “ideological void” soon accompanied the failure of economic development strategies. This void was ultimately filled in most cases by religious slogans of Islamist groups. As the state failed to improve the living conditions of its citizens, therefore paving the way to be a legitimacy base in their minds, the permeating socio- political projects within Islamism filled this void. The ultimate and final legacy of the black decade is not yet manifest, nor will it be defined in the next future. Since 1999 when the insurgents were granted amnesty, the ranks of insurgent groups have declined dramatically, and a relative peace was formed. However, Algeria has still seen sporadic violence of mass casualties, primarily by the last remnant of the Islamist groups. Whereas before, the struggle was a liberation from colonialism, and later, for economic relief and social change. Now the battle takes on a global perspective. The question posed now affect the west more than both the liberation and the black decade: whether North Africa or Algeria in particular is the next staging ground to fight Al Qaeda, will the Algerian government be able to resist the Islamic message of salvation through violence, indeed, the

violence witnessed in the Algerian war of independence and the black decade might be the beginning of a longer and a bloodier war against the west (Giuseppe 12).

## **1.2 The Evolution of Al Qaeda: from Algerian Islamism to Transnational Terror**

For over the past half century, Algeria has suffered from an on-going political violence and terrorism. The international rise of al-Qaeda has brought this radical movement to this already-troubled North African nation. Moreover, al-Qaeda's second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a video taped on September 11 2006, where he called for the liberation of former Muslim lands from Spain to Iraq and that the Salafist group for preaching and combat has joined Al Qaeda organization. In announcing this union, al-Zawahiri established the region of the Islamic Maghreb as a priority for the global Islamic jihad. He also expanded the limits the organization providing it with transnational legitimacy as an AlQaeda franchise and expanding its mandate from the overthrow of the secular Algerian government to serving as the base for the jihad in the region. The renaming of the organization is not a publicity stunt but is the culmination of a multiyear evolution toward the current structure from the Algerian Islamist insurgency of the 1990's toward full integration with the contemporary al-Qaeda. Following the endorsement from al-Qaeda central, the GSPC changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and began a resurgent campaign of violence, making 2007 one of the most violent years in Algeria since the black decade of the 1990's (David 91). AQIM is distinct from its predecessor organizations in its political objectives, tactics and organizational structure, which reflects its new operational outlook (Lund 21).

In the meantime, the Islamic opposition was becoming more moderate, following a round of peace negotiations between the Algerian government and various Islamic groups, president Bouteflika offered amnesty to all Islamist rebels back late 1999, so long they put down their weapons. While a large number of GPSC affiliated fighters did stop their fight,

GPSC refused the government's amnesty. Over the next few years, the group stepped up its attacks on military targets, while the government responded by launching the largest anti-terror effort in several years. The group remained focused on domestic activities. Following yet another round of infighting, an Emir was put on the head of the group. He actively supported a shift towards an internationalization of the fight, voicing his support for "Brother" jihadi movements around the world. While his tenure did not last ( government forces killed him four months later), his replacement, Droukdel, shared his vision for the movement, the US invasion of Iraq around that time also helped steer the movement towards international action. And also provided the group with an important recruitment opportunity for radicalized young Algerians, many were sent to Iraq to fight under the banner of Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI), but a number also stayed at home, to help fill the vacancies that had been caused by the Algerian governments several rounds of amnesty (Lund 21).

Over the course of the following two years, Droukdel attempted to strengthen ties with AQ, the group increased its frequency of its attacks, also hitting foreign targets, and for the first time attacked a military outpost in Mauritania causing more than forty casualties,. Attacks on US interest in Algiers, combined with the group public plea of allegiance to Bin Laden cemented the alliance between the two groups. On September 11, 2006, GPSC announced its merger with Al Qaeda, which officialized six months later when the group adopted the name Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). On a tactical level, the group began experimenting with new tactics, such as suicide attacks and vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), which was seen by most observers as an attempt to please its new Qaida like tactics, and highlight its resolve to hit foreign targets (Theo 03).

For most of the late early2000 up to last year, strategic retreat of AQIM, confined to the desert of Southern Algeria, where it focused on its smuggling activities, kidnappings and infiltrating Mali and Mauritania. Most of clashed with armed forces during this time were said

to have more to do with group smuggling activities in the region, than its religious agenda. The group acquired additional notoriety for the kidnapping of 32 European tourists in 2003. And the subsequent ransom that they got from the German government for their release. Money is central to AQIM, not simply as a terrorist organization, but also to acquire the good graces of the traditional chiefs in Northern Mali.

#### **1.4 Keeping the Borders Security**

Algeria have suffered in terms of keeping the borders with other countries safe especially the southern part, the large surface of the Algerian lands posed a real threat for interventionism and terrorist groups to enter the country. The grand desert and the security status have been very fragile, organized crimes, terrorist groups, arms trafficking, food insecurity, fragile governance malnutrition, and other issues have been big challenges for the efforts of creating Stability in this area. The increasing number of terrorist activities throughout the region, particularly, those carried out by armed extremist groups including kidnappings for ransom, continue to have negative results the people who lived in that area. The Malian case for example represents a serious challenge for Algeria as a regional power. Moreover, the Sahel region is considered as one of the most problematic zones in the world and the most complicated in terms of security. In fact, several reasons have contributed to the importance of this area. Most importantly, because of the wide spread of number of trans-boundary terrorist groups and organized crime, the Sahel region has been seen by its neighboring countries as a source that may cause security issues in the future and would create danger for the government and citizens also (Mohammed 312).

The Sahel region the Sahel stretches almost 4,800 miles from the Horn of Africa to Senegal, it covers the countries the countries that Algeria has borders with which are Mauritania, Mali and Niger, and some other countries. This zone suffers from political, economic and environmental problems, which increased the rate of poverty, unemployment,

food security .These issues usually lead the population to fall in the arms of criminal groups looking for jobs, or to be displaced from their lands looking for better living conditions, which is the case for the Malians who escaped to Algeria from the consequences violent ethnic conflicts. The current situation has left the region' countries increasingly vulnerable to insecurity that caused by violent ethnic conflicts, activities of extremist groups and related organized crime. Indeed, all of Sahelian states are concerned by the apparent ties among terrorist groups active in the region as well as criminal organizations involved in human and drug trafficking. All of the Sahel region's countries then are threaten by the activities of terrorist groups , such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Boko Haram, and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, as well as other transnational criminal organizations. They have committed acts of terrorism and threaten the regional security, they have also increased the expansion of arms over the Sahel and engaged in drug and human trafficking and other illegal activities (Mohammed 310).

The fragile security situation within the Algerian borders coupled with political instability, weak governances and new transnational threat (soft and hard threats) are creating a need for adaptation in the Algerian security approach towards the region, including a militarization of borders. Particularly, the outbreak of crisis in the Malian state in 2012 was unprecedented, involving for the first time not only Tuaregs movements fighting against the Malian government, but also terrorist and trafficker armed groups. New security reality has risen in the Sahel region, creating a new challenge for Algeria (Lutfi 162).

## **2. The 9/11 Attacks and the War on Terror**

On September the 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, 19 terrorists boarded four American airplanes with the intention of killing hundreds of people on US soil. Two planes hit the World trade center in

New York city, one hit the Pentagon, the military central for the United States, and the fourth one was headed for the national capital, Washington D.C., but crashed into a field prior to its destination. These attacks not only changed the American history, but it changed world history. These attacks were the starting point in major US involvement in the war against terrorism. This incident resulted in deaths of more than 3000 lives including service personal, as well as the destruction of property, and institutions. This attack illustrated the dark side of globalization as the terrorists used tools of global modern society such as the internet, high technological airplanes and opened borders to attack the west at home. Without doubt thereby, September 11 represented a day of unprecedented shock and tragedy in US history.

As previously mentioned, these terrorists were part of a group known around the world as Al-Qaeda and their infamous leader being Osama Bin Laden. Through research, it has been thought that the attacks on the United States were derived from an ongoing battle and power struggles from the major forces in the Middle East. These events and the power war have been ongoing in the Middle East for some time. The terrorist attacks left an extravagant effect on the American people, the fear of terror and death led to the fear of anything related to these groups including Islam and Muslims under the name of Islamophobia. And this level of anxiety was translated into support for any form of overseas military action and to a stressed relationship between the government and its people, most of the Americans believed that the government should more present in providing security and peace in the country. Furthermore, these attacks affected American politics in a dramatic way. It cannot be understated that the attacks carried out on the United States introduced the country to a new era of exposure to real threats over security, it also marked a new era for the world particularly when the world's greatest power was under attacks. In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States realized that urgent actions must be taken in order to prevent any future risks. (Sami 03)

## **2.1 The Initial U.S Response after 9/11**

The attacks of September 2001 represent a turning point in the American history two days after the attacks in Manhattan George W. Bush, the US president openly declared a global war in a televised speech to the nation. The president was very quick at responding to millions of Americans who questioned the unknown future of the nation's safety. The speech was extremely emotional and it could be argued that it was crafted in order to mentally prepare the US citizens for a harsh response in regards of freedom and security. It was here where Bush first mentioned "war on terror" which has been widely debated ever since the declaration of a war on terror included a war on the Taliban regime of Afghanistan because it provided a safe haven for Al Qaeda network which claimed responsibility for the attacks. Simultaneously, the president warned the entire world that there is no room for neutrality and the parts should be either with the US or against the US in the fight against terror. This warning could be regarded as a call for formation of a worldwide coalition against terrorism, especially that of Al Qaeda. And indeed, many countries from all over the world joined the American "war on terror", while a few ones found a room for neutrality despite the warning of the president Bush. Russia, China, Iran preferred not to participate. After a few weeks of high military coordination between the American led union and the Afghani so-called Northern alliance, the Taliban was defeated and replaced by another regime. The removal of the Taliban from the power, however, represented just the first battle in the 'war on terror'. Iraq was the second one on the list of the countries that should be invaded by the American led union. Unlike the extreme Taliban, Saddam Hussein's regime could not be accused of providing a safe haven for Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. Nor could it be accused of sponsoring global terrorism. Possessing weapons of mass destruction was the excuse used to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. However, the American led coalition this time was not as wide as that which was formed against the Taliban. That was due to the fact that the accusation of

possessing weapons of mass destruction was not strong enough to invade a strong country and make its regime fall down (Sami 08).

## **2.2 The Invasion of Afghanistan**

Since the very beginning, the American administration had no doubts that Al Qaeda was responsible for the attacks of September 2001. Al Qaeda in its own part claimed responsibility for the attacks and then became the target number one for the United States and its allies. The Taliban, which provided Al Qaeda with a safe haven in Afghanistan, refused to hand over the suspicious people, including Al Qaeda's leader Osama Bin Laden, to the United States. The Taliban's refusal led to a war.

In order to give this war an international dimension, the United States tried to form a wide coalition of states from all over the world. This union could be regarded as a team led by the only superpower at that time. Most of the western countries agreed to enter the American team, some of them offered troops, such as the United Kingdom, France and Canada. Other countries offered logistics and military equipment, the joint of the western countries to the American team was inspired by some factors, most importantly was the fact that Al Qaeda network has become a common enemy for these states and imposed threats to the security and stability of their societies. Moreover, the increasing influence of this organization in the Middle East could in the long run, influence the western interests in the region. Russia and China, despite their strong commendation to the terrorist attacks of September 2001, they did not join the American union. This position could be explained by the fact that they did not like the American military presence, and eventually bases, near their borders. Moreover, the two great powers believed that they would not avail themselves of the establishment of a pro-American regime in Afghanistan after the removal of Taliban (Samy 12).

The United States succeeded in forming an efficient coalition to overcome the Taliban and Al Qaeda. At the domestic level, the Americans found in the Northern alliance, a very

effective ally in their war. The only common goal between the members of the team was to topple the Taliban and remove Al Qaeda from Afghanistan. On October 2001, the American effective military support to the Northern alliance resulted in a swift collapse of the Taliban's regime and the killing and capturing of hundreds of its Al Qaeda's fighters. This swift collapse, however, did not put an end to the Afghan conflict. Most of the Taliban and Al Qaeda's warriors moved to Pakistan where the mountainous area provided a suitable environment for guerilla war (Samy12).

Despite this coalition which is led by the United States, there was no clear plan to rebuild Afghanistan or help its people to stand up from the crucial economic, health, political and social problems from which they suffered. The absence of an adequate long term assistance package was one of the main factors that led many of the western countries withdraw from this union besides seeing that what they expecting from this union were less than what they paid for.

### **2.3 The Invasion of Iraq**

The Iraq war will remain one of the most continuous debates of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The decision to go to the war even without explicit authorization from the united nations security council or even the United States congress sends a hidden message that this action had other goals and motivations that can not be shown to the international community. Taking the 9/11 attacks as the background of the American invasion of Iraq, even though Iraq was in no way involved in it, exposed a great willing of the Bush administration to take the Middle Eastern area and the Muslim community as the picture of an enemy with hidden intentions, and therefore the attacks were the perfect opportunity to mobilize the war to suit the US interests. The first obstacle for the Bush administration had to do with clearing up the reason of declaring a war on a state that did not threaten the US. The issue of weapons of master destruction was put as the front page to turn the war on terrorism to a war on Iraq; to do so,

the president Bush claimed that the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was linked to Al Qaeda and was actively developing weapons of mass destruction which he might turn over to terrorists or even use it on their behalf, and therefore Iraq represented a serious threat to the United States. Moreover, the war party in Washington discussed some unsure claims that Iraq is indeed a serious threat in which they exaggerated those claims and knew with no doubts that it was a unnecessary war against a non-serious target, where the real threat did not exist in the weapons themselves but on the risk of losing the American control on that part of the world and impose any type of threat to Israel (Raymond 11).

On February 26, 2003, Bush said to a televised audience that it exists a dictator in Iraq who is building and hiding weapons that could enable the United States to dominate the Middle East and intimidate the civilized world and that the States will not allow it. This same tyrant has close ties to terrorist organizations and could supply them with the terrible means to strike this country. The danger posed by Saddam Hussein and his weapons cannot be ignored or wished away and must be confronted. In addition, the Iraqi regime is under pressure to meet the demands of the United Nations and disarm, fully and peacefully. On the other hand the United States is prepared to disarm Iraq by force. Either way, the danger will be removed (Michael 02). Less than a month on, March 20, 2003: President George W. Bush appeared on television screens across America and made an announcement that the American forces were in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger. Finally, On March 19, 2003 at 9:34 PM EST the U.S begins bombing Iraq. Strikes are first made against Baghdad. In his address to the nation Bush outlined that the purpose of invading Iraq is only to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger. The United States clearly announced its intention to rule the world and do so by military force, with no regard for international law, free from boundaries imposed by multilateral institutions or agreements and the supreme international war crime, 'aggression. For this, the 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq would have

profound consequences for millions of Iraqi civilians killed in warfare, drones, refugees, starvation etc. (Jim 15). The Bush doctrine principally argued the need for America to remain a strong global superpower. In order to maintain this position, it highlighted the importance of taking pre-emptive action against foreign threats, acting unilaterally if necessary. This aggressive stance on foreign policy was illustrated perfectly by the US government's intervention in Iraq. The doctrine also served to create the thesis as well as the antithesis that would define America throughout his years of presidency, and even after. This thesis was that America would be at the forefront of bringing freedom to the rest of the world, uniting all peoples under the umbrella of democracy. (Carolina 01)

Evaluating the reason behind invading Iraq is centered around there being weapons of mass destruction in the country. There was found to be no actual evidence of this. UN Security Council Resolution 1441 gave Saddam Hussein a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations. That it had been subject in former resolutions. Previously, the UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission), were tasked with performing systematic inspections to ensure Iraq was disarming its nuclear stockpile. However, due to the interference of Saddam Hussein, these organizations were unable to carry out their inspections. While the US sponsored resolution 1441, they did not truly believe that Iraq would subject itself to such inspections again, and decided to take unilateral action. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that from the US previous experience with Iraq in terms of weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration truly believed Hussein's regime was still hiding these weapons and would refuse to give them up, unless coerced by military action. Moreover, part of the US case for war was that the Iraqi government was hiding old pre-1991 chemical weapons, such old chemical weapons were found in Iraq; but the US case for war was still totally false because Saddam's regime was not hiding those weapons. Many of these chemical weapons that the US discovered were the remains of those from previous wars that had been abandoned and forgotten by Saddam's

regime. Yet this reason should still be counted as a true motivation for the US invasion. (Security Council 2002)

It should be noted that there has also been a strong support for the idea that a key motive for America's invasion was the Iraqi's oil. Prior to even 9/11, the plan to invade Iraq under the Bush administration was already underway. Large multi-national companies based in America would have much to gain if the US could find a way to take control of large shares of Iraqi oil for a cheap price. The most efficient way to do this was to invade the country and take hold of the nation's oilfields for themselves, yet America would need a logical excuse, one that would have the support of much of the American population. At the time, the US was facing an energy crisis, as a result of volatile price control tactics by Middle Eastern countries, especially Iraq. These countries would withhold oil from U.S market to increase the price and demand for the product, causing America to be faced with a fear for future energy security. By taking hold of production and stabilizing energy supplies, the countries most benefitted by this would be the U.S and the U.K. many speculate that this reason was also why the U.K chose to support America's unilateral actions to invade.

It would seem that the reasons for the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq are multiple, and it is perhaps the climax of these reasons that led the bush administration to take this decision. America wanted to overthrow Saddam's rule and transition the country into a democracy, not only to bring freedom to the people, but also to maintain U.S. primacy and ensure American control over Iraqi oilfields. While the bush administration had reason to believe Iraq still possessed WMDs and would not comply with UN resolution 1441, they did not give the country a chance to see whether this was true before deciding to invade. Also as no weapons of mass destruction were discovered after the invasion yet American troops did not vacate the country, this was, this is further proof that U.S. interests lay deeper than merely searching for and destroying these weapons. The U.S. had much to gain from invading Iraq, however

they did not realize that the war they had incited would be much longer and harder to win than initially anticipated. Mostly this had to do with the lack of planning in regards to establishing a democracy in a state, as U.S. troops would have to remain in the country to ensure that fair democratic processes were carried out. This made it difficult for a smooth exit of the U.S. military from the country, and resulted in the bush administration having the term the U.S. continued involvement in the country as a necessary measure to combat the ongoing war on terror. (Carolina 03)

This section of the research has provided a very significant foundation on how the concept of terror can be spread under political and religious motivations. The circumstances of the so called “black decade” period where the Algerian people witnessed the most brutal and savage practices done by extremists and terrorist groups who took religion as a cover for their actions. Moreover, the significance of this period obliged the United States to cooperate with the Algerian government after the 9/11 attacks especially that Algeria have experience the real deal with terrorism. Therefore, the following chapter will offer an over view of how the Algerian American relationship improved after the attacks and what military and political approaches they both use to solve issues related to security.

# **CHAPTER TWO: THE ALGERIAN AMERICAN COOPERATION IN FIGHTING TERROR**

This chapter provides an analysis of the relationship between Algeria and the United States before and after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The rapprochement between the two countries after the events besides the differences and similarities in their international policies. Furthermore, it gives an overview on the different approaches to fight terror in Africa and other countries and how the two intervene to solve any issues that might create a danger for the security of its lands.

## **1. The Evolution of the Relationship**

It could be said that the attacks of September 2001 are the main motivation to improve the American Algerian relationship, and specifically in security issues. In fact, relations between Algeria and the United States have been complex and ambivalent for decades. In the late 1990s, a visible improvement emerged but it was only after the events of 9/11 that American perceptions of Algeria changed. What was considered a normal domestic issue for the Algerian government – the fight against terrorism – suddenly became a prime American and global concern. The events of 9/11 opened the way not only to very important bilateral military cooperation between the United States and Algeria, but also allowed the United States to include Algeria in two security systems, the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue in the north, and the Sahel region in the South. Moreover, creating cooperation is considered one of the most important aspects of bilateral relations since 9/11. This cooperation is centered on the exchange of information, military cooperation and the monitoring of the transfer of funds. However, it remains difficult to confirm or deny that the United States has established an NSA listening base in the Algerian desert, even if Americans as well as Algerians deny the existence of such a base. What is certain though is that American officials insist that Algeria has become extremely important to the United States. Adding to the picture that these events

gave a green light for the United States in order to change the Maghreb's geopolitical situation by encouraging the latter to make a move in terms of bringing together of the Maghreb states with the American ones, and also making a greater focus on the interest of the area, which, from a security point of view, now extends to the Sahel region (Yahia 03).

In terms of actual collaborations, Algerian President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, had seized the opportunity provided by the attacks, Bouteflika had visited the White House the following November to express his support for the global War on Terror. In stressing a connection between the Algerian civil conflict and the wider, international effort to combat terrorism, Bouteflika presented Algeria as being most capable of empathizing with the United States in the wake of the 11 September attacks: To substantiate the relevance of Algeria to the global War on Terror, the Bouteflika Government pointed to the alleged link between Al Qaeda and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a militant Islamic group classified by the United States and the European Union as a foreign terrorist organization. This connection was reportedly revealed on 12 September 2002, when Imadibn al-Wahid, a Yemeni accused of being a representative of al Qaeda in the Sahel-Maghreb region, was alleged to have recorded a message granting Al Qaeda's approval to the GSPC. The announcement was of considerable political significance, as it enabled Algerian authorities to argue that their terror problem is not specific to the country but part of the wider international battle against Islamic extremism (Haven 27). Surprisingly, the aftermath of the crisis resulted in an unexpected rapprochement between Algiers and Washington in the field of intelligence and defense. The United States proposed to share with Algeria some intelligence data provided by their drones, in order to facilitate the securitization of the southern borders, and under the condition of accepting the opening of a cross border Algeria-Mali fly-zone (Schmitt, Sayare17). Indeed, following his visit to Algeria in February 2006, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared that the US was studying the possibility of selling sophisticated weapons to Algeria, arguing that the Algerian government have similar desires with the United States, with having

recognized the importance of the relationship which exists between Euro-Atlantic security and stability in the Mediterranean, established a programme of cooperation, as well as joint operations in the Mediterranean with Algerian forces, following Bouteflika's visits in December 2001 and in December 2002 to NATO headquarters in Belgium. Those visits were followed by frequent trips made by high-ranking Algerian military officers to NATO headquarters (Yahia11).

The Washington Post reported that the Pentagon was screening Gillo Pontecorvo's classic film *The Battle of Algiers* (Ignatius 23). For the US military, the Algerian war of liberation provides a close parallel and some useful lessons on the strategies, the strengths, and the weaknesses of a Muslim popular resistance movement facing a Western occupying power. It has also been reported that George W. Bush was reading Alastair Horne's classic *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–62*. Henry Kissinger had apparently recommended it to the president. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Algeria was also one of the first countries the United States turned to in order to learn how to fight Islamic militancy. Washington, as undersecretary of state William Burns put it in December 2002, has much to learn from Algeria on ways to fight terrorism (Faouzi21)

Despite the remarkable development in the relationship between the two countries. However, in spite of Algeria's strategic, economic, and political importance to American policy in the Maghreb, the United States still remains much more sensitive to Morocco's interests than to Algeria's. Historical, ideological, political and military reasons provide the explanation for such a state of affairs. US support for colonial France in the 1950s had a negative, long-lasting influence on US-Algerian relations long after Algeria's independence in 1962. The misunderstandings and disagreements which characterized Algerian-American relations for nearly 30 years created a mutual mistrust between decision makers of the two countries which have only recently started to dissipate. Whether it is Algeria's support for

national liberation movements, or frictions over the conflicts in Palestine and the Western Sahara, this prevented the development of close relations between the two countries in the past and partly explains the hesitation for a much more solid rapprochement. Notwithstanding the new pragmatism of Algeria's foreign policy, the stance taken by Algeria often runs against the current of America's policy, especially with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or to the Western Sahara conflict because of the historical experiences of Algerian nationalism, but also for reasons of national security with respect to the Western Sahara. But, whatever their disagreements, a mutual respect between Algeria and the United States does exist. One must remember the crucial role played by Algeria in 1980 in the release of the American hostages held in Iran. More recently, in April 2005, Algeria tried to act as a mediator between the United States and Iran to solve the latter's differences on the question of the Iranian nuclear power (Yahia 07).

A few days before the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, reports indicated that the United States would deliver sophisticated anti-guerrilla equipment to Algeria, specifically for the detection of troop movements, on the condition that Algerians not use such equipment against their neighbors. This decision seemed to indicate that the United States had finally decided to help Algeria eradicate terrorism. Obviously, the attacks on New York and Washington could not but bring the two countries closer, at a minimum on security cooperation. Algeria condemned in a way that leaves no doubt the horrific attacks and agreed to join the international coalition led by the United States, although arguing that a military coalition should be under the U.N. umbrella and not be aimed against. From Algeria's perspective, the September events vindicated the government's decade-long position on the global nature of terrorism and its capacity to threaten states. Officials argued that Algeria had been at the forefront in the struggle against terrorism and have witnessed different scenes and periods of this crucial phenomena, from which it has suffered the loss of more than 100,000 lives and massive destruction. Algerians argue that they have fought terrorism on their own

without the world coming to their rescue. They took the opportunity to criticize Europe, the United States and Canada for having sheltered Islamist groups on their territories, thus closing their eyes to the responsibility of those groups in the events that have taken place in Algeria. They asserted that Bin Laden had funded extremist groups like the GIA and the GSPC, both on Washington's hit list. Hence, from their standpoint, the fight against terrorism should be worldwide and the events in the United States should inaugurate a new era of international cooperation against this phenomenon. Undoubtedly, the September events created a golden opportunity for Algerians to place themselves in the right camp and to reap some benefits, i.e., eliciting assistance in eradicating the terrorists in their country. The authorities handed Washington a list of 350 suspected Algerian militants on the run in Europe and the United States and offered their cooperation in security and intelligence matters. Undoubtedly, Algerians also hoped that the United States and Europe would reciprocate by extraditing wanted Algerian extremists. In order to consolidate the international coalition by involving as many Arab and Islamic countries as possible, and as mentioned previously, President George W. Bush invited Bouteflika to come to Washington on November 5, following the third U.S.-Africa Business Summit, sponsored by the Corporate Council on Africa, held in Philadelphia on November 2. The visit to Philadelphia was aimed at promoting the idea of "a new Algeria, a winning Algeria" and to persuade U.S. businesses that Algeria is a lucrative market. No less than 44 Algerian companies participated in the meeting. The visit to Washington, though focused on the issue of international terrorism, was a great opportunity for the Algerian regime to improve its image. Algerians exaggerated the importance of the visit, arguing that it was rare that a foreign leader visits the White House twice within a period of four months ((Yahia 08).

However, it was clear that Bouteflika's visit, ahead of that of France's Jacques Chirac, could not but enhance Algerians' self-worth. Algerians felt vindicated, especially since less than a week before the visit Bush had called on Africans to ratify the summer 1999 Algiers

Convention on Terrorism, which African countries had failed to endorse. Undoubtedly, Bouteflika's objective in meeting with President Bush was not just to convince the latter that U.S.-Algerian relations should be strengthened but also to persuade him that the fight against terrorism would be in vain unless the roots were dealt with, that is, the poverty and inequality exacerbated by globalization. Thus, the United States should help Algeria economically, perhaps transforming the debt into investments, so that the country could regain its stability and eliminate one of the sources of political extremism. Also high on the agenda was the question of Western Sahara, since, from Algeria's perspective, regional stability depends on a resolution of that conflict. Only time will tell how well the United States has received Bouteflika's message and whether Algerians will get concrete gains. Algerians hope that perhaps the country has truly become a pivotal state. American officials stroked their ego by stating that the United States has "a lot to learn from Algeria's experience with terrorism." But one should hope that the scenario that followed the freeing of American hostages in Iran would not repeat itself. Indeed, in the guise of a "reward" to the Algerians for helping free the hostages in 1981, the United States supplied tanks to Morocco to crush Algerian-backed Sahrawis (Yahia 76).

U.S.-Algerian relations have improved considerably in the last few years. A U.S. regional Maghreb policy, in which Algeria plays a pivotal role, might be in the making. Algeria's rich hydrocarbon sector and other "hot" sectors is an attractive market for America's growing energy requirements. The country, which holds an influential position in the organization of African and the Arab League, has the potential of serving Washington's regional interests. Despite its close relationship with France, the United States is no longer reticent about penetrating the French-dominated Maghreb and wishes to play a more active role in a region traditionally under France's influence. Should Algerians carry out the political and economic reforms sought by Washington, a U.S. presence in Algeria could soon become a reality. The question remains, of course, whether Algerians are really serious about breaking their

dependence on France or whether they are simply playing the American card to alter France's policy in the region. The other question, of course, is whether U.S. policies in the Middle East, especially toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, will spare U.S.-Algerian relations from the inevitable repercussions of the unwavering U.S. alignment with Israel against the Palestinians. The United States is aware of this potential obstacle. This partly explains why, on December 9, 2001, Washington sent Assistant Secretary of State William J. Burns for a two-day visit to Algiers to discuss with the authorities not only the issue of global terrorism and bilateral cooperation but also the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the question of Western Sahara. Whereas Algerians view Palestinian actions against Israelis as legitimate because they emanate from a movement of national liberation, the United States views them as terrorist acts. Nevertheless, the United States seems genuinely interested in involving Algerians in the resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, the United States may decide to play a more evenhanded and steadfast role in the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. This decision would not only isolate France, whose support for Morocco on this question is no secret, and thus diminish France's overwhelming influence in the region, but it would also convince Algerians that the United States is a reliable partner (Yahia 79).

## **2. Approaches of Fighting Terror in the Sahel Region**

Since Algeria is considered the biggest and the most capable of any country among the ones of North Africa in general and surrounding the Sahel zone in particular, a bigger pressure is put on the government to address growing security issues that are rising over the years in the area. Algeria is viewed as a regional leader able of coordinating the efforts of the Sahelian countries to defeat the transnational security threats. The rising threat of terrorism has been the main reason why the Sahel region has found itself in the international spotlight over the last few years. Things came to a head in 2012 with the takeover of northern Mali by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) together with AQIM splinter group Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Dine, led by former Tuareg rebel leader

Iyad Ag Ghali, following the March 2012 military Coup in Mali. The growing issues of the region and its threats on the security of various countries made it easier for other parts to intervene under trying to cure those issues, US focus on the Sahara-Sahel region began in the early 2000s when it became apparent Algeria's civil war against Islamist terrorist insurgent groups was spilling into the desert. Security analyst Daniel Volman states that US interests in Africa in the mid-2000s centered on three aspects. The first one is a new front on the global war on terror, secondly an access to Africa's energy supplies, and last a competition with China for access to Africa's resources. Regional expert Yahia Zoubir sees US interests in the Maghreb, and by extension the Sahara-Sahel zone, as twofold, including political and economic interests focusing on energy concerns and military/strategic interests focusing on security. The 2001 report of US Vice President Dick Cheney's Energy Task Force called for increasing US interest in Africa's oil supplies to reduce dependence on Middle East oil. The Bush administration, following up on concerns raised by the Energy Task Force, defined access to Africa's oil supplies as a strategic national interest. Algeria is Africa's third largest oil producer, behind Libya and Nigeria, and the US was, in the mid-2000s, Algeria's largest foreign investor in hydrocarbons, amounting to \$22 billion in trade in 2008 (Stephen 04).

As the following year Algeria's Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) was placed on the US list of terrorist organizations. Similar concerns over Islamist terrorism were growing regarding other countries in the Sahel zone. Journalist Paul Marshall noted that Senegal, Gambia, Niger, Mauritania, "and even historically democratic Mali," were experiencing growing Islamist unrest. Reports noted the presence of "foreign extremists," as well as activities by the GSPC in northern Mali. Some reports claimed the GSPC had many bases and arms caches across the Sahara and that the Group maintained connections with rebel groups in Mali, Niger, and Chad. Algerian scholar Farid Belgaçem described the frontier area between Mali, Algeria, Libya, and Niger as a zone of "permanent insecurity" that had been infiltrated with GSPC activists since June of 2004. He called the Sahara a vast area

of contraband in drugs, cigarettes, and arms, as well as human trafficking. As a result of concerns arising from such reports, the US and its regional allies attempted to implement a series of securitization initiatives to address the linked issues of access to oil resources and protection of US and regional interests against increasingly active Islamist terrorist organizations in the Sahara-Sahel zone. These initiatives include the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), established in 2002; the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), established in 2005; and, finally, AFRICOM (Africa Command), a new US military command for Africa created during the last years of the Bush administration and the early years of the Obama administration. This new command was to be distinct from and parallel to both EUCOM, which had jurisdiction for Europe and North Africa, and CENTCOM, which had jurisdiction for the Middle East and the Horn of Africa (Stephen 47).

## **2.1 The Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI)**

The Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) was developed specifically to counter GSPC threats to security in the four so-called Sahelian countries, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The PSI was a military initiative run by the US European Command (EUCOM) between November 2002 and March 2004. It had two objectives: first, to strengthen the capacity of the Sahelian states to fight terrorist organizations, and second, to prevent terrorist groups from establishing bases and strongholds in the region. Teams of US Special Operations Forces (SOF) were deployed to provide training and equipment to the four Sahelian countries to improve border security and to deny the use of their territory to terrorists and criminals. Specifically, the goal of the PSI was capacity building in the security forces of the target countries, including the creation of rapid-reaction forces to pursue terrorists (Anna 84).

The PSI failed spectacularly in these objectives. The first and main motivation for the creation of the Pan Sahel Initiative was the involvement of the Algerian GSPC in the Sahelian countries. The terrorist organization's presence in the Sahara was signaled by the rise of the

Saharan hostage crisis of 2003, which first came to light between February and April of that year when a total of 32 European tourists were taken hostage by a GSPC cell, also known as Al- Para. After a gun battle, 17 of the hostages were freed by the Algerian security not far from the Libyan border. The rest of the hostages were taken to what is known to be the beginnings of a GSPC safe haven in the Malian Adagh. These hostages were released in August after ransom with the involvement of the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The Pan Sahel Initiative transitioned to the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership, or Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), as it was at first named, during 2004–2005. The TSCTI (later TSCTP) was created to address concerns similar to those that had prompted the development of the PSI. EUCOM’s concerns in the Sahara, besides the inroads of Algerian terrorists group, included fears that trafficking in drugs, arms, and labor migrants would be combined with poverty and unemployment to create more and more issues. According to Maj. Holly Silkman, a EUCOM public affairs officer who described the Sahara as the “Wild West.” Gen. Wald began pushing for an expansion of the PSI right after the engagement between Chadian troops and Al-Para’s fighters. After intense lobbying by military personnel before Congress in March of 2004, this expansion resulted in the creation of the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), Specifically, ,and it was argued that there was a huge possibility to call of Qa’ida training camps comparable to those in Afghanistan appearing in the Sahara. They also suggested fighters from Maghrebi and Sahelian countries then training in Iraq might transit back to North and West Africa to teach terror techniques learned in Iraq to recruits there (Stephen 54).

The most known belief among EUCOM leadership was that the 150 or so troops that had been trained by US teams in the four Sahelian countries under the PSI would not be enough to tackle with issues like those described before Congress. If the Sahara were to become a place for terrorism, as Afghanistan once had been, and if the illegal trafficking of arms and labor migrants were to continue and even increase, then more troops in friendly

countries would have to be trained, and the training programs would be more expanded in the future to other countries. Ultimately Congress agreed to a budget for the TSCTI of \$16 million for 2005, \$30 million for 2006, and \$100 million for each of the next five years.

## **2.2 The US Africa Command (AFRICOM)**

In February of 2007, President Bush announced the creation of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). Until then, responsibility for US military affairs in Africa had been divided among three US military unified (multi-service) regional commands, including CENTCOM, which had jurisdiction over Egypt and the Horn of Africa; EUCOM, which had control of most of the continent; and PACCOM, which had responsibility for Madagascar. In October of 2007, AFRICOM “opened its doors” in Stuttgart as a sub-unified command under EUCOM. A year later, AFRICOM became a fully operational command, responsible for everything the US does military in Africa. AFRICOM is still based in Stuttgart because no appropriate African country has yet been found willing to host it. As of 2010, only Liberia and Morocco had offered to host a permanent base for AFRICOM. Other countries have hesitated so far, some citing fears of domestic repercussions as a reason. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), whose members include 15 Southern, Eastern, and Central African states stretching from South Africa to the DRC, has gone so far as to preclude the possibility of any of its member states hosting AFRICOM. As a result of this reluctance, the command’s only forward operating base is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which was established in 2002 and transferred to AFRICOM in 2008 (Sumedh 51).

Although the precise wording of AFRICOM’s mission statement has changed through the past years, the department of defense broadly announced that the motivation of the initiative is to promote the US stability and security in the region by working with African partners to help strengthen those objectives. Moreover, when of the key aspects of the

command's mission is to support other agencies and other department in their goal of promoting peace in the continent. AFRICOM is also expected to supervise military operations when directed to prevent any kind of aggression and respond to crises, in addition, the Bush administration's motivation for the creation of a new unified for Africa evolved in part out of concerns about the department of defense's division of responsibility for Africa among three geographic commands, which reportedly posed coordination problems. Although some military officials had defended the creation of an African command for over a decade, recent crises put the light on the challenges created between the unified combatant command's boundaries, one of them was located between Sudan, Chad and the central African republic, an area of increased instability. The United States, acting first and alone as a member of the North Atlantic treaty organization (NATO), has provided air lift and training for African peace keeping troops in the region of Sudan, and although CENTCOM was responsible for Sudan, much of the training was done by the EUCOM forces ( De Lauren 02).

As will become very apparent is that the American securitization initiatives in the Sahara-Sahel zone, especially the ones made for Mali, were a total failure in terms of their goals and objectives. Northern Mali was completely controlled by terrorist organizations and organized criminal networks. The Malian army units trained by American SOF teams lost their fight with other rebels and were forced to retreat, and leave all the materiel the US-led initiatives had paid for. The PSI and the TSCTP failed in Mali because corrupt officials whether from military or civilians, as well as local business interests that had long embraced and accepted laws and jurisdictions they felt did not work for them, did not want to deny any type of access to the country to terrorists or traffickers so long as they felt they would share in the profits gathered as gains by contraband or illegal activities. These same initiatives failed in Algeria because they operated under the assumption that Algeria was a "partner" with the US in the struggle against terrorism and insurgency, as well as contraband and trafficking in the Sahara-Sahel zone. America defined a partner as sharing the same goals as the US in the region.

Algeria's goals, however, were mainly protecting the regime and have control over Saharan petroleum and natural resources. Defeating terrorist organizations, establishing border security, and controlling trafficking in arms, drugs, and labor migrants were always secondary goals for Algeria. As a consequence, Algeria was double-dealing with its partner. AFRICOM too has failed in Mali and in the broader Sahara-Sahel region because of its focus on solving political, economic, and often social problems with military solutions. AFRICOM, like the PSI and the TSCTP, focused on capacity building within Malian and other African militaries while overlooking the problems that cannot be seen like poverty, corruption, and underdevelopment. In particular, the securitization initiatives failed because they put all of the emphasis on terrorist groups and failed to take proper account of criminal networks and organized criminal activities. Problems like these do not have a military solution. Algeria was not committed to helping Mali control its smugglers insurgencies so long as it felt these groups might help it gain access to as yet undiscovered petroleum and mineral wealth that might be found in the desert of northern Mali. Similarly, the government of Mali, or rather its corrupt officials, was not committed to ending either the kidnappings for ransom or the smuggling of illegal commodities like cocaine, so long as it was able to count on a cut of the profits of these projects. These failures led to the rise of assumptions by critics, especially journalists and activists both in the US and in North and West Africa, as to whether these security worries may have been exaggerated, or, more sinisterly, a cover for underlying political and economic agendas. (Stephen 184)

The failing counter terrorism strategies and approaches should have multiple factors that need to be improved upon in order for counterterrorism strategies to gain significant results. Above all, the factors that created spaces for radicalism and extremism to rise need to be addressed. State-building is a major key in removing the presence of militant groups through the establishment of order and governance wherever they are missing. States can be strengthened from being administratively or institutionally weak through the assistance of

technology and intelligence, combined with skillfully managed political and diplomatic rewards which can have positive impacts on countries suffering from lawlessness where terrorists grow (Canada Service, 2016).

### **3. The policy of Interventionism in the Sahel zone (Libya and Mali)**

Algeria is one of the few countries that is very clear and consistent about its policy of interventionism, considering its interesting location full of terror and continuous conflicts, given its colonial history, Algeria does not want foreign powers involving themselves in internal affairs. Likewise, Algiers withholds from military intervention outside its borders. Non-interventionism has even been written into the country's constitution. However, given how serious the region's situation has become, marked by the rise of different jihadist groups, this principle could be reconsidered, and it is indeed mentioned and highlighted in the Algerian constitution that the country does not use or support the language of violence in order to regain freedom and security to other nations. It puts forth its efforts to settle international disputes through peaceful means. While other parts and aspects of the constitution have been flexible, this part concerning international policy had never been challenged or changed. Unlike other countries, which may or may not engage in cross-border or extraterritorial conflicts according to specific circumstances and in pursuit of specific interests, Algeria never does, this position has numerous advantages and also disadvantages considering that its position surrounding countries of conflicts like Libya and Mali will the country in real serious test (Politiques Etrangères 02).

The maintenance of a strict non-interventionism policy goes back to the Algerian history of being colonized by the French and the colonial legacy, the experience of war and its results on the Algerian people from frustration, anger and oppression, and the suffer og winning its freedom without any external help led to the decision of never letting any other nation relive what the Algerian lived or subject any other country to the same hardships. As

an expression of this desire to protect its lands and other lands from any external interference, Algeria joined the non-aligned movement (NAM) as soon as it was able and had been a committed member ever since, in 1973 Algeria hosted the NAM's 4th summit under the leadership of the NAM's Secretary General, Algerian President Houari Boumediene. The high-profile event was intended to convey to the world Algeria's commitment to the NAM's guiding principles, including, abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country, refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country and settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations .This policy is intended to augment and legitimize the role that Algeria has cast for itself on the international level, Algeria sees itself as a part who chase peace and stability, and the real life manifestation was when it helped the solving of hostages crisis in 1979, when the Algerian foreign minister Mohammed Seddik, working alongside the American Secretary of State Warren Christopher, negotiated the release of American hostages who had been held captive in Iran for 444 days. Upon their release, the Americans boarded on the Algerian Airlines plane and flew to Algiers before traveling onward to the US (Politiques Etrangères 03).

Algeria is very protective and sensitive when it comes to the protection of its borders or any threats of its sovereignty. In March 2008, Algeria accused the united states of interfering in its internal affairs after the American ambassador met with leaders of political parties and civil society. Similarly, on the grounds of protecting its sovereignty, Algeria resisted World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements that it allow for alcohol imports if Algeria wished to join the organization. Thus in a certain sense, Algeria abstains from interfering in the affairs of others because it does not want others interfere in its own (Geoff 08).

Algeria's refusal to use its military extraterritorially gives up the battlefield to others that may not share Algeria's position or its interests. And by giving up conflicts to others, Algiers may inadvertently endanger itself. For example, Algeria strongly opposed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)- led military intervention in Libya, arguing that what eventually became known as the 17 February Revolution was an internal Libyan affair. The NATO campaign continued its operations anyway and in the aftermath of the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, Libya has become acutely unstable. In addition to a long lasting civil war, violent Islamist terrorist organizations like the Islamic State have also established themselves in Libyan territory and pose a direct threat to Algerian safety and security. Algeria was also against the French military intervention in Northern Mali in January 2013. Algeria argued that the way to establish an enduring solution to the destabilization of Northern Mali by competing groups of violent non-state actors was to pursue a political solution, not a military one. However, a quick armed offensive southward by one faction from Northern Mali prompted France to launch a campaign to protect the Malian capital. Four days after the start of the French campaign, a terrorist organization attacked a large gas facility in Algerian territory, with the attackers claiming that they had done so in response to France's military activity(Geoff 12).

While Algeria follows a non -interference policy, it allowed France to use its airspace and cooperated with French military operations in Mali in 2013. Moreover, Algeria was the US partner of choice in its Pan-Sahel Initiative from 2004 onwards and also for the Africa Command (Africom) mission, which was established in 2007 to monitor terrorism, organized crime, and trafficking networks across the region. Another such initiative is the US Trans Sahara Counter Terrorist Initiative (TSCTI). Algeria and the US also signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in the field of counterterrorism in 2010. In addition, the FBI has opened a field office in Algiers, Algerian officers have been trained in the US, and there have been a number of joint intelligence missions between high-ranking DRS officers and their

counterparts from the US. The EU also launched its Strategy for Security and Development in the Conflict analysis of Algeria 17 Sahel in March, 2011 Algeria is also a member of the NATO Mediterranean dialogue, which aims at promoting regional security and stability (Anna 04).

Since the independence of the last of its colonies, Algeria, in 1962, France has maintained a system of dominance in the continent through 'France Afrique', where bases, troops and influence over political systems have been maintained over its former colonies in the continent. This control has enabled France to maintain power over security matters in the region and solidified its position as the buffer between the West and the crises in the continent. However, the discovery of oil reserves in the Gulf of Guinea in the 1960s introduced a new player seeking control, contesting France's dominance: the United States (Yasmina 05).

During the Cold War, Africa became a battleground for both economic and military investments between mainly the US and France. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the US began a series of humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa, beginning with the civil war in Somalia in 1992. A few years later, a new threat for Washington emerged in the form of Al-Qaeda (AQ), after the US embassies of Kenya and Tanzania were targeted by the group in 1998. As a follow, and in response to the 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre, the US launched the War on Terror which would permanently re-configure the region. The US returned to the Horn of Africa to set up its first military base in Djibouti to observe arms exchange and the movement of foreign groups in what they deemed a corridor of terrorism of the Sahel, spanning from Senegal eastward to Sudan. Fleeing militants from fighting in Afghanistan from the 1970s, via recuperation in Sudan, began settling in their native North and West Africa cementing their threat in the continent (Yasmina14).

In 2003, the kidnapping of over 30 tourists, headed by an Algerian army veteran, Amari Saifi, provoked the Pan-Sahel Initiative, where the US invested equipment and intelligence in Chad, Mali, Niger and Mauritania. The initiative was expanded in 2005 into the more robust Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Programme (TSCP) where Sahelian state security apparatuses would be trained by the US in order to do undertake their own counterterrorism exercises and develop intelligence useful to the US fight against terrorism. The perceived success of the organization gave birth to another American military initiative in 2007, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), which would allow the US to be better placed to monitor and patrol the continent and consolidate its correlated interests of counterterror initiatives and regional influence. Like France, the US presence in Africa needed a guise by which a desired long-term stay could be justified. Counterterrorism was the perfect guise needed to not only fulfill its security needs but to also maintain access to Africa's riches which France, China and others also sought dominance over. The looming energy crisis stipulated in the Dick Cheney report reiterated the strategic importance of ensuring control over Africa's oil, minerals, land and even water under the desert ( Shivit 45).

The 9/11 attacks gave the United States a green light to use the events as a shadow for intervening in other countries under the name of fighting terrorism. Furthermore, Al-Para's kidnapping of the 32 hostages became Defense's core justification for expanding US military presence in the Sahel. Wald (USAF), Deputy Commander of EUCOM, called the kidnapping a "blessing in disguise." The release of the last of the hostages was mediated by Mali's President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT). After the end of the hostage crisis in August 2003, Gen. Wald called the defense chiefs of the PSI countries and other regional states to a meeting at EUCOM headquarters in Stuttgart. In a two-day meeting with heads of the armed forces of seven Maghrebi and Sahelian states, Wald and his conferees discussed coordination of their anti-terrorist efforts. Further motivation for US involvement in the Sahelian countries, if any was needed, was provided by the fact that Al-Para used the ransom money he

collected for the release of the hostages to buy arms in the Algeria-Mali border area. The massive expansion and evolution of United States security cooperation under the auspices of the 'war on terror' remains overlooked in the counterterrorism and interventions literature. The Sahel provides a useful region in which to explore the constitutive effects of such cooperation and its evolution because the US has always pursued an 'economy of force' mission there. The indirect intervention by the United States to build the capacity of local forces in Mali, where jihadists were based, failed because of the dissonant relationship between the two countries. This led the United States to intervene more directly in the region, including through its cooperation with and support for French and Nigerien forces. The nature of this more direct military intervention was also informed by evolving US experiences working by, with and through partner forces in other parts of the world. The War on Terror has become a convenient excuse war for a monopoly over the continents' vast reserves between old and new powers to ensure their future in a world of shrinking resources (Stephen 23).

After 2011, Militant groups in southern Libya revived ties to northern Niger and the insurgency in the region following the Tuareg rebellion over the economic marginalization in the neglected north was soon underway. The rebellion was opportunitized by AQIM and other extremist groups to perpetuate conditions conducive to radicalization which has been a strategy also adopted by Daesh in utilizing local vulnerabilities to deter national development and stimulate terrorism apparatuses in sectors like arms trade (Canada Service, 2016) Congress appropriated \$7.75 million to train special armed forces units in the target countries to resist terrorism. Ultimately some 1,200 troops received training in the four Sahelian countries In North Africa, Libya represents the most insecure nation due inter alia to its porous land and maritime borders, unstable political institutions following the collapse of Gaddafi's regime, and the rise in the number of foreign fighters reinforcing indigenous extremist groups and militias. In January 2015, for instance, Daesh established a jihad training

ground around Sirte, making profits of the country's instability and lack of unified government. Moreover, the "Islamic State of the Tripoli Province" (ISTP) was reportedly involved in the major assault in Tripoli with a high cost in human lives among Libyans and foreigners. The attack was apparently undertaken as a revenge for the 2013 arrest of Abu Anas al-Libi by American commandos. Libi, an al-Qa'ida key operative, was accused of involvement in the 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people. He died in a New York hospital while awaiting trial (Yonah 24).

In Mali, similar insistent instability in the war-torn northern part of the country underscored the continuing ambiguity even three years after French forces recaptured the major cities and some of the territory in the north that had been seized by al-Qa'ida affiliate groups. During early 2015, civilians were abused and killed, government forces targeted, and African members of a U.N. peacekeeping mission were attacked by militants. Other security concerns continued throughout the year. Al-Qa'ida fighters, the nomadic and ethnic minority, and unidentified armed men engaged in low-level attacks as well as in more detailed operations against civilians, Malian forces, and UN convoys and barracks. Additionally, Ansar Dine killed 11 Malian soldiers at an outpost, an outspoken critic of militant Islam was gunned down by unidentified assailants, and three French special forces were injured in landmine blast in northern Mali. To be sure, the most dramatic, sophisticated, and costly assault in 2015 took place in Bamako, Mali's capital, when armed members of al-Mourabitoun, an al-Qa'ida affiliated group, seized the luxury Radisson Blu Hotel. Some 170 guests and staff members were held hostage and some 27 people were killed, including an American aid worker and a member of the Belgian Parliament. (Yonah 26)

Two factors contribute to Mali's lingering instability. First, the failure of the government to find suitable political solutions for its internal security concerns. And second, the continuing flow of combatants and weapons from Libya. In the face of these challenges,

eleven Africa countries are contributing forces, however modest, to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Moreover, it is also encouraging that the international community has expanded its regional efforts to combat terrorism through the endeavors of the Sahel Multilateral Planning Group that includes the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Italy.

Numerous analysts in France and in the Maghreb suggest –and worry– that the United States is showing too much interest in the Maghreb and that it wishes to displace French influence in the area. But what is really happening? What are US interests in the Maghreb? Is it true that the United States aspires to eliminate French and European influence in the region? Is it also true that the United States, through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Millennium Challenge Account seeks to undermine the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process)? The principal assumption in this Working Paper is that the United States is undeniably interested in the area, which has become of strategic importance since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. However, although American interest in the Maghreb is real enough, it is less ambitious and less worrying for European interests, France’s in particular, than one may be led to believe. In fact, transatlantic relations in the area are more complementary than competitive. (yahia57)

Libyan politicians, police, military personnel, clergymen, educators, journalists, business people, women, children, and others have been victimized. Additionally, an unprecedented number of foreigners residing, working, or visiting Libya have been specifically selected as targets. Some of the incidents include the abduction and killing of dozens of Coptic Egyptian workers, the capture of Indian medical staff, and the bombings of various embassies and firing on diplomatic convoys. By early 2016, it became apparent that Libya has become a major base for Daesh, with reportedly some 5,000 fighters. What is also a particular concern is that the chaotic environment in Libya threatens to export instability

elsewhere in Africa and beyond. In fact, it has been established that several groups are controlling the exodus of those fleeing war zones across the Mediterranean to Italy. It is not surprising therefore that the United States and its European allies are currently involved in a multilateral security effort to support a Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) to stabilize the country and bring its borders under control. Algeria and Tunisia are particularly concerned with the spillover. Algeria has assigned thousands of its troops to guard its eastern border against infiltration, and Tunisia has built a perimeter wall along its border with Libya to protect against terrorists and smugglers (Yonah 31).

#### **4. Hostages**

The Sahara has long been a venue of human trafficking. For much of the last millennium this trafficking was in the form of the trans-Saharan slave trade, known since classical times. When the great markets for slaves dried up in the New World and the Middle East in the nineteenth century, human trafficking in the Sahara continued in the form of the Tamasheq and Bidan enslavement of farming peoples along the Niger River. These captives were transported into the Sahara to do agricultural work and domestic. These slaves served their masters throughout the Sahara and in the Sahel. This traffic obtained, of course, during the era of the trans-Saharan slave trade as well, as many of the slaves were trafficked to the Sahara rather than across it. The present-day trafficking of labor migrants is an outgrowth of this earlier traffic in slaves from the Niger bend to the Sahara and sometimes beyond. A significant difference between the slave trade of the pre-colonial and colonial eras and the labor migrant trafficking of today is that modern labor migrants are not captured in raids, but rather are forced by economic conditions to undertake the arduous and dangerous trip across the desert to seek work either in the Saharan towns or in the cities of North Africa and sometimes Europe. The number of labor-seeking migrants from West Africa transiting the Sahara increased in the early 1990s, at which time an “integrated migration system” developed in the central Sahara. A vast support industry for this tide of migration has

appeared, especially in Niger, but also in southern Algeria. It includes restaurants, money changers, and telephone communication services, in addition to the ghettos. In Tamanrasset, a city that has no industry, whose economy rests on trade and tourism, including migration, there is a strong presence of Sahelian Africans as well as migrants from the cities of West and Central Africa. Of those who never make it to Europe, Libya and Algeria were the most important countries where West Africans could find work. Libya was the most popular North African destination country because of its large GDP. But that situation changed with the fall of the Qaddafi regime in October of 2011. The majority of labor migrants are young men seeking work either in the Saharan towns or in North Africa or Europe. Of those who do make it to Europe, many find work as street vendors in tourist destinations; others find menial jobs. Women also make the arduous journey, often lured by promises of legitimate work as domestics or cooks or waitresses. Many wind up being trafficked into the sex trade in European cities (yahia 43).

Algerian policy have changed over the years through different experiences, U.S.-Algerian ties have grown over the past decade as the United States has increasingly come to view Algeria as a key partner in countering Al Qaeda-linked groups in North and West Africa. Algeria is also a significant source of petroleum for the United States and of natural gas for Europe, and therefore a destination for U.S. investment. Congress appropriates and oversees small amounts of bilateral development assistance and receives notification of arms sales, and Algerian security forces benefit from U.S. cooperation programs. Algeria's political system is dominated by a strong presidency and security apparatus. The country's macroeconomic situation is stable due to high global oil and gas prices, which have allowed Algeria to amass large foreign reserves. Yet Algeria's wealth has not necessarily trickled down, and the pressures of unemployment, high food prices, and housing shortages weigh on many families. Public unrest over political and economic grievances has at times been evident, though other factors appear to have dampened enthusiasm for dramatic political

change. It is unclear whether reforms initiated in 2011 amid the “Arab Spring” have the potential to alter the deeper power dynamics within the opaque politico-military elite networks that Algerians refer to as *Le Pouvoir* (the powers-that-be). Algeria’s foreign policy has often conflicted with that of the United States. Strains in ties with neighboring Morocco continue, due to the unresolved status of the Western Sahara and a rivalry for regional influence, although signs of a thaw emerged in 2011. Relations with former colonial power France remain complex and volatile. The legacy of Algeria’s anti-colonial struggle contributes to Algerian leaders’ desire to prevent direct foreign intervention, their residual skepticism of French and NATO intentions, and Algeria’s positions on regional affairs, including a non-interventionist stance toward the uprising in Syria and an ambivalent approach to external military intervention in Mali. (Alexis 01)

## **5. The Extremists Radicalists Thought**

The path that some individuals take to a point at which they may be willing to kill others and they in the name of Islam is today’s most pressing security concern. It is a journey that is still too poorly understood despite dozens of theoretical models and profile studies. What is clear is that there is no such thing as a typical terrorist, and no such thing as a typical journey into terrorism. The journey into terrorism is often described as a process of ‘radicalization’. However, to be a radical is to reject the status quo, but not necessarily in a violent or even problematic manner. The process of radicalization is obviously a problem when it leads to violence, and most obviously to al-Qaeda inspired terrorism. But the last decade in particular has also seen a growth in many types of nonviolent radicalization. A successful counter terrorism strategy must be based on a clear understanding of these distinct forms of radicalization. Separating different types of radicalization is not an easy task. There is an overlap in the ideologies and goals of many radical groups and individuals

including Islamist groups, religious conservative movements, and ultraorthodox organizations and individuals. Differentiating between these types of radicalizations is extremely important because targeting the wrong people can breed resentment and alienation, and erode the very freedoms Western governments want to preserve. Violent radicals are clearly enemies of liberal democracies; but non-violent radicals might sometimes be powerful allies (Jamie et al 07).

Radicals refused to defend violent jihad in the West as religiously obligatory, acceptable or permitted. The same was true of the young Muslim sample. Young Muslims rejected al-Qaeda's message and often use simple, catchy sayings from the Qur'an or Hadith to express that rejection. However, there was widespread support among radicals and young Muslims for Iraqi and Afghan people 'defending themselves' from 'invaders', framed in the language of self defense, just war and state sovereignty. Furthermore, Western Muslims travelling abroad to fight was not seen as obligatory, or something to be encouraged, but neither was it denounced outright: this is a difficult grey area for many. Muslims who supported violent 'resistance' to forces in Afghanistan or Iraq cannot and should not be put in the same radical category as those who support the use of violence within Western borders. There are potential allies among radicals who denounce terrorism at home, but support the principle of violent Jihad overseas as a natural extension of just war theory. Nonetheless, individuals who travel overseas to actually take part in military operations will, and should, remain of concern to security services because of the potential skills, training, contacts and credibility they could bring back with them. It is possible to conclude that radicals did not see Islam as a pacifistic religion but rather a religion based on justified violence, much like the other Abrahamic religions and the long tradition of just war theory. Crucially, this idea found resonance among the young Muslim sample, with implications for more effective communications (Jamie et al 11).

The spread and acceptance of radical or violent ideas can be helpfully conceived as a social epidemic, because whether an individual comes to accept such ideas depends on how far their peers do and the extent to which they are seen as worthy of imitation. An increasingly important part of Al Qaeda's appeal in the West is its dangerous, romantic and counter-cultural characteristics. This aspect is often overlooked, but has important and difficult implications for how to tackle it. Becoming a terrorist was not always a natural or linear progression from being a radical. Those who turned to violence often followed a path of radicalization which was characterized by a culture of violence, in-group peer pressure, and an internal code of honor where violence can be a route to accruing status (Jamie et al 12). Certain signs of radicalization to violence are visible from this vantage point, for example: distribution of jihad videos, clashes with existing mosque authorities, debates between 'doers' and 'talkers', deep engagement in literature that explains how to determine a kafir and what is permissible once you know, and any criminal activity undertaken in this respect. These manifestations are potentially useful indicators for local police agencies, community leaders and members, and public servants involved in working to prevent radicalization to violence. Terrorism and radicalism in the community unsurprisingly, individuals considering violence often existed on the fringes of the community, especially when they believed violence are religiously obliged, because of their unwillingness to participate in organized groups or institutions and the desire to avoid detection. However, for some people considering violence — either in a cell or not — the credibility and status attached to violent activity motivated them to vocalize their activities and beliefs: there was talk, and it was picked up and argued over at the community level. This puts a high premium on community intelligence. Indeed, there was a strong sense that Muslim communities were undertaking self-policing within their own communities. Some in the community, including radicals, have come into contact with individuals contemplating violent acts, and successfully dissuaded

them. Nonetheless, there are limits to what self-policing can achieve, particularly given that future terrorist cells might be more closed following high profile infiltrations ( Jamie et al 12).

The current threat of terrorism and radicalization can be broadly measured by three indicators: the size of the terrorist threat and the importance of a country in the al-Qaeda narrative; the size and activity of radical groups; and the degree of community support. In respect of the immediate terror threat in the countries studied, the UK faces the most severe threat. Arrests for al-Qaeda inspired terrorism for 2007/08 included 231 in the UK, 78 arrests in France, four in the Netherlands and three in Denmark in 2008.<sup>36</sup> In Canada, al-Qaeda background inspired terrorism remains the security service's first security priority, and Canada has been identified repeatedly in Al Qaeda propaganda as a legitimate target because of its involvement in Afghanistan. Authorities are increasingly concerned about the pool of individuals and organizations that might be sympathetic to the goals of terrorists. This includes a growing segment of religious and political groups as well as 'political Islamist' organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami. These groups can be considered both 'radical' in that they seek far-ranging changes to society that are often hostile to core liberal democratic principles, and 'ultra-orthodox' because of the high degree of rigidity in their theological interpretation and their resistance to 'innovations'. The radical, ultra-orthodox element is thought to be between 5 per cent and 15 per cent of the Muslim population in each country in this study. The relationship between radical groups and individuals, and those who commit terrorist acts are unclear. Broadly speaking, there are two opinions. It is being said that radical groups even when non-violent provide an environment of intolerance that gives the inspiration and tacit support for terrorist activity and serves as a ground for recruiting. On the other hand, equally large non-violent radicals provide an important buttress against violent action and are best able to stop individuals getting involved in terrorist activity. This argument is difficult to resolve, because it is rarely based on actual evidence. In reality, as this paper argues below, both are taking place simultaneously. Among

the broader population, the greater the community sympathy, the easier it is for conspirators to avoid detection. The extent of this sympathy and what role it actually plays is unclear.(Jamie et al 23).

Jihadism in Algeria dates back to the 1980s. Between 2001 and 2012, 938 terrorist attacks took place within its borders (Ammour20). While the Algerian government has traditionally taken a hard-line approach against terrorism, this strategy appears to have had limited success in recent years, due to a lack of cooperation with neighboring countries and due to the changing nature of the threat. One of the main reasons for the fragmented regional response to AQIM and other Islamist groups, is the inability of regional governments to detect the enemy. MUJAO has also carried out a number of attacks in Algeria. Much of the literature emphasizes the fact that AQIM is increasingly being viewed as a criminal organization rather than just being viewed through the Islamist terrorist lens. It is necessary to differentiate between AQIM in northern Algeria and AQIM in the Sahel. AQIM is currently divided into separate cells, with a northern cell based in Kabylia and the Algiers hinterland, and two southern cells operating in the Sahel. According to the UCDP, this split became more obvious in 2011. The northern factions of the group have remained more focused on the struggle against the Algerian government and their aim of establishing an Islamic caliphate, while the southern cells have increasingly turned to criminal activity (Spencer47).

According to the UCDP, Algeria's geographical features, and the region in which AQIM operates, might be the reasons behind the split, as the Sahara desert separating the different cells makes it difficult for them to coordinate and cooperate. The groups sometimes appear to be acting in competition with one another. The changing nature of AQIM has already had an impact on the regional dynamics of the conflict. Countries in the Sahel are keen to be an obstacle on increasing the process of cooperation between AQIM and other terrorist organizations. Moreover, the northern branch of AQIM has become less important, as the importance of the southern branch has increased (Spencer 56).

Some authors argue that the AQIM ‘phenomenon’ is manipulated by the Algerian regime in order to serve its strategic aims both domestically and in the Sahel. Furthermore, the Algerian authorities deny the fact that there is a connection between AQIM and domestic terrorist groups, they see AQIM as a new type of terrorist organization, which is driven by its extremist ideology, while other governments in the Sahel emphasize the criminal nature of AQIM. AQIM is well-funded because it imposes fee on trans-border drug smuggling and because it regularly kidnaps people for ransom (Boukhars 13). AQIM in Algeria also receives funds from supporters living abroad, especially in Western Europe. A number of sources cite the possibility of links between AQIM and the Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram. One expert argues that the majority of terrorists are not terrorists as a result of their convictions, but due to the money earned. He does however add that Salafism remains a significant threat.

Algeria relies heavily on military force to combat terrorism, however, countries in the wider Sahara-Sahel region see this approach as counterproductive. The hard-line Algerian government approach to extremism has resulted in the internationalization of the conflict. In addition, Algeria has been poor at fighting extremism outside its borders despite having the capacity to do so. Algerians constitute the majority of the leadership of Islamist Jihadist groups in Northern Mali. The Algerian government has focused on negotiating political settlements in Mali rather than opting for military intervention. Consequently, Algerian Islamists moved to Mali, having been forced out of Algeria by the ANP (Algerian National Army) (Anna24).

The transformation of Algerian violent Islamist groups into a regional franchise for terror began over a decade ago when Algerian forces chased Islamist combatants into the southern part of the country. Adding that by 2003, the Islamists had moved into Mali and other countries in the region. It has been suggested that the Algerian secret services might have been happy to support this relocation, which allowed them both to eradicate the problem of armed Islamists at home, and to remind Western governments of the dangers facing the

region. This ensured foreign support for the Algerian government, in spite of its limited democratic credentials (Anna 24).



## CONCLUSION

Terrorism is a phenomenon that has always concerned the international community, Terrorism “from below” has emerged in many different forms and out of such various motivations as religious protest movements, political revolts and social uprisings. It consists of couple or risks and danger aspects that the societies and even states suffer from.it destroyed the heritage and the future of a better peaceful life that guarantees a proper life for the human all over the universe.The sociology of terrorism has been understudied, even though considerable literatures on various forms of social conflict and violence have been produced over the years. The aim here is to note what has been learned about the social origins and dynamics of terrorism in order to suggest agendas for future research.

This research is attempted to investigate what are the real definitions of terrorism that experts did not agree on, the nature and the source from which it is originated in the first place, the causes that lead a group of humans follow a trend of destroying and killing and spreading fear under the flag of religion or policy. At first, a general overview is given on terror and terrorism and different examples from different states. The first chapter tackled the Algerian experience with terror and how “the black decade” as it is called left a huge effect on the memory and the future of Algerians. Moreover, an investigation is made on how the organization of Al Qaida developed from Algerian Islamism to international terror. In addition to this, the Algerian government fights for keeping the boarders security and protecting its lands from any external threats those different terrorist groups are practicing.

The events of 9/11 represent a turning point in the history of the world, the next part tackles how the united states changed the map of the war against terrorism around the world, and how these events created a chance for the states to become closer and cooperate with

different countries under the name of fighting terror and terrorists and create a new opportunity for people to regain their freedom again.

In the second chapter of this research, an overview on the nature of the American Algerian cooperation in the field of fighting terror is undertaken. The evolvement of the relationship between the two countries and the nature of the cooperation through history, and how the attacks of 9/11 gave an opportunity to the united states to revise and correct that connection with Algeria in specific and the whole world in general. Furthermore, how the Sahel region represents a real threat to the security of Algeria since the latter is the biggest country in North Africa and is surrounded by the most problematic countries like Mali and Libya, investigating the different approaches of fighting terror and its position towards the initiatives from different countries like the United States and France in the region. The next title tackles the hostages policy and how the Algerian government deal with cases of kidnaping for ransom and the way it solves this issues with the minimum of risks. And lastly the extremists radicalist thought and how terrorist manage to be gathered in groups and organization while they follow a path of violence and destruction of lands, civilizations, the taking of freedoms and stealing the past and the future of the human being.

What is understood from the phenomena of terror is that it is an umbrella of destruction and violence, it is a real threat for the providing of a peaceful and balanced living for people, however, this phenomena in particular gave an opportunity for the leaders of the world like the united states to intervene in other countries internal businesses which is the case of the post 9/11 attacks period, where the states take over those countries resources and practice manipulations under the name of peace making, and not surprisingly, taking the 9/11 events as a shadow for invasion and stealing natural resources in order to cover the impotence of their economy and build their countries on a stolen base.

The next important result of this research is the Algerian policy considering the international intervention either in its business or other countries businesses like the example of Mali and Libya, even the prohibition of external intervention it does not prohibit intervention when it benefits its interests, the only purpose of the Algerian regime is to keep it reign for the longest time and with maximum gains.

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ملخص

تقوم هذه الأطروحة بمحاولة الاجابة على الأسئلة المتعلقة بطبيعة الحرب على الإرهاب. و البحث في التعاون الجزائري الأمريكي على الرغم من أن لديهم تجارب ووجهات نظر مختلفة. كما تتناول هذه الدراسة الإرهاب بمختلف تعريفاته ومصادره ونتائجه. و تقدم للقارئ لمحة عامة عن التجربة الجزائرية مع الإرهاب منذ حرب الثورة وحتى العشرية السوداء. علاوة على ذلك ، كيف غيرت هجمات الحادي عشر من سبتمبر الخريطة السياسية للسياسة الأمريكية في التعامل مع الصراعات الخارجية والقضايا الداخلية للدول الأخرى كما تتناول هذه الرسالة أيضًا العلاقة الجزائرية الأمريكية بعد أحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر وكيف غيرت هذه الهجمات الإرهابية العلاقة بين البلدين من سوء التفاهم إلى التعاون السياسي والعسكري. وأخيرًا تقوم بالبحث في الأساليب المختلفة لمكافحة الإرهاب في منطقة الساحل وكيف تتعامل الحكومة الجزائرية مع الصراعات ومواكبة الأفكار المتطرفة وافعال المتطرفين بأقل قدر من المخاطر.

#### كلمات مفتاحية:

الارهاب, الحرب على الارهاب, التعاون الامريكى الجزائري, هجمات 11/9, منطقة الساحل.