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***Terrorism Between The Hard Line Approach of Trump and
the Soft Hand Policy of Obama***

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to My beloved parents to whom i appreciate their
help and sepport

My brothers ,my friends

Special thank to every one who supports me

Acknowledgment

All praise to Allah who has helped and guided us along the year to fulfill this work ;thanks to Allah ,the most graceful,the most compassionate and the Almighty, we are able to achieve this success.

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Abstract :

11/9 attacks on the world trade center and the pentagon, this catastrophic event has created a global chaos which led to war on terrorism by America within the two presidential phases, president Barack Obama and Donald Trump, the question of presidential discourse on the over the period of war on it is important, because it is expected to find variation in the presidential narratives in response to changes in context this thesis uses president Obama and Trump as a case study to examine the diplomacy and the approaches used by them and the impact on the middle East countries, creating a new framework for analyzing the policy of Obama and Trump regarding Terrorism, because it is an intriguing by the expected tensions between president Obama and Trump's Terrorism framing, this framework enables scholars to test their assumption that there is a difference between how Obama dealt with the existence of terrorism and how Trump has been fighting ISIS and terrorism.

key words:

11/9attacks - Terrorism - Obama - Trump- middle East countries - ISIS

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General

Introduction

The pace of violent events around the world recently brought new terms such as terrorism, despite the widespread use of this word; the statement of Luis Freilich. The country was not focused on terrorism before September 11th, persuading that these tragic events were one of the turning points in the US external policy that completely changed the perception of security and methods of combating the terrorist threat. Since then the world entered a period of history where a number of terrorist groups has been challenged by superpowers, mostly America. In response to those attacks, former-President Bush and his administration declared the Global War against Terrorism that later was accompanied by different events including US invasion to Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the War on Terror became predominant in the foreign policy of USA and remained crucial even after Bush Presidency.

Nevertheless, the actions of US that aimed to combat terrorism became subject of skepticism among other policy-makers and were frequently criticized. The notion of the War against terror has been changed, when Obama came to power in 2009, and had impact on the interstate relations. Nowadays, USA is considered as one of the key actors in the international relations that is engaged in the number of global conflict resolutions and it can be observed that new President Donald Trump intends to conduct foreign policy that would be similar to policy pursued by George W. Bush and his administration.

The research studies the changes in US foreign policy regarding the fight against terrorism under Bush, Obama and Trump Presidency should be carefully examined and the practical consequences of those policies.

The dissertation mainly takes the new United States policy in Middle East countries and discusses the different diplomacies of Obama and Trump toward terrorism and special attention is paid to this dilemma ending throughout observing which policy of two policies succeeded.

For this reason .the research requires the use of historical analytical approach meaning a method that seeks to make a sense of disciplined and systematic analysis to historical events .in the light of this approach.this study aims at studying the distinctive diplomacies of both two presidents in dealing with terrorism and the traces left on Middle East countries .

The research is divided into three chapters the first is designed to give a background of terrorism as an international phenomena;the second chapter aims to tackle the different policies of Barack Obama and that of Donald Trump toward terrorism .in the third chapter , there is an analysis to the traces of terrorism and the impacts of the two policies left.

Chapter one :
**Background of Terrorism as
an International Phenomenon**

Introduction

Terrorism has become one of the most important current issues that have occupied the whole world so that everyone wants to know its truth and what it is and satisfy their curiosity by scrutinizing everything related to it. In this chapter we will try to give a general background on the history of terrorism as a global phenomenon and also to provide a range of definitions of Terrorism and how much this word is related to violence, in addition to that this chapter deals with us foreign policy regarding terrorism in general using a theory called realism, there is defensive which focusses on security whereas offensive realism its and purpose is gaining power. Moreover this chapter discribes the formation amd the history of both Al-QAEDA **and the 11th September's attacks in the United States**

In terms of targeting, many of the tactical means and methods of modern terrorism have, until relatively recently, followed those utilized between States in their armed conflicts interest. It has been argued specifcally that, a century ago, terrorist codes on targeting victims closely resembled professional military codes, in that they respected the distinction between soldiers and officials on the one hand, and innocent civilians on the other (e.g., the targeted 4 COUNTER-TERRORISM UNIVERSITY MODULE SERIES assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria on 28 June 1914) (Walzer, 1977, pp. 197-234).

This was the case from approximately the mid-nineteenth century onwards, when increasingly industrialized weaponry facilitated a lack of targeting, in the sense that killing the enemy became more indiscriminate and deadly. Te industrialized and indiscriminate means and methods of warfare utilized during the two “total wars” of the twentieth century (e.g., in widespread disregard of the principle of distinction) effectively taught those who would become post-war revolutionary terrorists, and who also would adopt more irregular weapons and forms of fighting, such as urban guerrilla warfare. In the contemporary world, indiscriminate weaponry (e.g., high-

level bombing capacities, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and so on) is a recurring feature.

In terms of terrorist strategy, a useful way to conceptualize the evolution of modern terrorism as a resort to revolutionary violence is provided by David Rapoport's influential concept of the "waves" of terrorism (The Four Waves of Terrorism). For example, one wave is the late nineteenth century/early twentieth century "anarchist wave". Another is the "anti-colonial wave" (starting with the post-World War I political principle of self-determination, e.g., the Aaland Islands arbitration in 1921, and its violent evolution into a legal right after World War II, examples being the Algerian Civil War and the Vietnam War).

What is Terrorism :

The task of defining terrorism is complicated, but absolutely necessary in order to develop a sufficient understanding of this phenomenon and to deal with it effectively. The complexity of defining terrorism has many aspects. It arises from the variety of parties who have used violence to instil terror.

There have also been many different justifications given for the use of this violence (that we may intuitively define as 'terrorism'), and there have been many different interested parties defining terrorism, each having their own views and in many cases vested interests in a particular way of defining 'terrorism'. Therefore, it is not that surprising that there are various definitions of 'terrorism' in existence. In order to define 'terrorism' for the purposes of this study, it is useful to begin with a brief historical insight.

The use of violence with the aim of creating fear in a wider audience in order to prevent various parties from doing something, or, on the contrary, to

coerce them into a certain behaviour, is as old as mankind. Such use of violence has served states and various regimes over a long period of time.

The term ‘terrorism’ originates from Latin word ‘terrere’ that means ‘to frighten’. It obtained its modern form ‘terrorism’ during the Reign of Terror in France from 1793-1794. In Maximilien Robespierre’s words: ‘...terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our country's most urgent needs(Jeffrey Record 2003, p. 6.)

United States Foreign Policy Regarding Terrorism in General : t

General Definition of ‘War On Terror’ (WoT)

The War on Terror (WoT), also known as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), is a metaphor of war referring to the international military campaign that started after the September 11th attacks on the United States. U.S. President George W. Bush first used the term "War on Terror" on 20 September 2001. The Bush administration and the Western media have since used the term to argue a global military, political, legal, and conceptual struggle against both terrorist organizations and against the regimes accused of supporting them. It was originally used with a particular focus on countries associated with Islamic terrorist organizations including al-Qaeda and like-minded organizations.(U.S. Department of State, “The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days”)

President Bush and his party, Republican, are conservative and think national security is the most important and valuable thing. The nations should fight for it whatever the consequences are.

As assessing the threat of terrorism and radical Islam ideology, the US activate intelligent bodies to investigate and protect the national interest such as CIA and NSA.(Dr. Sebastian L. Gorka and Katharine C, Gorka, “ISIS: The Threat to the United States”, Threat Knowledge Group,)

The attacks against America or any potential threat should be vanished and the fear of US government and citizens will always be enlightened on decision making process if peace can't be achieved. Furthermore, the threat which is radical Islamic group, Al-Qaeda, had evolved and the group remain exists with only slightly different ideology and aims. For now, US considered fighting against stronger and well-funded terrorist group called ISIS.

At the beginning of WoT, President Bush built a worldwide coalition and deploy military movement to some areas in middle east alleged terrorist concealment. US was implementing basic

steps:

- Began to destroy al-Qaeda's grip on Afghanistan by driving the Taliban from power.
- Disrupted al-Qaeda's global operations and terrorist financing networks. □
Destroyed al-Qaeda terrorist training camps.
- Helped the innocent people of Afghanistan recover from the Taliban's reign of terror.
- Afghans - including women.

The further implications of War on Terror were military operations such as; Operation Enduring Freedom that caused War in Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedoms, Operation New Dawn and Operation Inherent Resolve. They are all the operation that continues until present.¹³ The technical operation might be different under different administrations, but WoT always requires military forces and sometimes breaching the International Law or Humanitarian Law. WoT by US is performing the human rights protection but only in particular states which is the Americans only and not so good at prioritizing universal human rights outside its border.

A Theory of Foreign Policy (Realism)

Realist emphasize the constraints on politics imposed by human selfishness (egoism) and the absence on international government (anarchy), which require ‘the primacy in all political life of power and security.’ (Gilpin, 1986 in Donley, Jack, “Chapter 2: Realism” in Scott Burchill, et al., Theories of International Relations 3rd eds, (Palgrave Macmillan: 2005)

As the result of there is no higher authority than state, a state that thinks they are superpower does ‘self-proclaim leader’ for all states or ‘police the world’. In understanding foreign policy, realism took their place as the external factors that influence the making of policy of foreign affairs. A lot of things and aspects can form a foreign policy but for realist, they are all not as significant and important as the aspects of distribution of power and national interest.

Defensive Realism

For realist, the national interest for every state at the most minimal level is defense themselves and protect their national security. The idea of defensive realism is the aim or interest of every states is security not power. Power is just a tool to seek for security. (Kenneth Waltz, op.cit.,) This perspective said that the act and behavior of states is motivated by the interest to maintain the status quo.

Defensive realist tends to pursue stability because the world is going to lose control when the shifting of distribution of power or the emergence of new power happens.(Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York, Columbia University Press: 1979)

So, because of the stability goals, defensive realism believes in military necessity and the excessive the use of power like military forces will be counterproductive because it will emerge the adverse alliances.(Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, op.cit., p.145)

From the name, we conceive that defensive realism is doing defensive act as a result of the existence of a threat. The threat is coming from non-state actors which its presence is not significant for the state because what matter for realist is the power of other states. Terrorist groups are profound threat and they are well organized of doing violation of peace so they are no longer insignificant at least for US who already got attacked. In order to protect national security, US took policy that show the world its totality to eradicate terrorism even though that means having to hostile with other states. The aim for defensive realism is always security for its nation and state.

Offensive Realism

Meanwhile, offensive realism has slightly difference with defensive one. Offensive realism said that the purpose of a state is gaining power and states are required to increase its power as big as it can.(Mohammad Rosyidin, op.cit),

The ultimate goals for every state is to become hegemony in international system.(Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, op.cit., p.142)

Concerning the distribution of power, a great power tends to look for opportunities to get more power exceed its own adversaries.(Ibid. p. 147)

A conflict can be an opportunity to dominate. A state who has non-international conflict or civil war is on the verge of becoming fail-state. Being hegemony doesn't have to globally, it could start with becoming regional hegemony and augment alliances everywhere as many as possible dominate certain region and if necessary take over the authority in a fail-state.

The objective of a state is to make itself feared by others so there will no challengers that possibly threaten its national security and interest. This term of realism was so popular while Cold War when the belligerent competed to deploy their influence to the world. Offensive realism is more aggressive than defensive realism because the motive behind it is to become the strongest one so that the state perceives others as a threat or obstacles to its aim that need to be fought. Means, whether it is wrong or right, bad or good the other is, the most important thing is to accentuate each own national interest. Everybody deserves to be tackled. If a state becoming a superpower, then there will be no problem for self-help or self-defense in this anarchical international system.

The Creation of Al-Qaeda

The formation of al-Qaeda cannot be separated from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. During the period of 1973-1978, Afghanistan was governed by Daoud Khan, who ended the monarchical regime, declaring the country a republic. Despite initially having the support of Communists, Daoud Khan began to pivot to the right in 1977, in the light, above all, of a deep recession that was affecting the country. The search for higher external revenue and the decrease in Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviets were two factors that led the Afghan government to open conversations with Iran, encouraged by the U.S., which resulted in US\$2 billion being directed to Kabul over a period of 10 years (EWANS, 2002).

This conjuncture exacerbated the opposition to Daoud Khan, uniting diverse factions of the Communist Party. The final straw for the coup d'état was Daoud Khan's attempt to remove all Communists from the Army, the main institution for controlling the country. As a result, Moscow, afraid of being jettisoned from the political scene in Afghanistan, arranged for the unification of the Communists and the removal of Daoud Khan. Thus, after the assassination of Daoud Khan and his entire family, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan emerged between April 27-30, 1978.

From its beginning, the new government initiated several reforms inspired by the Soviet model, with the intention to modernize the country. The new laws, however above all, those pertaining to marriage and agrarian reform — were not well- received by the population, and any demonstration of opposition or dissatisfaction was brutally put down by the government (COLL, 2004).

The year of 1979 was the stage for other important events in the Middle East as well. The Iranian Revolution happened in January, deposing Shah Reza Pahlavi and installing a Shiite theocracy in the country. In November, an attempt to capture the Great Mosque of Mecca by groups opposed to the Al Saud monarchy marked the first big revolt against the Saudi government since its establishment. In light of this international juncture — it was feared that Afghanistan could be on the path to an eventual Iranian solution — and fearing the domestic collapse of the Communist regime in Kabul, the USSR invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 (SAIKAL, 2004).

The presence of a foreign power on Afghan soil was an important catalyst for the formation of a resistance. Despite the geopolitical interests involved in weakening the presence of the USSR in the region (above all, the U.S. and countries such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) (COLL, 2004), there was symbolism around this occasion. It had to do with a Communist state invading a Muslim country, providing airs of war to the defense of Islam. As a result, in

August 1988, during a private meeting in the city of Peshawar, bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abdullah Azzam⁹ founded al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda had the purpose of channeling combatants and funds to the Afghan resistance but, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, it began to accompany the struggles of Muslims around the world, including rebellions against regimes considered apostates (BYMAN, 2015a)¹⁰.

After the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. However, he found U.S. troops who had been installed there since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, an act he considered unacceptable because it implied the presence of foreigners in sacred Muslim lands. This was how his already-explicit opposition to the

U.S. increased, as well as his antagonism to the Saudi regime, and it led him to get involved with groups opposed to the Al Saud monarchy. As a result of these acts, bin Laden became a 'persona non grata' in the country, with exile (initially in Sudan, between approximately 1991 and 1992) the only option remaining for him (COLL, 2004).

In Sudanese territory, bin Laden and al-Qaeda found the essential conditions to develop the group by means of an agreement with Sudan's government. On the one hand, through his personal fortune, bin Laden contributed to the construction of infrastructure projects in Sudan. On the other hand, the Sudanese government provided them with, for example, training camps and other conditions for their operations (MIGAUX, 2007). The honeymoon between Khartoum and al-Qaeda, however, did not last very long, because bin Laden's activities began to draw the attention of the Persian Gulf monarchies. Therefore, Middle Eastern countries' pressure on Sudan increased, particularly for bin Laden's expulsion. With the imposition of international sanctions in 1996, the

Sudanese government saw no other option but to ask bin Laden and his comrades to leave the country (BYMAN, 2015a).

Al-Qaeda's next destination was Afghanistan, at the time dominated by the Taliban regime. According to Stern and Bergen (2015, p. 179), al-Qaeda subordinated itself, at least formally, to the Taliban through a commitment agreed to by bin Laden and Mullah Omar, the Taliban's leader at the time. At the beginning of 1997, the Taliban authorized the opening of training camps in Afghanistan for al-Qaeda's use. Estimates highlight that between 10,000 and 20,000 volunteers were trained after bin Laden gained control of those spaces (9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, 2004, p. 67). This aid, however, was not free: US\$20-30 million of al-Qaeda's annual pre-9/11 budgets would fill the Taliban's coffers every year (BYMAN, 2015a, p. 22).

After the 9/11 attacks, the pressure on the Taliban to turn over bin Laden increased extraordinarily. In response to the regime's refusal to do so, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched on October 7, 2001. On November 13, 2001, the Taliban fell, but neither its main leaders nor bin Laden were found. It is estimated that al-Qaeda lost at least 80% of its members and training camps (BYMAN, 2015a, p. 42). However, even though its capacity to act was harmed, al-Qaeda played prominent roles in other terrorist attacks, particularly an attack on a synagogue in Tunisia, an explosion in a nightclub in Bali (both in 2002), explosions in train stations in Madrid in 2004, and metro stations in London in 2005. Finally, in May 2011, bin Laden was assassinated by U.S. troops in Abbottabad, Pakistan, bumping al-Zawahiri up to the top of al-Qaeda.

1.4 History of Terrorist Attacks in United States of America

The history of terror attacks in the USA began long before 9/11. The United States, as one of the world's leaders in economic and political spheres, was always one of the major targets for international terrorism (Korolev, 2007). The

reason for this is the powerful political influence of the USA and its economic interests all over the world. Due to cultural differences, economic reasons, etc. not all societies - ethnical and social groups - perceive such an influence as “fair competition”. Moreover, democratic values are not positively treated in such societies. Thus, there are several factors which could push international terrorist groups to react in such a violent way. Among them, clashes in cultural differences, economic and ideological influences of the “Western World” with the US to the forefront, disbelief in democratic values based on strong and sometimes radical religious influences, etc. (Goodrich, 2001).

International terrorism is quite a powerful political tool. During the rise of international terrorist activities in the mid-eighties, it significantly affected US tourist outflow. In 1986, over 28 million US tourists traveled abroad and 162 people were killed in numerous terror acts (although mostly in Europe and Middle East regions). These circumstances influenced two million Americans to change their travel plans in favor of other destinations. This change resulted in a 30% decrease in people traveling to Europe in 1986 (Boger, Varghese and Rittapirom, 2005).

Prior to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, the US had experienced three big terrorist attacks - the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and a bomb explosion in Atlanta during the Olympic Games in 1996. The resonance of these attacks was so overwhelming that the US government began to realize the severity of such a national-level threat, and this resulted in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and which was adopted by the US government in 1996 as a measure to combat terrorism. The national security system was revamped and has since become much more advanced (Soenmez, 1998).

The 9/11 Terrorist Attack and its Immediate Impact on Tourism

Terrorist Attack

On 11 September 2001, 19 terrorists on a suicide mission took over control of 4 passenger airplanes and used it as bombs on several targets in the United States. Two of the airplanes were used in an attack on the “Twin Towers” of the World Trade Center in New York, resulting in their total destruction. Another airplane was crashed into the Pentagon, the Headquarters of the US Ministry of Defense. The fourth plane crashed near Pittsburgh without hitting any particular target (possibly due to some resistance from crew members and passengers). This tragedy took the lives of 2,973 people (Goodrich, 2001). The attacks can be considered as one of the most horrible and tragic terrorist acts in the history of humankind due to the number of irreplaceable losses, as well as the level of impact it had globally. The cumulative loss in terms of rebuilding was estimated at 105 billion US dollars in 2001 (Goodrich, 2001).

The day after the attacks, the UN Security Council passed resolution # 1368/2001 and following that resolution # 1373/2001, condemning this terrible terrorist act. The international terrorist organization al-Qaida took responsibility for the attack. It became clear that in order to symmetrically react to such new challenges the frames of international legislation norms had to be expanded. Until the 9/11 attacks, the legitimate use of force was possible in two cases - self- defense as stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter, and upon obtaining agreement from the United Nations Security Council. It has since become clear that these measures are not dynamic enough to adequately respond to threatening challenges such as international terrorism.

First shock and immediate economic consequences

With regard to the negative impact the 9/11 terrorist attacks had on the tourism industry, one needs to emphasize two time scales of this impact, i.e. the long

and short-term timelines. If one looks at the short-term effect, it is evident that the world tourism industry suffered a severe downturn of over 10% (Belau, 2003), in the first few months following the attacks. In some countries such as Egypt this figure was even close to 30%. These figures would be even higher had world tourism not experienced a 3.8% increase in 2001 which created a kind of a buffer to balance out the economic downturn during the time of the crises. These losses have resulted in over 6 million jobs gone, or 8.6%, in the tourism industry worldwide, or every 12th employee in the industry had lost his/her job by the end of 2002 (Belau, 2003). It took up to one year to observe the peak effect on the tourism labor market.

Generally, the biggest losses were experienced in the Americas and Middle East countries. In particular, the United States had the worst downturn in tourist arrivals - a loss of 6.8% in 2002, a significant number considering that just in the last quarter of 2001 they experienced a loss of around 22.6% (Belau, 2003). During the same last quarter, many other global travel and tourism players reported severe losses in tourists arrivals: Canada (-19%), Mexico (-24%), Germany (- 17%), Austria (-9%), the Dominican Republic (-25%), Egypt (-55%), the United Kingdom (- 12%), Australia (-21%), etc. (Blake and Sinclair, 2002). It has become clear that these dramatic terrorist attacks affected tourists` decisions to rather visit countries which were far away from the North America region. The second conclusion is that Muslim countries suffered heavily in terms of tourists` inflow. Finally, we can see that countries such as Canada or Mexico, which are highly dependant on US travelers, also faced similarly severe difficulties.

In contrast, some countries continued to gain a higher number of tourists. Among them: Turkey (+12%), Croatia (+12%), Bulgaria (+14%), etc. (Blake and Sinclair, 2002). One of the reasons for these statistics can be that international tourists (mostly European tourists) redirected their goals towards

the Mediterranean region which were of benefit to the tourism industries of Mediterranean countries. It can be explained by the fact that 80% of European tourists (2001) and intra-region tourists easily opted for totally new destinations (Hamarneh and Steiner, 2004).

If one compares tourist arrival statistics by world geographical regions in 2001 and 2000, the following picture emerges (Evans and Elphick, 2005):

- Africa: -1.4%
- Americas: -20%
- East Asia/Pacific: -4%
- Europe: -6.5%
- Middle East: -20%
- South Asia: -24%

Based on these statistics we may conclude that the Americas (mostly the US) were some of the biggest losers due to the terrorist acts in this region. Middle East countries lost nearly the same amount of arrivals as a result of the initial reaction to the terror attacks by the Western world and the mass media, as well as the potential threat of a similar terrorist act happening in the near future. The European situation can be perceived as average to good compared to the first two regions discussed. A real surprise is the South Asia region, topping the international tourist arrivals losers list. Due to significant arrival losses in North America and the Middle East one could assume that this market would become an attractive opportunity to those international tourists who rethought their travel destinations. Obviously, a great concern for safety in air transportation in 2001 played such a dominant role in the decision making process of tourists that it culminated in a lose-lose situation for most of the biggest international tourism markets.

United States tourism industry's immediate losses

The United States is the world's largest tourism market (Gut and Jarrell, 2007). The US tourism industry reported a 2 billion US dollar loss in the first two weeks after the terrorist act. The employment rate fell by 5%. Domestic airlines lost over 100 million US dollars. The severe drop in tourism expenditure resulted in a GDP loss of 27.27 billion dollars (Blake and Sinclair, 2002). During the post attack period, the 2001-2002 US tourism labor market suffered 335,000 job losses, whereas 141,000 jobs were lost in accommodation and 93,000 in air travel sectors simultaneously (Blake and Sinclair, 2002).

If one analyzes the negative impact on various sectors of the US domestic tourism industry (change from base) one will see that, logically, air transportation and hotel sectors experienced the heaviest losses of 5 billion US dollars and 5.9 billion US dollars respectively (Blake and Sinclair, 2002), (Table 3). The sector least affected is the entertainment and leisure sector - 0.2 billion US dollars.

The entire industry showed a cumulative loss of 34% in September-October 2001 (Blake and Sinclair, 2002). Total economic harm to the US was close to 5 billion US dollars. Tourists' influx to the United States from some major US supplier countries by the end of 2001 reduced by almost half (Brazil (-49%), Germany (-46%), Japan (-45%) and (Belau, 2003). The overall drop in tourist influx has resulted in a consequent accommodation sector decline of 6.5% (Belau, 2003).

Trips abroad from the US declined from 60.9 million (2000) to 54.2 million departures (2003). Partially, this figure shows that a certain percentage of domestic travelers substituted international travel with domestic trips.

However, one should not forget the situation in the United States was economically far from perfect. Various economic problems such as the Enron oil company collapse resulted in a cumulative loss of 7 trillion US dollars (Boger, Varghese and Rittapirom, 2005). The US Federal Government had great difficulties in reducing the budget deficit. The terrorist act worked as a crisis catalyst which revealed economic problems and a lack of financial resources, as well as state security problems.

Conclusion :

Terrorism, this threatening phenomena has its history and reasons to appear which have been discussed above has brought the world into chaos many terrorist attacks took place in a short time, however America did not stand watching what's happening after what happened to it, but took decisions and followed strict foreign policies to reduce the occurrence of these problems again.

Chapter two :
The differences between
Obama and Trump's
Approaches towards
Terrorism

Introduction

Terrorism is considered as threat to United States Foreign policy because it influenced the ground upheavals.

this delimma has adopted different strategies and system to fight and to preserve the interests of the Americans

Thus ,the coming of Barack Obama has increased the United States the ability of taking the righteous decisions on both international and internal systems . and how the comming of Donald Trump has impacted in attempting to cover the United States issues sharply .this chapters takles different approaches of both presidents has adopted as a way to fight terrorism.

War on Terror has experienced evolution and it did evolve depends on who's the leader of the administration. Since the declaration of WoT, US been under three different administrations. The concern and emphasize between these regarding foreign policy of WoT are also different. Security sometimes is so important but sometimes is not primary. It is better not the only one reference to serve foreign policy to set healthy relation among nations.

WoT under President Barack Obama Administration

The very first presidential visit of Obama was to Egypt and gave a speech at University of Cairo. Obama hoped to reset the US relationship with the Muslim of the world by ending the worst excesses of the 'Global War on Terror' and standing up new forms of public engagement with Muslim leaders and populations. He succeeded in some of these efforts, but failed at the most symbolically important issue when he could not close the Guantanamo Bay prison camp. He used offshore forms of military power and pulled away other military intervention that US did in middle east. For two periods of his presidency, US withdrawal domination and idea of democratic politics been intensified.

The way he leads and run US role prioritized only at diplomacy as the most effective ways and negotiation rather than deploy military forces in a country who has terrorist in it. The prioritize shifted but on the issue about Palestine-Israeli conflict, US steadily support Israel. 'The New Beginning' from Obama makes US with softer look pursue its national interest. Obama portrayed the US in the defensive realism who acknowledged the excessiveness of War on Terror by his predecessor and implemented military necessity and war as the last resort proceeded by diplomatic and negotiating way first.

WoT under President Donald Trump Administration

When he spoke in his electoral campaign and his political rhetoric, Trump critics Obama Administration a lot. A psychologist investigated Trump and find out he has narcissism, disagreeableness and grandiosity type of personality. This is how we can predict the Trump possible presidency will contain egoism and social dominant manner. (Dan P. McAdams, op.cit., p.3) Different from Obama who came from Democratic party, Trump who comes from Republican party and so his inner circle will determine more aggressive acts on War on Terror. Trump has backtracked on his position on deporting all illegal immigrants living in the US, and on banning all Muslims for entering the country.(Giovanni Grevi,p.7) "Lost in Transition? US Foreign Policy from Obama to Trump", European Policy Centre Discussion Paper, 2016, (pdf.)

He said that US under Obama Administration has wasted so many efforts, money and power to something that do not benefit US. So, the policy of Trump will be 'America First' as a vision with deep nationalist. US will pull back from international engagement and stabilizing national security.(Ibid.) The definition of US interest will be narrower and the basic needs like security for US will be guaranteed. The emphasis is US itself, so that's going to explain Trump's determination to 'make America great again' as one of his famous campaign slogan. The term 'great' is associated with the power and domination of US. It

looks offensive realism moreover when it is featured with the military power priority under Trump Administration. It is not to participate in conflict settlement nor to protect US allies' national security but the military will be prepared

Obama Approaches Towards Terrorism: both president Donald Trump and Barack Obama used different strategies and approaches in fighting terrorism and countering the chief threat for US which is Islamic terrorism and ISIS.

US Middle East Policy: Bush and Obama in Perspectives

President George W. Bush took over the White House in January 2001 with no significant foreign policy commitments or priorities but was surrounded by a group of close associates who were better known as neoconservatives (henceforth neocons). He started his presidency with an inward-looking domestic policy focused on issues like tax cuts, educational reforms, the “No Child Left Behind Act,” etc. One important foreign policy issue he took serious interest in was the ballistic missile defense program.(Melvyn P: 2013, pp. 190-191) However, the major change in his foreign policy came after the notorious 9/11 attacks that not only changed America but the whole world forever. A new foreign policy was immediately announced as dividing the world along “friends versus foes lines,” with unforeseen implications for the post-war world order.(Ken Booth and Tim Dunne: 2006, pp. 539-552.) The neocons used the attacks to justify efforts to promote America’s global supremacy and to reorder other societies along American ideological and political lines, particularly societies in the Middle East. Salient to US foreign policy towards the Middle East, this new ideology eventually drew up a dividing line between the Muslim world and the US. The attacks soon resulted in a new foreign policy prescription, which President Bush dubbed “the war on terrorism,” initially directed against the al-Qaeda network based in Afghanistan and extended to Iraq. Bush interpreted the 9/11 attacks as an existential threat posed by the Islamic fundamentalist

group al-Qaeda, viewed it as a fight between good and evil forces, and declared his intention to rid the world of these evil forces.(Michael Boyle: 2004, pp. 81-103) The “war on terrorism” was planned to be fought overseas and would target all organizations and states that supported al-Qaeda terrorists. In his address to the American people delivered on September 11th, 2001 Bush categorically said: “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them”.(George W. Bush:September11,2001) This is what soon came to be known Bush Doctrine”.(Robert Jervis: 2003, pp. 365-388)

Major strategic objectives, operational targets and plans of the Bush Doctrine were laid out in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, issued in September 2002. It defined threats to freedom as primarily coming from non-state actors through a combination of “radicalism and technology,” which was a marked departure from the traditional idea of security defined as immunity to external military threats. The National Security Strategy identified three sources of threat agents: terrorist groups with no specific people or state to defend but are able to strike any country anywhere, states that provide refuge to terrorists, and rogue states that kill their own peoples and try to acquire weapons of mass destructions (WMD) to hold other states hostages. The reference to rogue states indicated a possible expansion of the frontier of the war on terror to include states hostile to America. In his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush referred to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as members of “an axis of evil,” hostile states that collaborated with terrorists and were posing serious threats to American security and prosperity.(George W. Bush: January 29, 2002)

Bush’s war on terror officially started on October 7th, 2001 with large-scale military assaults on Afghanistan to eliminate al-Qaeda and its protector-the Taliban government. Having the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces driven out of Kabul, President Bush directed efforts to include Iraq in his campaign against

global terrorism on the grounds that the late Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had possessed WMD that threatened America and that he maintained close links to terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda.(George W. Bush: October 7, 2002) He defied global opposition, bypassed the UN Security Council, and unilaterally decided to invade Iraq on March 3rd, 2003 with the support of the so-called “coalition of the willing” but ultimately ended up with no WMD found in Iraq. The Iraq Survey Group, appointed by the Bush administration itself to seek biological and chemical weapons, finally concluded that US WMD intelligence on Iraq was wrong. Moreover, no link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda was ever proven. Bush’s second term in office started in January 2005 and this time he exclusively shifted his attention away from WMD to democracy promotion in Iraq, an elusive goal that he never achieved. Initially, his administration used the rhetorical slogans of freedom and liberty for the Iraqi people in the run up to the invasion in 2003 but once the allegations of WMD and links to al-Qaeda proved false, democracy promotion became his only option to justify the invasion and occupation of Iraq. But rising sectarian violence between Shi’ites and Sunnis, unbridgeable differences between Iraqi political parties and groups, differing opinions on US troop presence on Iraqi soil, and so on, had critically defeated Bush’s democracy promotion agenda in Iraq. The Bush administration, before the invasion, appeared not to have realized that controlling and rebuilding a country like Iraq would be much more difficult than toppling the Saddam regime. The rising human and material costs of the war and the Iraqi opposition to occupation quickly morphed into a deadly insurgency. This rapidly deteriorating situation blew away all hope for a post-Saddam democratic Iraq. Bush himself later described the Iraq war as “a catastrophic success”.(Fox News: August 30, 2004) President Bush’s Middle East centric foreign policy, as a whole, was marked by three significant characteristics: first, unilateralism at the expense of multilateral efforts to deal

with terrorism and other global issues; second, the promotion of democracy through force; and, third, militarism.

Aggressive unilateralism became an important part of American foreign policy after the 9/11 attacks. The administration officials, particularly the neocons, had a deep distrust in international institutions and were in favor of shedding institutional constraints on America's freedom of actions in the global arena. It launched military attacks on Afghanistan with UN approval but bypassed the same institution with regard to Iraq, primarily due to French and Russian threats to veto American actions to topple the Saddam Hussein regime. The neocons projected the UN as a weak organization, unable to deal with global issues of anarchy and threats to global peace.(Robert Perle: March 21,

2003) They cited the UN's inability to stop Serbian aggressions against the Bosnians or to save the Kosovars from the Serbs as reasons for avoiding the world body.¹³ The neocons found it logical to "go it alone" to promote their Iraq agenda, despite then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's warning that any US military actions against Iraq would be in violation of the UN Charter. But once the invasion of Iraq was over, the Bush administration showed some interests in limited multilateralism. It invited allies and adversaries to participate in Iraqi reconstruction efforts and to deal with Tehran's and Pyongyang's nuclear programs. The immediate reason behind this policy shift was dual, on the one hand the US needed multilateral help and cooperation to stabilize Iraq and, on the other, the US wanted to neutralize Iranian opposition to the occupation of Iraq.

Obama's "Smart Power" Approach in the Middle East

Generally, in the first five years from 2009-2013, the Obama administration dealt with traditional Middle Eastern conflicts as well as new developments spawned by the Arab Spring. However, America's involvement in those

conflicts has shown little signs of progress towards resolution, similarly to the Bush administration. The main accomplishment Obama made was the US withdrawal from Iraq, and it could be argued the new opening towards Iran is a positive step forward, but for now there remains no permanent settlement on Iran's nuclear question. The Arab Spring, whose impact is still reverberating throughout the region, has posed extra challenges to the Obama administration's Middle East policy. In the following pages, the article maps out the various factors at play, the hard realities behind the scene, and roles of regional and extra-regional actors that have either facilitated or obstructed Obama's "smart power" approach to the Middle East.

End of the Iraq War

One of Obama's electoral pledges was to "get the US out of the war in Iraq." Soon after assuming power in January 2009, he ordered all American troops, combat and non-combat, to leave Iraq by December 2011, paving the way to effectively end the Iraq war. It was a difficult step, given the complex political dynamics inside Iraq and tough competitions for influence by neighboring countries in the post-US withdrawal Iraq. President Bush also decided to pullout from Iraq but having left residual forces to train Iraqi armed forces and to keep al-Qaeda operatives under check.

Political dynamics in Iraq during the US occupation years (2003 - 2011) were shaped by two critical developments: Shiite - Sunni sectarian violence, and the rise of pro-Iran Shiite political elites. These two developments were the direct outcomes of the US occupation of Iraq. The sectarian violence started after 2006 and resulted in a massive bloodbath and casualties on both sides of the religious divide, with the lives of common Iraqis being torn apart.(Ashraf Al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner: 2007 , pp. 6-9.) Iraq's two powerful neighbors, Shi'ite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia, positioned themselves to support their sectarian co-religionists. Iran sought to realize at least three principal interests: first, the

installation of a friendly Shi'ite government in Baghdad that would pose no Saddam-like threats to Iran in the future; second, the gradual US disengagement from Iraq; and third, the minimization of Sunni Arab influence in Iraq. Saudi Arabia's interests were the exact opposite; it wanted to thwart the Iranian-backed Shi'ite resurgence while supporting a secular government, inclusive of Shi'ites as well as Sunnis, in a post-occupation Iraqi political system. While Saudi Arabia courted the Sunni tribal leaders and secular Shi'ite political parties led by former interim prime minister Ayad Allawi, Iran strongly shored up groups and parties like Al Sadr Movement and the Iraqi List party led by former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki.(Frederic Wehrey: 2009, p. 63.) The majority Shi'ites, who were repressed under late Saddam Hussein's long rule, were, however, expected to politically sweep away the minority Sunnis. That prompted Secretary Robert Gates to unsuccessfully persuade Saudi and Egyptian leaders to engage the Shi'ite political elites to avert sectarian violence, promote regional security stability, and thus check Iranian influence in Iraq.(Mahjoob Zweiri and Rula Awwad: October 21, 2011)

Given widespread Iraqi-public opposition to occupation forces and despite a greater scope for Iranian influence in Iraq, the US had hardly any choice other than total withdrawal. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the Bush administration signed with the Iraqi government in December 2008, required US forces to leave Iraq by January 1, 2012. Nouri Al-Maliki's government was unwilling to negotiate another SOFA agreement, which would have allowed US troops to stay beyond that deadline. The Shi'ite cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr's threats to withdraw from Al-Maliki's ruling coalition and thus bring down his government finally put the American troops on the road towards the exit from Iraq. Like Bush, Obama had liked to see a small number of US troops stationed in Iraq to meet contingencies but the Iraqis refused to grant them immunity to local laws; (James M. Lindsay : p. 771.)the implication was that American

troops must operate within the framework of Iraqi laws and would remain accountable to the Iraqi legal system for all military operations.

US withdrawal from Iraq fit with Obama's position on the Iraq war from the beginning and his electoral campaign promises. He denounced the Iraq war, as Bush's "dumb war," back in early October 2002, a position he strongly reiterated during the 2007-2008 presidential campaign. (He criticized Bush for not ending the Iraq war and was worried about "a US occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences" but stood firm to "finish the fight with bin Laden and al-Qaeda" in Afghanistan, (Barack Obama: August 01, 2007) a partial continuation of Bush's policy. The war on terror kept on rolling.

The Stalled Israel - Palestine Peace Process

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a daunting challenge for President Obama as well as a test case of his "smart power" approach. He, in fact, hoped to succeed in bringing this conflict to an end while his predecessors had either failed or lacked the resolve to deal with it. President Bush was more preoccupied with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, thus, the peace between Israel and Palestine was not on his list of foreign policy priorities. Yet, in 2003 the Bush administration pushed the peace agenda through the Quartet (composed of the US, the EU, Russia, and the UN) by proposing a two-state solution to the conflict. Known as the "roadmap", the proposal initially called on the Israelis and the Palestinians to reach a peace agreement by 2005, whereby they would implement the two-state solution and co-exist in a peaceful and secure environment. Major contentious issues like the status of Jerusalem and the return of the Palestinian refugees to their land were to be resolved on a mutually acceptable basis. The "roadmap", however, was largely derailed due to a series of developments, such as Israel's entrenched position not to compromise its defense and security by withdrawing from Palestinian lands, particularly its

refusal to stop settlement expansions; the 2006 electoral victory of Hamas, which has refused to accept the existence of Israel; and Hamas' takeover of Gaza in 2007 that effectively divided Palestine into two separate entities.

Obama's diplomatic foray to resolve the conflict started from where Bush's efforts had stopped. In keeping with his "smart power" approach, and with a focus on the two-state solution, Obama demanded in May 2009 that Israel must freeze all settlement constructions to give peace negotiations a chance.(The Washington Post : May 29, 2009)but was forced to drop this demand by late 2010, after the Israelis had declined to stop settlement construction. (The New York Times December 10, 2010) The US reverted to the old strategy of political and diplomatic influence, similar to the Bush administration, to engage the Israelis and the Palestinians in the peace process. George Mitchell, who Obama appointed as his Mideast peace envoy in January 2009, failed to make any progress in the negotiation process and resigned in early May 2011. Two new developments further undermined the Obama administration's Mideast peace efforts. First, as of December 2010, the Arab pro-democracy uprisings that started in Tunisia swiftly engulfed Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Second, the Palestinian Authority's launched diplomatic efforts to obtain UN recognition of a Palestinian state in 2011. Washington and Tel Aviv were scared by the move to take the Palestinian statehood issue to the UN General Assembly and thus avoid the Security Council where the US could use its veto, as it had done repeatedly in the past. The General Assembly recognized Palestine as a "non-member state" on November 30th, 2012 with a vote of 138-9.(CBS News: November30,2012) This represented an important political win for the Palestinian people and a major diplomatic blow to the US and Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu, after his January 2013 electoral victory, focused more on the Iranian nuclear issue and simultaneously expanded settlement activities. The

peace process completely stalled, as a result, and Obama's "smart power" approach suffered its first major blow.

In a bid to revive the peace process, Obama, during his March 2013 visit to Israel, underlined his government's commitment to Mideast peace and he again emphasized the Quartet-proposed two- state solution, (The White House : March 21, 2013) which Bush attempted but failed. His Secretary of State John Kerry successfully persuaded the Israelis and the Palestinians to restart direct peace negotiations as of late July 2013. This time both sides decided not to attach any preconditions to peace negotiations. As before, Hamas remained opposed to negotiations with Israel, and Mr. Netanyahu had never felt the need to halt settlement expansions to support peace with the Palestinians. Kerry-mediated direct peace talks finally collapsed by the end of April 2014. Obama's "smart power" approach, like all previous peace initiatives, did not turn the page in Mideast peace negotiations. There was no change, on the contrary Obama's foreign policy on the Israel - Palestine issue fits into the continuity of a stalled peace process.

The Iran Nuclear Conflict

Obama's Iran policy has been marked by toughness as well as a desire to break out of the nuclear standoff with Tehran. Although after winning the race to the White House in 2009, he called on Iran to "unclench its fist", his administration has, in fact, inflicted more crippling sanctions on Iran than the Bush administration on the suspicions that Iranian nuclear program was secretly developing the bomb and that Iran failed to comply with different UN resolution requiring it to halt its nuclear program. The latest sanctions targeting Iran's oil industry and banks were imposed by the US and the European Union on eve of 2012.(BBC News: November 8, 2013) Whereas Bush adopted a hard power approach to counter Iran's nuclear program, including the threat of use of force

to substantially damage, if not totally wipe out, Iranian nuclear sites and infrastructures, Obama's approach has been more a carrot and stick policy to induce Iran to negotiate. But the Iranians have hardly cowed even in the face of the harshest sanctions. Under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tehran pursued a policy of confrontation with the West, defied US and Israeli threats of military strikes, and participated in a few rounds of nuclear negotiations but resisted all pressures to abandon the nuclear program.(BBC News: January 26, 2012) During his first term in office, President Obama appeared less resolved to put an end to the nuclear dispute with Iran. Being susceptible to pressures by the pro-Israel lobby and hawkish Congressmen at Capitol Hill, he lacked the political will to give nuclear diplomacy with Iran a serious try. Both Tehran and Washington took part in nuclear negotiations while hoping that nothing concrete would come out of negotiations.(Trita Parsi: 2012, pp. 38 & 222)

The Iranian June 2013 presidential election brought about unexpected changes in the conservatives and hardliners-dominated Iranian power structure. Hassan Rouhani, a political moderate and reformer, won the election with a comfortable majority, which soon changed the strategic calculations in Washington. President Rouhani prioritized his foreign policy on the normalization of relations with the West and lifting the Iranian economy out of devastating sanctions.(Mohammed Nuruzzaman: December 11, 2013) This fit perfectly with President Obama's new foreign policy priority of gradual disengagement from the Middle East and more involvement in Asia to face off a rising China. Influenced by Thomas Donilon, the National Security adviser from October 2010 to early June 2013, he decided to go for a low-profile policy towards the Middle East and a high-profile policy approach in East Asia,(Ryan Lizza: 2011, p. 5) in part prompting the need for a "smart power" approach to Iran. In line with this policy priority, he was quick to seize the opportunity to resolve the nuclear issue with Iran. In his 2013 UN General Assembly speech, Obama welcomed Rouhani's

statement that Iran would not go after the bomb and he directed John Kerry to join the European Union to step up diplomacy to negotiate a deal with Tehran.(The White House: September 24, 2013) Obama's and Rouhani's efforts finally succeeded in clinching an interim nuclear deal on November 24, 2013 that was expected to pave the way for a permanent deal in the next six months, though it ultimately failed to materialize.

The interim deal was not, however, without pitfalls. It required Iran to halt its nuclear activities for the next six months in exchange for some sanctions relief. Tehran, however, retained the right to uranium enrichment up to a 5 per cent level. Although many Iranians and Americans have warmly welcomed the deal, the hardliners in Tehran and the hawks in Washington have voiced their serious concerns. The Iranian hardliners, the religious conservatives and the Revolutionary Guards, have interpreted it as surrender to the West, the hawkish Senators and members of the House of Representatives in Washington saw it as a major security concern for Israel(Associated Press: January 13, 2014). Israel and Washington's Gulf Arab allies opposed the deal, as it recognized Iranian supremacy in the Middle East region, which, in turn, undermined their own security and regional status. (The New York Times : November 11, 2013)The Iranian hardliners are so far kept at bay due to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's support for the deal. President Obama is, however, facing a difficult situation to persuade the pro-Israel hawkish Senators who view any deal with Iran as a bad deal, negotiated at the expense of Israeli interests. The signing of the interim deal, however, marked a milestone in Obama's "smart power" approach. It demonstrates his administration's willingness to directly negotiate with Iran, a country President Bush included in his infamous "axis of evil" and refused to negotiate with during his Presidency. Thus, under Obama's administration, there has been a shift from Bush's military option to a

combination of political and diplomatic tools to iron out differences with Iran on the nuclear issue.

Obama and the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring caught the Obama administration off-guard. This was a major historical development in the Middle East and North Africa where the US played a reactive, not a proactive role. Youth groups that spearheaded the pro-democracy movements had no ties to Washington. Obama candidly admitted this after the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak when he declared: “It’s not America that put people into the streets of Tunis and Cairo”,(TheWhiteHouse:May 19, 2011) Hilary Clinton made a similar statement: “These revolutions are not ours. They are not by us, for us, or against us”(US Department of State: November 7, 2011). Clearly then, the Obama administration had no strategic vision of how to respond to the pro-democracy movements. It was rather hesitant to aid the democratic forces and facilitate a transition from dictatorship to democracy for two main reasons. First off, the administration was uncertain that the new Arab democracies, like their autocratic counterparts, would maintain friendly ties to the US and Israel. Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006 did not bring it closer to the US or West European democracies. Secondly, Washington’s nemesis, Iran, was enthusiastic in its support for the pro-democracy forces, until the outbreak of anti-government protest movements in Syria. The Iranian leaders falsely assumed that the movements were driven by an “Islamic awakening,” like their own 1979 Islamic revolution, to overthrow US-protected authoritarian rulers in the region and thus kick out the Western powers.(Ali Parchami: 2012, pp. 35-52) The Iranian bid for influence, which succeeded in ending post-1979 diplomatic isolation with Cairo under the erstwhile Mohammed Morsi government, complicated US reactions to the Arab Spring forces. Smart power did not, or had

a limited scope in influencing the pro-democracy movements; rather, realpolitik appeared to determine the course of US policy choices.

Overall, the Obama administration's response to the Arab Spring was marked by two main characteristics: one, tensions between pro-democracy versus pro-autocracy policy preferences; and two, a cautious approach to use force to promote democracy in the Arab world. These two aspects combined represented a real dilemma for Obama. On the one hand, during his 2009 inaugural address, he advanced his ideals to support democracy and peace for everyone everywhere, but on the other hand, the imperatives of protecting America's geopolitical interests in the Middle East and North Africa appeared strong. When Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation on December 17, 2010 sparked a nation-wide protest movement in Tunisia that buried Ben Ali's long dictatorial rule, Obama was quick to support the Tunisian pro-democracy movement. In his 2011 State of the Union address he said: "The United States of America stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all people", (TheWhiteHouse:January25,2011.) but made no mention of Egypt where a similar anti-Mubarak protest movement broke out on the same day he made the speech. The administration dithered on the Egypt question and even tried to protect Mubarak. On January 30, 2011 Hilary Clinton declared that the president supported an "orderly transition" in Egypt under Mubarak, a massive blow to the pro-democracy protesters, who gathered at Tahrir Square. Seeing the mass resilience to oust Mubarak, Obama finally disassociated the US from the Mubarak regime on February 1, 2011 by declaring: "An orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now(Ryan Lizza: 2011, p. 13.

)." It soon drew fire from Israel and Saudi Arabia who doubted Washington's commitment to save old friends.

Still, the old policy of supporting dictators in Bahrain and Yemen managed to hold on. Despite killings and repressions of pro-democracy forces in Bahrain, home to the US Navy's Fifth Fleet, Washington maintained its silence, failed to condemn the Bahraini government's violence against peaceful protesters, and even acquiesced to Saudi military intervention to protect the authoritarian Al-Khalifa rulers. In Yemen,(Global Research: March 16, 2011) the Obama administration initially threw its weight behind Ali Abdullah Saleh, a long-time president and a key US ally in the fight against al-Qaeda terrorism in the Arabian Peninsula, and then backed the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) brokered agreement to stop further violence and instability in Yemen.(Al Jazeera: May 23, 2011).

US policy response to Libya and Syria, two other Arab states swept away by pro-democracy movements, saw a return to Bush's preference for military options to promote democracy in the Arab world. After initial reluctance, Obama finally decided to go for the force option to promote democracy in Libya, though eventually he opted not to apply force to topple the Al-Assad government in Syria. The difference is that whereas Bush openly talked of military power to advance his freedom and democracy promotion agenda, Obama resorted to force under the ruse of humanitarian mission to protect the Libyans from Gaddafi's atrocities. UN Security Council Resolution 1973 that legitimized NATO-led military intervention to dislodge the Gaddafi government was approved on March 17, 2011. Before going to the Security Council, the US brought the Arab League to the fore to show the world that it was the Arab League, not the US that wanted military actions in Libya. Additionally, Secretary Clinton obtained from the Russians a vote of abstention, since they were threatening to block any actions including a no-fly zone against the Gaddafi government.(RyanLizza:p.17.)

This was a clever diplomatic ploy; the Obama administration preferred the use of force to topple Gaddafi but did not present it to the American public as a US-led initiative, instead it engaged indirectly under the umbrella of an international coalition. One Obama adviser has characterized US actions in Libya as “leading from behind” .(RyanLizza:p.19.) This was a good diplomatic technique for Obama to get other nations to do America’s bidding to take off governments unfriendly or hostile to America’s interests.

The same strategy of “leading from behind” did not, however, work in the case of Syria where both government troops and the opposition rebel fighters are committing violent crimes against humanity.(Human Rights Watch: 2013, pp. 605-615) Syria’s great power backers, Russia and China, defeated two Security Council resolutions to initiate actions against the Assad government, which also enjoys ironclad support from its regional partners Iran and the Lebanon-based group Hezbollah. On Syria, the Obama administration preferred to avoid the risk of getting Russia and Iran involved in a new military confrontation in the Middle East, which the American public, after a serious military debacle in Iraq, would not easily stomach.

Trump Approaches Toward Terrorism:

Donald Trump’s Middle East policy represents a significant change from that of Barack Obama. The president is seeking to bolster Israel and Saudi Arabia, in particular, and to isolate Iran. This agenda has emerged in piecemeal fashion rather than as part of a coherent strategy - and there are few indications that administration officials have considered the long-term implications of their approach.(Miller, Aaron David and Sokolsky: August 29, 2018)

Iran And The Ground Upheavals

Iran is a top concern of the administration. The 2017 National Security Strategy mentions it 17 times, and lists as a key priority in the region preventing

predominance by “any power hostile to the United States” - a clear reference to Tehran. However, the administration is struggling to formulate a realistic policy in the wake of its withdrawal, in May 2018, from the JCPOA. Trump had often criticized the deal. (Katulis, Brian and Benaim, Danie: January 19,

2018) He and other conservatives complained it did nothing to address other problematic aspects of Iranian foreign policy, including its aspirations for regional hegemony and support for radical groups such as Hezbollah. The marginalization or departure of advisers inclined to support the JCPOA - such as Secretary of Defense James Mattis, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster - and the influence of hawkish National Security Adviser John Bolton, made withdrawal more likely. (Lynch, Marc: September/October 2015): 18 - 27.)

In a May 2018 speech, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the administration would be willing to restore diplomatic and economic ties in return for: complete denuclearization; cessation of Iran’s ballistic missile program; the release of all prisoners that have citizenship in the US or an allied nation; an end to efforts to extend Iranian influence in the region, especially in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan; and an end to cyberattacks.

As a basis for negotiations, this was a non-starter. Furthermore, other signatories to the JCPOA have indicated that they intend to abide by the agreement and oppose the sanctions regime.

Trump has shown no interest in promoting political reform or bolstering democratic norms with skepticism to Pompeo’s creation of the Iran Action Group, in August 2018, which the administration has billed as “an elite team of foreign policy specialists” that will seek to implement “a campaign of maximum diplomatic pressure and diplomatic isolation.” They see it as window dressing rather than a serious task force, especially because Brian Hook, a longtime

Republican operative, leads it. Hook, who served as the principal deputy to former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, discontinued the traditional mission of the department's Policy Planning Staff - offering the secretary independent, strategic advice. He has also politicized personnel decisions. (Mohseni, Payam and Nakhjavani: June 25, 2018)

The Shia-Sunni Divide

Trump and his advisers have abandoned the longstanding policy of opposing Shia and Sunni extremism, choosing to back Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and by extension Israel all of which favor confrontation with Tehran. This decision risks further destabilization in the Middle East. During the 2016 campaign, Trump accused Riyadh of free riding on US security guarantees, but as president, he has given the Saudis carte blanche in the region. Saudi Arabia hosted his first foreign visit and he has ignored Riyadh's disastrous intervention against the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, its crackdown on domestic dissent, its attempts to isolate Qatar, and its attempt to cow Canada after Ottawa criticized the Saudi government's human rights record. (Nasr, Vali: March/April 2018): 108 - 118).

Most importantly, the administration is in the process of creating the Middle East Strategic Alliance - an "Arab NATO" - a proposal floated by the Saudis in the past. The goal would be to increase overall security and economic cooperation, including a regional anti-missile defense shield, and the confrontation with Iran would assume a principal role in the new alliance's agenda. It will reportedly be announced this autumn, at a summit in Washington tentatively planned for mid-October 2018.

Analysts have speculated that Trump wants Saudi support for confronting Iran and for a Middle East peace deal. Both expectations rest upon a misunderstanding of Riyadh's thinking. Saudi Arabia would have been willing

to support a tougher line against Iran - which it views as the chief regional threat - regardless of concessions in other areas. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Saudis would be willing to back the peace deal that Washington is trying to impose upon the Palestinians.

As the Trump administration draws closer to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, regional polarization has increased and some key actors are more distrustful of Washington. Instead of decreasing Iranian influence, US favoritism of Sunni regimes is bolstering ties between Tehran and groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis. Iraq, which is majority Shia but which also has a substantial Sunni population, and where Iran yields considerable influence, especially among the country's powerful Shia militias, would prefer to avoid choosing sides. It has reacted warily to overtures from Saudi Arabia and criticized US withdrawal from the JCPOA. Turkey and Qatar have also reacted increased cooperation with Tehran.

Syria, Iraq, and the Islamic State

Trump's feud with Erdoğan comes at an inopportune moment. Turkey is an influential actor in Syria and the US military uses Incirlik Air Base for airstrikes against the Islamic State. In addition, the administration has struggled to formulate a coherent strategy regarding the Syrian civil war. In early 2018, former Secretary of State Tillerson announced a plan that entailed indefinitely committing troops to Syria in order to counter Iran and secure the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad. Then, in April 2018, Trump ordered the military to begin planning for the withdrawal of troops - there are approximately 2200, mainly in eastern Syria - and urged regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia, to assume the costs of reconstructing the parts of the country that have been liberated from the Islamic State. Trump and National Security Adviser Bolton planned to rely on Russia, rather than the presence of US forces, to persuade Tehran to depart. (Singh, Michael: May 9, 2018.)

Recently, James Jeffrey, the State Department's new "representative for Syria engagement," announced another reboot. According to the former diplomat, US troops will remain as long as necessary. Trump and his advisers have decided to "find ways to achieve our goals" - which will once again focus on blunting Iran's influence and fostering a stable government acceptable to Syrians and the international community - "that are less reliant on the goodwill of the Russians." Washington will not insist on Assad's departure - according to Jeffrey he has "no future" but it is not "the job" of the United States to oust him - but it has warned that there will be significant consequences if Assad uses chemical weapons again or if Syrian and Russian forces kill large numbers of civilians.

Though Trump repeatedly criticized Obama's Syrian policy before taking office, as president, he confronts the same challenge as his predecessor - a desire to influence the course of the conflict and the post-war order, without committing large numbers of troops. Like Obama, he has adopted a similar approach, which entails focusing on defeating the Islamic State and pressing other nations to take actions that will serve US interests. He has had little success in these efforts. The continued presence of a small number of US troops will not fundamentally change the dynamic, and, when it comes to determining the nature of Syria's post-conflict political landscape, it is likely that Washington will have less influence than Russia, Iran, or Turkey.

The United States has more influence in Iraq, but even there, in spite of a massive investment of resources over the last fifteen years, and the continued presence of US troops - 5200, according to the Pentagon

- Iran enjoys a stronger position. Popular Mobilization Units - state-approved militias - played a crucial role in defeating Islamic State forces, and the administration fears that many of these units are beholden to Tehran. US officials consider Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a leading figure in the movement,

to be a terrorist, not least because he reportedly has close links to Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, the Special Forces unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guards that operates abroad

Conclusion:

Although the distinctive approaches and strategies has used by both Barack Obama and Donald Trump in order to fight terrorism in the Middle East countries.

Obama is well known by his peaceful treatments as pulling military intervention ..but president Trump's approach is more aggressive and brutal in dealing with muslims people especially and attempts to isolate Iran

The main aim to these approach is to protect the American interests as well as to support the United States Foreign policy in the world .

Chapter three :
The Impact of The Two
Policies on Fighting
Terrorism

Introduction

This chapter contains the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is fundamentally a struggle over land in which Zionist movement attempts to show that Terrorism is not only rational but morally justifiable, it is also mentioned that terrorism logically begets terrorism in which revenge and religious justification for violence are offered also through self event argument, moreover this chapter includes the Obama's and Trump's dealing with Afghanistan ,they have taken contrasting approaches, Obama announced a multi-year timetable for a withdrawal, however Trump supported increasing the use of force to compel the Taliban, in addition to the policy of Trump and Obama on the middle East ; Obama's goal was to get the US out of the middle East and "pivot to Asia" ,his policy was merciful and careful ,unlike Obama, Trump does not have a middle East strategy grand or otherwise. Discussing regime types and Terrorism and the relationship between them took the idea of countries with intermediate levels of political freedom are more prone to Terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, trends since 9/11 attacks shows that advanced democracies can be expected with time and experience to acquire superior abilities not only to reduce the incidence of terrorist assaults but also to make such assaults less deadly when they occur, finally in this chapter there is a looking to the future in which political leaders , security professionals ,and voters in electoral and minimalist democracies can expect to reap a great safety from improved democratic quality to push Terrorism back down.

The Core of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs is fundamentally a struggle over land, over who is to reside in, own, and possess sovereignty over the territory that is variously called Palestine and Israel. Prior to 1948, the conflict concerned the entire 10,000 square mile area of Palestine as defined in the 1922 League of Nations Mandate, but since 1967, the conflict has been

focused on the remaining 22% of the area that was not incorporated into the state of Israel as delimited in the 1949 armistice agreements. Anyone familiar with this conflict knows that more than land is at stake; both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are conscious that their very identity is bound up with that land, its terrain, cities, villages, and monuments. Both have been jealous in their attachments and have denigrated the claims of the other.

The reasons for these mutual attachments reach far back into the history of both peoples, but the conflict dates from the inception of the Zionist movement in late 19th century Europe that called for the establishment of a Jewish state in the historic homeland of the Jewish people, Palestine. From the outset, Zionism faced a moral problem, namely, that its vision of a Jewish state with a decisive Jewish majority could be fulfilled only at the expense of another people, the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. In 1897, Palestine contained approximately 600,000 people, 95% Arab and 5% Jews. Faced with this imbalance, how was the Zionist vision to be achieved? Zionist leaders like Theodore Herzl came to favor a twostep program for demographic change: first, to promote massive Jewish immigration into Palestine, and second, to encourage the emigration of the Arabs into the neighboring countries.

In late 1917, the British, whose forces now controlled Palestine, pledged to facilitate establishment of a Jewish national home and open the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigration. As a result, Jews went from 8% of the population in 1918 to 20% by 1931, and by 1948, after three decades of British rule, Jews made up one-third of the two million people in Palestine.² Inducing the Arabs to emigrate proved more difficult. Official Zionism advocated peaceful coexistence with the Arabs, insisting that there was ample room in Palestine for both peoples, that the Jews had no intention of dispossessing people of their property and that the Arabs stood to benefit by cooperation with the Jews. But the maximalist idea—that there is no room for two peoples

sharing sovereignty in Palestine—predominated among Zionist leaders, such as Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president, and David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister (Morris 1999, 140-1), and with it, the prospect of forcibly transferring the Arabs came to be seen as the “obvious and most logical, solution to the Zionist’s demographic problem” (Morris 2001, 40).

In 1918, it became clear to the British authorities in Palestine the Arabs were opposed to Zionism and would resort to violence in order to stop a Jewish state from being established. One Palestinian, Pasha Dajani, summed up the Arab attitude in 1919: “If the League of Nations will not listen to the appeal of the Arabs, this country will become a river of blood” (Morris 1999, 91). Men like Ben-Gurion understood this as well and began preparing the Jewish community for armed conflict and forcible transfer (Morris 2001, 42-43). “I am for compulsory transfer,” he declared, “I don’t see anything immoral in it.” His view was echoed by his political rival, Vladimir Jabotinsky, who stated that intentional demographic change was a necessary evil that was neither unprecedented nor a historical injustice (Gorny 1987, 270).

Forcible removal of a population constitutes violence against civilians, and hence, the mechanism of demographic change that came to be pursued by Zionist leaders was—and continues to be—terrorism. Attempts at transfer would expectedly evoke outrage, resistance and similar terrorism by Arabs against Jews., Jabotinsky predicted this, but seeing no other alternative, he insisted that the tit-for-tat violence was something that the Jewish community had to endure. Since the end of Zionism is moral, he contended, so are the means necessary to achieve it, even if this requires an “iron wall” of military might to prevail against Arab opposition. In a nutshell, this reasoning is the most simple and straightforward Zionist attempt to show that terrorism is not only rational, but also morally justifiable.

Terrorism

While all terrorism is politically-motivated violence that deliberately subjects noncombatants to violence or the threat of violence, there are different kinds depending on facts about the agents and the modes and mechanisms whereby harm is threatened or carried out. Terrorism is strategic if violence or coercive threat is part of a plan to achieve a political goal, but reactive if it derives only from an emotional response to politically induced grievances, e.g., vengeance. Of course, since strategy and emotion can be jointly operative, and actions can have multiple agents, a given act might manifest both modes of violence.

A second contrast concerns the causal route whereby harm is inflicted. An act of direct violence consists in assault or an immediate threat to do so, for example, killing or maiming someone or giving the orders to do so. However, violence can be committed by other means, say, by imprisoning people, depriving them of essentials, like clean water, food, or necessary medical supplies, or by damaging the institutional fabric of their society, e.g., hospitals, schools, factories and businesses, through legal and other authoritative mechanisms. States, in particular, accomplish such structural terrorism by forcibly implementing or impeding institutions, laws, policies, and practices that result in harm to noncombatants.

A final contrast depends upon the identity of the perpetrators. In Western media, ‘terrorism’ is regularly used to depict the violence of individuals or groups pursuing specific political agendas, not that inflicted by states or governments.

This restriction is questionable as a reportive definition since, etymologically, the root, ‘terror’, implies nothing about its cause, and, historically, ‘terrorism’ has been applied to states. Moreover, given that the term is the expression of choice for illegitimate violence, exempting states from being agents of terrorism

yields an unfair rhetorical advantage to established governments, especially since states usually inflict more greater harm upon civilians than do non-state agents. One could always yield this point and employ a different term to describe politically motivated violence against civilians by states, but apart from propaganda concerns, we may speak of the latter as ‘state-terrorism’ (e.g., Ashmore 1997, Primoratz 1998).

Terrorism Begets Terrorism

In February 1994, a settler from Kiryat Arba, Baruch Goldstein, massacred 29 Palestinian worshippers at the Ibrahimiyya mosque in Hebron. His suicidal terrorism was both reactive and strategic, for, while motivated to avenge the deaths of Jews at hands of Arabs, Goldstein also wanted to undermine the Oslo peace process that he feared would lead to a withdrawal from the territories. His action precipitated a like response by Palestinian militias such Hamas. Founded in 1988, Hamas initially confined its resistance to what it regarded as legitimate military targets in the occupied territories, but after the Goldstein massacre and the failure of the Israeli Government to respond to its May 1994 offer of an “armistice” in which civilians would be immune from violence (Hroub 2000, 246), Hamas launched a wave of suicide bombings that took the lives of scores of Israeli civilians.

Like Jewish zealots, Hamas offers a religious justification for violence, but it also justifies its actions through the familiar self-defense argument. The Zionists are intent upon dispossessing the Palestinians of the remaining 22% of their homeland, and its occupation is “downright terrorism” (Alexander 2002, 346). By all laws, human and divine, people have a right to defend themselves against those who employ violence to dispossess them of their homeland. Since appeals to justice and the world’s conscience are futile in stopping determined aggressors, and since attacks against the Israeli military are insufficient to stop Israel’s expansionism or force the rest of the world to intervene, then making

Israel suffer by striking at civilian targets is the principal mechanism Palestinians have left for self-defense. The effect of striking at “the most vulnerable spot in the Zionist body” will be to exhaust Israel and weaken both its tourism and immigration programs. Like Goldstein, the terrorism of Hamas has been reactive as well as strategic, for Hamas routinely maintains that specific operations are carried out to avenge massacres and assassinations (Hroub 2000, 245-251).

Hamas has been at the forefront of armed resistance in this second intifada after the collapse of the Oslo peace process. Sharon’s visit to the Jerusalem mosques on Sept. 28, 2000 began a round of terrorism by both sides that eclipsed any previous level of violence seen during the previous 33 years of occupation. Young Palestinians, finding little hope for improvement in their situation, began volunteering for suicide missions, and in time, women joined the ranks the martyrs.

“She is the first, but not the last,” said a teacher who knew the first of these women. “You shouldn't think we don't love life and don't want to live. We do this only because it is the last thing we can do.” A student of psychology at the Islamic University in Gaza put it this way: “The arbitrary killing that we've experienced during the Intifada has caused every young person to say, ‘If in any case I am destined to die, why shouldn't I die with dignity?’” (Ha’aretz July 17, 2002).

Facing a greater proportion of armed Palestinians in this second intifada, the IDF has responded with more firepower than ever before, employing Merkava tanks, F-16 fighter jets, and Apache attack helicopters. Implementing Sharon’s directive to eliminate the “terrorist infrastructure” has involved it more deeply in a war against a civilian populus (Ha’aretz, March 9, 2003). In the process, the casualty rates have increased on both sides, this time with more deadly ratios from the Israeli point of view. In the first intifada, there were eleven dead Palestinians for every dead Israeli, but during the second, this

figure has approached a three to one ratio.¹⁵ The Israeli Government justifies its violent response by invoking its right to defend its citizens from the threat of Palestinian terrorism, and the only effective means for this is a massive military crackdown in the form of checkpoints, curfews, house to house searches, detentions, interrogations, house demolitions, and targeted killings. Yet, just as Hamas had its Palestinian critics, some Israelis have dissented from this policy, including members of the Israeli military (Ha'aretz supplement, Sept. 14, 2001). At the end of the IDF offensive in late April 2002, the Israeli Defense Minister Eliezar admitted that "it is impossible to eradicate the terrorist infrastructure," and that "military actions kindle the frustration, hatred and despair that are the incubators for the terror to come" (Zunes 2003, 149).

Trump Against Obama In Afghanistan

Obama and Trump have taken contrasting approaches to the Afghanistan war, America's longest. Both favored troop withdrawal - but with different intentions.(ibid

In June 2011, Obama announced a multi-year timetable for a withdrawal, after an initial surge. His goal was to let the Afghan government know that the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan was not open-ended. The Afghans had to get their house in order, then take over the fight before the U.S. left for good.

It was, in effect, an announcement of the "Afghanization" of the war, similar in intent to Richard Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization." In 1969, Nixon proposed replacing U.S. combat troops with South Vietnamese troops in order to extricate the United States from a seemingly endless war. This was Obama's goal in Afghanistan as well. By the end of his second term, however, circumstances there persuaded him to slow the withdrawal.

When Trump announced his policy toward Afghanistan during the first year of his presidency, he mocked Obama's plan. According to Trump, "Conditions on the ground, not arbitrary timetables, will guide our strategy from now on."

And instead of "Afghanization," Trump originally supported increasing the use of force to compel the Taliban, whom the U.S. and its allies are fighting in Afghanistan, to come to the bargaining table.

The Taliban had other ideas. .(ibid)

Rather than being backed into a corner, the Taliban recently made battlefield gains and is defying U.S. efforts to negotiate a settlement. It was in this context that Trump decided that "conditions on the ground" were ripe for a partial U.S. withdrawal.

Trump Against Osama In The greater Middle East

Obama's Afghanistan policy was part of a broader approach his administration took toward the Middle East.

Obama believed that the United States had expended far too much blood and treasure in the Middle East under his predecessor, George W. Bush. For Obama, the region's deep-seated problems made it more trouble than it was worth. .(James L. Gelvin : January 7, 2019)

Obama believed that an economically ascendant Asia, not the Middle East, will be the epicenter of global competition in the 21st century. His goal, then, was to get the United States out of the Middle East and "pivot to Asia."

Obama wanted to calm the waters in the Middle East, then shift the burden of policing it to America's partners there, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, as the United States had done during the Cold War. Hence, his policies were aimed at the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region, forging an Iran nuclear deal

and restarting negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This strategy could have enabled the United States to focus its attention on Asia.

Unfortunately for Obama, the chaos created by the Arab uprisings of 2010-11, the resistance of U.S. partners in the region to what they believed was American disengagement and poor execution stymied his grand strategy.

Unlike Obama, Trump does not have a Middle East strategy, grand or otherwise. He has impulses.

Trump's move to withdraw troops from Syria came as a spur-of-the-moment decision during a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. After Erdoğan asked Trump why the United States still had troops there, Trump reportedly replied, "You know what? It's yours. I'm leaving."

This surprised his national security team, which assumed that the United States was still committed to fighting Islamic State militants in Syria alongside the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, which the United States will now abandon.

Does this mean that Trump is prepared to jettison the global war on terror, not to mention the Saudi-led coalition to stop the spread of Iranian influence in the region? At one time, both seemed bedrock policies of the Trump administration. Now, not so much.

With U.S. forces gone from Syria, so is a check on Iranian ambitions to expand its military presence and political influence there - much to the horror of officials not only in the United States, but in Saudi Arabia and Israel as well. Adding insult to injury, Trump followed his "I'm leaving" statement with another that was just as impulsive. In a conversation with reporters, he said: "Iran is pulling people out of Syria, but they can frankly do whatever they want there." (Ibid)

None of this is to say that America's open-ended commitments in Afghanistan and Syria and the global war on terror do not deserve rethinking.

I and numerous other observers have been calling for that for years.

But while we are doing that rethinking, it is important to remember an aphorism that is often repeated in military circles: "Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat." It is a useful guide to the difference between the Obama and Trump approaches to the Middle East.

Regime Types and Terrorism: The Scholarship

Scholarly interest in the relationship between regime type and terrorist incidents goes back to the early 1980s. Spikes of intense interest have punctuated longer periods of neglect. The literature in this area is consequently fragmented, and has tended to suffer from methodological and conceptual weaknesses.

Most studies, for instance, have an outmoded quality. They tend to focus on intervals drawn from the three and a half decades between 1968 and 2004, with temporal clusterings that bespeak interest in secular, left-wing, and nationalist strains of terrorism—phenomena that have since essentially dissipated. (William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg April 2005: 278-97) The most recent major studies are more up to date, but still rely on data that go up only to 2012 at the latest, before the combined impact of the "Arab Spring" and the civil wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen could be adequately measured and analyzed. (Khusrav Gaibulloev, James A. Piazza, and Todd Sandler :May 2013: 355-78.)

Moreover, researchers interested in terrorism and those concerned with political regimes have traditionally worked in separate disciplinary realms. Terrorism analysts have often examined either domestic or transnational terrorism, but not

both. They have used inconsistent definitions and measures of regime types, and they have tended to treat “democracy” and “dictatorship” as dichotomous variables. (Eubank and Weinberg, “Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism : January 2008: 72-91) For their part, democracy scholars have so far only scratched the surface of the complex relationship among post-9/11 terrorism, voting patterns, and broader sociopolitical attitudes. (Johann Park and Valentina Bali :August 2017: 1343-70) The conditions and causal pathways by which terrorist attacks and public fear of jihadist terrorism may fuel democratic decline—or spur democratic resilience and renewal—remain too little studied. (Aziz Huq : 2018)

Still, over the past several decades a pair of distinct and broadly opposing views has emerged regarding the relationship between democracy and terrorist attacks. Inquiry into the relationship between dictatorship and terrorism emerged much later.(Deniz Aksoy, David B. Carter, and Joseph Wright : July 2012: 810-26) Most recently, terrorism scholars have caught up with developments in comparative politics, and have recognized that neither “democracy” nor “dictatorship” is a monolithic category. The upshot has been the development of a third view regarding the association between regime types and terrorist attacks.

Until recently, the dominant view had been that democracies were more prone to terrorist attacks than nondemocracies, and that “the more democratic a country is, the more terrorism it should experience.(Chenoweth : 357.)” Advocates of this view offer three main explanations to support it.

The first holds that liberal-democratic freedoms of association and movement, coupled with due-process safeguards and legal restraints on security forces, make it easier to organize terrorist groups and to plan and carry out attacks. As Martha Crenshaw remarked in 1981, “terrorists view the context as permissive, making terrorism a viable option. In a material sense, the means are placed at

their disposal by the environment.” (Martha Crenshaw : (July 1981): 383) Twenty years later, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. attorney-general John Ashcroft lamented to a Senate committee that “terrorists exploit our openness.” Mentioning a captured al-Qaeda training manual, he warned that “terrorists are told how to use America’s freedom as a weapon against us.” (John Ashcroft : 6 December 2001)

The second explanation emphasizes mobilization, publicity, and the susceptibility of elected officials to public sentiment. Terrorists can most easily achieve “strategic influence” in the most liberal democracies owing to the confluence of a free press, which guarantees a wide audience for acts of spectacular violence, and officials who feel intense public pressure to avoid any additional violence.(Eubank and Weinberg : 2006, 174)

The third explanation holds that electoral competition and institutional design play key roles in explaining heightened vulnerability to terrorism among certain democracies. Between 2004 and 2010, three studies found that political systems with higher levels of political competition suffered more terrorist incidents. (Mia Bloom : Spring 2004: 61-88)

Since the mid-1990s, an opposing view has emerged. This view contends that democracy actually has an antiterrorist effect because democratic openness allows grievances to be peacefully and publicly expressed and redressed, which in turn makes it harder for violent, conspiratorial fringe groups to prosper.

(Jeffrey Ian Ross : August 1993: 317-29)

This logic suggests that encouraging authoritarian regimes and lower-quality democracies to embrace greater openness can similarly help to cut the ground out from under their local extremists before the latter reach the point of mounting attacks abroad.(Gaibullov, Piazza, and Sandler : 494)

In a twist that may have bred more confusion than clarity, a small number of studies argued that the observed proclivity of terrorists to target democracies was an illusion caused by authoritarian regimes' underreporting of terrorist incidents. (Todd Sandler : 1995: 1-9).

More recently, as scholars who study terrorism have taken to seeing political freedom as a matter of degree rather than one of opposite poles marked "democracy" and "dictatorship," a third view has begun to take shape. Among its pioneers has been Alberto Abadie, who in 2006 suggested that political freedom has a nonlinear effect on terrorism. The relationship that he saw between regime types and terrorism took the form of an inverted U. The idea was that "countries with intermediate levels of political freedom [are] more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes(Alberto Abadie : May 2006: 51)." Following Abadie, in 2013 Erica Chenoweth found that "partial democracies" sustained the highest number of attacks.(Chenoweth : 358.) Similarly, an extensive recent study by Khusrav Gaibullov, James A. Piazza, and Todd Sandler finds that "regime type has an extremely robust inverted U-shaped relationship to terrorism for a global sample," with the fewest terror attacks occurring in both strict autocracies and full-fledged democracies while "some middle range" of regimes between democracy and autocracy is most prone to suffer such attacks. (Gaibullov, Piazza, and Sandler : 492.)

Trends Since 9/11

It was only after 9/11 that reliable studies covering both domestic and transnational terrorism became possible. This was owing to the development, starting in late 2001, of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)—a systematic, open-source database that now records terrorist incidents and casualties globally through 2016. Building upon Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning's

typology, published in these pages in 2013 (Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning : October 2013: 98), we can disaggregate regime types well beyond the typical democracy-dictatorship dichotomy into six theoretically grounded categories, and apply the GTD data to each category for the years from 2002 through 2016.

Møller and Skaaning sort democracies into four subcategories based on a taxonomic hierarchy where the more demanding definitions subsume the less demanding ones. In ascending order, the categories are minimalist democracy, which includes regimes that fulfill the thinnest Schumpeterian definition of competitive elections; electoral democracy, which further requires the maximization of the elections criterion (that is, inclusive, high-integrity elections) but nothing else; polyarchy, in the classic sense meant by Robert A. Dahl, which extends beyond elections to cover civil liberties, particularly the freedoms of speech and association; and liberal democracy, the most demanding category, which denotes substantive democracy complete with inclusive elections, civil liberties, and the rule of law understood as equality of all persons before and under the law. In addition, autocratic regimes are divided into closed autocracies and multiparty autocracies. The latter are distinguished from the former by virtue of holding elections that involve more than one party, though these votes are not competitive enough for the regime to qualify even as minimally democratic.

Even if we put aside for the moment the exceptionally high rates of contemporary terrorism in states that score high in state fragility (as identified by the Fragile States Index), the GTD figures reveal an enormous increase in the number of terrorist attacks globally over the years from 2002 through 2016. In fact, during that period terrorist incidents in nonfragile states worldwide grew by 1,029 percent, going from 1,174 attacks in 2002 to 13,257 attacks in 2016. The number of terrorist events, moreover, rose across all regime types.

The aggregate increase in terrorism is at odds with the decades-long decline in interstate wars, but consistent with the dramatic resurgence of other forms of political violence over the past decade. Globally, the number of “major civil wars”—those involving at least one state actor and causing more than a thousand battle deaths per year—had declined by 72 percent between 1990 and 2003, only to go back up again thereafter: There were only four such wars in 2005, but eleven in 2015. The number of minor civil wars (involving 25 to 999 battle deaths per year) also rose over the same period, with the sharp uptick since 2014 largely driven by the expansion of ISIS and its affiliates, which were involved in conflicts in three countries in 2014 and at least twelve in 2015. (Sebastian von Einsiedel et al : March 2017, 2.).

The scourge of terrorism is real, yet summary data tell us little about the distribution of attacks or the rates of increase in terrorist incidents across various regime types. In reality, the disparity in the internal distribution of terrorism incidents across regime types is already immense and seems to be getting wider.

A number of insights can be gleaned from the aggregate trends. Contrary to the traditional view, we observe a robust and growing “double democracy advantage” among liberal democracies and polyarchies over the 2002-16 period, and especially since 2007. Not only are higher-quality democracies less prone to terrorist attacks than all other regime types, but the rate of increase in the number of attacks among such democracies is substantially lower in comparison to the rest.

The pattern is maintained even where we exclude any country that is farther than two standard deviations from the subcategory mean, namely the United Kingdom among liberal democracies, and Israel among the polyarchies. This is all the more striking given the already relatively low levels of terrorist incidents experienced by liberal democracies and polyarchies at the start of the

measurement period. It lends support to the minority view in the literature that sees political openness and the protection of civil liberties and the rule of law as assets that facilitate the minimization of terrorism through the airing and redress of grievances; the wide scope granted to peaceful political expression; and the resulting lower legitimacy accorded to violent fringe groups.

Broadly speaking, the empirical picture also lends support to Abadie's "curvilinear" thesis, but with several important new caveats. Countries possessing intermediate levels of political freedoms, on both the democratic and authoritarian sides of the regime spectrum, do suffer the largest number of terrorist attacks and are substantially more susceptible than regimes that are more free (on the democratic side) and less free (on the authoritarian side). These intermediate regimes, it seems, cannot match either the grievance-assuaging and cooptation capacities of liberal democracies and polyarchies, or the brutal, no-holds-barred crackdown abilities of hardened autocracies.

In this sense, simply clearing the minimal "democracy" threshold does not guarantee a country the democracy advantage. It should be stressed that only reasonably high-quality democracies with broad civil-liberties guarantees can expect to enjoy the lowest relative levels of terrorism incidents. Indeed, electoral democracies and (since 2011-12) minimalist democracies have experienced sharp increases in the number of terrorist attacks. A greater frequency of terrorist incidents, therefore, can be expected to follow any decline in democratic quality big enough to drop a country below the polyarchy level.

Although intermediate levels of political freedoms predict considerably higher rates of terrorism than either high-quality democracies or closed autocracies suffer, significant internal differences between minimalist or electoral democracies and multiparty autocracies have emerged in recent years. Indeed, with the singular exception of the most fragile states—Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Nigeria,

North Korea, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe—multiparty autocracies have, since 2012, experienced the greatest absolute rise in the number of terrorist attacks and have become by far the most “at-risk” regime type when it comes to terrorism incidents. Again, the pattern holds even if we exclude outliers such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan.

Looking to the Future

The dramatic increase in the number of attacks in closed autocracies is a recent trend that signals a potentially significant shift in the future distribution of global terrorism, but it is not the only one. Looking ahead, three additional emerging issues stand out.

As ISIS and al-Qaeda lose territorial control in areas ranging from Iraq and Syria to Sinai, Yemen, and the Sahel, thousands of their fighters seek new sanctuaries. More than 5,600 ISIS members are known to have already returned to their home countries from Iraq and Syria alone, with authorities in 33 states reporting arrivals of fighters in the past two years. These include countries across the regime-type spectrum, notably Saudi Arabia (760 fighters), Turkey (800), Tunisia (800), Jordan (280), Russia (400), the United Kingdom (400), Germany (250), and France (270). (Barrett)

As the squeeze on existing geographical centers of organized jihadism becomes tighter, intelligence services worldwide are striving to predict where extremist concentrations will appear next. Will it be Turkey and Europe; parts of Africa; Southeast Asia; Afghanistan and Pakistan; or some combination of the above? While returnees present different levels of risk, one thing is clear: Regimes with higher levels of state capacity will be better able to manage whatever problems returnees pose, and should thereby suffer less terrorism than regimes whose state capacity is lower. This too augurs well for the ability of advanced democracies to handle the terrorist threat as its contours change.

This points to a second way in which scholarship on terrorism and regime types can improve: It is time to break the bad habit, too common across the social sciences, of taking the state for granted by ignoring the “statehood” (or state-capacity) dimension of regimes.

This is a serious lapse. If we consider the world’s sixteen most fragile states over the 2002-16 period, we see an enormous and growing correlation between state fragility and terrorism incidents. Whereas from 2002 through 2004 the incidence of terrorism among the most fragile states was unremarkable, by 2014 the numbers of terrorist attacks and terrorism fatalities in fragile states dwarfed any of the regime-type groupings (these groupings of course include the sixteen most-fragile states, which are being singled out here as an analytical category and are not meant to be an add-on to Møller and Skaaning’s list of regime types).

In the fragile states, terrorist attacks rose gradually in number between 2003 and 2011. Then they shot upward, owing to incidents mainly in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, but also in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria. This clustering of terror attacks in a handful of troubled states comports broadly with important shifts in the nature of post-2003 civil wars—what Barbara Walter recently called “The New New Civil Wars.” The pattern suggests that future research will need to view terrorism not merely as a singular species of political violence, but as one element in a broader repertory of order-contestation methods that includes not only insurgencies and civil wars (Barbara F. Walter : (2017): 469-86.), but also efforts by “antisystem” challengers to establish governance configurations, Islamist social-welfare arrangements, and even electoral systems across various tracts of land while rejecting conventional “Westphalian” statehood.

Finally, scholars of democracy and political violence need to turn their attention to risks of decay and decline within the liberal order itself. That contemporary

challenges to liberal democracy come from radical Islam and other overtly authoritarian ideologies does not exclude populist nationalism as another possible source of trouble.

Populism focuses on perceived physical, economic, and cultural threats to “the people,” which come from elites and “others,” often construed to include immigrants and religious minorities. Populism tends to see the international realm as a matter of “us” and “them” as well. Populism is antipluralist, treating criticism as opposition to “the people” and their interests. Populism typically traffics in conspiracy theories: If the people and their affairs are in a bad way, it must be because corrupt elites and outsiders (including immigrants) have leagued against them. There are enemies everywhere. Something vast and shadowy is going on behind the scenes. The political system is rigged, and so is the economy. The world is dangerous and hostile. Democracy is a sham, the security organs that are meant to protect us are failing, and the media is lying to us. There is an ongoing crisis, and an apocalyptic showdown between the forces of good and evil is coming.

As its sovereign solution, populism inclines toward support for a “strong leader” who can speak for “the people” and act decisively in their name. What needs to be done is obvious, “no debate about values or weighing of empirical evidence is required.(Jan-Werner Müller : 2016, 26.)” Whoever opposes the solution is an enemy of the people and a traitor.

The drift of such a complex of ideas and attitudes is antiliberal. It has the potential to corrode democratic values and institutions, and it can also be toxic to the effective management of terrorist threats. Although the causal mechanisms that link terrorism to democratic decline are less than fully clear, it is not hard to make the case that populist politics can exacerbate terrorist threats in democracies, reduce democratic resilience, and lead to the undermining of democratic quality and the rule of law.

To push the idea that society and indeed the world are split into two hostile camps may risk inclining more and not fewer people toward radicalism of thought and deed. Perhaps the greatest success of free societies in their fight against terrorism so far is the relatively small number of recruits that the radicals have managed to gain within the West. Ironically, jihadists and populists share a hostility to pluralism. Both advance a worldview in which “the sons of light and the sons of darkness” are locked in an all-consuming existential struggle that reduces any idea of a middle course or a different way of thinking about things to a delusion.

By maintaining pluralism and refusing to force individuals with competing civic and religious identities to make sharp choices among them, liberal societies provide potential sympathizers of radical Islam with diffuse but potent “opt-out” prospects that can help them steer clear of terrorism and terrorism-supporting activities. In an important sense, astute counterterror policy should seek to give those involved or potentially involved in political violence strong material and symbolic incentives to shun or quit such involvement. In a pluralist society, an individual may occupy identity and social spaces where competing civic and religious loyalties can coexist, even if in some degree of metaphysical tension. To brand any group collectively as a threat is to constrict such salutary spaces, and thus is poor policy.

Those charged with making political and security decisions in a free society should act on the basis of facts and the accurate assessment of risks. As part and parcel of a strategic counterterrorism posture, leaders must assuage public fears, inspire trust in the values and institutions of the democratic state, nurture unity, and promote hope for a safer, more harmonious future for all members of society. This involves carefully handling intelligence information; supporting law enforcement while simultaneously holding it accountable for wrongful conduct; and signaling to adversaries that society is resilient and united. It also

means keeping the public informed about threat levels without destroying trust in the security agencies, sowing panic, or emboldening vigilantism or reprisals against minorities. Just after a terror attack, moreover, democratic leadership requires the skillful balancing of rapid, decisive action and public reassurance with the avoidance of knee-jerk reactions that are likely to prove counterproductive in the longer term.

The populist instinct for antagonism and conspiracy is antithetical to these goals. To stoke public fears, stress internal differences, cultivate a permanent sense of emergency, and encourage aggressive nationalism is to make a real-enough threat into something worse than it has to be.

In an atmosphere of fear and mistrust, the “terrorist threat” can serve as a catchall excuse for stifling dissent and stacking intelligence, law-enforcement, and judicial institutions with loyalists of the ruling party and its “strong leader.” In Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey and Vladimir Putin’s Russia, for example, “terrorism” has come to mean making statements that the government finds disagreeable. Meanwhile, terrorist attacks become excuses for crackdowns on dissidents and antiterror laws are broadened and used as cudgels against independent journalists and opposition politicians.

Terrorist incidents can hand illiberal governments pretexts for the full-blown crushing of political expression and competition. An especially notorious case from history is the Reichstag fire of 27 February 1933. That night, the German parliament building in Berlin went up in flames. Evidence at the scene pointed to arson. A young Dutch Communist named Marinus van der Lubbe was found nearby and arrested for the act. The Nazis under Adolf Hitler (who had been chancellor for slightly less than a month) immediately claimed that the blaze had been the work of a vast conspiracy intent on revolution, and began locking up suspected opponents. On February 28, Hitler persuaded 85-year-old president Paul von Hindenburg to issue a sweeping emergency decree under the

powers vested in the head of state by Article 48 of the Weimar Republic's constitution. Key civil rights and liberties such as habeas corpus and the freedoms of expression and assembly were suspended, and the campaign of mass arrests received legal cover. The episode (which some argue was a Nazi ploy from the outset) became the first step in the creation of Hitler's dictatorship.

More recently, Russian president Vladimir Putin used a handful of Chechen terrorist attacks—including one that killed 41 people on a train two days before the 2003 parliamentary elections and the horrific Beslan school hostage siege in September 2004—to achieve radical centralization. He stripped all provincial governments of power while giving the Kremlin control over security matters and political institutions throughout the country.

Worries about terrorism (let alone actual attacks) give governments incentives to weaken civil-liberties safeguards and make it easier for authorities to intrude into once-private spheres. New powers to surveil, investigate, and “administratively detain” (in other words, to hold people without actually filing charges) can corrode the rule of law.

These capacities, which go far beyond ordinary policing tactics and powers, owe their legitimacy in the public's eyes to their seeming necessity as counterterror measures. Yet once they are called into being, temptations to use them against political adversaries will inevitably arise. Surveillance and financial-regulation authorities developed to stop terrorism might become sources of damaging information (the Russian term is *kompromat*) that can be leaked, used as fodder for blackmail, or selectively employed in tax, corruption, or other embarrassing investigations. Laws that ban various “terrorism-supporting” activities can be misused to threaten actual and potential opponents with fines or even jail. (Huq) The inherently clandestine nature of the actors and information involved is problematic, while advancing surveillance

technologies add to the difficulty of keeping such state capacities within bounds.

Grasping the relationship between regime types, on the one hand, and the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks, on the other, is essential for both domestic and foreign-policy reasons. Among liberal democracies and polyarchies, the knowledge that preserving and deepening democratic substance enhances safety should help both to refute calls to erode civil liberties and legal safeguards for security's sake, and to enhance democratic resilience in the face of the long-term struggle against terrorism. Against the background of a global surge in terror covering most of the last decade and a half, and contrary to popular hype, a consolidated, high-quality democracy is increasingly proving to be the best counterterror organization known to humanity. A liberal democracy is by its very nature as an open society built for enduring success against terror.

At the same time, political leaders, security professionals, and voters in electoral and minimalist democracies can expect to reap greater safety from improved democratic quality. Multiparty autocracies—and external actors backing their liberalization—need to prepare for a curvilinear effect in which liberalizing authoritarian regimes will suffer increased incidents of terrorism unless and until they manage to get “over the hump” by attaining levels of democratic quality high enough to push terrorism back down. Closed autocracies, meanwhile, appear to have lost much of the antiterrorist advantage that they may have once enjoyed. Oppression and denial of political access cannot keep them safe.

Findings

This paper sets out the results of the questionnaire. Initially, studying the two policies of President Obama and Trump regarding war on terrorism leads us to differentiate between which one is more effective. Obama's administration was softer and he prioritized only at diplomacy as the most effective ways and negotiation rather than deploy military forces. However Trump's administration determines more aggressive acts on war on terror, he focused on military power which will be prepared to counter the chief threat for US which is Islamic terrorism and ISIS. Although Trump's approach seems to be racist he would manage to come to a more effective result in fighting terrorism rather than Obama's one.

Obama's diplomacy in dealing with terrorism, generally, in the first five years from 2009-2013, the Obama administration dealt with traditional Middle Eastern conflicts as well as new developments spawned by the Arab Spring. However, America's involvement in those conflicts has shown little signs of progress towards resolution, the main accomplishment Obama made was the US withdrawal from Iraq, and it could be argued the new opening towards Iran is a positive step forward, but for now there remains no permanent settlement on Iran's nuclear question. The Arab Spring, whose impact is still reverberating throughout the region, he posed extra challenges to the Obama administration's

Trump diplomacy toward terrorism:

Donald Trump's policy represents a significant change from that of Barack Obama. The president is seeking to bolster Israel and Saudi Arabia, in particular, and to isolate Iran. Trump and his advisers have abandoned the longstanding policy of opposing Shia and Sunni extremism, choosing to back Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and by extension Israel all of which favor confrontation with Tehran. Most importantly, the administration is in the

process of creating the Middle East Strategic Alliance an “Arab NATO” The goal would be to increase overall security and economic cooperation, including a regional anti-missile defense shield,the administration has struggled to formulate a coherent strategy regarding the Syrian civil war

Conclusion:

Though the different approaches has been used by both presidents;Barack Obama and Donald Trump they attempt to prserve the American character and interests. Thus. Each president tries to present his diplomacy more efficient than the other one .

Regarding to the targted countries fought with many means and tactics to protect their own intersts as well as.

Conclusion

The conclusion that can be drawn is the tragic events that took place in September 2001 changed the external policy of US. The Bush administration launched the anti-terrorist campaign against the AlQaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq, which had certain negative impact on the interstate relations even though the idea of Bush doctrine was supported by several American partners. Moreover, the policy of ultimatum rather than a persuasive approach conducted by Bush led to the increase in the level of terrorist threat among states that cooperated with US, and to the increase in the support of extremist groups and contributed to the rise of ISIS.

The policy of Obama was different to the Bush one and focused on the targeting specific individuals that could be considered as potential threat for US rather than on states. It was decided to withdraw the forces from the Iraq and Afghanistan within a certain period of time, but the policy course has been changed later on and the idea regarding potential assistance in Afghanistan was not supported by the American allies. The policy of new-elected President Donald Trump concerning the global war on terror is unpredictable, but his goal is to eliminate the radical Islam and to lead the existence of ISIS to the end. To some extent it is similar to the Bush and his administration when it comes to the fight against terrorism, but it can be noticed that his policy will be focused on the internal issues rather than external ones. Nevertheless, the missile strike on Syria that was recently conducted can have significant impact on the relations between countries that are engaged into Syrian conflict, especially US and Russia. In other words, the risk of proxy war between US and Russia is one of the key issues in the resolution of the current Syrian conflict and potential defeat of ISIS.

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ملخص:

هجمات الحادي عشر من سبتمبر على مركز التجارة العالمي والبانثاغون أحدثت فوضى عالمية أدت الى مايسمى بالحرب ضد الإرهاب من طرف امريكا خلال مرحلتين رئاسيتين؛المرحلة الاولى برئاسة باراك أوباما والثانية برئاسة دونالد ترامب.

من المهم التساؤل حول فترة الحرب لأنه من المتوقع أن تجد تباينا في الروايات الرئاسية استجابة للتغيرات في السياق. تستخدم هذي الأطروحة الرئيس أوباما والرئيس ترامب كعينة لدراسة الدبلوماسية والمناهج المستخدمة لمحاربة الإرهاب وتأثيرها في دول الشرق الأوسط من طرف الرئيسين، وخلق إطار جديد لتحليل سياسة أوباما وترامب في مايتعلق بالإرهاب لأنها قضية مثيرة لجدل بسبب التوترات المتوقعة بين الرئيسين ،هذا الإطار يمكن الباحثين من اختبار فرضياتهم أن هناك فرق بين طريقة تعامل أوباما وترامب مع وجود الإرهاب.

الكلمات المفتاحية:

هجمات 9-11 ، الشرط الأوسط ، الإرهاب ، ترامب أوباما، داعش.