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## **Idealism, Realism and the Obama's Foreign Policy towards the Arab Spring 2011**

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of the Requirements for the Degree of Master in Literature and Civilization**

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## DECLARATION

We hereby solemnly declare that the work we are going to present in this thesis **“Idealism, Realism and the Obama’s Foreign Policy towards the Arab Spring 2011.”**, is our own. It has not been submitted before to any other institution or University. All sources that we have used and quoted from have been indicated by means of complete references.

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## DEDICATIONS

To the dearest people to my heart, I am greatfull to dedicate this work:

A special dedicate to the tender hearts, to the candles of my life to my parents;  
Mouhammed El Tahar, and Messaouda

A particular dedication to my lovely sister Zineb, and brothers; Idriss, Tarek, and  
Djamel Eddine

To my brother's sweetest daughters; Djinane El Beilacen, and Soudjoud

To my beloved and grateful friends: first of all, to Assmahane, Zahra, Latifa, and then,  
to Khadidja, Yammama, Radjaa, Bassma, Bariza, Aicha, Hanane, Ghania, Ahlem, and Malika

To my relatives and to all people who loved and helped me

For all their love, deep support, and encouragement

May Almighty Allah bless you and keep your healthy forever

Chahrazed

I would like to dedicate this work to:

To the dearest people to my heart, to my parents, Abdalallah and Zineb

To my lonely sister Maria

To my brothers, Zaki, yacine, Oussama and Koussai

To my best friends Ghania, Hanan, Soumaya and Bariza, to my aunt Djamila and all  
my relatives

Ahlam.

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis deals with the Arab Spring as a process of profound political change in the Arab world, previously the only major world area where dictatorship endured unchallenged for decades. While in different countries of the Arab world mass protests in 2011 constrained rulers to hand over power, however; other dictator administrations have – in spite of political and economic pressure – so far possessed the capacity to stay in power. The Arab Spring influenced every country in the region very differently. Six countries are chosen for the analysis. The American President Barack Obama and his top diplomats' performances respond to each country differently according to U.S. national interests, and its key objectives in the Middle East region. The motivation behind this thesis is to understand the Obama Doctrine and set up a clearer meaning of what it is by contextualizing it through the perspectives of other presidential tenets, the schools of idealism and realism. In addition to that, this thesis aims to set up specific tenets of the Obama Doctrine, as well as recognize the contradictions existed inside the Obama Doctrine that appeared when responding to the Arab Spring. We will then use Obama's arc of disenchantment to explain how the Arab Spring changed the Obama Doctrine's way of decision making.

**Key words:** The Arab Spring, Middle East Region, The Obama Doctrine, The Schools of Idealism and Realism, Obama's Arc of Disenchantment.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

|                   |                                                            |
|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>A.Q.A.P:</b>   | Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula                          |
| <b>G.C.C:</b>     | A Gulf Cooperation Council                                 |
| <b>M.E.N.A:</b>   | Middle East and North Africa                               |
| <b>N.T.C:</b>     | Libyan National Transitional Council                       |
| <b>N.A.T.O:</b>   | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                         |
| <b>N.C:</b>       | Libyan National Council                                    |
| <b>F.S.A:</b>     | Free Syrian Army                                           |
| <b>G.P.A:</b>     | General People's Congress party                            |
| <b>J.M.P:</b>     | Join Meetings Party                                        |
| <b>N.A.V.C.O:</b> | Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Data Project |
| <b>U.S:</b>       | United States                                              |
| <b>W.M.D:</b>     | Weapons of Mass Destruction                                |
| <b>N.S.S:</b>     | National Security Strategy                                 |
| <b>T.T.W.T.C:</b> | Twin Towers of the World Trade Center                      |
| <b>U.N</b>        | United Nations                                             |
| <b>G.M.E.P:</b>   | Greater Middle East Project                                |
| <b>S.C.U.N:</b>   | Security Council of the United Nations                     |
| <b>C.S.M.O:</b>   | Council of Senior Military Officers                        |
| <b>I.S.I.S:</b>   | Islamic State in Iraq and Syria                            |
| <b>I.A.E.A:</b>   | International Atomic Energy Agency                         |
| <b>G.N.C:</b>     | General National Congress of Libya                         |
| <b>P.L.O:</b>     | Palestine Liberation Organization                          |

|                   |                                            |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| <b>P.N.A:</b>     | Palestine National Authority               |
| <b>U.N.S.C.R:</b> | United Nations Security Council Resolution |
| <b>U.S.S:</b>     | Union of Sovereign States                  |
| <b>G.P.C:</b>     | General People's Congress                  |

## LIST OF FIGURES

|                                                                    |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Figure One: Territories Occupied by Israel since 1967.....         | 11 |
| Figure Two: Palestinian- Israeli's Further Steps toward Peace..... | 21 |
| Figure Three: The Arab Spring .....                                | 36 |
| Figure Four: Egyptian's Revolution.....                            | 41 |
| Figure Five: Libya's Revolution .....                              | 45 |
| Figure Six: The Yemeni Civil War .....                             | 50 |
| Figure Seven: U.S.'s Helps for Yemen.....                          | 53 |
| Figure Eight: Syrian's Uprising .....                              | 58 |
| Figure Nine: The Role of Social Media in The Arab Spring.....      | 68 |
| Figure Ten: The Arab League.....                                   | 74 |
| Figure Eleven: The Obama Doctrine.....                             | 83 |



## **LIST OF TABLES**

|                                                               |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Table One: Events with Deaths: Geographical Distribution..... | 38 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|----|

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

| CONTENTS                                                                                                           | Page     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| DECLARATION.....                                                                                                   | I        |
| DEDICATION.....                                                                                                    | II       |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....                                                                                               | III      |
| ABSTRACT.....                                                                                                      | IV       |
| LIST OF TABLES.....                                                                                                | V        |
| LIST OF FIGURES.....                                                                                               | VI       |
| LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....                                                                                         | VII      |
| <b>GENERAL INTRODUCTION.....</b>                                                                                   | <b>1</b> |
| 1-Statement of the Problem.....                                                                                    | 1        |
| 2-Aims of the Study .....                                                                                          | 2        |
| 3-Methodology.....                                                                                                 | 2        |
| 4-Structure of the Dissertation .....                                                                              | 3        |
| <b>I. CHAPTER ONE: The American Foreign Policy since the Second World War to the Election of Obama (1945-2008)</b> |          |
| 1- Introduction.....                                                                                               | 5        |
| 2- Idealism from the American Perspective.....                                                                     | 6        |
| 3- Realism in the American Homeland .....                                                                          | 7        |
| 4- The Arab Israeli Conflict 1948-.....                                                                            | 9        |
| 4-1 -The Palestinian Question 1945- .....                                                                          | 15       |
| 4-2 -The Camp David Agreement and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process 1979.....                                         | 17       |
| 5- The Deseret Storm Operation of 1991.....                                                                        | 19       |
| 6- Clinton’s Major Peace Treaties 1993- 2000.....                                                                  | 21       |
| 7- The Bush Doctrine 2001-2009.....                                                                                | 24       |
| 7-1- The Principles of Preemptive-Preventive War.....                                                              | 25       |
| 7-2- The 9 /11Attacks and its Aftermath in 2001.....                                                               | 27       |
| 7-3- The Invasion of Iraq in 2003.....                                                                             | 28       |
| 8- Conclusion.....                                                                                                 | 30       |

## **II. CHAPTER TWO: The Arab Spring 2011: Road to the Crises.**

|                                                                                       |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1- Introduction.....                                                                  | 34 |
| 2- The Jasmine Revolution: Tunisia's Uprising 2010 .....                              | 36 |
| 3- The Tahrir Square Revolution of 2011: The January 25 Revolution.....               | 41 |
| 4- The Zanga Zanga Democracy: The Libyan Uprisings on February 2011.....              | 45 |
| 5- The Taghyir Square's Revolution: Yemen's Continuing Political Transition 2011..... | 49 |
| 6- The Sectarianism in Bahrain: The February Pearl Uprisings 2011.....                | 54 |
| 7- Syria's Unfinished Story: Syrian's Uprising May 2012.....                          | 58 |
| 8- Conclusion.....                                                                    | 62 |

## **III. CHAPTER THREE: The Arab Winter and Obama's Foreign Policy Legacy.**

|                                                                          |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1- Introduction.....                                                     | 66 |
| 2- The Role of Social Media in the Arab Spring.....                      | 67 |
| 3- After the Hope of the Arab Spring, the "Chill" of an Arab Winter..... | 70 |
| 4- The Arab League and the Arab Spring.....                              | 74 |
| 5- Idealist or Realist? Obama's Confused Foreign Policy.....             | 76 |
| 6- The Obama Doctrine and the Arc of Disenchantment.....                 | 82 |
| 7- The Legacy of Barack Obama in the Middle East.....                    | 86 |
| 8- Conclusion.....                                                       | 88 |

|                                 |           |
|---------------------------------|-----------|
| <b>GENERAL CONCLUSION .....</b> | <b>91</b> |
|---------------------------------|-----------|

|                           |           |
|---------------------------|-----------|
| <b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b> | <b>93</b> |
|---------------------------|-----------|

|                       |            |
|-----------------------|------------|
| <b>GLOSSARY .....</b> | <b>101</b> |
|-----------------------|------------|

|                                |            |
|--------------------------------|------------|
| <b>ABSTRACT IN FRENCH.....</b> | <b>104</b> |
|--------------------------------|------------|

|                                |            |
|--------------------------------|------------|
| <b>ABSTRACT IN ARABIC.....</b> | <b>105</b> |
|--------------------------------|------------|

## **GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

American foreign policy has dependably been instilled with a tension between its national interest and idealistic national values. This tension, in a sense, can be viewed as a conflict between 'foreign policy realism' and 'foreign policy idealism. Realism, obviously, being the articulation and goal for national self-interests while idealism (or liberalism) being the articulation and spread of values or ideals.

The American president Barack Obama come into office relentlessly dubious about the policies of his predecessor, George W. Bush, the so-called Bush Doctrine, to make democracy promotion a key, if not predominant, part of American policy toward the Middle East. Through his administration, Obama needed to reestablish America's lost picture and status in the world, to lead the world again to accomplish peace and pride, and to begin a "new beginning" with Muslims worldwide through his pledges that he conveyed on June,4,2009 at Cairo University in Egypt.

But the quick and eccentric changes that occurred in the Middle East or what is known as "the Arab Spring" was posturing huge difficulties to U.S. strategy formation and activity. The pressure in the American foreign policy between following the American values (foreign policy idealism) and protecting American interests (foreign policy realism) renewed and the United State was in dilemma over how to treat or to address the crisis (the Arab Spring). The pressure between those two fundamentally distinct policies orientation has turned out to be much more significant as the United States endeavored to react to the Arab Spring uprisings.

With regards to America's foreign policy approach towards the Arab Spring uprisings that started in late 2010, it seems to be contradicted. Some would contend that the Obama administration's eloquence coordinated towards the provisional states was very much idealistic, while others would point to the intervention in Libya as being within the national self-interest and thus, realist.

### **1- Statement of the Problem:**

The Obama's foreign policy received many attentions by historians and politicians alike, the main concern was about whether Obama's foreign policy was an idealistic one, looking for the common good of all countries or it was a kind of continuity to the preceding U.S. administrations in which political realism and its main principles (preserving the

American interest and security) was always on the first place. So, the main research questions that can be raised are the following:

- 1)-What is meant by an idealistic foreign policy?
- 2)-What kind of effect does political realism have on American foreign policy?
- 3)-Whether Obama's foreign policies towards the Arab Spring are idealistic or realistic?

## **2- Aims of the Study:**

Since we are going to talk about the Barack Obama's two terms and his reaction towards the Arab Spring, so our main objectives are:

- 1)-To study the policy of the United States of America, under the President Barack Obama, towards the Arab Spring from its beginning in the year 2011 to the year 2016 which was the end of Obama's two terms.
- 2)-To identify the contradictions present within the Obama Doctrine, through investigating, and analyzing the policy of the United States of America towards the Arab region.
- 3)-To study the concepts of the Arab Spring, its causes and its most important consequences.
- 4)-To make the reader have a good idea about the different events that happened in the Middle East and took place in the Obama's two terms and how Obama dealt with those events.
- 5)-To make a good evaluation about whether the Obama's foreign policy is an idealistic or realistic one.

## **3- Methodology:**

This research will depend on both descriptive and analytical methodologies, descriptive methodology helps to identify and classify the elements included in my topic whereas the analytical one helps to explain the relationship between those elements and why and how they are happening. Both of them are interrelated to each other. Descriptive methods are used to collect, analyze and summarize data while the analytical ones are used to extend the descriptive approaches through suggesting, comparing measuring and evaluating the available data.

In our research project, we will describe the Obama's foreign policy toward the Arab Spring with special focus on crisis that happened in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, and identify the reasons and methods used. Besides, we will evaluate the Obama's administration.

#### **4- Structure of the Dissertation:**

In this thesis, several aspects of the American foreign policy making process will be discussed. The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter consists of three parts. It starts with history of the American foreign policy under the schools of realism and idealism. The second part is concerned with the leading role of America after the Second World War in the Middle East under the concept of democracy promotion, and how it mediated in the Arab–Israeli peace process. The third and last part of this chapter deals with the Bush Doctrine, its historical background, its definition, its legitimacy, and its principals of preemptive preventive war that was caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and how the use of force abroad is a new way to promote democracy that can be best illustrated in the invasion of Iraq.

The second chapter has focused on the so-called “The Arab Spring” that occurred and spread in the Middle East region. It has focused on six selected countries. Four of them have experienced total or major political changes which are Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen; while the other two, Bahrain and Syria, have had minor political changes, with focus on the cause and the consequences of the uprisings. These two groups have been compared to each other in order to explain how the United States supported and acted differently towards the Arab uprisings.

The third chapter consists of two parts. Part one will discuss the role of social media, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other forms in the Middle East during the uprisings, and the role of the Arab League that failed to address the revolutions. In addition to that, how they facilitate and accelerate the uprisings known as the Arab Spring to become an Arab Winter. Part two will cover the foreign policy of Barack Obama during the Arab Spring. His doctrine represents a radical break with the earlier American Presidents. The Obama engagement with the Middle East followed an arc of disenchantment which was caused by the failure of the Arab Spring. Obama combines soft and hard power into smart power to become a mixture between idealism and realism, however; his legacy was a total failure that can be exemplified in the retreat of his early promises.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

**The American Foreign Policy since the  
Second World War to the Election of  
Obama (1945-2008)**

## **1-Introduction**

The US foreign policy experienced changes from time to time and applied distinctive foreign policies in different periods. In the first years of its independence it followed a policy of isolation. In accordance with the time changing international structure, the United States also attempted to change its foreign policy in accordance to these conditions. After the First World War, the American president Woodrow Wilson proposed his approach, Idealism, by spreading liberal qualities, particularly liberal markets and human rights through his famous statement which was the Fourteen Points. Another approach in the international relations was realism which emerged between the two wars. According to realism the state was the most important actor in the international system and the power of a state was evaluated in terms of its military capacity.

One of the prominent issues in the American foreign policy since many decades was The Arab–Israeli conflict which was the political tension, military conflicts and disputes between a number of Arab countries and Israel that emerged in the mid 20th century after the Israeli Declaration of Independence by the British Mandate. Large-scale hostilities occurred between Israel and Arab state and mostly ended with peace agreements like the Six Day War which took place June 5-10, 1967, in which Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Old City of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights; those territories became subsequently major points in the Arab Israeli conflict. In September 1978, a series of negotiations started and lasted for twelve days between US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. at Camp David in the White House, resulting in Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and abolishment of the military governance system in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in favor of Israeli Civil Administration and consequent unilateral annexation of the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem.

The first major foreign crisis for the United States after the end of the Cold War was seen in the Operation Desert Storm of January 1991, which was a war waged by coalition forces from 35 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The Iraqi Army's occupation of Kuwait that started in August 2, 1990 was faced with international condemnation that imposed immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the UN Security Council.



After the peace process that followed the Camp David Accord, The Lebanon Crisis occurred, it was known in Lebanon as "the invasion", began on 6 June 1982, when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invaded southern Lebanon, after repeated attacks and counter-attacks between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) operating in southern Lebanon and the IDF and it caused civilian casualties on both sides of the border. In order to end the decades-old fight between Israel and Palestine; the United States and other entities once again tried to mediate an end to the Middle East conflict. To end the decades of old fight between Israel and Palestine them. Hesitation on both sides, however, derailed the process, leaving the United States and other entities once again tried to mediate an end to the Middle East conflict. In which the American president Bill Clinton proposed a set of negotiations, the first was the Oslo Accords in 1993. The second was in July 2000, and the third was known as, The Clinton Parameters, which included a plan that indicated the distribution of land between the Palestinian State and Israeli state. The plan offered proposals for dealing with the most significant problems settlement, Jerusalem, and refugees.

After Clinton's peace process in the Middle East region, things changed upside down when President George Bush the son took office in the 2001. In general, the Bush Doctrine was a significant departure from the policies of deterrence that generally characterized U.S. foreign policy during the cold war and the period between the collapse of the Soviet Union and September 11, 2001 attacks. The emphasis on a unilateral, preemptive initiative shaped the Administration's reactions to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 which considered as the most shocking event in the history of the United States. As a response to the attack, President Bush and his advisers decided to destroy the Taliban government in Afghanistan which supposedly supported and sponsored the terrorist organizations, and to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq for supposedly developing weapons of mass destruction and conspiring with terrorists to attack the United States and its allies. In this chapter these events will be explored in further details.

## **2-Idealism from the American Perspective**

Idealism or Wilsonianism was an approach or a view that it was utilized to depict a specific kind of ideological perspective in the American foreign policy. The American president Woodrow Wilson proposed an announcement of standards or what was known by the fourteen points to the U.S.'s congress on 8 January 1918 in order to guarantee national

security, to accomplish an enduring peace in Europe, and to set up a world peace if executed<sup>1</sup>. In 1920, he was granted the Nobel peace prize for his endeavors. Wilsonianism was a type of liberal internationalism.<sup>2</sup>

Wilson's foreign policy can be reflected in the making of an international council which, believed would counteract future wars. "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants," Wilson explained, "For the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."<sup>3</sup> Here, Wilson was supporting for the League of Nations.

President Wilson's fourteen points turned into the reason for a peace program, suggesting that a League of Nations should be set up to guarantee the political and territorial independence of nations. The main purpose of the fourteen points was to create a strategy for consummation wars in all over the world, to promote democracy, and to emphasize on the self-determination of people. Wilsonianism is contrary to isolationism and non-interventionism.

Idealism's principles were about justice to all peoples and nationalities. In the initial six points, President Wilson proposed to get rid of the general causes of the wars through disarmament, free trade, freedom of seas, objective amendments of colonial claims, and the adoption of open diplomacy in Europe instead of secret agreements. The following eight points Wilson addressed the right of self-determination of people. According to him, people must be allowed to decide their political status and to hang on their economic, social, and cultural systems without any external interference by another state. Wilson also insisted on the creation of general organizations that would safeguard human rights.<sup>4</sup>

### **3-Realism in the American Homeland**

The United States organized its foreign policy around several distinct values that had both historical and principal significance to the American peoples. These values were promoting democracy, promoting human rights, and promoting national self-determination.

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<sup>1</sup> Tony Smith, *Wilsonianism* (Virginia: University of Virginia Faculty, January1,2002) P:3

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Woodrow Wilson, *President Wilson's Fourteen Points*. (World War Document Archive. January 8, 1918), p2.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

Frequently, these values would contradict each other and more regularly than national security, and economic self-interests would dominate and prevail over all of them.<sup>5</sup>

Realism, also known as political realism, was a view or way to deal with practice of international politics that appeared after the Second World War by the following founding fathers Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. Thucydides, (born 460 BC or earlier? died after 404 BC?), was one of the best of old Greek historians and authors of the History of the Peloponnesian War, who described the struggle between Athens and Sparta in the 5th century BC. His work was the primary recorded political and moral analysis of a nation's war policies. He additionally called the father of the school of political realism. Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (3 May 1469 – 21 June 1527) was an Italian diplomat, politician, historian, philosopher, humanist, and writer of the Renaissance period. He frequently called the father of modern political science. According to Machiavellianism, the ends constantly legitimized the means—regardless how merciless, figuring or immoral those means might be. The term “Machiavellian” was likewise used to depict an action undertaken for pick up without respect for right or wrong. Thomas Hobbes (5 April 1588 – 4 December 1679) was an English philosopher who was considered as one of the founders of modern political philosophy. Hobbes was best known for his 1651 book *Leviathan*, which built up the social contract theory that has served as the foundation for later Western political philosophy.<sup>6</sup>

The US realist foreign policy can be separated into three periods. The first period was in the cold war period (1945-1990), the second was from the end of the cold war till the start of the 11th September attacks (1990-2001), and the third was after the 11th of September (2001 and after). Realism concentrated on the role of the nation-state that it was motivated by national interests. State interests regularly concerned with self-preservation, military security, economic prosperity, struggle for power, and influence over other states. It was often in opposition to idealism or liberalism. In this regard, President George W. Bush said “Liberals were wrong, liberals are wrong, because they are liberals. What is wrong with liberalism is liberalism-metaphysics and a mythology that is woefully blind to human and to political reality.”<sup>7</sup> And he was the best example of this theory, in the twentieth century. Realism claimed the following six principals:

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<sup>5</sup> Bryan R. Jackson, *Realism and Liberalism: The World We Live in*. (Southern New Hampshire University: Global Security Policy) p2.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy*. P.17.

To start with, since the world is cruel and perilous place, the best way to protect yourself or your interest is through the use of power or the military power. A powerful state will dependably be able to have self-preservation. Second, interest is constantly dynamic changeable, it changes with the changes in the environment. Third, abstract moral principles cannot be connected to politics because it will diminish a state's capacity to ensure itself. Fourth, political leaders must not give moral concepts a chance to control the foreign policy. Fifth, self-rule of international politics; universal associations and laws have no power or impact on political decisions. Sixth, politics are already administrated by Objective Laws which have origins in human nature.<sup>8</sup>

#### **4-The Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-**

The Arab-Israeli Conflict was and still the biggest and most dangerous struggle that the world and the Arabic world in particular have ever seen since the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. This conflict witnessed four major wars. First of all; we have the 1948 War. Joel Benin and Lisa Hajjar said, "On May 15, 1948, the British valuated Palestine, and Zionist leaders proclaimed the state of Israel Neighboring Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq)"<sup>9</sup>. The 1948 war is a war that broke out in Palestine between the Egyptian, Jordanian and Iraqi kingdoms, Lebanon and Syria against Israel.

The United Kingdom at that time announced the end of its mandate on Palestine and the British troops left from the mandate area when the United Nations issued a resolution to divide Palestine into tow Jewish and Arab countries, which was opposed by Arab countries and launched a military offensive to expel Jewish militants from Palestine when it was the most important of which was the Jordanian-Israeli front. With the end of the war Jordan was able to maintain Jerusalem and the West Bank. On the northern front, the Lebanese Forces captured a number of villages while Israel suffered huge losses. This is on one hand. On the other hand, Israel suffered heavy casualties and the fighting continued until the UN Security Council intervned and imposed a ceasefire on June 10, 1948.

Despite the international resolution, Israel did not abide by the law and accelerated to compensate for its losses through European and American military support. On July 8, 1948, the Israeli army resumed fighting and managed to impose control over large areas of the

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<sup>8</sup> Charles Krauthammer, *Democratic Realism An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World* (Washington D.C. 2004) P. 5.

<sup>9</sup> Joel Bein in and Lisa Hajjar, *Palestine, Israel and The Arab-Israeli Conflict A Primer*. Middle East Research & Information. P. 5.

Palestinian territories. Arab forces suffered a series of defeats and the fighting ended on January 7, 1949, after the UN Security Council threatened to impose sanctions on the combatant parties which led to the Arab recognition of defeat and thus the entry of Palestine into Arab History under the name of the Nakba.<sup>10</sup> As an Israeli scholar Ilan Pappé said; “the Palestinians regard Israelis as the conquerors and themselves as the true victim of the first Arab-Israeli war, which they call al-Nakba or the disaster...The Israelis whether or not they were conquerors, were the indisputable victors in the 1948 war, which they call the war of Independence”.<sup>11</sup>

Jews would not have found a foothold in Palestine and Arab Countries without the support, encouragement and care of countries that have governed fate of world since the beginning of last century especially the United States. The Zionist movement succeeded to win the U.S. sympathy for their demands through rejecting the Arabs demand that limit their ambitions in Palestine. America’s goals and interest are tied to Israel’s interests and in the establishment of the state of Israel. Another support came economically through financial, technological and scientific support. As well as military support.

In addition, there were Israeli-American Organizations that were active within the American political system by nominating their supporters not only in the Federal Government, Congress and Executive Branch but also in the administration and councils of the states and cities of the U.S. Common interests and the strategic dimension of protecting America’s interests in the Middle East is what governs the relationship between the two parties and the orientations of U.S. Policy. America has sought to consolidate and defend the foundation of the new state of Israel.

In view of the increased American-Israeli rapprochement, Israel has refused to implement U.N. Resolutions 242-338, that supposed talks at just and indestructible peace in the Middle East, especially during Reagan’s (1911-2004) reign and decision-makers in his administration, such as, Rums field and Dick Cheney constituted a cover Israel’s practices against the Arabs especially Palestine.<sup>12</sup> After the American initiatives to stop the Arab-Israeli Conflict like the initiative of William Rogers (1913-2001), U.S. Security of state under

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<sup>10</sup> Jeremy Pressman, “A Brief History of The Arab-Israeli Conflict.” *Copyright Jeremy Pressman*. Connecticut University, May 25, 2005. p. 4, 5.

<sup>11</sup> Ilan Pappé, *The Israel / Palestine Question. Rewriting Histories*. (London and New York: Series editor: Jack R. Censer). P. 150.

<sup>12</sup> Kiyo Akasaka, *The Question of Palestine and the United Nations*. ( New York: 2008. United Nations Secretary. General Bank KL- mon, February 2007). P. 18.

Richard Nixon (1913-1994) was the first American attempt to intervene directly in the Arab-Israel Conflict. Then, this events was followed by another major event called The Massacre of Innocents, that is to say The 1967 War. Also known in both Syria and Jordan as the Setback of June and Egypt in the name of the 1967 Setback and is called in Israel by the Six Day War.

As Joel Beinin and Lisa Hajjar said that; “As the military and diplomatic crisis continued, on June 5, 1967 Israel preemptively attacked Egypt and Syria, destroying their air forces on the ground within a few hours. Jordan joined in the fighting belatedly, and consequently was attacked by Israel as well. The Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies were decisively defeated, and Israel captured the West Bank from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The 1967 War, which lasted only six days, established Israel as the dominant regional military power”.<sup>13</sup>

The 1967 War broke out between Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan in June 5-10, 1967, that led to Israel’s Occupation of Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

**Figure One :Territories Occupied by Israel since 1967**



**Source:** Kiyo Akasaka, op. ct., p.17.

<sup>13</sup>Joel Beinin, op. cit., p. 17.

It is considered as the Third War within the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The war has killed 15,000- 25,000 people in Arab Countries against 800 in Israel, destroying 80% of Arab equipment, compared with 5 % of Israelis.<sup>14</sup> As well as a similar disparity in the number of wounded and prisoners, as a result of the issuance of the Security Council resolution and the convening of the Arab (three- nation) Summit in Khartoum and displacement of most residents of The Suez Canal cities.

In addition, the population of the citizens of Quneitira province in Syria, and the displacement of thousands of Palestinians residents of the West Bank, including the removal of villages and opening the door towards East Jerusalem and the West Bank. The consequences of the 1967 war have not yet ended.<sup>15</sup> Israel continued to occupy the West Bank and annexes Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.<sup>16</sup> Another consequences were the outbreak of the war in October 1973 and the Separation of the West Bank from Jordanian Sovereignty.<sup>17</sup> The culmination of U.S. Policy toward the Middle East in 1967 after Israel's military superiority in the war made the U.S. move Israel from the dependency site to the partnership site. According to the former President Donald Reagan, Israel is the only country capable of helping the U.S. strategically assisting the U.S. In addition to its military and technological capability to stand by America as a trusted friend and ally.

Moreover, another event was The Black September as Thierry Lalevée said," On Dec.29, in America, Jordan, Fahd Qawasmeh, the former mayor on the West Bank town of Hebro and a high-ranking official of the Palestine Liberation Organization (POL), was assassinated by professional gunmen the crime fits the pattern of Soviet-Syrian response to the prospect of an American-sponsored peace initiative in the Middle East."<sup>18</sup>

Black September is the conflict that broke out in Jordan between the Jordanian armed forces under the leadership of King Hussein (1935-1999) and the Palestine Liberation Organization led by Yasser Arafat (1929-2004) in the first place between 16 and 27 September 1970 with some work continued until July 17, 1971. After Jordan lost control of

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<sup>14</sup> Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies. "The June, 1967 War: Fifty Years On." *Conference Background*. Paper. P. 1,2.

<sup>15</sup> Jeremy Pressman, op. cit., p. 6, 7, 8.

<sup>16</sup> Machairas Dimitios, "The strategic and political consequences of June 1967 war." *Politics & International Relation Research Article*. 07 March, 2017.P. 1, 2, 3, 4.

<sup>17</sup> Kiyo Akasaka , op. cit., p. 15, 16, 17, 18.

<sup>18</sup> Thierry Lalevée, "Black September" Kills PLO moderate." *EIR* 12, ( 3), January 15, 1985. P. 42.

the West Bank to Israel in 1967, Palestine fighters known as the Fedayeen moved their bases to Jordan and stepped up their attacks against Israel.<sup>19</sup> Israel's retaliatory response the PLO's camp has evolved into a large-scale battle where the joint Palestinian-Jordanian Victory in the battle of dignity in 1968 increased Arab support for Palestinian fighters in Jordan the PLO grew in Jordan and by 1970, groups calling the overthrow of the Hashemite Monarchy were publicly launched.

As a state within a state, the "Fedayeen" ignored local laws and regulations and even tried to assassinate King Hussein twice, leading to violent confrontations between the PLO and the Jordanian army in June 1970. Hussein wanted to oust the militants from the country but he was reluctant to attack because he did not want his enemies to use him to equate Palestinian militants with civilians. The actions of the PLO in Jordan culminated in the hijacking of aircraft in Dawson Square on September 10, in which the Fedayeen blew three civilian planes in front of the international press, angering King Hussein and ordering the army besieged the cities to be surrounded by the PLO and threw with heavy artillery and the next day with the same force from Syria with the Palestine Liberation Army towards Irbid declared by the guerillas a liberated city. On September 22, the Syrians withdrew after the Jordanian army launched a ground offensive that inflicted heavy casualties on Syria. The mounting pressure from the Arab countries led Hussein to stop the fighting. On October 13 Hussein signed an agreement with Arafat to regulate the presence of the Fedayeen. However, the Jordanian army attacked again in January 1971 and drove the Fedayeen from one city after another until the guerrillas surrounded on 17 July. This was a sign of the end of the conflict. Black September was founded during the conflict to carry out reprisals and the organization claimed responsibility for the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in 1971.<sup>20</sup>

Furthermore, there was The October 1973 War, which was one of the founds of Arab-Israeli Conflict, with the Egyptian leadership planning with Syria to launch a simultaneous war against Israel in order to recovering the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights which Israel had already occupied in 1967.<sup>21</sup> As Lisa Hajjar and Joel Beinin said, "After coming to power in Egypt in late 1970, President Anwar Sadat indicated to U.N envoy Gumar Jarring

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<sup>19</sup> Subhash Singh, "Black September: A turning point in the Palestinian National Movement." *International Journal of Applied Social Science*, New Delhi: Jawharlal Nehru University. 2 (5&6), May & June (2015): 135-145. May 26, 2015. P. 137.

<sup>20</sup> Barbara Gallets, "Black September and Identity Construction in Jordan." *University-Qatar Middle Eastern Studies: Student Association*, 2015. P. 12.

<sup>21</sup> Kiyo Akasaka, op. cit., p. 17, 18.



that he was willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel in exchange for the return of Egyptian territory lost in 1967 ( the Sinai Peninsula ). The final outcome of the 1967 war was the destruction of the Bralev Line in the Sinai and Alon Line in the Golan Heights. Israeli spent six years after the June War for unifying its positions in the Golan and Sinai spent huge sums to do so.

In October 1967, the leaders of the league of Arab States met at the Khartoum Conference in Khartoum and published a statement called the Three Dictates of not recognizing Israel the enemy of negotiating with it and rejecting peaceful relations with it on November 22, 1967. The U.N Security Council passed Resolution of 242, which calls for Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupied in June 67.<sup>22</sup> With the demand of neighboring Arab states to recognize it and its borders on September 1968, fighting between Egypt, Syria and Israel renewed the so-called war of attrition, prompting the U.S. to propose plans for a peace settlement In the Middle East. U.S. Security of State William Rogers proposed three plans on both sides on December 9, 1969, June 1970, and October 4, 1971.

In 1973, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad (1930-2000) decided to resort to war to recover the land lost by the Arabs in the 1967 war. They attacked Israel with unexpected attack, the Egyptian and Syria armies achieved the desired strategic objectives behind the military surprise of Israel and there were tangible achievements in the early days of the war. At the end of the war, the Israeli army rebounded to regain control of the situation, based on continued American support while The Soviet Union helped Egypt and Syria. By the end of the war, U.S. Security of State Henry Kissenger (1923-) served as mediator between the two sides and reached a truce agreement still in effect between Syria and Israel. Egypt and Israel changed the armistice agreement to a comprehensive peace agreement at Camp David 1979.<sup>23</sup>

As Hassan Ahmed El-Rewany said, “A most important outcome of the October war was that it paved the way for achieving a peace based on justice. Accordingly, Egypt launched its efforts for peace until the Egyptian – Israeli Peace Accord was signed on March 26, 1979.”<sup>24</sup> After the 1973 war the American attempt to intervene in the Arab-Israeli Conflict increased because of the impact of the war on U.S. interest and held to prevent the use of oil as a

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p. 18.

<sup>23</sup> Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, op. cit., p. 5, 6.

<sup>24</sup> Hassan Ahmed El-Rewany, *The Ramadan War: End of Illusion*. (Strategy Research Project. 26 February 2001). P 17.

weapon in the conflict. This has changed America's view of the region and can separate the oil from the Arab-Israeli Conflict so that it is not a pressure card. Three main things America has sought to prevent from happening; the first was the outbreak of another Arab-Israeli War, the polarization of the Middle East between the super powers and the oil link to the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

Therefore, America felt the need to deal peacefully with this conflict by finding mutually satisfactory solutions which would strengthen its influence in the Middle East and would give it an opportunity to protect its interests and control oil prices in the region that would develop its economy and make it in the forefront, in addition to protecting Israel's security as a strategic element in the Middle East. These peace initiatives were embodied in the signing of the Camp David Treaty between Israel and Egypt, which removed the Arab states from the stage of confrontation with Israel and the exclusion of Egypt in particular as it is the most influential Arab country in the region.<sup>25</sup> The U.S. has lost the Palestinian Question one of its main supporters and managed to get Egypt out of the conflict with Israel which allowed America and Israel to be unique in dealing with Palestine. The October war 1973 was a turning point in the political and strategic situations in the Middle East.<sup>26</sup>

#### **4-1-The Palestine Question 1945-**

Since the 20<sup>th</sup> Century Britain crowned its policy in Palestine by Balfour Promise which led to establish a Zionist country in Palestine which began Palestinian suffering. Jeremy Pressman said; "The Zionist diplomats scored a major victory on November 2, 1917 when Lord Arthur J. Balfour (1848-1930), the British Foreign Secretary, wrote the following to Lord Rothschild, a Jewish Leader. His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object,..".<sup>27</sup>

More than fifty years ago, the Palestinian individuals have being dragooned to autocracy, justness, and dourness, their hole land have being continuously plundered and unlawfully annexed, their human privileges have being violated and they were the victims of brutal slaughters; they were dissipated all over the world to dehumanize as refugees without a future in the camped of exile away from their homeland, persisting untold torment and

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<sup>25</sup> Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies. Op. cit., p. 5, 6.

<sup>26</sup> Tarek Awad, A. *The Ramadan War 1973*. (Air University. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: March 1986). P.44.

<sup>27</sup> Jeremy Pressman, op. cit., P. 3.

disenfranchising. All that existed were “Occupied territories” which comprised the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it might be protected to accept that a long extension for way need generally been secured, but Palestinians did not remain silent they resisted through many Revolutions such as; Yafa Revolution in 1921, Borak Revolution in 1929, disorders in 1933, and the Big Arabic Revolution from 1936 to 1939.

Then came the first Intifada, where the weapons for decision were stones. The individual’s cheerful occasions accompanied by the go about killing Jew, rightwing fanatic Yigal Amir, who shot and murdered Rabin. Despite Rabin’s martyrdom, peace might still walk on its own two feet, despite a host of obstacles.<sup>28</sup> Following that the long and disruptive Odyssey that prompted the 1993 Oslo Accords, which offered the world the striking picture of Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabin (1922-1995) shaking hands with Yasser Arafat (1929-2004) in the white house garden. Although an arrangement of Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorist assaults against Israeli civilians, Rabin and Arafat marked the Oslo II in September 1995.<sup>29</sup> President Bill Clinton (1946- ), who spreads as much arms wide, concerning illustration if should encase their previous enemies. Clinton, by the end of his second term, continued what had proceeded to grow trusts delineated in the 1978 Camp David.<sup>30</sup> Once again, Israeli leader Ehud Barak (1942- ) and Yasser Arafat seemed will have those completion line in sight. Soon came the second and bloodier Intifada, this one including Kalashnikovs and suicide assaults by extremists. For an era, Yasser Arafat, has been a national figure previously in Palestinian governmental issues both typical and act. As a s symbol, Arafat represents in his people’s eyes a series of national achievements for all Palestinians: Autonomous Palestinian representation, worldwide help and the strife against Israel. However, in the same duration Arafat symbolizes the “sector” of the refugees of 1948, summarized in the interest to the “Right of Return”.

A different significant chance emerged at yet another Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon (1928-2014) chose will withdraw totally starting with Gaza and demolished all Jewish settlements.<sup>31</sup> Anyway Sharon, a man of war who wanted to enter the historical backdrop books as a man of peace, might have been stopped in his tracks eventually. Not long before, in Ramallah, Arafat the Memorable Author of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

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<sup>28</sup> Antonio Ferari, “Palestine: The End of a Dream?” *East Crossroads Europe*. 44. November 2012. P.44

<sup>29</sup> Kiyo Akasaka, op. cit., P. 56.

<sup>30</sup> Oren Barak, “The Failure of the Israeli Palestinian Peace Process, 1993-2000”. *Journal of Peace Research*. Jerusalem Hebrew University, 42, NO. 6. Nov, 2005. P. 723,724.

<sup>31</sup> Antonio Ferari, op. cit., P. 45.

and the Palestine National Authority (PNA), needed been stricken for a long and bizarre ailment that inevitably prompted as much passing military hospital eventually in Paris, where he needed been exchanged to life-saving treatment. It failed.<sup>32</sup>

#### **4-2-The Camp David Agreement and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process 1979**

March 26th 2018 marked the 39<sup>th</sup> memoration of the signing of Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty; the state of war between two long standing enemies formally was ended by that assertion.<sup>33</sup> On March 26, 1979, the first step toward a peace agreement between the Arab world and Israel was taken by both Egypt and Israel when they signed the historic Camp David Accord on the white house yard.<sup>34</sup> As Lewis Samuel said; “ Since the “Six Day War” in June 1967, Countless America and other diplomats have sought almost continuously to broker peace between Israel and its surrounding Arab enemies. From that tangled history, one achievement stands tallest in forest of scrub: The Egypt-Israel Treaty signed on March 26, 1979 on the White House...”<sup>35</sup>

Under a quite while the summit occurred after a historic trek was made by the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (1918-1981) toward Israel for addressing the Israel parliament in Jerusalem<sup>36</sup>. Sadat was made by that typical act as the first Arab leader to recognize the Jewish state’s right to exist, 30 years a considerable length of time following Israel announced its autonomy. The fact was reflected by that peace treaty that the break through between Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (1913-1992) took place in September 1978 at the United States Camp David, once both of them Egyptian President and Israeli prime Minister were welcomed to Camp David by American President Jimmy Carter (1924-), in Mary land.<sup>37</sup> They acted out two agreements: A frame work for peace between Egypt and Israel, and a general outline for determination of the Middle East crisis, i.e. the Palestinian Question. In 1979, the basis of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was formed by the first accord. While granting autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid p.45.

<sup>33</sup> Woodrow Wilson, “Camp David 25 The Anniversary Forum”. . *International Center for Scholars*. Washington, D. C. September 17, 2003. P. 4.

<sup>34</sup> Kiyo Akasaka, op.cit., P. 19.

<sup>35</sup> Samuel Lewis, *The Legacy of Camp David: 1979-2009*. (Washington, DC. The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Legacy of Camp David. www- mei. Edu). p.7

<sup>36</sup> Kiyo Akasaka, op. cit., P 19.

<sup>37</sup> Joel Beinin and Lisa Hajjar, op .cit., P. 8.

Moreover, installation of a local administration for a five-year interim period were suggested by the second agreement, following the last status of the territories would be negotiated. The help of U.S. mediation for Egypt and Israel as regional powers in the Middle East finally made peace. This act was a turning point in the historical backdrop of the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the end of ceremony imparted expansive smiles moreover joined hands took place by the Three Leaders.<sup>38</sup> Merely the Egyptian-Israeli part of the Camp David Accords might have been executed the self-sufficiency particular idea as a result it didn't surety full Israeli withdrawal from territories captured in 1967.<sup>39</sup> A major diplomatic achievement was reached by The peace occurred between Egypt and Israel and it was one that might not have been reasonably expected without the brave endeavors of Jimmy Carter. These occasions overshadowed the carter administration's outstanding outside strategy particular victories. Large successes including the peace establishment between Egypt and Israel were reached merely in one term. Carter was a Washington "outsider" who regularly was ignoring the personal political costs of doing so.

So, Carter accomplished something in the Middle East. The serene determination of the Arab-Israeli clash however was made as a central priority for Carter's administration.<sup>40</sup> This was a hazardous decision because carter not merely exposed himself to the costs of involving in the Arab-Israeli conflict but rather he placed his prestige and political future on the summit that may have ended in an entire disappointment. Ensured continued progress of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state was led by Carter personally intervention, Many transactions were sabotaged by Israeli forces through continuing confiscation of Palestinian lands furthermore constructing new settlements in violation of the commitments Menachem started made to Jimmy Carter at Camp David.<sup>41</sup> The Arab side were given every reason by historical precedent to think that U.S. policy would support Israel conversely Carter's pronouncements regarding Israel expecting to withdraw from the 1967 outskirts what's more as much references should Palestinian privileges were fact for Israeli suspicion.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. p. 9.

<sup>40</sup>Shibley Telhami , *The Camp David Accords: A Case of International Bargaining.* (Maryland University. Professor, Department of Government and Politics). P. 9.10.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.p. 9.

<sup>42</sup>Matthew T Penny, *President Carter and The Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords.*( Atlanta, Georgia: Jimmy Carter Presidential Literary. 13 November 2013). P. 9.

Furthermore, shortly after the Camp David Peace Treaty, Israel didn't stop its illegal activities, but rather, it launched the invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, that was known by the "Lebanon Crisis". In fact, the attack was coordinated against two particular adversaries Syria, and Palestinian Liberation Organization. Lebanon, alternately, was the merely a single of Israel's neighbors that had abstained from initiating hostilities against it ever since six decades. protection of this heretofore quite border, but now challenged by both the developing Syria and PLO roles in Lebanon, constituted key vital strategic objectives for Israel.<sup>43</sup> The invasion's real goals as brought about by Israeli policy makers were to set up a security zone along the northern border intended to drive PLO out of range, and thereat enabling Israel concluding by a peace treaty with Lebanon, and the creation of an other political border in Lebanon, subsequently empowering Israel to dictate the terms both of settlement there and of Palestinian issue. At any rate, the attack was to slow down the force of Palestinian patriotism and extraordinarily decrease the possibility that the West Bank may ever be separated from Israel. The Syrian and PLO threats that were perceived by Israel, made it eventually failed to accomplish even its formal goals.<sup>44</sup>

## **5-The Deseret Storm Operation of 1991**

In the international system, the 1991 Middle East crises, the invasion of Iraq, was the main issue that United State faced since the end of the cold war. Also it was the main test for it as the undeniable widespread world power. And the Persian Gulf region was constantly considered as an area of tension for America since the withdrawn of the British colonizer. The second Gulf war was one of the stages that illustrated the American intervention in the Middle East region.

The tension between Iraq and Kuwait started in 1961, when Kuwait took its independence, at first it was about the borders, and it reached the highest phase in 1990, when Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) claimed that Kuwait was an Iraqi territory. The United States saw it as a chance to invade Iraq, in which it took a policy of double standards towards this

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<sup>43</sup> Benjamin S Lambeth , *Moscow's Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War*.( Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data). P. 1,2.

<sup>44</sup> Charles D Freilich, "Israel in Lebanon\_ Getting It Wrong: The 1982 Invasion, 2000 Withdrawal, and 2006 War". *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, VI: 3. 2012. P. 43, 47.

tension. From one side, it upheld Iraq to realize its bad faith. And from the other side, it led an international coalition against Iraq.<sup>45</sup>

The first leg of the story was when Saddam Hussein ordered his army to occupy Kuwait guaranteeing that it was an Iraqi state, instantly after this action, Arab powers such as Saudi-Arabia and Egypt called the United States and other western nations to mediate through the United Nations Security Council. The SC of the United Nations began a series of warnings and negotiations to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait without conditions. When Iraq refused to withdraw, a war was waged on January 1991, by the coalition forces from 35 nations led by the United States to free Kuwait. After 42 days of brutal and cruel assaults by the allied coalition in air and on the ground, the U.S. president George W. Bush (1946-) announced a cease-fire and the total liberation of Kuwait.<sup>46</sup>

The United States, under President George W. Bush, propelled war against Iraq since it feared from Saddam's future annexations after the control of Kuwait and from the emergence of the Iraqi army as the fundamental superpower in the Gulf region particularly after its victory in the first Gulf war against Iran. Another reason was the American claim that Iraq began to develop weapons of mass destruction's programs that will be a risk to the American interests in oil in the region and also will destabilize the existence and the security of Israel. The United States also participated in other operations in the Arab region such as the Operation Desert Shield in which American troops settled in Saudi Arabia to guard it in case of potential invasion.<sup>47</sup>

The United States considered that the invasion of Kuwait was more than a state-state assault; it was an act of aggression against the whole world, because of that it intervened under the allied coalition to reestablish the world peace and security. The war politically resulted in the coalition victory and the restoration of Kuwait sovereignty. Economically, the war resulted in the destruction of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti infrastructure which took years and billions to rebuild. Socially, thousands of people were killed and the rest suffered from chronic fatigue, moodiness, and depression. In addition to that, the raising number of environment's problems such as contamination that occurred from the explosion of weapons.

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<sup>45</sup> Jeffrey J Clarke, "Center of Military History: United States Army". *War in the Persian Gulf*, Washington, D. C. 2010. P, 5.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p, 6.

## 6-Clinton's Major Peace Treaties 1993- 2000

**Figure Two: Palestinian- Israeli's Further Steps toward Peace**



**Source:** Kiyo Akasaka, op. ct., p,27.

For solving the Arab Israeli Conflicts, there were many endeavors, as far as those of the American President Bill Clinton (1945- ). Clinton's presidential period might have been those the majority biased, especially, toward the level of peace process by taking after dependent upon the activity from claiming Madrid Gathering which included all the parties of Arab-Israeli Clash through bilateral and multilateral gatherings.<sup>48</sup> The Oslo 1 or "Declaration of Principles" was signed on the White House Lawn by Israeli Leader Rabin (1922- 1995) and PLO Leader Yasser Arafat (1929-2004), in 1993. That gathering concluded by a ceremony which underlined the U. S. backing of the peace agreement.<sup>49</sup> As Robert O. Freedman said that; "While U. S. President Bill Clinton achieved success in his Middle East policy during his first term in office. Most noticeably the Oslo peace agreement between Israel and the PLO that was signed on the White House Lawn in September 1993"<sup>50</sup> A quite while later; a peace treaty was signed by President Clinton additionally present, Rabin also King Hussein Ibn

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<sup>48</sup> Mohammed Alial Rousan, "American – Israeli Relations During A President Bill Clinton's Reign". *European Scientific Journal*. April 2013, 9 ( 11). p. 199.

<sup>49</sup> Robert O Freedman, *U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East in Clinton's Second Term*. (Middle East Review of International Affairs , 3 ( 1 ). March 1999). p. 55 – 56.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid p. 55.



Talal (1935-1999) of Jordan signed that treaty which led to transformation of the informal serene relationship between Israel and Jordan into a public one.<sup>51</sup>

President Clinton over an exertion to protect the crisis, w which occurred more than a month preceding the President election welcomed Netanyahu (1949-), Arafat, King Hussein and Hosni Mubarak (1928- -) to Washington. The degree of trust between Arafat and Netanyahu, never very high to start, anyway it might have been the U. S. that was forced to get included in the process.<sup>52</sup> “Principles Declarations” were launched by Clinton starting with Washington accompanying the mystery Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in Oslo.<sup>53</sup> Afterward, the negotiations with Jordan and Syria were sponsored by Clinton’s continued role. In this way, Clinton needed as much fantastic accomplishments on the Palestinian and Jordanian sides.<sup>54</sup> However, the Syrian track stayed clinched alongside in a state over Golan Heights. Increasingly, Clinton proceeded as much of his endeavors to make investment and political plans with other Arab parties through economic furthermore security conferences in which Israel, the United States and other universal forces took an interest to the reason for the insertion of Israel over the Arab region.<sup>55</sup>

Hence, Palestine Organization Liberation Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin shook hands.<sup>56</sup> The aims of this Accord were; First, to make a Palestinian-Israeli transactions between time self- legislature Authority, the chosen Council for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, to transitional period not surpassing five years, prompting lasting settlement in light of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). In addition, the issues of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, starting of the third quite while of the interim period.<sup>57</sup> Solving intricate issues and raising money for security and economic help for of Israel settlement of refugees and compensations for Palestinian were the first goal of Clinton Oslo Agreement.

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid p. 55-56.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid p. 57.

<sup>53</sup> Mohammed Alial Rousan, Op. cit., p. 199.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid p. 199.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid p. 199.

<sup>56</sup> Jonathan Rynold , *The Failure of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed Implementations?* (Ramat Gan University. Mideast Security and Policy Studies. (76). March 2008). P. 1.

<sup>57</sup> Kiyo Akasaka, op. cit., P. 31. 32.

As well as, another Peace Treaty was mentioned at that time that is to say; the peace process showed new indications for life previously, late 1998.<sup>58</sup> On 23 October 1998, after eight days of discussions at Wye River, Maryland, United States, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed the Wye River Memorandum in Washington, D. C.<sup>59</sup> The Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and President Yasser Arafat of the Palestinian Authority, in the presence of President Bill Clinton of the U. S, and King Hussein of Jordan signed the Accords which outlined the following elements: First, Israel might withdraw its troops starting with 13 percent of West Bank land, exchange 14,2 percent of West Bank land from joint Israeli-Palestinian control to Palestinian control. Second, abiding status negotiations might have been instantly resumed by both of sides. Third, to combat terrorism, actions might have been taken by the Palestinian powers. The Wye River Memorandum was depicted as a promising advancement.<sup>60</sup>

Moreover, on July 2000, invited the leaders of Israel and the Palestinian Authority were welcomed by The American President Bill Clinton for a peace talks at Camp David, Maryland.<sup>61</sup> This agreement included the issue of Palestinian refugees which the agreement included might have been managed with without the minimum thought of the privileges recognized by many international agreements, Both Israeli and Palestinian states got Jerusalem as an open city and capital. Therefore, these negotiations neglected because of the profound disagreements between the two sides over Jerusalem, the give back of refugees to their homeland and other uncertain issues despite the guarantees that Clinton had expressed in front. On December, 2000, in spite of all that, Clinton's strategy repeated by calling the sides through the presentation of new suggestions that concentrated on the issues of settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, borders and security.<sup>62</sup> The summit finished inconclusively, with the two sides unable to reach an agreement of the last status issues. The commitment however, was restored by both sides to continue negotiations with a perspective will concluding an agreement as soon as possible with peace talks obstructed the circumstances on the ground quickly deteriorated. Each chance the negotiations were stymied, the Israelis and the Americans faulted the Palestinians responsible for their disappointment.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid p. 34.

<sup>59</sup> Robert Freedman, op. cit., p. 60 – 61.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid p.35.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid p.

<sup>62</sup> Oren Barak, op. cit., P. 723-724-732.

<sup>63</sup> Kiyo Akasaka, op. cit., P. 35.

Then, on 16 and 17 October 2000, an additional summit might have been clinched alongside Sharem el-Sheikh, Egypt, mutually chaired by President Mubarak of Egypt and President Clinton of the United States.<sup>64</sup> Three key areas were understood over the summit are the following items: Different measures and security collaboration with conclusion of the confrontation, a council of certainty finding will ask under those later occasions and how to frustrate their recurrence, and reestablishing the peace process.<sup>65</sup>

As a result, we can say that ever since the time that to begin with days of Clinton's administration, it might have been reasonable that it was the friendliest one to Israel. President Clinton (1993-2000) was surrounded by a Zio-American administration which needed its part over a considerable measure from claiming political choices that Israel will bring about making new realities that settle on Israel the merely winning side.<sup>66</sup>

## **7-The Bush Doctrine 2001-2009**

George W. Bush took office on January 20, 2001 and ended on January 20, 2009. He was a republican president controlled by the neo-conservatives who supported him in his election campaign. The neo-conservative's ideas were about the promotion of democracy and American national interests in the international affairs through the use of the military intervention.

During the Bush presidency, the U.S had known two noteworthy wars, the invasion of Iraq and the invasion of Afghanistan, in its postmodern history. The terrorist attack of 9/11 was the most stunning and unexpected event in the history of the United States in which the use of military intervention was a new way that formed the American foreign policy and the Bush Doctrine was a new instrument that applied this foreign policy after deterrence and containment policies that were used during the cold war era.<sup>67</sup>

The term "Bush Doctrine" was utilized to portray the policy elements of the President George W. Bush. It included a strategy of preemptive preventive war, which implied, to work on different levels, as a defense against any immediate or future attacks to the security of the world in general, and to the United States in particular. This policy principal was applied chiefly in the Middle East to get rid of international terrorism, to prevent tyrannical regimes

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid p.36.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Oren Barak, op. cit., P. 719-720.

<sup>67</sup> George W. Bush, op.cit., P. 19.

from acquiring or even utilizing weapons of mass destruction, and to legitimize the invasion of Iraq.<sup>68</sup>

When the National Security Strategy was distributed by the Bush Administration in 2002, one of its most prominent shifts determined a doctrine or principal of ‘preemption.’ Preemption can be defined as ‘strike attack’ or an attack that kept an apparent enemy, from assaulting a nation which was under threat. Preemption can likewise be defined as an effort to dodge conceivable threats. President Bush addressed preemption in a major policy address at the US Military Academy on 1 June 2002. He stated “If we wait for threats to materialize, we will have waited too long” and he declared that “our security will require all Americans... to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and defend our lives.”<sup>69</sup>

In the National Security Strategy, it was stated “It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United State can longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.”<sup>70</sup>

## **7-1-The Principles of Preemptive-Preventive War**

After the terrorist attack of 9/11 and the start of the war on the international terrorism, the President George W. Bush (1946-) announced the America was prepared to fight back to secure itself from a future threat. His new approach composed of three fundamental principles which were: First, waging war against the terrorist organizations and who supported them, in this regard the National Security Strategy asserted, “the United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security...and the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”<sup>71</sup> The United States introduced a strategy of preemption that claimed that America can assault any country or overthrow any political regime if they represented a threat to it, regardless of whether prompt risk or future danger. Second, this new strategy aimed to prevent and overthrow the tyrannical regimes that were building up the weapons of mass destruction. Those countries were named as “the evil countries” by George W. Bush. The third set of the Bush’s principals referred to the strategy

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> George W. Bush, *Graduation Speech at West Point* (The White House, June1, 2002).

<sup>70</sup> George W. Bush, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

that supported or promoted democracy in all over the world, in general, and in the Middle East in particular.

In this regard, he said “To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal- military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn.”<sup>72</sup>

According to the National Security Strategy, the choice to be engaged in military intervention must be founded on the Just War Theory which gave moral criteria. According to this theory, four criteria must be met all together for the utilization of force to be ethically legitimate.

The Just Cause: the essence of just cause intended to ensure innocent life, to safeguard conditions necessary for decent human existence and to secure essential human rights. States had the right to react to any aggression with force because according to the international law, hostility was a crime against human rights. The Right Authority: the genuine approval of the utilization of forces must be constrained to a political sovereign. It also required an official announcement of war that contained and articulated the ethical justification and aims of the. War. It must be approved by the UN Security Council. Reasonable Hope of Success: this criterion entailed a count of the likelihood that the utilization of pressure will repair an equitable peace. This stipulation constituted an endeavor to safeguard the residents, military or nonmilitary alike, from the lack of caution as well as unethical pursuits of their leaders. The Last Resort: this last criterion showed that the utilization of military force must be the final resort, if all endeavors at peaceful compromise failed, at that point the criterion of last resort could be applied.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> George W. Bush, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>73</sup> Council, National Security, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (The White House, September 2002).

## **7-2-The 9/11 Attacks and its Aftermath in 2001**

“For much of the last century, America’s defense strategy relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence-- the promise of massive retaliation against nations--nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.”<sup>74</sup>

On September 11, 2001, 19 members of a fundamentalist Islamist group called Al-Qaida (“The Base”) kidnapped four airplanes and did a suicide assaults in New York, Washington Dc area, and in Pennsylvania, in which Two of the plane were flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center and resulted in its total destruction, in New York city, a third plane struck the Pentagon closer to Washington D.C., and the fourth plane exploded in a field in Pennsylvania.

Those attacks caused the death of approximately 3000 persons, (2,750 in New York, 184 at the Pentagon, and 40 in Pennsylvania) including nationals of 78 different countries. Whereas the economic costs of the destruction were about \$ 83billion. At the time of the attack, president George W. Bush was in Florida, immediately after the attacks, he returned to the White House and delivered a broadcast address in which he declared that terrorist assaults could shake the establishment of American greatest buildings, but they could not touch the foundation of America. These acts smashed steel, but they could not mark the steel of America resolve.

The September attacks were not the primary attacks, there were other attacks like the bombings of USS Cole, in Oklahoma City, World Center in 1993, and the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. According to U.S. Department of States, between 1991 and 2001, 100 American nationals were murdered in terrorist attacks abroad. On September 20, 2001, the president George W. Bush addressed a warning to Taliban government of Afghanistan to submit Osama Ben Laden and all Al-Qaida leaders, the Taliban government demanded proofs of Ben Laden’s link to the September attacks and if such proof justified a

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

trial, they offered to do such a trial in an Islamic court, after that U.S. refused to provide any proof.<sup>75</sup>

The response of the U.S. government to the September 11 attacks was waging war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, this war was led by the United States and the United Kingdom through the NATO with the objectives of arresting Osama Ben Laden and Al-Qaida leaders to justice and preventing the emergence of other organizations that may contribute in future assaults against U.S. The attack of Afghanistan that occurred just after 9/11 attacks was justifiable but the invasion of Iraq had no connection to the attacks and it was a part from the policy of risk-benefit.<sup>76</sup>

### **7-3-The Invasion of Iraq in 2003**

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was one of the considerable actions of the American military intervention in all over the world, in which the United States chose to utilize power to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime (1937-2006). This military intervention was motivated by political, economic, ideological, and key elements which were in form of declared and undeclared reasons.

The declared reasons, before starting of the war, 2002, Bush (1946-) claimed that the America's aim of declaring war on Iraq was characterized by three important reasons. First, the possession of weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. estimation was based on an interpretation of the neo-conservatives that Iraq was developing WMD programs, and in this regard President George W. Bush said "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological, and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends – and we will oppose them with all our power". Also, the Vice president Dick Cheney stated that "There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us."<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Record Jeffrey, "U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute", *The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq*, 33(1), 2003.p19

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, p, 20.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, p, 21.

Second, sponsoring terrorism was the primary factor in the justification of Iraq's invasion. The terrorist attacks of 11 September led to the emergence of a new phase in the U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy. The neo-conservatives under Bush administration saw it as a chance to apply something they effectively wanted to do it. Historically speaking, the term "neoconservative" referred to those who made the ideological trip from the anti-Stalinist left to the camp of American conservatism during the 1960s and 1970s. Neoconservatives generally advocated the promotion of democracy and American national interest in international affairs, including by strategies of military power and were known for adopting scorn for communism and for political radicalism. Neoconservatives achieved its peak in influence during the Administration of George W. Bush, when they played a noteworthy role in advancing and arranging the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Notable neoconservatives in the George W. Bush administration included Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams, Richard Perle and Paul Bremer. While not recognizing as neoconservatives, senior officials Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld listened eagerly to neoconservative advisers regarding foreign policy, particularly the defense of Israel and the promotion of American influence in the Middle East. The U.S. administration linked between the Iraqi regime and terrorism to legitimize the invasion of Iraq.<sup>78</sup>

Third, liberation and the promotion of democracy, the Bush administration announced that liberating the Iraqi people was one of the important reasons of invading Iraq. According to them, the Saddam regime was one of the tyrannical regimes in all over the world and he must be toppled. In this regard George W. Bush stated that "promoting democracy abroad has been one of the main aims of U.S. foreign policy. I believe the United States is the beacon for freedom in the world. And I believe we have a responsibility to promote freedom".<sup>79</sup>

The undeclared reasons, securing Israel and the oil interests were only the tow real reasons of the invasion of Iraq. Firstly, the relationship between the United States and Israel was and still a unique one since its formation in 1948. The United States saw that Saddam Hussein was not a risk to it rather than a risk against the existence of Israel in the Middle East region. Secondly, the U.S. interest in oil and energy sources was a significant factor behind

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid, p. 26.

<sup>79</sup> George W. Bush, op.cit., p. 7



the invasion of Iraq in order to secure future vitality supplies. The United States chose to have the Iraq's oil reserves since its hegemony depended on oil and energy sources.<sup>80</sup>

In sum, the neo-conservative's ideology played a noteworthy role in the Bush administration in general, and in the invasion of Iraq in particular. It seemed that there was a gap between the U.S. public reasons and the real reasons of Iraq's invasion in which the Foundation of Intelligence and Coalition could not find any clear evidence about the Iraq's ownership of weapons of mass destruction or about the Iraq's support to terrorism.

## **8-Conclusion**

Throughout its history, the United States structured its foreign policy around several distinct values that had both historical and principle significance to the American people. These values were promoting democracy, promoting human rights, and promoting national self-determination, which originated in the Fourteen Points Wilson's ideas about idealism. Often, these values contradicted with the national security and economic self-interest which originated in the realism ideas that emerged in the twentieth century between the two wars. In realism, states underlined as an interest in emphasizing the collection of power in order to ensure their security in the international system. The security, power and military were the most important things for realism.

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States was one of the leading nations that encouraged, facilitated, and arbitrated the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians which was a series of military conflicts between Israeli and various Arab states that happened in different periods. The initial war between Israel and her Arab neighbors was The Six-Day War in 1967 that occurred when Israel extended her borders, occupying parts of Jordan, Syria and Egypt. Following his election as U.S. president, Carter committed himself to working toward a comprehensive Middle East peace agreement, which called The Camp David Accords that were signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on 17 September 1978, at the White House. It was the first framework that dealt with the Palestinian territories, and it was written without the participation of the Palestinians and was condemned by the United Nations. Israel agreed to withdraw from Sinai, and Egypt promised to establish normal diplomatic relations between the two countries and open the Suez Canal to Israeli ships. The ultimate goal of the Camp

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<sup>80</sup> Dale T. Snauwaert, "The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution". *The Bush Doctrine and Just War Theory*, 6(1), 2004. P129.

David Accords was to establish a framework for peace in the Middle East by formalizing Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist, developing a procedure for the withdrawal of Israeli forces and citizens from the so-called "Occupied Territories" of the West Bank, which would enable the establishment of a Palestinian state there.

The leading role of the United States in the Middle East region renewed in 1991, when President George H. W. Bush announced the start of what would be called Operation Desert Storm which was a military operation to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait. US officials feared that the invasion of Kuwait might mark the Iraq's first step to consolidate its power over other nations in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, since the Iraq Army was the world's fourth largest military force. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait also might pose a geopolitical oil crisis, if Saddam Hussein took control of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

On June 6, 1982, a renewed Arab Israeli conflict started again, in which the Israeli Defense Forces, following the directions of Ariel Sharon, launched a large-scale invasion across the northern border into Lebanon. The announced purpose of the attack was to push back those elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that operating from Lebanon. After many years of tensions, President Bill Clinton called for a summit at Camp David in 1993, to start negotiations between Arafat and Prime Minister Ehud Barak to address important issues such as, borders, security, settlements, refugees, and Jerusalem. But the talks collapse. Another negotiation started in July 2000, and it also failed because both sides refused the existence of the other. The third one was before his departure; President Clinton proposed a plan discussing the necessary elements and conditions for a future Palestinian state "on the basis of Security Council Resolutions. By the time, Clinton left office, however, the peace process stopped, and a new series of Israeli-Palestinian violence began

During his presidency, President Bush approached foreign affairs with his characteristic conservatism and pragmatism. Generally, the term "The Bush Doctrine" referred to the modification of U.S. foreign policy by President George W. Bush in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States that shook America and forced Americans to declare war against terror. The start of the policy change arrived in a speech to the U.S. Congress immediately after the attacks when the president declared the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as a result to the attack. Subsequently, the Bush Doctrine came to be related with a policy that permitted preemptive war against possible threats or in other words, it was an effort to avoid possible threats to national security at all costs. The United States-led

invasion of Iraq represented the first application of this new national security policy that signaled a radical break from previous national security strategies and fundamentally changes the way the United States may act toward the rest of the world. In the next chapter, we will discuss the Arab Spring that occurred in the MENA region with focus on six selected countries.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **The Arab Spring 2011: Road to the Crises**

## 1-Introduction

The Arab Spring was an influx of pro-democracy dissents and uprisings that occurred in the Middle East and North Africa in 2010 and 2011. The development started in Tunisia in 2010, and it soon spread to other countries in North Africa and the Middle East. It challenged some of the region's most tyrant administrations. The protestors were both pushed and sponsored by the Obama Administration that promoted democracy in all over the world. Demonstrators expressing political and economic grievances confronted violent crack downs by their countries' security forces.

In January and February 2011, demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt prevailed in a matter of weeks in toppling two administrations initially thought to be among the area's most stable. The primary demonstrations occurred in central Tunisia in December 2010. A dissent development, named the "Jasmine Revolution" in the media, rapidly spread through the country. The Tunisian government tried to end the turmoil by using violence against street demonstrations and by offering political and economic concessions. However, protests soon overpowered the country's security forces, and forced President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali to step down and escape the country in January 2011.

Although genuine socio-economic injustice was the justification for the Egyptian revolution in 2011; but, it was not the only cause of Egyptian politicization. Demonstrators peacefully toppled a strong western partner on the promise of high joblessness, lack of opportunity, lack of free elections, food inflation, systematic corruption, economic stagnation and lack of democracy. The Egyptian government tried to calm down the protests through introducing some reforms but it failed.

The Yemeni political crisis was directly related to the 2011 revolution and could follow its roots back to the events after the parliamentary elections in April 2003 on which the country's dominant party the GPC (General People's Congress party) again won a majority, and the government began an anti-terrorist operation in the country while in the meantime confronting a Shia led rebellion in northern mountains. The anti-terrorist operations started with help of the USA.

In Bahrain, sectarian divisions were a source of tension for many decades. They prompted to significant uprisings against the ruling family that governed the country since the late of 18th century. The uprising in Bahrain that began in February was inspired by the

demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt. Ten of thousands of people demanded their legitimate rights through peaceful protests. The uprisings exclusively called for more prominent powers for elected institutions, more controls on the power of the ruling family, and less corrupted environment in the Bahraini social, political and economic life of the country.

The presence of covetousness and grievances in pre-2011 Libya was shown by the dissents in the cities and in the southern locale in 2009 because of the impacts of stagnating economy, liberalization, discrimination, and years of international sanctions. Consequently, a peaceful protest started in the city of Benghazi, but soon it turned to an absolute civil war when the military intervention, led by the United States, targeting the Gaddafi forces and resulting in his wounding.

In Syria, a steady discontent in the country could be traced back to the drought excited humanitarian crisis in the east-central region between 2006 and 2010, which joined with lodging deficiencies and Iraqi-Palestinian immigrants made the situation flammable. As a result, dissents were held and burnt down a government building. Immediately the regime's move was to provide the Kurdish minority with full citizenship rights and stopping short of federalization in order to decrease the possibility of a large number of Kurds joining the rebels to gain control of the region. But, the demonstration soon turned into an absolute civil war.

In December 2010, the self-immolation of a street vendor, Mohammed Al-Bouazizi, flamed the wave of uprisings on the Middle East and North Africa that later became known as the Arab Spring. However, the hope and optimism for change that came with the primary uprisings was increasingly disappeared as the region seemed to degrade into violence, instability and chaos. All the six selected countries will be best investigated and discussed in this chapter.

**Figure Three: The Arab Spring**



**Source:** <http://kurdساتnews.com/news.aspx?id=14258&MapID=5>

## **2-The Jasmine Revolution: Tunisia's Uprising 2010**

US President Barak Obama (1961 -) gave a memorable discourse at Cairo College on 4 June 2009. The title of the discourse was “A Fresh Start”. Nobody could have anticipated how radical that fresh start would be. Merely year and half later, on 14 January 2011, president Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali (1936 -) fled Tunisia after a month of demonstrations following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit and vegetable seller in Tunisia, the whole world was astounded. It was the beginning of a progression of events that changed the world.<sup>81</sup> What initially looked like an “Arab spring” transformed step by step into an Arab revolution. Dissents begun up in Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Syria and even Saudi Arabia. Dictators fell in Egypt, Libya and Yemen.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Koert Debeuf, *Inside the Arab Revolution Three years on The Front Line of the Arab Spring* .( Leuven: Koert Debeuf and Lannoo Publishers nv, Tielt, 2014). P.13.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. p. 13.

In December 2010, the anger and disappointment of the Tunisian individuals following their requests for pride, rights and the finish of the repressive regime exploded.<sup>83</sup> Fed-up crowds surged through the boulevards of the focal Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid when Mohamed Bouazizi an organic product vegetable vender, going up against the embarrassment and misery of his circumstances set him self-sacrificed prompted the starting of the transformation of on 17 December 2010.<sup>84</sup> The discharge of the upset of overwhelmed the country and spread to the entire district building up a self- overseeing popular committees, fending off bullets, beatings and poisonous gas and taking control of their urban communities, the insurgencies vitally spread to down-Town Tunis the capital, dismissing Ben Ali's deadly administration and his fascism "go away" without preconditions, people lost their fear and in this way never again could be controlled.<sup>85</sup>

Truth to be said that, there was fruitful soil for the Tunisian unrest, striking diggers and jobless laborers in the west central town of Gafsa were brutally repressed by the Ben Ali regime in 2008. Various mineworkers were executed, the leadership was detained, and the mining families endured. The strike is regularly proclaimed as the state of the Tunisian Revolution.<sup>86</sup> After Sidi Bouzid province the protests and civil unrest broke out showing solidarity with Mohamed Bouazizi in cities like Kairawan, Sfax, and Ben Guerdaune. Several exchange unionists and human rights activists in Tunisia assembled to express their solidarity with individuals of Sidi Bouzid and the terrible treatment they had confronted.<sup>87</sup> Violence heightened and protestors assaulting the administration structures, in the capital and other major cities what drove the President Ben Ali ventured down and left the nation on January 14, 2011.<sup>88</sup> Because of events recorded from December 2010 till the end of 2013, expanded protests that spread to adjacent urban areas and groups following those in Sidi Bouzid such as Sidi Ben Aoun, Menzel Bouziane, Regueb, Meknassy, More than 30 deaths, hundreds of adolescents and even individuals were captured and punished by police using teargas.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Azadeh Shahshahani and Corina Mullih, "The legacy of US intervention and the Tunisian revolution: promises and challenges one year on" *A journal for and about social movements*. 4(1): 67-101. May 2012. P. 68.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> "The Report of the 2010 Delegation of Attorneys to Tunisia From National Lauyers Guild (US), Haldane Society of Socialist lauyers (UK), and Mazlumder (turkey)". New York: June 2011. P. 3.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. p. 12.

<sup>87</sup> Nasser Adèle Aranki, *Events of the Tunisian Revolution the Three First Years*. (Upsala University. Department of peace and Conflict Research. January 2016). P. 14.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid. p. 10.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid. p. 18, 19, 20, 21.



**Table One: Events with Deaths: Geographical Distribution**

| <b>Quarter</b>  | <b>Deaths in Capital</b> | <b>Deaths in the Provinces</b> | <b>Deaths at Border</b> | <b>Total Deaths</b> |
|-----------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| <b>2010: Q4</b> | 5                        | 5                              | <b>2010: Q4</b>         | 5                   |
| <b>2011: Q1</b> | 44                       | 69                             | <b>2011: Q1</b>         | 44                  |
| <b>2011: Q2</b> | 2                        | 6                              | <b>2011: Q2</b>         | 2                   |
| <b>2011: Q3</b> |                          |                                | <b>2011: Q3</b>         |                     |
| <b>2011: Q4</b> |                          |                                | <b>2011: Q4</b>         |                     |
| <b>2012: Q1</b> | 2                        | 2                              | <b>2012: Q1</b>         | 2                   |
| <b>2012: Q2</b> |                          |                                | <b>2012: Q2</b>         |                     |
| <b>2012: Q3</b> |                          |                                | <b>2012: Q3</b>         |                     |
| <b>2012: Q4</b> | 1                        | 1                              | <b>2012: Q4</b>         | 1                   |
| <b>2013: Q1</b> | 1                        | 2                              | <b>2013: Q1</b>         | 1                   |
| <b>2013: Q2</b> | 3                        | 3                              | <b>2013: Q2</b>         | 3                   |
| <b>2013: Q3</b> | 2                        | 3                              | <b>2013: Q3</b>         | 2                   |
| <b>2013: Q4</b> | 16                       | 16                             | <b>2013: Q4</b>         | 16                  |
| <b>Total</b>    | <b>48</b>                | <b>79</b>                      | <b>Total</b>            | <b>48</b>           |

**Source:** Nassar Adèle Aranki, op.cit., P.15.

On January 14, 2011, since then Zine Al Abidine who fled the country amid the current upset, held the presidency. Just for one day Mohamed Ghanouchi (1941 -) became president; he cleared out the presidency by force because of protests that the Muslim Brotherhood development may govern the country to Fouad Mebazza who assumed control until the elections in December 2011.<sup>90</sup> On 23 October 2011, Tunisians voted in favor of the first time after the revolution. 41 percent of the total vote was taken by En-Nahda the previously restricted Islamic party prompted their winning.<sup>91</sup> In March 2014 a human rights lobbyist Moncef Marzouki (1945- ) was chosen by the assembly as a break president, he lifted

<sup>90</sup> Azadeh Shahshahani and Corina Mullih, op.cit., P. 70.

<sup>91</sup> Ridha Kéfi, "Tunisia: Civil Society, the Driving Force behind the Democratic Transition". *Tunis: Strategies Sectors / Security & Politics*. 2015. P. 239.

the highly sensitive situation that has been set up since the episode of the 2011 revolution. The new constitution was composed for permitting a multi- party framework.<sup>92</sup>

Tunisia has great relations with the United States, which go back over 200 years. The U.S. has kept up official portrayal, in Tunis persistently since 1795, and in 1799 the American kinship Treaty with Tunisia was signed, security bargains don't connect the two governments, however relations have been close since Tunisia's autonomy. For discussing military cooperation, Tunisia's resistance modernization program, and other security matters, the U.S. Tunisian Joint Military Commission meets every year; Tunisia and the U.S. are partners under the Major non- NATO partner assertion since 2015.<sup>93</sup> Resulting to the insurgency, American authorities as often as possible iterated the states, eagerness to support the Tunisian transition to democracy.

On January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2011 talking from the state office, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (1947- ) called attention to Tunisian's absence of "experience" and institutional muscle memory to manage them through the popularity based progress and offer the need assistance.<sup>94</sup> Obama Administration finally to acknowledge publicly what State Department officials had been quietly stating in their Annual Human Rights Report for years and which recently had been confirmed by Wikileaks' release of statements from the Obama- appointed US ambassador to Tunisia: That Ben Ali's regime was patently corrupt and brutally repressive. President Obama's condemnation of the Tunisian government's violence on the day that Ben Ali was finally forced to flee the country and his subsequent praise for "the courage and dignity of the Tunisian people" was seen by many Tunisians as too little and too late".<sup>95</sup>

In addition, American donors were especially strongly show American authorities have constantly focused on democratization as a key concern of their arrangement toward the Arab world. Subsequently, supporting popular government in this region was normally depicted as a principle segment of the U.S.'s worldwide war on terror.<sup>96</sup> Nonetheless, U.S. vote-based system advancement endeavors and champion human rights, the U.S. is as yet

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<sup>92</sup> "The Report of the 2010 Delegation of Attorneys to Tunisia From National Lawyers Guild (US), Haldane Society of Socialist lawyers (UK), and Mazlumder (turkey)". Op. cit., P. 3.

<sup>93</sup> Ridha Kéfi, op. cit., P. 237.

<sup>94</sup> Tassnim Abderrahim, *Tunisia in Transition. American Democracy Promotion in transition Tunisia*. (A Recipient.Centred Approach. March 2015). p. 3.

<sup>95</sup> The Report of the 2010 Delegation of Attorneys to Tunisia From National Lawyers Guild (US), Haldane Society of Socialist lawyers (UK), and Mazlumder (turkey). op. cit., P. 12, 13.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid. p. 3.

backing ensuring imperious regimes which oblige its interests in the area. The concerns about the authenticity and validity of American funding were raised by this double standard.<sup>97</sup>

Moreover, since the 14<sup>th</sup> January 2011, in help for Tunisia's vote-based progress, the U.S. has offered around \$200 million. This aid concentrated on technical and financial endowment for the country's economy, security, and common society.<sup>98</sup> The American benefactors helped the capacities of nearby considerate society associations include grants, training, workshops, and data-sharing sessions.<sup>99</sup> The center destinations of these endeavors, as sketched out on the Department of States "websites" are to reinforce efforts to strengthen common society and metro cooperation in the political procedure, bolster free and reasonable discretionary and advance transitional equity process.<sup>100</sup>

In fact, respondents assented that American endeavors to advance majority rule government in Tunisia are interest-driven. As far as topography, Tunisia is a door to Europe and partner in the Mediterranean locale which encourages especially European countries to ensure steadiness in this country to safeguard their interests and to secure their geography by confining unlawful migration.<sup>101</sup> With respect to the U.S. Tunisia is more especially critical in light of the fact that they are betting on the achievement of the Tunisian revolution to show case smooth democracy which the American administration embraced as a model.<sup>102</sup>

As a result, we can say that nevertheless of the crushed landscape of what has rather quickly been known as the Arab Spring, Tunisia is a special case, it included less violent and actually involved an exchange of energy from a tyrant regime to vote based one, and then between different democratic powers. It was regarded as a positive example of peaceful transformation.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Nasser Adèle Aranki, Op. cit., P. 24.

<sup>98</sup> Kristina Kausech, *Foreign Funding in post Revolution Tunisia.AFA, Fride and Hivos,2013.* (San Fransisco: 2013). p. 13, 14.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid. p. 13, 14.

<sup>100</sup> Zeidan Dowson, Najla Eaton Tim and Karen Wespieser, *After the Revolution: Libian And Tunisian Media through The People's Eyes.* (Research Report. O6. March 2015). P. 4.


<sup>101</sup> Abderrahim, Tassnim. Op. cit., P. 10.

<sup>102</sup> Michael Robbins, *Tunisia Five Years after the Revolution Findings from the Arab Barometer.* May 15, 2016. P. 4.

<sup>103</sup> Azadeh Shahshahani and Corina Mullih, op. cit., P. 82.

### 3-The Tahrir Square Revolution of 2011: The January 25 Revolution

**Figure Four: Egyptian's Revolution**



**Source:**[https://www.haaretz.com/polopoly\\_fs/1.698076!/image/4239287961.jpg\\_gen/derivatives/headline\\_609x343/4239287961.jpg](https://www.haaretz.com/polopoly_fs/1.698076!/image/4239287961.jpg_gen/derivatives/headline_609x343/4239287961.jpg)

Hosni Mubarak (1928- ) took office from 1981 to 2011. His presidency was portrayed, during his five terms, by a severe arrangement which stifled everyone who needed to request more political and social rights. He announced the Emergency law to curb his people and to dispense the opposition political parties. The standards of living of the Egyptians were so terrible because of the expanding gap between the rich and the poor.<sup>104</sup> In 2005, the president Hosni Mubarak did few changes in the presidential electoral law as a reaction to the raising calling for democracy and to prettify the Egyptian government in the eyes of world.

But his winning in five terms brought about disaffection civil distress, and loss of public support. In the election of 2010, the fabrication of electoral system was compromised; this led to a enormous rage (anger) among the opposition political parties which were represented by the Muslim Brotherhood. When the upheaval began on January 2011, Cairo's Tahrir Square was loaded with protesters demanding that the country's tyrant, Hosni Mubarak, leave office. The U.S. President Obama praised on the peaceful protesters and said" That means protecting the rights of Egypt's citizens, lifting the Emergency Law, revising the Constitution and other laws to make this change irreversible, and laying out of a clear path to

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<sup>104</sup> Kamal Edin Osman Saleh, "The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings". *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35(2), 2013. p.17.

elections that are fair and free,” He said. “Above all, this transition must bring all of Egypt’s voices to the table.”<sup>105</sup>

The Egyptian mass media (television, radio, and press) were the government’s voice, in which they depicted that the protesters were close 100 to 200 persons, but in fact they were hundreds of thousands, then soon ended up millions. The Egyptians people passed a very hard time during the unrest; they were kept from their political, economic, and social rights and this was the foundation of the presence of some organizations that called for the human rights such as “Enough Organizations” that called for the political, economic reforms, fighting corruption, and enhancing the ways of living. From that point, the American intervention began. Obama’s tone was very optimistic, and he promised the crowd in Cairo’s “Tahrir” Square \_which was listening to his brief broadcast live via Egyptian state television\_ continued American support for Egypt. In his remarks, Obama also promised whatever assistance was, America was ready to pursue a credible transition to a democracy.<sup>106</sup>

The United States, under Obama’s presidency, requested from Hosni Mubarak to do political reforms such as allowing the political parties, particularly the Muslims brotherhood, to take part in the presidential election.<sup>107</sup> The Muslims Brotherhood won 88 out of 454 seats in the parliament, and this was the starting point of the formation of the opposition parties. The mass demonstrations’ causes were focused about legal and political issues including police brutality, state of Emergency Laws, lack of free elections and freedom of speech, uncontrollable corruption, and economic issues like the high unemployment, food price inflation, scarcity of water supplies, and low minimum wages. The primary demands of the protests’ organizers were to end the Hosni Mubarak regime and to end the Emergency Law.<sup>108</sup> In a one on one conversation by telephone with Mubarak on January 28, Obama told the Egyptian president nearly point blank to resign, and Mubarak refused. Obama told Mubarak:” It is time to present to the people of Egypt its next government.” Mubarak replied:” let’s talk in the next three or four days.”<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa.” *speech*, May 19, 2011, The White House.

<sup>106</sup> Sharp Jeremy M, “Congressional Research Services”, *Egypt: The January 25 Revolution and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy*, 31(4), 2011. p.2.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Duncan Green, “What Caused the Revolution in Egypt?”. *The Guardian* 27 (4), 2011. p.3.

<sup>109</sup> Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa,” *speech*, May 19, 2011, The White House.

The utilization of social media platforms (Facebook and Twitter) assumed a significant role and contributed, in indirect way, in flaming the upset in which it facilitated their way of communication inside the country and abroad and gave critical news, analysis of events to people, sharing ideas, and building ties between the opposition or the political movement's leaders and ordinary people. According to western standards, the Middle East's countries in general, and Egypt in particular, lacked or failed in accomplishing democratic outcomes.<sup>110</sup> The United States supported the protesters financially; Hilary Clinton confessed that the American government gave aids to protesters through its embassy in Cairo, and Obama addressed a speech to the Egyptian people in which he said "To the people of Egypt, particularly the young people of Egypt, I want to be clear: We hear your voices. I have an unyielding belief that you will determine your own destiny and seize the promise of a better future for your children and your grandchildren. Also, he said "The people of Egypt have spoken, their voices have been heard, and Egypt will never the same."<sup>111</sup>

Before the terrorist attacks, the United States was with the tyrannical regimes in the Arab region, in which it supported them militarily, economically, and politically. According to the Daily Mail newspaper the US government gave approximately \$1.3 billion to Egypt annually in form of military aids since 1987. But after the 9/11 attacks, everything changed, the American President George W. Bush announced that he would fight the tyrannical regimes that supported terrorism in the world in general, and in the Middle East in particular, and this new policy was applied when he introduced the Greater Middle East Project in 2004 that aimed to destabilize and mobilize the geographical boundaries of the Middle East region.<sup>112</sup>

The Egyptian government, under the president Hosni Mubarak, was corrupted politically, economically, and financially. The absence of press's freedom, the low standards of living, and the economic recession were factors that weakened the country. America took this opportunity to interfere under the umbrella of democracy promotion. During the uprisings, the Egyptian government endeavored to end the unrest by utilizing violence against street demonstrations, and by blocking three cell phone systems. They cut even the phone

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<sup>110</sup> Duncan Green, op. cit., p.3.

<sup>111</sup> Obama Barack. "Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa". *speech*, May 19, 2011, The White House.

<sup>112</sup> George W. Bush, op. cit., P.19

landlines to keep any news agency from following the events. The government likewise cut the water supply and electricity.<sup>113</sup>

On February 1, President Obama cautioned the Egyptian authorities against utilizing brutality against protesters, called for an end to Egypt's shutdown of the Internet. In this regard, he said "I want to be very clear in calling upon the Egyptian authorities to refrain from any violence against peaceful protesters. The people of Egypt have rights that are universal. That includes the right to peaceful assembly and association, the right to free speech, and the ability to determine their destiny. These are human right. And the United States will stand up for them everywhere. I also call upon the Egyptian government to reverse the actions that they've taken to interfere with access to the Internet, to cell phone service and to social networks that do so much to connect people in the twenty-first century."<sup>114</sup> To conclude his speech, he said "The word Tahrir means liberation. It is a word that speaks to that something in our souls that cries out for freedom. And forevermore it will remind us of the Egyptian people\_ of what they did, of the things that they stood for, and how they changed their country, and in doing so changed the world."<sup>115</sup>

In sum, the Egyptian people truly endured during the uprisings, patients in hospitals could not get urgent medical care. The families of the killed protesters could not get the bodies of their sons to bury them. In February, President Hosni Mubarak left office after nearly 30 years, leaving the power to the Council of Senior Military Officers.<sup>116</sup> The American President Obama said "I am pleased that President Mubarak has heard and heeded the voice of the Egyptian people, who have called for change," He added, but "It is crucial that Mubarak's departure be an orderly one and that it leads to true democracy for Egypt, including free, fair and open elections." He added, "We caution all side against violence during this transition."<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Duncan Green, op. cit., p.5.

<sup>114</sup> Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa" *speech*, May 19, 2011, The White House.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> "Arab Uprisings: The State of the Egypt Revolution". *Middle East Political Science* (George Washington University, 2011) p.3.

<sup>117</sup> Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa". *speech*, May 19, 2011, The White House.

#### 4-The Zanga Zanga Democracy: The Libyan Uprising on February 2011

Figure Five: Libya's Revolution



Source: <http://i.huffpost.com/gen/440985/original.jpg>

Libya was known as one of the undeveloped countries in the world when it took its independence by the United Nations in 1951. Gaddafi (1942-2011) took office in 1969 after a military coup. During his period, the influence of the tribes was a big one to the extent that the law of the tribes had priority over the national law in some regions.<sup>118</sup> The country's economy, during his period, was enhanced to the maximum comparing to other African countries. But, unfortunately political status was not developed as the economic status. Perhaps, this was the weakest point of the Gaddafi government. Subsequently, this problem was the greatest obstacle on the country's way to democratization. The opposition powers who wanted to oust Gaddafi started from this claim (lack of democracy) and they were not alone, they were supported by NATO, and also by external powers. The American President Barack Obama praised the uprisings and said "For generations, the United States of America has played a unique role as an anchor of global security and advocate for human freedom.

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<sup>118</sup> Wolfram Lancher, "Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution." *Middle East Policy* 33(1), 2011. p.154.



Mindful of the risks and costs of military action, we are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the world's many challenges. But when our interests and values are at stake, we have a responsibility to act. That is what happened in Libya.” Also, he stated,” In cities and towns across the country, Libyans took to the streets to claim their basic human rights. As one Libyan said, ``for the first time we finally have hope that our nightmare of 40 years will soon be over.”<sup>119</sup>

At first, the mass uprisings in Libya began on February 15, 2011 in the city of Benghazi, focusing on human rights abuses, social program mismanagement, political corruption, and finally demanding the end of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. Then soon, the peaceful demonstrations developed and turned into a bloody civil war when Gaddafi’s government escalated its random shelling on the Libyan cities. At this point, Obama said” Faced with this opposition, Gaddafi began attacking his people. As President, my immediate concern was the safety of our citizens, so we evacuated our Embassy and all Americans who sought our assistance. We then took a series of swift steps in a matter of days to answer Gaddafi's aggression. We froze more than \$33 billion of the Gaddafi regime's assets. Joining with other nations at the United Nations Security Council, we broadened our sanctions, imposed an arms embargo, and enabled Gaddafi and those around him to be held accountable for their crimes. I made it clear that Gaddafi had lost the confidence of his people and the legitimacy to lead, and I said that he needed to step down from power.”<sup>120</sup>

After two months of the protests’ starting, the United States saw that the revolution was unable to topple the Gaddafi regime, so it intervened under the umbrella of the Security Council of the United Nations. Obama justified the US intervention when he said” As the bulk of our military effort ratchets down, what we can do - and will do - is support the aspirations of the Libyan people. We have intervened to stop a massacre, and we will work with our allies and partners as they’re in the lead to maintain the safety of civilians. We will deny the regime arms, cut off its supply of cash, assist the opposition, and work with other nations to hasten the day when Gaddafi leaves power. It may not happen overnight, as a badly weakened Gaddafi tries desperately to hang on to power. But it should be clear to those around Gaddafi, and to every Libyan, that history is not on his side. With the time and space

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<sup>119</sup> Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation of Libya.” op. cit.,

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

that we have provided for the Libyan people, they will be able to determine their own destiny, and that is how it should be.”<sup>121</sup>

The Security Council of the United Nations approved an international force to be deployed and the enforcement of various sanctions on Libya, on Gaddafi, and on his family members. Hence a multi-state NATO-led coalition began a military intervention in Libya. The NATO started by keeping up a no-fly zone, followed by military operations against the Libyan government and in all the Libyan cities. Gaddafi frequently changed his place to be protected from air operations. But, unfortunately, he was injured as a result of the intensive air attacks of NATO on October 20, 2011 and got by the opponents who then lynched him. By the Gaddafi's death, the NTC became officially recognized by more than 100 countries.<sup>122</sup>

Both declared and undeclared reasons contributed to the multi-states intervention. The undeclared reasons, first, the Lockerbie bombing event that occurred on December 22, 1988. It was the worst terrorist attack against the US nation before the events of 11 September 2001. The event resulted, from a mid-air attack that exploded Pan Am flight 103, by two Libyan agents. The attack killed 259 people who were on the plane and another 11 who were on the ground. Two weeks later, the United States requested from Libya to acknowledge responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials and pay appropriate compensation. The Libyan government refused to grant extradition, asserting that such an act constituted direct interference in Libya's internal affairs. Then economic sanctions were imposed on Libya by the Security Council of the United Nations.<sup>123</sup>

Second, the Libyan program of mass destruction's weapons, on December 19, 2003, Gaddafi announced that Libya would stop the weapons of mass destruction's program under the pressure of the United States via IAEA. Third, the nature of Gaddafi regime, Gaddafi built up his own political philosophy that was depended on his Green Book to replace the parliament and the political parties. He prohibited direct elections and called the process of democracy “bourgeois” and in essence “anti-democratic”. This was why he was viewed as the last dictator in all over the world.<sup>124</sup> In this regard President Obama said, “Libya sits directly between Tunisia and Egypt - two nations that inspired the world when their people rose up to take control of their own destiny. For more than four decades, the Libyan people have been

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Wolfram L anchor, op. cit., p.168.

<sup>123</sup> Michael p Schar, “A preview of the Lockerbie Case.” *Insights*, 5(5), 2000. p.3.

<sup>124</sup> Okanem Godwin, “the Libyan Revolution: Philosophical Interpretations” *Open Journal of Philosophy* 17(5), 2015. p.31.

ruled by a tyrant - Muammar Gaddafi. He has denied his people freedom, exploited their wealth, murdered opponents at home and abroad, and terrorized innocent people around the world - including Americans who were killed by Libyan agents.”<sup>125</sup>

Another reasons contributed to the military intervention like the Gaddafi ‘s ambition to unite and empower the whole Africa, and this contradicted with the US interests in the region. In addition to that the US interests in Libyan oil that had a good quality, this was from one side. From another side, the US intervention was a continuation of the Greater Middle East Project which was introduced during the Presidency of George W. Bush in early 2004 and it contained plans for redrawing the Middle East.<sup>126</sup>

The declared reasons were about the aggressive methods, and the random shelling on the Libyan cities, and the stopping of the food’s supplies by the Gaddafi government. In this regard, Obama said, “In the face of the world's condemnation, Gaddafi chose to escalate his attacks, launching a military campaign against the Libyan people. Innocent people were targeted for killing. Hospitals and ambulances were attacked. Journalists were arrested, sexually assaulted, and killed. Supplies of food and fuel were choked off. The water for hundreds of thousands of people in Misratah was shut off. Cities and towns were shelled, mosques destroyed, and apartment buildings reduced to rubble. Military jets and helicopter gunships were unleashed upon people who had no means to defend themselves against assault from the air.”<sup>127</sup> He added " That is not to say that our work is complete. In addition to our NATO responsibilities, we will work with the international community to provide assistance to the people of Libya, who need food for the hungry and medical care for the wounded. We will safeguard the more than \$33 billion that was frozen from the Gaddafi regime so that it is available to rebuild Libya. After all, this money does not belong to Gaddafi or to us - it belongs to the Libyan people, and we will make sure they receive it”<sup>128</sup> .As a result of the war, thousands of people lost their lives and hundreds of thousand migrated to neighboring countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, and Algeria. The country’s economy became the worst in the world.

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<sup>125</sup> Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation of Libya," op. cit.,

<sup>126</sup> George W. Bush, op. cit., P.15.

<sup>127</sup> Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation of Libya." op. cit.,

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

## 5-The Taghyir Square's Revolution: Yemen's Continuing Political Transition 2011

As unrest spread across the Arab world in 2011, people particularly an adolescent led popular demonstration movement challenged President Ali Abdullah Saleh's 33 years rule (1947-2017) in Yemen initially inspired by Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution and after that galvanized by the oust of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (1928- ),<sup>129</sup> a student dissent movement oversaw through the course of several months to keep up across the nation-wide protests and draw in expansive well known help that called for Saleh to step down from power seeing an opportunity to displace the President and his family.<sup>130</sup>

The Yemeni system that Saleh had led since 1990 is based on a power-delighting accord among the president, the folks allied to him, and the army.<sup>131</sup> Saleh's opponents from inside the political and military elite, such as the powerful Al Ahmar and the commander of the first Armored Division, General Ali Mohsin defected on March 21, 2011, joined resistance requests for the president's abdication.<sup>132</sup> At last, what began as a popular rebel against a long-term ruler, advanced into a confrontation between competing elites for executive power. This confrontation turned violent in mid-2011, as road fights erupted in Sana'a and different urban communities between powers loyal to Saleh and supporters of his adversaries.<sup>133</sup> As political rivals straightforwardly battled in the capital, government powers were reviewed from distant provinces to protect the regime. Leaving a security Vacuum in territories known to harbor Islamist militants. In fact, the Yemeni confrontation parties had started even before the disgusts in Egypt and Tunisia that called for altering President Saleh's voting system, then the confrontation's anger was escalated, too, by Saleh's aim to move power into his son.<sup>134</sup>

Soon, militants associated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seized territory in one southern region. Concerned that political unrest in Yemen was enervating the central government and security powers and consequently making a security vacuum

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<sup>129</sup> Hisham Qarawi, *The Yemeni Revolution: replacing Ali Abd ulah Saleh, or replacing obsolete institution?* (Doha: Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies. May 2011). P. 4.

<sup>130</sup> Jeremy M. Sharp, *Yemen: Back ground and U.S. Relations.* ( Congressional Research Service. Informing the legislative debate since 1914. February 6, 2014). P. 4.


<sup>131</sup> Hisham Qarawi, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>132</sup> Ahmed Awad Binmubarak, *The US Congress and Yemen: Background, critical Issues and the Way Forward.* (Special Report (April 2017), Embassy of the Republic of Yemen. Washington, DC. April 2017). P. 14.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Hisham Qarawi , op.cit. p. 5.

conductive to terrorist elements emerging the U.S. Saudi Arabia, and others individuals from the global group endeavored to handle a political compromise.<sup>135</sup> Then, President Saleh was capable for a while to oppose international attempts to broker his managed departure, disregarding shelling assault that almost slaughtered him and forced his temporary exile to Saudi Arabia.<sup>136</sup> However, a mix of more universal pressure, as exemplified by the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2014 which reaffirmed UN bolster for a political settlements as soon as possible, surrender from his supporters security powers, and their mounting losses on the ground to rival tribal militias, ultimately drove him to conclude that his political position had turned out to be untenable.<sup>137</sup>



**Figure Six: The Yemeni Civil War**

**Source:** Roland Popp, op.cit., P.3.

<sup>135</sup> Jeremy M Sharp, o p. cit., P. 4, 5, 7.

<sup>136</sup> Qarawi, Hisham.op. cit., P. 4.

<sup>137</sup> Ronald Popp, *War in Yemen: Revolution and Saudi Intervention*.( CSS Analyses in Security Policy.N0, 175. June 2015). P. 1.

Some European Association part states had started to openly threaten sanctions including asset freezes against the President and his family, if Saleh did not adhere to UNSCR 2014 in early November 2011.<sup>138</sup> There has been hypothesis that the Saudi Arabian government may be detecting a chance to intercede, may have provided President Saleh and his opponents money related motivating forces to settle their differences and move to a wrinkle-fire.<sup>139</sup>

Following eleven months of demonstrations and brutality that asserted over 2,000 lives On November 23, 2011.

Then, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen signed on to a U.S. sponsored, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) brokered transition plan.<sup>140</sup> As a feature of the arrangement and in return for his resignation, Saleh and his family were allowed resistance from indictment and the previous president could hold his part as leader of the General Individuals (GPC), the former decision party.<sup>141</sup> Yemen held a presidential “election” with one agreement candidate on the ballot-former Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour al Hadi (1945-) in February 2012 following a 90-day progress period. Al-Hadi was initiated president on February 25, 2012, after he got 6, 6 million votes.<sup>142</sup>

Political power step by step blended around the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s close family under his rule. Key posts were filled by whose members in different security services. Depravation was rampant, and the country remained the poorest in the Arab world and one of the most destitute nations on earth. Yemen disposed 154 out of 187 on the United Nations Human Advancement file in 2011. Saleh figured out how to remain in power for over four decades, but the nation’s long term basic resource and economic challenges worsened during his rule.<sup>143</sup>

During Saleh’s presidency, U.S.-Yemeni relations were always stressed by an absence of solid military-to- military ties and business, denial Yemeni objective of U.S. policy in the Middle East, and U.S. doubt of Yemen’s sense of duty regarding battling terrorism.<sup>144</sup> Indeed,

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> Jeremy M Sharp, op. cit., P. 7.

<sup>140</sup> Ahmed Awad Binmubarak, Op. cit., P. 16.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid. p. 9.

<sup>142</sup> Peter Salisbury, *Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War’*. ( Middle East and North Africa Programme. February 2015). P. 3.

<sup>143</sup> Hisham Qarawi ,op. cit., P. 4, 5.

<sup>144</sup> J. E. Peterson. *36 The United and Yemen A history of unfulfilled expectations*. ( London: Handbook of US-Middle East Relations/Formative factors and regional perspectives. 2009). P. 506.

the U.S-Yemeni relations turned back to the 1940s, and they are characterized as warm, concerted, and venerating.<sup>145</sup> The United States government has been fundamentally concerned with fighting Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist groups inside Yemen, since its unification. In 2000, Al Qaeda's assault against the USS Cole, combined with the attacks of September 11, 2001, after a year formally made Yemen a front in the "war on terror".<sup>146</sup> During the early years of the George W. Bush (1946-) Administration, reciprocal relations enhanced under the rubric of war against Al Qaeda, despite the fact that Yemen's remiss policy toward suspected terrorists and U.S. concerns about debasement and administration showed down extra U.S. bolster. Saudi Arabia's Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) drove activists to look for shelter in Yemen in the middle of decade.<sup>147</sup> In fact the Yemen's globe is particular and singularly important which prompted it to be the double capture for the American interest.<sup>148</sup>

The Obama (1961- ) Administration started a major review of U.S. Policy toward Yemen in 2009. That review combined with the endeavored aircraft shelling over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, prompted to another U.S. methodology toward Yemen alluded to as the National Security Committee's Yemen key arrangement. This System is basically three-crease, concentrating on fighting AQAP in the short term, expanding improvement help to address long-term difficulties, and marshaling support for worldwide efforts to stabilize Yemen.<sup>149</sup> Overall, the Obama Administration remains warily idealistic about Yemen's direction the State Division reports that the U.S. has submitted \$ 256 million in help to Yemen to date in FY 2013, in addition to the more than \$ 356 million dispensed in FY 2012. The Branch of safeguard notified Congress of its goal to spend 62 million in FY 2014 Section 1206 supports on exactness, strike airplane, on December 2013.<sup>150</sup> Mr. Ted Deutch (D) from Florida, US Congressman said; "Following the deposition of Yemen's long autocratic ruler Saleh in 2011, the U.S. supported an inclusive transition process, via national dialogue, into rebuilding the country's political and governmental institutions and bridging gaps between groups that have had a long history of conflict". And while the national dialogue was initially viewed as successful, the process concluded in 2014 with several key forms still not

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<sup>145</sup> Ahmed Awad Binmubarak, op. cit., P. 11.

<sup>146</sup> J. E. Peterson. op. cit., P. 508.

<sup>147</sup> Jeremy M Sharp, op. cit., P. 7.

<sup>148</sup> Ahmed Awad Binmubarak, op. cit., P. 5.


<sup>149</sup> Ibid. p. 18.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid. p. 25.



completed, drafting of new constitution. The Hadi government had continued to face deep opposition for Yemen's northern tribes,"<sup>151</sup>

**Figure Seven: U.S.'s Helps for Yemen**



**Source:** Ahmed Awad Binmubark, op.cit., P.19. <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/yemen.html>

On January 2014 Yemen's Continuous Political transition, following ten months of talks, Yemen's National Discourse, a gathering expected to achieve expansive national accord on another political request, formally finished up without assertions amongst northern and southern politicians on the most proficient method to sort out another government arrangement of administration Yemen was once in the past separated into two states.<sup>152</sup>

As a result, we can say that Yemen have been brought into a new situation that no one could have expected by the protester's demands, which led exceedingly hazardous event occurred at that time was a radical change in Yemen society, the adolescent aim on commanding a different sort of docket, one which gave forth republic civil revolution such as those in Tunisia and Egypt, in order to make a new political system.<sup>153</sup>

<sup>151</sup> Ibid. 15.

<sup>152</sup> Jeremy M Sharp, *Yemen*. op. cit., P. 2.

<sup>153</sup> Hisham Qarawi, op. cit., P. 16, 17.



## 6-The Sectarianism in Bahrain: The February Pearl Uprisings 2011

The uprisings in Bahrain were a part of the general Arab Spring wave in the Middle East. There were unique and separate factors that differentiate those revolutions. But all aimed to put an end to corruption among the various governmental sectors. After the spread of uprising against dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the Sunni-ruled monarchy of Bahrain saw its first protests mostly by its Shiite population. The February 2011 demonstrations in Bahrain were first declared on internet by young Bahraini Facebook members, who requested far-reaching democratic and political reforms, a revision of the 2001-2 constitution, better job opportunities, and changes within the governmental system. They hoped to accomplish this by peaceful demonstrations. This strategy was both encouraged and affirmed of by Shiite ‘Ulama’. This phenomenon of utilizing the internet to call for peaceful mass protests and democracy found its way into Bahrain after it was utilized by the Tunisian and the Egyptian.<sup>154</sup>

The anti-government demonstrations in Bahrain began in early February 2011 nearer the Pearl (Lu’lu’a) Roundabout. At first, it was peaceful demonstrations but soon it turned to a bloody one, when some demonstrators were fired at by the government forces with live ammunition. Both sides (the government and its opposition) blamed each other for the turmoil. Then the government contained the uprisings and did not solve the problems that drove them to demonstrate, by cracking down on the protests and denying the human rights organizations and media from entering the country.<sup>155</sup> As a response to the crackdown, Obama’s tone was noticeably toughened. The message was clear stability must depend on respecting the rights of the people, not on foreign troops. When the president gave a major speech on the Middle East in May 2011, he was even more critical of Bahrain and its policy of repression, he said “We have insisted both publicly and privately that mass arrests and brute force are at odds with the universal rights of Bahrain’s citizens, and ... such steps will not make legitimate calls for reform go away.”<sup>156</sup>

The government, or the ruling family, legitimized its actions by expressing that it was simply safeguarding itself because the demonstrators were armed and threatened to attack them, while the protesters denied this and argued that the government and police services were the real aggressors. Pearl Roundabout was at last cleaned when troops from Saudi

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<sup>154</sup> Kamal Edin Saleh Osman, op. cit., p.19.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Barack Obama, op. cit.,

Arabia and other GCC states entered the kingdom in March 2011 in what was a moment of humiliation for al- khalifa's family. As a result of the uprisings, and according to the Bahraini Ministry of Interior, hundreds of people died, hundreds of people were arrested, while more than 4.000 people were summarily removed from their jobs.<sup>157</sup>

The Obama administration more than once offered the Bahraini government for self-restraint and Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton called for political process that advanced the rights and goals of all the citizens of Bahrain. But the administration had neither recalled its ambassador nor threatened the kind of sanctions it forced on Libya. More than that, apparently in reaction to the brutal crackdown against protesters, the US government gave some arms sales to Bahrain that could be utilized against protesters.<sup>158</sup>

America's reaction to the crackdown was criticized by the Shiite of Bahrain and they requested from US to stop arming the killers (the Bahraini government). The United States stopped selling weapons to Bahrain, but, it resumed them after seven months. This American-Bahraini economic agreement was paradoxical. From one viewpoint, the Obama administration was strongly condemning Russia for selling weapons to the Syrian uprisings. While then again, America was doing exactly the same in Bahrain.<sup>159</sup>

The US officials guarded the administration's ad hoc approach to Middle East democracy movements as reasonable, saying each country required a unique balancing of democratic ideals and convincing security interests, they did not take decisions about issues like intervention based on consistency or precedent, Denis R. McDonough, Obama's deputy national security adviser, explained why U.S. policy on Libya differed from that on Bahrain, they made them depended on how they could best advance their interests in the region.

Bahrain was and still a vital partner to the United States in the Middle East, this was due to its strategic location in the Persian Gulf; the United States kept up a naval base in Bahrain since 1947, and US 5th fleet stationed there since 1991, along with numerous other U.S. naval forces. The United States had used facilities in Bahrain while leading numerous operations, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The fleet's presence aimed at

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<sup>157</sup> Ahmed K Al-Rawi, "Sectarianism and the Arab Spring: Framing the Popular Protests in Bahrain." *Global Media and Communication* ,11(1), 2015. p.5.

<sup>158</sup> Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "Bahrain's uprising: Regional Dimensions and International consequences." *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2(1), 2013. p.14.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

guaranteeing the free flow of oil through the Gulf, since it possessed half of the world's total oil reserves, as well as, monitoring Iran and deterring piracy.

Some U.S. officials made the case that the U.S. government should not be too hard on a loyal military partner, like Bahrain, especially at time when the United States' needed Arab partners in the fight against ISIS. "America is a close friend of Bahrain,"<sup>160</sup> President Obama said in a 2011 speech at the United Nations just seven months after the Bahraini dictatorship reacted to peaceful democratic uprisings by ordering security forces to shoot live rounds into crowds of protesters. In this view, Bahrain remained a key to countering Iranian aggression and not pressuring Bahrain on human rights was important tradeoff that served U.S. national interests. Though not ideal, they argued, the situation in Bahrain was tolerable and served the United States sufficiently enough. The U.S. built up a new strategy that would bring stability to Bahrain; this smallest Middle East country exemplified several of major challenges for U.S. policy in the region. Washington needed a new approach, it needed to quit sending blended signals to the Bahraini government and its people about whether it supported or opposed the regime's repression.<sup>161</sup>

The U.S. strategy would focus on three objectives which were: first, getting political leaders out of jail since they could be no forward movement on political compromise as long as the opposition and those endeavoring to consider the government responsible for its actions were in jail. In this regard Obama said "Bahrain is a long-standing partner, and we are committed to its security. We recognize that Iran has tried to take advantage of the turmoil there, and that the Bahraini government has a legitimate interest in the rule of law. Nevertheless, we have insisted publically and privately that mass arrests and brute force are at odds with the universal rights of Bahrain's citizens, and will not make legitimate calls for reform go away. The only way forward is for the government and opposition to engage in a dialogue, and you can't have a real dialogue when parts of the peaceful opposition are in jail. The government must create the conditions for dialogue, and the opposition must participate to forge a just future for all Bahrainis."<sup>162</sup>

The second set of objective was ending corruption to promote political and economic stability, in August 2012, the U.S. President Obama declared, "the global fight against corruption remains a high priority for the United States, linked to the international

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<sup>160</sup> Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa," *op. cit.*,

<sup>161</sup> Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, *Op. cit.*, p.14.

<sup>162</sup> Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa." *Op. cit.*,

community's shared interests in fighting terrorism, illicit trade, and transnational crime; promoting free and open markets; increasing economic growth; and encouraging stable democracies, human rights, and the role of law.”<sup>163</sup> The State of Department said that the U.S. government supported those who fight corruption by counteracting, exposing, and punishing graft.

The third set of objectives was security service reform\_ in particular more prominent incorporation of Shi'a into the police and other security forces\_ to diffuse pressures and promote comprehensive government. In this regard, Obama said “America must use all our influence to encourage reform in the region. Even as we acknowledge that each country is different, we will need to speak honestly about the principles that we believe in, with friend and foe alike. Our message is simple: if you take the risks that reform entails, you will have the full support of the United States. We must also build on our efforts to broaden our engagement beyond elites, so that we reach the people who will shape the future – particularly young people.”<sup>164</sup> Also, Robert M. Gates, the U.S. former Secretary of Defense wrote in his 2004 book Duty that when he met the king of Bahrain in March 2011, he told him that “Time is not on your side and you should take some urgent steps to reforms.”<sup>165</sup>

In sum, the sectarian division between the Sunni royal family and elites and the Shi'a majority was a source of tension for a long time, numerous Sunnis seemed to trust that Iran and Hezbollah were driving the turmoil. America likewise shared this belief that any Shi'a community in the Middle East would be a problem and an obstacle to its interests in the region. While, the protesters wanted reforms and democracy in a country that ruled by the royal al-Khalifa family for more than 200 years.

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<sup>163</sup> Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps,” *speech*, August 20, 2012, The White House.

<sup>164</sup> Barack Obama, “*Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa*,” *op. cit.*,

<sup>165</sup> Robert M. Gates, *Duty* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), p. 504.

## 7-Syria's Unfinished Story: Syrian's Uprising May 2012

Figure Eight: Syrian's Uprising



**Source :** [https://vid.alarabiya.net/images/2016/08/25/6b40e9d4-d6d5-4649-95b2-a1536c7eacc7/6b40e9d4-d6d5-4649-95b2-a1536c7eacc7\\_16x9\\_788x442.jpg](https://vid.alarabiya.net/images/2016/08/25/6b40e9d4-d6d5-4649-95b2-a1536c7eacc7/6b40e9d4-d6d5-4649-95b2-a1536c7eacc7_16x9_788x442.jpg)

What initially looked like an “Arab spring” changed step by step into an Arab unrest. Protests begun up in Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, Syria and even Saudi Arabia. In Syria as one of these countries, protests took place against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad transformed into an overwhelming war that has destroyed the country, causing in excess of 140,000 deaths, uprooting a large portion of the nation’s populace and destabilizing the whole neighborhood, thus including not merely the primary players of the Middle East, but also the worldwide superpowers.<sup>166</sup>

“It is almost a year ago, that Syrian citizens, inspired by the revolution in Tunisia and Egypt, courageously took to the streets in protest against the decades-long denial of their basic rights by the Assad regime. The revolution signaled the return of politics to Syria...and regain control of their lives.”<sup>167</sup> Grave days were upon Syrians, on is the 25<sup>th</sup> of August 2013. The agitators have been battling a ridiculous war against Syria for two long years. That war was not a war for freedom, as the corrupt western media has brought it out to be. It is a war of abuse, a war for the radical Sunnis to enslave decent variety. It is war of deprived of energy,

<sup>166</sup> Koert Debeuf, Op. cit., P.13.

<sup>167</sup> Heinrich Boll Stiftung, *Syria's Revolution Society, Power, Ideology*. (3 February 2012). P. 5.

for clean financial once more. In particular, it is a war for outsiders to decrease the Syrian Arab Republic to nothing yet a conductor for their common assets.<sup>168</sup> Syria is stand out amongst the most interesting and major issues in the world today, and it is merely made more muddled by the complicated mutual and partisan divisions introduced in its general public.<sup>169</sup>

The two Assad administrations had reproduced discontent among the Sunni majority; In spite of the fact that Sunnis possessed several high-level posts in the administration, they were viewed as auxiliary to the world class Alawite minority.<sup>170</sup> The thought the cutting edge Syria nation state is something that was forced upon the region by European colonizers; as a nation, it did not exist in its present frame until the early twentieth century. In other words, its limits do not fit in with its social history.<sup>171</sup> The revolution of the Arab Spring persuaded that there was extension for change in Syria resulting in the war we see today.

Syria's progressing civil war has inspired a surge of arrangement suggestions from American observers, a large portion of them altogether on impressions of immediate U.S. interests. Recent advancements in Syria and the Middle East have focused American attention on a few contemplations of evident and urgent import, darkening different contemplations that have historically mattered to the United States.<sup>172</sup> Despite some geopolitical characteristics of Syria that were basic in decades past are never longer so, others justify the consideration of anybody concerned with U.S. policy towards Syria today. For a large portion of its history as an autonomous country, Syria has been a national security worry of the United States principally due to its pertinence to the Israeli-Palestine strife. Syria's government has reliably evidenced hostility towards Israel, abetting its adversaries and declining to make peace with the Israeli government as many of its Arab neighbors have.

However, Syria has at times also played a stabilizing role in the Middle East, which is one of few reasons why the present Syrian government's fall would not really help either Israel or the United States.<sup>173</sup> When Syria picked up its autonomy in 1946, Each U.S. President from Truman (1884-1972) to Clinton (1946- ) tried to win Syria's friendship so as to ease its threatening to Israel and encourage a determination to the Israeli-Palestinian

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<sup>168</sup> Arnav Mariwala, *The Syrian Civil War Regime of Bashar Al-Assad*. (California: Standard University. History- Social Science content standards for California Public schools, 1998). P. 4.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid. p. 3.

<sup>170</sup> Arnav Mariwala, op. cit., P. 6.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid p. 3.

<sup>172</sup> Mark Moyar, Britain's *Land Offensive Syria the Allies March in*. (Hoover: Stanford University. April 2013). P.5.

<sup>173</sup> Aissa El Hassane, *The Arab Spring: Causes, Consequences, and implications*. (Philadelphia: U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013. 18 March, 2012). P. 12.

clash.<sup>174</sup> The Syrian dissidents too have gotten universal help. The United States has long been giving non-deadly aid to the renegades and has likewise been blamed for giving battle preparing to the agitators. Arab countries, like Qatar and Saudi Arabia have additionally been known to give arms to the dissidents.<sup>175</sup> Diplomatically, the Russian Administration has sent appointments to express their help of the Assad Government, Russia has also provided the Assad administration with weapons, and providing of arms, the Iranian government is likewise to have furnished Syria with outfitted warriors and more than 9 billion in money related help.<sup>176</sup> The Syrian government has also gotten help from non-government revolutionaries.

In the years going before the Syrian civil war, U.S. policymakers underscored that Syrian inclusion in Lebanon's internal issues was a basic lever in the stability of the Middle East. The U.S. government urged Syria to send battle powers into Lebanon to prevent the triumph of Islamic radicals in the Lebanese civil war in 1976.<sup>177</sup> Inside a few years, however, Syrian powers and their Lebanese partners collided with Israeli powers and their Lebanese allies, convincing the United States to mediate in Lebanon strategically and for a brief timeframe, militarily. The U.S. powers attempted to assume the part of fair peacekeeper, but eventually came to be viewed as favoring Lebanon's Christians, which prompted the shelling of the Beirut encampments by terrorists connected to Iran and Syria.

As a result, the Reagan organization chose to pull back U.S. powers and prefer to dependence for remote militaries to stabilize Lebanon. The U.S. position on Syria's military presence in Lebanon hence wavered amongst help and resistance, until Syria pulled back its powers in 2005. The fight of Syrian troops was, at the time, broadly deciphered as an extreme corruption of Syrian impact in Lebanon. Resulting occasions, nonetheless, demonstrated that Syria held the capacity to shape Lebanese occasions. Syria's an incentive as an accomplice of the U.S. escalated since many years ago inferable to rising U.S. fears of universal terrorists of Sunni Arab origin.<sup>178</sup> The Syrian government, ruled by secular Arabs whose Alawite organization had just a single-seventh the same number of followers among Syria's all-inclusive community as Sunni Islam, shared America's dread of Sunni extremists. Therefore,

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<sup>174</sup> Mark Moyar, op. cit., P. 7.

<sup>175</sup> Arnav Mariwala, op. cit., P. 18.

<sup>176</sup> Hamoud Salhi, *Syria's Threat to America's National Interest. Strategic Insights*. IV( 4). April 2005. P.6.

<sup>177</sup> Mark Moyar, op. cit., P. 7.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.p.7.

it teamed with the U.S. in countering al Qaeda and other Sunni agitators.<sup>179</sup> The still more prominent U.S. enthusiasm for Sunni extremists after 9/11 strengthened joint efforts between the American and Syrian governments for a brief span, but the partnership crumpled after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.<sup>180</sup> The topple of the Afghan and Iraqi governments together with brutal talk from Washington generated Syria fears that Damascus would be the following stop on America's administration-change visit. To persuade the United States that such an attack would be exorbitant and to tie U.S. powers down in Iraq, Syria welcomed Sunni terrorists from around the globe to enter Iraq through Syrian region. Syria's help to Iraq-bound extremists drove the Bush (1946-) organization to seek after an arrangement of segregating and undermining Syria, which included economic sanctions and help to Syrian democracy activists whom it imagined as vanguards of political change.<sup>181</sup>

At the point when Barack Obama (1961-) took office, he minimized vote-based system advancement as a U.S. foreign policy goal and looked to engage Syria and other tyrant states. But the endeavors of Obama's administration to acquire Syrian collaboration in advancing Middle East peace amid 2009 and 2010 bore little fruit.<sup>182</sup> The law-based leanings of a portion of the Arab Spring dissenters in late 2010 and early 2011 drove the Obama organization to turn around its situation on democratization in the Arab world. After some underlying wavering, it tossed America's weight behind the democratic oppositionists in Tunisia and Egypt and upheld the resistance in Libya with force. The slaughter and chaotic aftermath of the Libyan clash, however, revived the portion of the earlier question about the intelligence of U.S. bolster for democratization. Those questions drove the Obama organization to timid far from supporting Syria's renegades amid 2011.<sup>183</sup> The developing nearness of outside Sunni fanatics on Syrian region in early 2012 caused yet another move in the U.S. position on supporting Syrian rebels.<sup>184</sup> The Obama organization gradually expanded aid to what it considered the more moderate gatherings, in the expectations of empowering them to remove the Assad government before fanatic gatherings did. The current U.S. center

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<sup>179</sup> Sari Hanafi, *The Arab Revolutions: The Emergence of a New Political Subjectivity*. (Beirut: American University of Beirut). P. 59.

<sup>180</sup> Hamoud Salhi, op. cit., P. 1.2.

<sup>181</sup> IbidP. 1.2.

<sup>182</sup> Mark Moyar, op. cit., P.9.

<sup>183</sup> Sari Hanafi, op.cit., P.59.

<sup>184</sup> Aissa El Hassane, op. cit., P. 21.



around getting moderates to control Syria has likewise diverted consideration from highlights of Syria that has historically bolstered progress U.S. national security goals.<sup>185</sup>

A new Syrian government is probably to have the knowledge or individual associations in Syria to keep up a balancing out impact there. In conclusion, an agitator victory is probably to decrease or eliminate the opposition to Sunni fanaticism that has been a historic characteristic of the Syrian government. Regardless of whether the new government were exceedingly moderate, its prevalently Sunni structure most likely would keep it from chasing down Sunni fear based oppressors with the same fervor as its Alawite ancestors, Iraq gives a sobering reminder of the dangers of empowering greater part Arab bunches that were generally represented by dictators from minority Arab gatherings.<sup>186</sup> Syrians for impose their presence on roads and squares, and recapture control of their live, they are paying a heavy cost till now.

## **8-Conclusion**

Starting in Tunisia and spreading to other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the Arab Spring took a picture that end up with violence, civil wars, sectarian division, instability and chaos. By August 2012, 4 countries saw government changes: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, and other countries succeeded in cracking down the demonstrations like Bahrain and Syria.

After the self-sacrifice of the street vendor Mohammed Al-Bouazizi that set himself on fire after obtaining no response to his accusations of police brutality. Numerous attempts made by the Tunisian president to offer democratic concessions to the Tunisian people, but; their public protests could not be quieted after Al-Bouazizi 's death. The Tunisian president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali stepped down and escaped to Saudi Arabia. In early 2011, protests started to spread to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria.

Enormous dissents followed in Egypt in late January 2011. The Egyptian government also attempted and failed to control demonstrations by offering concessions while cracking down brutally against nonconformists. In February President Hosni Mubarak left office after almost 30 years in control, leaving a council of senior military officers to govern the country. Supported by dissidents' quick victories in Tunisia and Egypt, dissent developments started to take place in Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria in late January, February, and March. In these

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

countries, however, influx of popular discontent led to extended bloody struggles between opposition group and ruling regimes.

In Yemen, the first demonstrations appeared in late January, when a number of the country's most powerful tribal and military leaders adjusted themselves with the pro-democracy protesters calling for the step down of president Ali Abd Allah Salih. When negotiations to remove Salih from power failed, loyalist and opposition fighters clashed in the city of Sanaa. Salih left Yemen to receive medical treatment after he was injured in a bomb attack. When he came back four months later, however, adding to the uncertainty and confusion about Yemen's political future. In November 2011 Salih signed an internationally intervened arrangement calling for a phased transfer of power to the vice president, 'Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi who was the sole candidate in an election in February 2012.

Mass challenges demanding political and economic changes ejected in Bahrain in mid-February 2011, led by Bahraini human rights activists and individuals from Bahrain's underestimated Shi'ite dominant part. Dissents were violently suppressed by Bahraini security powers, supported by a power of around 1,500 officers from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that entered the country in March. During one month, the mass dissent development was smothered.

In Libya protests against the regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi in mid-February quickly turned into an armed revolt. When the rebel forces became on the brink of defeat in March, an international coalition led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) propelled a campaign of air strikes focusing on Qaddafi's forces. After few months, he was constrained from power in August 2011, and then he was killed in Sort in October 2011 as dissidents took control of the city. In Syria protests calling for the departure of President. Bashar al-Assad broke out in southern Syria in mid-March and spread through the country. The Assad regime reacted with a brutal crackdown against protesters, drawing condemnation from international leaders and human right groups.

In sum, the Arab Spring<sup>1</sup> which initially broke out in Tunisia and spread to numerous countries in the Arab world turned to be an Arab Winter after one year from its starting. There were several reasons that caused the violent demonstrations in the Arab world which were namely about inflation and deficiencies, unemployment, underdevelopment, political and religious abuses, absence of political dissent, lack of political participation, foreign interference, police and state brutality, dictatorship, social imbalance and limitations on

communications and supervision. In the next chapter, we will talk about how the Arab Spring turned into an Arab winter and the reasons that lead it to fail. In addition to that we will talk about response of Obama's foreign policy towards the Arab Spring, the Obama Doctrine, the contradictions that appeared within his Doctrine, and his arc of disenchantment.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

# **The Arab Winter and Obama's Foreign Policy Legacy**

## 1-Introduction

In late of 2010 and during 2011, the Arab countries saw a progression of huge scale political uprisings. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other forms of social media played a major role in the planning, acceleration, and even the preparation of some of the uprisings and revolutions that took place in the Middle East at that time. Social media was utilized effectively to awaken the Arab people and to mobilize them to fight against repressive regimes in their drive for greater freedom and independence.

One year after its onset, the Arab Spring fully turned into the Arab Winter. Despotic regimes planted the seeds for future unrest even while offering temporary stability, and the unrest witnessed nowadays in the MENA region was the result of political, social and economic ills of dictatorships. The Arab Winter was characterized by the emergence of multiple regional civil wars, mounting regional instability, economic and demographic decline of Arab countries, and ethno-religious sectarian strife, and resulted in death of millions of innocent people. Six years on, there was no happy ending. War ravaged Yemen, and imploded Libya. Egypt was back in the clutches of military rule and Syria tottering into a chasm between pain and terror. Cities lie in ruin; hundreds of thousands were killed and millions displaced.

During the Arab uprising, the Arab League adopted different policies towards the internal conflicts in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria since December 2010. First, the Arab League was most active in its policy towards Syria and Libya, which experienced civil wars with massive human rights violations by using the principle of 'Responsibility to Protect' to justify its intervention in member states. The League also supported the international intervention in Libya. Regime interests of Saudi Arabia and Qatar affected the League's policy towards Syria in particular. The Arab regimes and the Arab League were under local, regional, and international pressure to intervene in Syria and Libya. Thus, the League policies towards Syria and Libya could not be reduced to regime interest and distribution of power alone.

In Cairo, Obama addressed the wide issue of political change in a sclerotic Arab world whose rulers sold themselves as guarantors of stability and western interests. That required an especially delicate balance. Eighteen months later, the uprisings of the Arab spring tested that inappropriate construct. From the short and mostly peaceful revolution in Tunisia to gore in Syria, Obama's responses were mixed between pragmatism and values.

Palestine, was always a touchstone for Arabs and Muslims, Obama had a grave disappointment, and called the situation of the Palestinians intolerable. US domestic politics intervened but with no results. Hopes of a two-state solution to the world's most obstinate conflict were fading fast. On Iran, Obama reached out to Iran with a friendly message to its people and clues at flexibility in negotiations with its government. But his efforts to engage had failed. In Iraq, the quick withdraw of US troops, made the country mired in sectarian wars.

Barack Obama ended up his second term with a mixed but negative foreign policy legacy. Although America's worldwide standing was tremendously enhanced from the waning days of the George W. Bush administration. He failed to remove America from military overextension in the greater Mideast and from the global polices mindset that produced that overextension. Also marring his record was his incoherent response to Syria's fatal civil war and Libya's fall into anarchy following the 2011 international intervention. Barack Obama campaigned for President in 2008 proclaiming a fundamental shift in the direction of American foreign policy. He promised to challenge, and change, the reflexive outlooks and outdated creeds that had shaped the policies of recent administrations, from attempts to police the globe to silly conceived attempts at 'nation-building' in societies America did not minded to, or cared to, understand. Obama wanted to restore strategic solvency to allow more powerful American interventions in the arenas that he believed counted most. In this chapter all these events will be best explained, tackled, and clarified.

## **2-The Role of Social Media in the Arab Spring**

The Arab countries saw a progression scale of political uprising in late of 2010 and amid 2011. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and different types of web-based social networking have played a major role in the arranging speeding up, and even the planning of portion of the uprisings and revolutions that occurred in the Middle East and North Africa at this time.<sup>187</sup> Social Media was utilized adequately to stir the Arab individuals and prepare them to fight against severe administrations in their drive for greater freedom and independence. The Arab World had witnessed enormous development in digital communication technologies in a

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<sup>187</sup> Martin Beck and Simone Huser, "Political Change in the Middle East: An attempt to analyze the Arab Spring". *GIGA Research Unit: Institute of Middle East studies*. NO 203. August 2012. P. 7.

way that made it possible for individuals to express their dissatisfaction via social networking.<sup>188</sup>

Using Social Media enabled people to communicate in real-time and thereby was powerful in developing vote-based system since social destination allowed individual's voice to express their opinions about government.<sup>189</sup> By 2010, there were tens huge number of Arab youth on the web. In that same year, 15 million of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) surfing the web, Facebook, Twitter, to express their anger and disappointment with the issues they confronted every day, such as joblessness, inflexible economic conditions and government defilement, however the Arab governments waged boundless crackdowns on journalist, bloggers, and human rights activists, for instance, in Egypt a blogger named Kareem Amer was detained for over four years.<sup>190</sup> In addition, in December 2010, 19-years-old Tal al-Malouhi was said to be the youngest web detainee of conscience in Syria. Moreover, the government shut down the telephone systems and the internet when the revolution initially started in Libya.<sup>191</sup> There were and still are a large number of bloggers who are prisoned and punished for blogging reality and making their voice heard.

**Figure Nine: The Role of Social Media in the Arab Spring**



**Source :** <http://recursostic.educacion.es/observatorio/web/ca/internet/web-20/1043?showall=1>

<sup>188</sup> Samira Hassan, *Social Media and The Arab Spring*. New Jersey University. (A Capstone submitted to the Graduate School Camden. January 2015). P. 5, 6.

<sup>189</sup> Martin Beck and Simone Huser, op. cit., P. 7.

<sup>190</sup> Mikael Eriksson, Ulrik Frank, Magdelina Granasen, and Lindah David, *Social media and ICT during the Arab Spring*. (Bild/ Cover: Wikimedia. Commons, Sherif 9282. July 2013). P. 20, 21.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid.

Online networking was one of numerous aspects of the Arab Spring that had the ability to put a human face to political repression. Story of Bouazizi was told over and over again on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, inspiring other individuals to arrange dissents and challenge their administration. Through Social Media individuals wanted to demonstrate the world the truth, how people in a significant number of the Arab nations had been living under degenerate tyrant regimes. Indeed, without Facebook and other social networks, Arab spring would not have been as well-known recorded.<sup>192</sup>

Furthermore, and for reality to be seen and not merely heard most of the youthful protestors in Tunisia were seen holding their mobile phone cameras and recording the scenes, film of the tranquil protestors and the scenes of police's ruthlessness were transferred onto Facebook, Twitter and YouTube and broadcast on Arab satellite stations like Al-Jazeera.<sup>193</sup> Additionally in Egypt, without the use of these social networks the activists wouldn't have had the chance to voice their worries and their political perspectives about the country. Ghonim an Egyptian protestor said that "I want to meet Mark Zuckerberg one day and thank him... This revolution started on Facebook... We post video on Facebook... I have always said if you want to liberate a society just give them the internet."<sup>194</sup>

As well as, Facebook page was imperative in igniting the revolution in Libya, since it encouraged the Libyan individuals to follow in the strides of the Tunisians and Egyptians. People who were in the lanes protesting took pictures and videos and posted them on Facebook and YouTube. These were broadcasted by Al-Jazeera and other channels.<sup>195</sup> Then, dissimilar to Tunisia and Egypt the role of online networking in Syria was restricted due to fears of the administration scanning of Facebook and twitter, until the video of a tormented dead body posted onto YouTube. This accident, led numerous activists took place to Facebook, Twitter, and Skype.<sup>196</sup> Besides, the events in Tunisia and Egypt propped the entire Arab region such as Yemen, Bahrain, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Web-based Social Networking was likewise used to organize dissents and to voice people's opinions and concerns.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> Oudraogo Adolphe. *Arab Spring and Social Media: The Social, Economic and Governance Issues Driving Revolutions: The Case of Tunisia*. (Ottawa University. Faculty of Social Sciences. August 2015). P. 8.

<sup>193</sup> Martin Beck and Simone Huser, op.cit., P. 7.

<sup>194</sup> Hassan, Samira. Op. cit., P. 22.

<sup>195</sup> Oudraogo Adolphe, op. cit., P. 6. 9.

<sup>196</sup> Mikael Eriksson, Ulrik Frank, Magdelina Granasen, and Lindah David, . op.cit., P. 28, 29, 30, 31.

<sup>197</sup> Samira Hassan, op., cit., P. 30, 31, 32, 33.



Finally, Social Media really became a threat to the Arab regimes. Indeed, bolstered by Social Media, the Arab Spring, at least in its early steps, prompted to the toppling of four merciless despots and the unprecedented outbreak of dissents in many Arab states.<sup>198</sup>

### **3-After the Hope of the Arab Spring, the “Chill” of an Arab Winter**

The so-called Arab Spring began on December 18, 2010, as a popular uprising inspired by the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Al-Bouazizi, who set himself on fire as a reaction to the country's corrupt and autocratic regime. Then soon a chain of revolutionary uprisings deployed across the Middle East and North Africa to overthrow the dictatorial regimes. One year after, the peaceful demonstrations in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen turned to bloodshed and chaos when dictatorial governments tried to turn back the situation. In the event that 2011 was the time of the Arab Spring, the most well-known representation in 2012 was the Arab Winter.

Tunisia, where everything started, recently achieved free elections. But that country — small, ethnically and religiously homogenous, and prosperous — was always seen as a model for a successful transition to democracy. Somewhere else in the Middle East, Saudi troops helped in organizing a crackdown on demonstrators in Bahrain, regime forces toppled protesters in Syria, and Yemen turned into civil war, with al-Qaeda running widespread in the countryside. In Libya, the uprisings turned into civil war when the opponents, Islamists, and tribal leaders fought each other for power in the post-Gaddafi world. Also, in Egypt, where the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in February paved the way for internal struggles that clearly appeared when the Council of Senior Military Officers military tried to keep its hands-on power.<sup>199</sup>

The reason of why the Arab Spring turned into an Arab Winter was not because of Arab peoples did not want to have fair elections or to be free. But rather because entrenched dictators did not provide a fertile soil for democracy. They had long jailed or killed dissenters, eliminate the opponents, weakened and deployed ignorance among civil society, and divided or frightened civilian people. And when dictators toppled, their methods of preserving power did not always fall with them.<sup>200</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> Khaled Hroub, *(Social) Media and Politics and the Arab Spring*. Qatar: Professor of Middle Eastern Studies & Arab Media Studies, (Northwestern University. 2006). P. 33.

<sup>199</sup> Maytha Alhassen, “Please Reconsider the Term Arab Spring”, *The blog*. 2012, P 4.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid. P 5.

In Egypt, the Council of Senior Military Officers military overthrow Mubarak from office but remained as a supposed caretaker and in the same time resistant to give up power, and this appeared when the security forces had again shot people in Tahrir Square. In Yemen and Libya, tribes and other power centers often opposed the old regime; however, they saw each other as opponents. Throughout the region, the police and the judiciary suspended after years of dictatorship, but there was nothing to take their place.<sup>201</sup>

Moreover, the demonstrations that led to the overthrow of rulers such as Mubarak and Tunisia's Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali severely insisted and offered a clear governing alternative. Although they materialized an authentic influx of popular anger, the protests were without leader and unorganized, they were often via social media; there was no African National Congress or official channel to take the control. And the opposition voices that were organized were not necessarily the most democratic. Islamist groups had popular support because of the social services that they provided and the repression that they suffered. They were not allowed to have a significant role in society or, to participate in the political system such as the Egypt's Muslims Brotherhood.<sup>202</sup>

Brotherhood leaders figured out how to ingest a guarantee to multiplicity and resistance, however, it was unclear that they would act on it when in power. Moreover, Islamists were very doubtful of democracy, considering it as methods of gaining power and not as a model for governing. Egyptian Brotherhood, who adopted a stricter version of Islam, entered the political system and succeeded unexpectedly in the elections; their demands for Islamizing society were excessive and may push them to implement a more radical agenda when they took power.<sup>203</sup>

These military forces often deter democracy in skillful ways, and sometimes those military forces changed their way to become more violent. In March, Saudi troops led across the causeway to neighboring Bahrain, a brutal crackdown against Shiite protesters. At home and abroad, the Bahraini royal family spent tens of billions to get rid of dissent. The Bahraini royals not only worry about their own power decreasing, but fear that change elsewhere would be an opening for their arch-rival Iran and for al-Qaeda in the Middle East region.<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid. P 6.

<sup>202</sup> Katerina Dalacoura, "The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical implications." *International Affairs*, 20 January 2012. (88):1, P. 6.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid. P 8.

A shaky Arab Spring did not mean they would return to a world of dictators and secret police. Not only Mubarak, Ben Ali and Muammar Gaddafi went, but also their factions of identity they supported went with them. Bashar al-Assad may stick to power in Syria, but he would be isolated abroad and hated at home. Where old regimes survived, they would be weak; where new ones came in, they would be weaker, because old institutions can be destroyed more quickly than new ones can be built. Both new and old leaders must play to public opinion, and this may lead to hesitant, incoherent, and mixed foreign policies, as politicians made campaign promises that were not included in their countries' interests.<sup>205</sup>

Anti-Americanism was an important feature that rose in the Arab Winter — and it differed much more from past till now that governments would seek to be in accepted by the public opinion. After Mubarak's fall, for example, only one in five Egyptians had a favorable view of the United States (just slightly higher than under Mubarak), and even in Mideast nations that were allied with Washington, larger parts recognized the United States and Israel among the top two threats to their security. One of the ironies of U.S. support for democratic change was that the tyrannical regimes were considered more pro-American than the democrats. Forces of the old regimes were disappointed and felt that Washington relinquished them at their most helpless time. The United States may end up with the most exceedingly bad of both worlds; disfavored by the forces of democracy because of its connections to dictators, and in the same time hated by dictators — whose collaboration was important to U.S. economic and security interests.<sup>206</sup>

The most dangerous outcome of the Arab Winter, however, was the spread of chaos and violence. In Syria, where thousands had already died, and the counting may grow exponentially as sectarian killings spread and peaceful protesters take up arms and waged war. In Yemen, the resignation of Ali Abdullah Saleh had not finished the turmoil throughout the country. And in Libya, lacking solid foundations and being divided by tribal and political factions, might never get its new government off the ground. With the unrest's spread, families would leave their homes, surcharging neighboring countries and evolving fighters for future conflicts. Nearly 1 million Libyans looked for refuge in nearby countries. Tens of thousands of Syrians escaped, and more would leave if the violence there escalated. In

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> Robert Lieber, *Retreat and its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). P 13.

Turkey, Syrian refugees could turn into a source of tension for a future opposition army that would fight the regime in Damascus.<sup>207</sup>

These conflicts could spread if neighbors intervened, whether because they feared from instability to reach them or because they wanted to consolidate their influence across the borders. Saudi Arabia had long intervened in Yemen, for example, and the collapse of that regime might lead the Saudis to move directly against al-Qaeda forces and other concrete threats there. In the same time, Turkey, Iran, and Israel all had strong interests in Syria and might arm factions or otherwise get included simply to counterbalance their rivals.<sup>208</sup>

The United States could do little to make the Arab Winter better, but it did a lot to make it worse. In regimes such as Mubarak who used the American aid to deter and resist democracy. While supporting new democratic parties was a better use of dollars, in the same time it was difficult for America to imagine that its aid for new governments would inevitably include anti-American Islamist groups who would later threaten it. Washington had the most influence with the region's militaries but supporting them presented a dilemma. Militaries were supposed to be the organized part of an orderly transition to democracy in the Middle East, but in Egypt, most officers wanted to keep their hectors and power, and with the U.S. support, they could do that. Outside Egypt, militaries were politicized by tribe (Yemen), faction (Syria) and loyalty to the old order (everywhere), making them part of the problem, not the solution.<sup>209</sup>

The Arab Spring started with U.S. help, and the people of the region who would decide its future. Washington should recognize that change and support it, since it promoted democracy, particularly in key power centers such as Egypt. But inevitably it would play authority, solving problems where it occurred to keep instability from spreading. This could involve helping refugees, using diplomacy to try to prevent neighbors from intervening and escalating a conflict, and continuing to strongly deter to al-Qaeda members from spreading in order to not threaten Arab nations or the United States.<sup>210</sup> In this regard, President Obama

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<sup>207</sup> Katerina Dalacoura, op. cit., P 9.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Dick Cheney and Liz Cheney, "The Collapsing Obama Doctrine." *The Wall Street Journal*, June 17, 2014. P 3.

<sup>210</sup> Richard Fontaine, "*Obama's* Foreign-Policy Legacy: The Limits of American Restraint." *National Review Online*, January 18, 2017. P 7.

optimistically declared that, across the Arab world, “Those rights that we take for granted are being claimed with joy by those who are prying loose the grip of an iron fist.”<sup>211</sup>

In sum, Tunisia could be a good model that led the region not only in loosening that grip, but in creating real democracy through free elections. However, one must recognize that the Arab Spring might not bring freedom to much to the Arab world. Indeed, even as the United States prepared to work with the region’s new democracies, it also must be prepared for the chaos, recession and disorder that would mark the Arab Winter.

#### 4-The Arab League and the Arab Spring

**Figure Ten: The Arab League**



**Source:**<http://www.aljazeera.net/specialfiles/pages/ab81d9aa-01c5-4ad4-abdf-8aed6d6c8dbc>

On March 22, 1945, The Arab League was established in Cairo. The recently independent Arab states of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and Yemen were the establishing members of the League.<sup>212</sup> The transactions over the plan of the League took place in a provincial context of inter-Arab competition during the ruling Hashemite dynasty of Transjordan and Iraq endeavored to impose their sovereignty. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria feared territorial aspiring of the Hashemite administration. They looked to secure the principle of sovereignty, regional trustworthiness and autonomy of Arab states in the Charter of the Arab League. It made out of a General Secretariat and Council, yet they don’t have any noteworthy self-ruler autonomy from member states, which makes it

<sup>211</sup> Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University”, *speech*, May 23, 2013.

<sup>212</sup> Kamil A Rahim, *The Arab League: Its origin- purposes- structures and activities*. (New York: The Arab Information Center 445 Park Avenue New York 22, N. Y. April 1955). P. 5.

troublesome if certainly feasible for the League to build up any organization.<sup>213</sup> The basic leadership process likewise mirrors the worry to forestall external intervention in internal issues of member states.<sup>214</sup>

The goal of the Arab League is to move nearer the relations between part states and co-ordinate their political exercises with the purpose of realizing a nearby coordinated effort between them, to defend their freedom and sway and to consider in a general way the issues and interests of the Arab nations.<sup>215</sup> Each individual of States of the League shall respect the form of government acquiring in alternate States of the League, and shall pledge itself not to make any move tending to change that frame. This casual establishment turned into the most essential part of the regionalism in the Arab world.<sup>216</sup>

At the point on December 2010, when the Arab Spring ejected in Tunisia, and spread to Egypt and Libya in North Africa and later to Syria in the Levant, and Bahrain and Yemen in the Arab Gulf. The Arab League was quiet amid the popular dissents in Tunisia. The League was supposed to hold a summit in Tunisia but it was wiped out due to the unsteadiness in the country.<sup>217</sup> The Secretary General Amre Mousa, on 19 January 2011, cautioned the Arab leaders that “Arab soul is broken by poverty, unemployment and general recession, and Tunisian revolution is not far from us, Arab citizens entered an unprecedented state of anger and frustration.”<sup>218</sup>

The Arab Alliance was quiet and it kept its policy of non-mediation in both of them; Tunisia’s post- revolution transition, and Egypt’s popular uprising, of course because of the Arab League was not merely influenced by domestic regional powers, but rather by the international ones.<sup>219</sup> Likewise, the Arab League’s strategy towards the uprising in the Gulf nations Bahrain and Yemen were vigorously affected by the prevalent power of Saudi Arabia, who saw administration change in the Arab Gulf as a threat to its national interest, the Arab League supported the arrangements of Saudi Arabia in this sub-district including its military mediation.<sup>220</sup> Moreover, the Arab League’s strategy towards the mass atrocities in Libya and

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<sup>213</sup> Raslan Ibrahim, *Regional Organizations and Internal Conflict: The Arab League and the Arab Spring*.( Rio de Janeiro: Policy Brief . 4 (02). May-August 2016). P. 17.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid. p. 18.

<sup>215</sup> Ece Yucer and Niki Hadjivasilio, “Arab League”. *Zurich, Switzerland: Study Guide for Zurich Model United Nations*. April 14<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> 2016.P. 5.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Raslan Ibrahim, op. cit., P. 23, 24.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid. p. 24.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid. p. 25.

Syria constitute a noteworthy change in its customary policy of non-mediation. Dissimilar to its distinction towards mass killings previously, this is the first time the Arab League find a way to end mass killings inside its member state. In fact, at that time the policy of the Arab League hasn't decided yet.<sup>221</sup>

As a result, the Arab League embraced different strategies towards the internal clashes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria since December 2010. First of all, the Arab League was most dynamic in its arrangement towards Syria and Libya, which experienced civil wars with enormous human rights infringements.<sup>222</sup> Then, the contribution of the Arab League to the processes of democratization, transitional, equity, and national reconciliation in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya after the disappointment of the old administration was outright non-intervention. Furthermore, the League bolstered the decision administration in Bahrain and Yemen, and the intervention of Saudi Arabia in these two countries. Thus, the Arab League assumed a noteworthy part of arbiter in these crises but with no accomplishment in resolving the conflict.<sup>223</sup>

## **5-Idealist or Realist? Obama's Confused Foreign Policy**

The Obama Presidency willing to enhance the U.S. relationship with the Arab world had not realized yet. Anti-Americanism elevated and became more pronounced in the region than it was under George W. Bush's government. Due to the exhausted, disappointed, and the high military and diplomatic engagement in the region, the Administration looked to remove its foreign policy attention to Asia. President Obama Middle East policy was progressively cautious, contradictory and confused. The Administration's reaction to the Arab Spring gave a false representation of a great part of the idealism resulted by his famous 2009 Cairo Speech.<sup>224</sup>

Obama's ambivalent and inattentive Mideast policy was caused by a multiplicity of factors that included his view of reducing the military presence especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, his realist-idealist vision of a post American world, and his inability to prioritize and direct strategic interests. These factors had increasingly caused the administration to retreat back from the region. The Administration's failure to secure a long-term security

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<sup>221</sup> Martin Beck, *The Arab League: A New Policy Approach in the Making?* (Syddansk University. Center for Mellemøststudier. April 2013). p. 3, 4.

<sup>222</sup> Raslan Ibrahim, op. cit., P. 27.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid. p. 27, 28.

<sup>224</sup> Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine." *The Atlantic*, April 2016, p. 2.

agreement with Iraq resulted in the removal of U.S. combat troops in 2011 which contributed a lot to the Iraqi instability. Iraq had again staggered on sectarian civil war as Baghdad faced the growing of terrorist organization such as “Al Qaeda”. President Obama’s unwillingness to fully involve U.S. military and diplomatic power in the Mideast increased regional instability and drove out traditional allies. The rising sectarian conflict and reappearance of jihadist violence within the Arab world had only consolidated Obama’s disengagement willing which contributed in advancing the turmoil.<sup>225</sup>

After implementing his early engagement strategy that failed to improve the America’s relationship with the Arab World, Obama’s current Mideast policy adopted strategic restraint to contain the rising violence across the region. Such a position dramatically changed the initial direction of the Administration’s original policies expressed in his Cairo address. Barak Obama’s 2009 speech at Cairo’s Al Azhar University was seen as “historic” and was aimed to improve America’s relationship with the Muslim world to great extent. The speech’s setting was viewed as a proper choice given the academic institution reputation in the Arab world. The decision was both encouraged and insured by massive U.S. financial support. The speech recognized 6 tensions between the West and Islam that needed to be overcome in an environment of “mutual respect” free of stereotypes. The arrangement of these tensions provided some proofs about his foreign policy priorities with beating religious radicalism, achieving a comprehensive Arab-Israel peace, and containing nuclear weapons that increased before promoting democracy, protecting women’s rights and ensuring the rights of religious minorities.<sup>226</sup>

In his Cairo speech Obama promised to restart the Arab-Israel peace process in order for a two-state solution based on 1967 borders. He refused outside military intervention as a way to advance the democracy process claiming that his opposition to the 2003 Iraq war did not contradict with his pledge to democratic government, regime transparency, the rule of law and freedom of people. Obama in his speech imposed his administration support for democracy and human rights and insisted on its spread across the Arab Middle East. Obama’s address offered meager direction of how regional democratization would emerge, other than in it should be a natural process facilitated by global economic and cultural forces.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> Ibid. P 5.

<sup>226</sup> Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.” *The Atlantic*, April 2016, p. 4.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid. P.5.



The President's address was eagerly received. His Cairo speech was interpreted as a total rejection of U.S. support for Arab despotism and seen to raise expectations that Obama would support democratic movements. What many failed to read in the speech (the high oratory aside) was the arrangement's degree of tensions in the address, and Obama's hazy and contradictory perspective view of democracy promotion. Democracy activists soon recognized that Obama's words were not followed by real actions in which vital interests (combating terrorism, achieving an Arab-Israel peace, engagement of Iran and Syria alleged democracy, women's rights, and the suppression of religious minorities) were not achieved.<sup>228</sup> The 2009 ignored Iranian elections that inspired wide protests and extreme state suppression were only merely condemned by the Obama Administration because of fearing that harsh criticism would accelerate the international efforts to include Iran and contain the development of its nuclear program. The recent nuclear deal to "freeze" Iran's nuclear program for six months in return for lifting the economic sanctions against Tehran underscored this commitment.<sup>229</sup>

Arab democracy activists were nearly disappointed by the U.S. government's policy in Egypt. The Administration's tepid criticism of election's forgery during Egypt's parliamentary elections, its inaction to Mubarak's decision to keep running for a fourth presidential term and his administration's reluctance to use U.S. financial support to push democratic reform angered many activists. In addition to that, the administration feared democratic reform could jeopardize the fight against Islamic extremism and disrupt its efforts to facilitate the Arab-Israel peace process. The administration's reluctance retreats back to previous presidents that saw reform would complicate Mideast peace efforts. Supporters of accelerating Mideast peace believed that democratic ideals would be easier to push once a two-state solution was achieved. Obama's reluctance to strongly support democratic movements got its greatest test in the Arab revolts of January 2011 that caused the overthrow of autocratic Tunisian and Egyptian regimes.<sup>230</sup>

In his Audacity of Hope book the President described himself as a realist-idealist. This philosophical framework might clarify the inconstancy in the Administration's approach across the region that had sidetracked between democracy promotion and preservation of core

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<sup>228</sup> Ibid. P 6.

<sup>229</sup> Thomas Friedman, "Iran and the Obama Doctrine ." *New York Times*, April 6, 2016. P 9.

<sup>230</sup> Robert r Liebe, *Retreat and its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). P 15.

strategic interests.<sup>231</sup> Obama's hesitancy toward a decisive role in the region was also encouraged in his belief in a post American world order. By given financial constraints, innate confinement to American influence and commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq; the U.S. could ill afford another costly military intervention.<sup>232</sup>

The February 2011 Libyan demonstrations consequently put the administration in a dilemma faced with fears of a mass killing and called by France, Britain, the UN and the Arab League for international intervention, a hesitant administration preferred to support the military intervention against Qaddafi's suppressive government. According to his vision of a post American world, Obama wanted to get France and Britain, regardless of their inferior military forces, to take the leadership of that intervention. This was confirmed by an initial American participation that gave way to the French and British dominance in the final phases of the war. As the war grown on for more than a half year the administration reserved over the purpose behind the intervention's main goal and the extent of American involvement, the administration systematically limited its objectives and constrained its participation. Obama's bashfulness disturbed his French and British associates who became confused about American determination. Criticized for "leading from behind", the administration was on edge until the point when rebels seized Tripoli and Qaddafi was executed by incensed agitators.<sup>233</sup>

The administration's caution toward supporting mass dissents was repeated in Yemen, Bahrain and in Syria where the fight against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) existed was due to the loss of the 5th Fleet port on the island nation and the fear of chaos in Damascus that could derail human rights and democracy.<sup>234</sup> Obama's Cairo speech favoring democratic reform increased clashes with his Administration's inaction, leading many comments about Obama's views on the Arab Spring. Faced with criticism about the genuineness of his government's support for democratic movements, the President was obliged to address the issue. His May 19, 2011 State Department in which he wanted to clarify his position towards the Arab Spring and put an arrangement of strategies in support of

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<sup>231</sup> Barak Obama, "Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream." (New York, NY: Crown Publisher. 2006) P 82.

<sup>232</sup> Richard Fontaine, op. cit., P. 9.

<sup>233</sup> Alan Kuperman, "Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in *Failure*." *Foreign Affairs*, (94): 2 (March/April 2015) P 6.

<sup>234</sup> Jessica Stern, "Obama and Terrorism." *Foreign Affairs* (94): 5, (September/October 2015), p. 6.

Mideast democratization. While lacking the articulation of his Cairo speech, the address elevated democratic reform to a “core” interest.<sup>235</sup>

By using Osama Bin Laden death and American withdrawal from Iraq as a spring assembly to discuss America’s reaction to the Arab Spring, the President rejected past policies of U.S. support for autocratic regimes. Democratic reform he argued could never be yielded for the sake of Mideast peace, oil or the fight against terrorism and that America’s inability to address to the obvious interests of ordinary people in the region would only sustain the doubt that the United States festered for many years our interests at their detriment. The speech recognized the historic nature of the Arab protest movements and promised political, economic and moral support for democratization.<sup>236</sup>

The address, however, was mysterious and kept on looking at balancing competing interests. The speech’s’ assertion on achieving a determination of the Israeli-Palestinian issue took a significance that was potential to overshadow any support for democratic reform. Obama’s Mideast strategy after his May 19th address was described as conflicted and clashed in its support for democratization and failed to counter the developing regional turmoil. Secretary of State John Kerry’s confidence about the potential for a complete peace in the region was not shared by either the Israeli government or the Palestinian Authority.<sup>237</sup>

The Administration supported transitions in Egypt and Yemen that featured noticeable roles for elites related with the previous absolutist administration. This was fortified by Obama’s refusal to describe the July 2013 Egyptian military’s topple of the equitably chosen Muslim Brotherhood regime as a military coup. While it called for the liberation of Brotherhood officials including previous President Mohammad Morsi, the U.S. government avoided any direct confrontation with the new military regime. Essentially the Obama Administration’s suspension of foreign aid to Cairo excluded anti-terrorism assistance and money to secure Egypt’s borders with Israel. Islamist motivated brutality in the Sinai since July 2013 was likely to aggravate, not reduce some U.S.-Egyptian security cooperation.<sup>238</sup>

Obama’s pro-democracy policy, in addition, contained no initiatives for Gulf Kingdoms to democratize. Clearly mindful of Iran’s developing regional influence in a post American Iraq, the Administration needed Saudi help for its containment policies against

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<sup>235</sup>Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.” *The Atlantic*, April 2016. P. 7.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid. p. 9.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid. P 11.

Tehran. Regardless the lack of democracy in the Gulf region, the Administration signed significant arms deals with Sunni Sheikdoms to sustain its Iran containment policy.<sup>239</sup>

The Administration's reservation to the fully support of democratic transitions was not without merit. The reappearance of terrorist expeditions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya jeopardized American interests in fighting religious extremism, protecting women and religious minorities and pushing for a final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab Spring created dangerous security gaps across the region aggravated by the U.S. unwillingness to completely use American military and diplomatic power.<sup>240</sup> The Administrations clashed, discrete strategy toward Syria, moreover, reflected a fear of instability and chaos, and the growing of al- Qaeda terror in a post Assad period. After declared that Assad must leave power two years ago, and provided economic and military support for Syrian rebels, and announced that Damascus' use of chemical weapons was an unacceptable "red line", Obama failed to take a significant action to secure the regime's topple.<sup>241</sup>

Obama feared the unexpected consequences of U.S. military intervention in Syria and the destabilizing impact of a post Assad period on the region. Indeed, the Administration's help for the UN's fall 2013 pushed to "dismantle" Syria's chemical weapons program and Obama's recent suspension of military aid to Syrian rebels progressively dominated by Islamist extremists reinforced Assad's military and political position. Nowadays the Baathist regime in Damascus sponsored by Iran and Hezbollah gained significant military ground against the wretched Sunni rebels. Some advisors close to the Administration quietly insisted on the reengagement with the Assad regime seeing him desirable over an Al Qaeda dominated Syria.<sup>242</sup>

The recent developments in Libya, Egypt, and Iraq and the emergence of al-Qaeda associates across the region created potential terror safe-havens harming to U.S. strategic interests. After supported democratic change, the Administration was disturbed about an arc of instability overwhelming the region and the rising jihadist tide. Obama's unwillingness to use U.S. political and military power, however, aggravated Middle Eastern turmoil and

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<sup>239</sup> Thomas Friedman, "Iran and the Obama Doctrine ." *New York Times*, April 6, 2016. P 3.

<sup>240</sup> Jessica Stern, Op. cit., p.9.

<sup>241</sup> Eliot Cohen, *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force* (New York: Basic Books, 2017). P 2.

<sup>242</sup> Florence Gaub, "Why We Can't End the Civil War in Syria, Carnegie Europe." *Carnegie Europe*, February 22, 2013. P 3.

undermined the preservation of U.S. strategic interests. There was, in short, an incompatibility between policy goals and realistic actions.<sup>243</sup>

President Obama's Iran approach was emblematic of his powerlessness to secure America's core strategic interests. His support for a soft long-term agreement to constrain Tehran's nuclear program above all other interests estranged Sunni Gulf allies and Israel both dreadful of a nuclearized Iran. The Administration became so confounded over what regional approach or strategy to follow; it feared that making authoritative action would make events drifted disastrously. Its policy of "strategic restraint" progressively endangered its efforts to protect Israeli and Gulf security and disrupt Iran's nuclear program.<sup>244</sup> The Administration's sudden cancellation of arranged military strikes against Damascus for its use of chemical weapons for a Russian upheld chemical weapons disarmament plan must reassure Iran that the U.S. government was unlikely to attack Tehran's nuclear foundations if it violated the recent accord that concerned with freezing its program. The President's strategic restraint policy in the Middle East contributed to growing regional unrest with the exception of Sunni Gulf partners and Israel, and its inconsistent policies contributed endlessly to developing regional disorder.<sup>245</sup>

## **6-The Obama Doctrine and the Arc of Disenchantment**

The President Barack Obama entered the White House on the promises of hope and change. The American population and the international community eagerly waited for the end of the Bush administration hegemonic position in world politics. The end of the war in Iraq presented a new turning point for American foreign policy. The Obama administration's foreign policy approach toward an arrangement of issues can be seen as "tune diplomacy" which meant that nations with strong power should cooperated each other in order to strengthen the global standards. This took the trademarks of multi-polarity, where states worked together in institutions and they did also react to potential threats through the use of institution, which in turn was controlling state power. A multipolar institution building created a long-term security commitment that was very difficult to recede once established. If George W Bush's foreign policy doctrine was the best image of unilateralism, then Barack Obama's foreign policy doctrine was quite clearly built on the lineaments of global

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<sup>243</sup> Dick Cheney and Liz Cheney, "The Collapsing Obama Doctrine." *The Wall Street Journal*, June 17, 2014. P5.

<sup>244</sup> Thomas Friedman, op. cit., P. 4.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid. P 5.

engagement and collaboration. The United States foreign policy called for a reengagement to the rest of the world through a multipolar approach.<sup>246</sup> The reconciliatory policy was quite clear in the president's first speech in the general assembly of the United Nations 2009 in which he said: "The time has come for the world to move in a new direction. We must embrace a new era of engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and our work must begin now."<sup>247</sup>

**Figure Eleven: The Obama Doctrine**



**Source:** <https://arabi21.com/story/ /894670/1>

It was during this speech that President Obama clearly indicated that the interest of all nations was shared, and that the different capabilities of power only mattered when they were creating new constraints which in turn strengthened the path to peace. By further guaranteeing those who viewed the United States with skepticism the president argued that: "We have paid our bills. We have joined the Human Rights Council. We have signed the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. We have fully embraced the Millennium Development Goals. And we address our priorities here, in this institution — for instance, through the Security Council." The Obama doctrine was seeking a world of international relations where common action resulted from a set of shared convictions, so power would grow out of a sense

<sup>246</sup> Jeffrey Goldberg, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>247</sup> Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in State of Union Address," speech, January 25, 2009, The White House.

of community. This was done due to multi-polarity, where powerful nations lead through strategic restraint, and it involved the structure that consisted of institutional building. This approach was quite clear through the use of a new National Security Strategy that promised weaker nations in terms of resources and influence, that they would be seen as equal partners.<sup>248</sup>

The Obama Doctrine was not a coherent strategy that can be easily defined. However, there were some key elements of U.S. foreign policy that could indicate the main directions of that administration which were: The reduction of military spending and overseas commitments, avoidance of further military conflicts, and reallocation of the saved resources to solve the domestic problems. President Obama was very persistent in the realization of this strategy; the grand strategy was first and foremost about balancing ends and means in order to achieve the best realization of national interest. Barack Obama decided that the most relevant strategy for his country was to reduce the means and set more modest ends.<sup>249</sup>

Obama's engagement with the Middle East followed an arc of disenchantment with the region. His early speeches in about the Middle East were full of optimism and hope, and as the Arab Spring started, he was hopeful that it would bring meaningful change towards democracy in some countries that witnessed the uprisings. However, as the Arab Spring lost its goals and became mired in civil wars, Obama became gradually more pessimistic about the region and became persuaded that it was impossible for the Middle East to change. This pessimism affected the way that he made policy in the region and he became less and less interesting to intervene in any way. His pessimism and disillusionment were caused by the failure of the Arab Spring.

Obama's early speeches about the Middle East tried to bring conciliation with the Muslim world in which he attempted to distance himself from the Bush Doctrine. In this regard, he said in his inaugural address, given in January 21, 2009, "We seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect."<sup>250</sup> This was a new beginning because for decades, especially during George Bush's presidency, the America foreign policy towards the Middle East was built on distrust and misunderstanding. As he settled into office, he started to reach out to the Muslim world, and this was quite clear in his famous Cairo speech

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<sup>248</sup> Robert Singh, *Barack Obama's Post-American Foreign Policy* (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2012), p 25.

<sup>249</sup> Jeffrey Goldberg, *op. cit.*, P. 13.

<sup>250</sup> Barack Obama, "President Obama's Inaugural Address" *speech*, January 21, 2009, The White House.

in which he said “Come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect.”<sup>251</sup>

Obama asked for a country-by-country report on strategies to implement political reform in the region and told his advisers to challenge the traditional idea that stability in the Middle East always served U.S. interests. Obama was eager for a new age of relations with the Middle East, and ready to accept new democracies, even ones that ran opposite to the US interests. By supporting the uprisings in the Middle East that was stable by autocrats or dictators fixed by the United States, Obama wanted to free himself from the mire of the Middle East and fulfill his desired pivot to Asia. As the Arab Spring began, Zbigniew Brzezinski, an ardent supporter of Obama on the campaign trail, wrote an article in early 2010 titled “From Hope to Audacity: Appraising Obama’s Foreign Policy,” in which he said “Obama is all talk and no action.”<sup>252</sup> Also he said that Obama “has not yet made the transition from inspiring orator to compelling statesman.”<sup>253</sup> Obama seemed to make promises that he then could not keep. Ryan Lizza said in this regard, that “Obama’s ultimate position, it seemed, was to talk like an idealist while acting like a realist.”<sup>254</sup>

The Arab Spring forced Obama to change his approach to the Middle East in many ways. At the beginning, Obama projected himself as an idealistic with total support for the revolutions and protestors. But as the Arab Spring started to lose its promises, Obama Doctrine started to become more complex, and Obama’s foreign policy realism began to appear in the contradiction that was presented within the Obama Doctrine when he delivered idealistic speeches over Egypt and made promises that he could not or was not willing to keep. And this could be best illustrated in the ultimate failure of free and fair elections in Egypt after Mubarak step down from power. Another event that illustrated Obama’s arc of disenchantment was the failure of the NATO intervention in Libya. The situation in Libya was similar to the one in Egypt. Obama was confused whether to intervene in Libya or not. In this regard, Ryan Lizza said that “the decision about intervention in Libya was an unusually clear choice between interests and values.”<sup>255</sup> Another feature of Obama’s contradiction was Syria, the situation and the current conflict in Syria was similar to the conflict that took place in Libya. In Aleppo, there were no more functioning hospitals, as they were the focuses of

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<sup>251</sup> Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning.” *speech*, The White House.

<sup>252</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “From Hope to Audacity.” *Foreign Affairs* (89): 1 (January/February 2010) p 8.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>254</sup> Lizza Ryan, “The Consequentialist”, *The New Yorker*, May 2, 2011, P 4.

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*



targeted attacks by terrorist groups and, by international actors such as Russia; civilians were also dying in huge numbers. Maybe Obama refused to intervene in Syria to avoid the failure that happened in Egypt and Libya.<sup>256</sup>

When the day of elections in Libya took place in August 21, 2013, factions opposing the GNC were involved with some Islamic forces who suppressed women's rights. And they started to come together; the country was not content with the new elected government. It was quite clear that Libya was unstable and it might enter into another civil war. The NATO intervention proved a failure; an international coalition proved unable to stop a country from regressing back towards the dark ages of dictatorship. He started to believe that American intervention in the region would achieve nothing. Regardless of the fact that Syria was facing a humanitarian crisis much greater than the one in Libya, Obama believed that an American intervention would solve nothing. In addition to that, there were other external factors to consider in Syria; Assad was a much closer friend to Russia than Qaddafi, and an American intervention would spark a conflict with Russia that America could not tolerate. So Obama retreated back from his early promises.<sup>257</sup>

## **7-The Legacy of Barack Obama in the Middle East**

The Middle East faced genuine and complex security challenges with the remarkable rush of terrorism across the region. The ascent and spread of terrorist groups represented a significant threat to the entire international community. However, the unsophisticated policies pursued by the Obama administration had only aggravated the problem, separated vital security partners, and chief lessened American credibility across the region. The current crisis in the Middle East became hard to repair, but could at last be accomplished with the adoption of an extensive multifaceted counter-terrorism strategy.<sup>258</sup>

The technological advances of the 21st century gave new platforms to terrorist networks to enroll supporters, spread their messages and extend their worldwide reach. At the same time, the current turmoil, disorder and fall of various Arab states destabilized the region. This allowed the illegal cross-border activities by terrorist networks to exchange arms, jihadists, and money. Subsequently, the rising terrorism trend required the full support of the

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<sup>256</sup> Jeffrey Goldberg, op. cit., P.14.

<sup>257</sup> Paul Miller, "Reassessing Obama's Legacy of Restraint", *War on Rocks*, March 6, 2017. P 5.

<sup>258</sup> Jessica Stern, op. cit., p. 11.

United States, as the only remaining superpower, in countering this extremist ideology that seemed to destroy rather than build.<sup>259</sup>

In 2009, President Obama's expressive and hopeful speech to the Arab world at Cairo University raised the expectations for quick action with clear and principled American Administration. However, more than six years later and to the disappointment of many, the Obama administrations' Middle East strategy proved to be shortsighted, mysterious, and contradictory. As the United States prepared to elect a new administration, it was basic for the world to underscore the importance of correcting the current Obama legacy of failure exemplified by weak American leadership with an indiscernible Middle East strategy.<sup>260</sup>

Obama put a lot of his efforts in office on a rapprochement policy with Iran in his attempts to reach a nuclear compromise, at the same time he turned a blind-eye to Iran's destructive terrorism activities across the region. This only served to reinforce and encourage Iran, that it was named by the State Department as a state-sponsor of terrorism, to keep to undermine regional stability.<sup>261</sup> In Libya, the Obama "leading from behind" military approach implied the financing and equipping of rebels that would later use their training and American made weapons in terrorism acts in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and several other places across the region. After the murder of long-time Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, the Obama Administration stayed hesitant to forcibly restore order and address the quick development of dangerous terrorism networks in the country that in 2012 cost the life of the U.S. ambassador.<sup>262</sup>

In Syria, Obama failed at an early stage to excite international supports for a politically reasonable answer for maintain a strategic distance from the production of new worldwide terrorist safe-haven and humanitarian crisis. He additionally reduced his credibility by not implementing his red line declaration on chemical weapon used by the Assad regime.<sup>263</sup> In Iraq, the early and quick withdrawal of American troops left a security vacuum that immediately allowed al-Qaeda and its offshoots to recapture their dependable balance and occupy large territories of the country. The strategy put initially by the Obama Administration to counter the ascent Islamic State did not possess the capacity to destroy or dismantle the

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<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

<sup>260</sup> Dick Cheney and Liz Cheney, Op. cit., P. 7.

<sup>261</sup> Thomas Friedman, Op. cit., p. P 9.

<sup>262</sup> Alan Kuperman, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign." *International Security*, (38): 1 (Summer 2013). P 19.

<sup>263</sup> Florence Gaub, "Why We Can't End the Civil War in Syria", *Carnegie Europe*. February 22, 2013. P 5.

group. In Yemen, the drone tactic did not provide any fruitful outcomes; to the contrary al-Qaeda and its members had only increased its essence over the southern Arabian Peninsula.<sup>264</sup>

In Egypt, the Obama Administration embraced the Muslim Brotherhood as a direct peaceful political movement, while in fact it was the source of all terrorist organizations. The Obama Administration conveyance hang of decisive military equipment to the Egyptian Armed Forces, important for counter-terrorism endeavors, flagged Washington's abandonment of Egypt's fight against terrorism. The Egyptian military's weapon of decision in its war on terror in Sinai was the American Apache attack-helicopters prevented by the Obama White House for over a year, forcing Egypt to broaden its military equipment. The later choice of the resumption of military aid to Egypt indicated a change in the special relationship with the United States, as the end of a longstanding privileged policy of "cash flow financing" made it easier at any time in the future for Washington to cut or suspend aid to the Egyptian military.<sup>265</sup>

The Obama Administration's devastating regional policies estranged and furthered long-time strategic partners, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. It nourished a relationship of mistrust and suspicion between key regional players and the Obama Administration, making it hard to address the genuine and complex worldwide terrorism threats. There was a necessity to simultaneously challenge all terrorist groups through military, political, socio-economic, religious, educational and cultural means, as well as the genuine elimination of terrorism financing. The Obama Administration's limited and exclusive focus on the Islamic State neglected other groups in an increasingly unstable region. There was an unprecedented well-financed development of complex and running regional terrorism networks requiring an effective international effort for a comprehensive and multifaceted counter-terrorism strategy.<sup>266</sup>

## **8-Conclusion**

The use of social media became the most well-known phenomena in the Arab societies during the Arab Spring. They use social media like Facebook, Twitter, and You Tube as a means for social interaction, the sites like Facebook and Twitter allowed people in the Middle East to control communication and to have the power that they wanted since long time.

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<sup>264</sup> Jessica Stern, Op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>265</sup> Dick Cheney and Liz Cheney, Op. cit., P 8.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid. p. 9.

However, the Arab spring, five years later, the situation was a tangle of two-faced relations, many interests and more conflicts. The Middle East became a chess game and it seemed like every move could lead to checkmate. Five years were needed to unleash multiple civil wars, to let a terroristic movement take charge in several areas and keep the world busy, to destroy lives and children's futures. Basically, the conclusion was that all of this looks more like an Arab winter which illustrated or included the Syrian Civil War, the Iraqi insurgency and the following civil war, the Egyptian Crisis, the Libyan Crisis and the Crisis in Yemen.

The contribution and the role of the Arab League to the processes of democratization, transitional justice, and national reconciliation in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya after the failure of the old regimes was absolute silence, inactive and non-intervention. The League did nothing to stop the failure of democratization processes in member states. This reflected the lack of institutional, normative, and know-how power of the League in these particular fields. The League supported the ruling regimes in Bahrain and Yemen. It also supported Saudi Arabia's intervention in these two countries. This also reflected the predominant power of the Saudi Arabia. The policy of the Arab League during the Arab Spring also demonstrated that the Charter of the League influences but does not determined the policy of the League. The League actually did not follow the Charter during the Arab Spring. The League excluded Syria and Libya without agreed support by all Arab states.

On 4 June 2009 Barack Obama bounded on to the stage at Cairo University to deliver a speech which promised to seek "a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world". It was, he said gravely, a time of great tension. Speaking from a lectern set against a backdrop of plush red curtains, Obama looked to move beyond the toxic legacy of the 9/11 attacks, the US-led invasion of Iraq, the "war on terror" and the long and occasionally bleeding impasse on the Palestinian issue. Expectations were enormous. Obama opposed George Bush on Iraq and criticized him for not doing enough to promote a just peace for the Palestinians – the two defining Middle Eastern issues of the preceding, turbulent years. The speech was widely praised for its eloquence and ambition, but the reviews were mixed. The key was to get beyond the courtesies.

Libya's revolution illustrated Obama's ambivalent attitude to force and his hesitance to get associated in another war in a Muslim country. Washington "led from behind," giving air power and intelligence but leaving it to NATO's European powers and their Arab allies to

help overthrow Muammar Gaddafi. The brutal aftermath – in which jihadist killed the US ambassador in Benghazi – painfully underlined the perils. In Syria, the bloodiest front of the Arab spring was the greatest challenge and clearly proved the failure of Obama's Administration. Critics said that in trying to balance US national security with the promotion of democratic values and human rights, Obama has dodged hard choices between being realist or idealist

## GENERAL CONCLUSION

In the course of history, many Presidents of the United States had their own perspectives on the most proficient method to interact with the rest of the world, their policies are called doctrines. These perspectives were often – if not always – not quite the same as each other. President George W. Bush Junior and Barack Obama characterized the political scene of the world. These two men each had their own doctrine. In general, American leaders have constantly stressed both values and interests in foreign policy formulation and rhetoric. But what has fluctuated has been the mixture of the two approaches, idealism and realism, with one regularly being stressed over the other in a given circumstances or historical time.

Unlike his predecessor, George W. Bush, Barack Obama is persuaded that multilateralism holds the key to a secure and peaceful world order. Furthermore, he believes that strong military power should just be used when every other alternative is depleted. This shift of foreign policy that was reflected through his rhetoric eventually led him to get the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize award after just nine months in office. The official clarification by the Nobel's committee was that Obama deserved the award as he imagined a world that is based on values and cooperation, rather than coerciveness and military accentuation (rhetorically, not practically). The only downfall of his soaring rhetoric is that it builds up a surcharge of expectations among both Americans, and the wider International community.

The Obama Presidency want for an enhanced U.S. relationship with the Arab world has not been realized. Anti-Americanism is more pronounced in the region than it was under George W. Bush's government. The Administration tries to turn foreign policy attention to Asia. President Obama Middle East policy is progressively cautious, contradictory and confused. The Administration's response to the Arab Spring gives false representation of a significant part of the hopefulness generated by his famous 2009 Cairo Speech. Obama's ambivalent and erratic Mideast policy can be explained by America's strategic interests in the region; oil security, fighting terrorism, the containment of Iran, Israel's security, in addition to his aversion to military force, his realist-idealist vision of a post American world, and his inability to prioritize and accommodate strategic interests. Eventually, as the political change detected it became clear that the United States would shape its responses on a country by country basis, balancing national interests with idealistic visions for the region.

Realism had long been the tool of decision for the United States in the Middle East. When looking at the Arab Spring, however, we can see tensions between realism and idealism

emerges in America's policy approaches. The eight years of Obama's administration reflects Obama's absence of a clear grand strategy and a long-term vision. He failed in taking any actions towards Israeli illegal settlements as he promised in his campaigns. The Administration's failure to secure a long-term security agreement in the Middle East during the uprisings is quite clear. The rising sectarian conflict and resurgence of jihadist violence within the Arab world has only fortified Obama's disengagement desires which contribute further to the turmoil.

To conclude we can say that Obama wanted to turn US attention from almost three decades of intense involvement in the military conflicts of the Middle East to refocus on the more economically dynamic Asia-Pacific region, which was playing an increasingly decisive role in US trade and investment. That refocus also implied a shift away from the high priority that America placed on European economic and security developments during the long Cold War decades. Along with this new realism, Obama also offered the promise of renewed idealism in the form of turning away from the previous American practices like torture and returning to policies more in conformity with American values and the US constitution. While Obama talked about a return to the rule of law and the constitution, he did not seek the presidency to diminish its powers, in which he firstly waged a worldwide military campaign against radical Islamist terrorists and their allies. He imagined that he could transform the content of American foreign policy without transforming its operating structures in which he had talked as an idealist while acted as a realist.

Despite the fact that this research was carefully arranged and reached its oversight aims and goals, we are still aware that there were some unavoidable limitations and inadequacies. First, the time limit that this research was assigned. It would be better if it was done in a more extended time. Second, the lack in the availability resources since we are dealing with complex events because of that, this thesis stayed restricted and just figured out how to tap the surface of a complex and profound topic such as the nature of the American foreign policy in the Middle East and its logical inconsistencies.

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## GLOSSARY

**The school of idealism:** Idealism in foreign policy asserts that a state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its foreign policy. President Woodrow Wilson was an early advocate of idealism. It particularly underlines the idea of American exceptionalism.

**The school of realism:** Realism is the anti-thesis of idealism. It is a school of thought in the international relations theory that asserts the role of the state, national interest, and military power in world politics.

**Woodrow Wilson's statement:** It is used to describe the American President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points that he advocated for peace negotiations in order to end the First World War and to establish a worldwide peace and prosperity.

**The Cold War:** It is an expression that is used to describe the tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union after the Second World War till the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It does not involve direct military actions rather than it was through economic and political actions propaganda and proxy wars.

**The Operation Desert Storm:** It is an expression that is used for the military operations in which international armed forces led by the United States attacked Iraq to liberate Kuwait.

**The Bush Doctrine:** It is an expression that related to foreign policy's principles of the 43<sup>rd</sup> President of the United States, George W. Bush. These principles include unilateralism and the use of preventative war.

**The Neoconservative Agenda:** It is an American political philosophy developed in 1970s and 1980s. It stressed the active role of government power, the defense of Israel, the promotion of American influence in the Middle East, the promotion of democracy and American national interests in the international affairs by the use of military power.

**Preemptive war:** It is used to describe an attack against possible enemy before that enemy had the chance to commit an attack. It was used by the American President George W. Bush after the terrorist attack.

**War on Terror:** Also known as the Global War on Terrorism, it is an international military operation that was led by the United States, as a response to the September 11 attacks that occurred in the United States in 2001, particularly on Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Democracy promotion:** It is a form of foreign policy adopted by governments and international organizations that intended to support the spread of democracy as a political system around the world. It was used by the United States to justify the invasion of Iraq.

**The Greater Middle East Project:** It is a political term introduced in 2004 during the presidency of George W. Bush. It contains plans for redrawing the geographical boundaries of the Middle East countries under the concept of democracy promotion.

**The Arab Spring:** It is an expression that is used to describe the waves of both violent and non-violent uprisings that occurred in the Middle East and North Africa. It began on 18 December 2010 in Tunisia.

**Dictatorship regimes:** It is an authoritarian type of government that characterized by single leader with either no party or weak party few mass mobilizations, and limited political multiparty.

**The Jasmine Revolution:** It is an expression that is used to describe the popular uprisings in Tunisia that demonstrated against corruption, poverty and political repression and succeeded to step down Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali. It was called “The Jasmine Revolution” by many media organizations.

**The Arab Winter:** It is a term used for the retreat of authoritarianism, Islamic extremism, chaos and violence that incubated in the aftermath of the Arab Spring protests in the Arab countries.

**The Arab League:** It is a regional organization of Arab states that it was founded in Cairo on 22 March 1945 with six members, and then soon the membership increased to reach 22 country. It aims to strengthen and regulate the political, cultural, economic, and social programs of its members as well as solving regional conflicts.

**The Obama Doctrine:** It is an expression that is used to describe the several principles of the 44<sup>th</sup> President of the United States, Barack Obama. These principles often include multilateralism and corporation.

**Obama’s arc of disenchantment:** It is an expression used by, the editor in-chief of the American magazine The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg in his article “The Obama Doctrine” in which he describes how the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy towards the MENA region.

## **Résumé**

Cette étude a abordé le sujet du printemps arabe en tant qu'un changement radical dans le monde arabe, le seul, qui a résisté à la dictature pour des décennies. Mais les manifestations collectives de 2011, dans les différents pays du monde arabe, ont obligés certains présidents et responsables à abandonner le pouvoir. Par contre, d'autres régimes dictateurs et malgré les pressions psychologiques et économiques, ont pu rester au pouvoir. Le printemps arabe a influencé différemment dans chaque pays. Six pays ont été choisis pour cette étude. Le président Barak Obama et ses diplomates supérieurs ont traité chaque pays à part, selon les intérêts des Etats unis et ses principaux objectifs au Moyen Orient. Le but de cette étude est de comprendre la doctrine d'Obama et établir une signification claire de son contenu à partir de différents points de vu des autres doctrines présidentielles, doctrines réalistes et idéalistes. De plus, cette étude vise à établir des convictions spécifiques à la doctrine d'Obama et comprendre les contradictions qui existent au sein de la doctrine d'Obama apparues dans sa réaction au printemps arabe. Ensuite nous allons utiliser l'arc de ressentiment d'Obama pour expliquer comment le printemps arabe a changé la manière de la prise des décisions dans la doctrine d'Obama.

**Les mots clés :** Printemps d'Arab, Moyen-Orient, Doctrine d'Obama, Ecole Ideales et Réalistes, la Déception d'Obama.

## ملخص

تناولت هذه الدراسة الربيع العربي كعملية تغيير سياسي جذري في العالم العربي، حيث كانت سابقا المنطقة الوحيدة في العالم أين صمدت الدكتاتورية لعقود. ولكن احتجاجات 2011 الجماعية في دول مختلفة من العالم العربي أجبرت بعض الحكام على التخلي عن السلطة، في المقابل بعض الأنظمة الدكتاتورية الأخرى وبالرغم من الضغوطات السياسية والاقتصادية، امتلكوا القدرة على البقاء في السلطة. أثر الربيع العربي في كل دولة في المنطقة بشكل مختلف. ستة دول اختيرت للدراسة. تعامل الرئيس الأمريكي باراك أوباما ودبلوماسيوه السامين مع كل دولة على حدى على حسب مصالح الو م ا و أهدافها الأساسية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط. الهدف من وراء هذه الدراسة هو فهم مذهب أوباما وتأسيس معنى واضح لماهيته بتأطيره من خلال وجهات نظر مذاهب رئاسية أخرى، مذاهب الواقعية والمثالية. إضافة إلى ذلك تهدف الدراسة إلى إقامة عقائد خاصة لمذهب أوباما، كما تهدف إلى إدراك التناقضات الموجودة داخل مذهب أوباما التي ظهرت في تجاوبه مع الربيع العربي. ثم سنستعمل قوس استثناء أوباما لشرح كيف غير الربيع العربي طريقة صنع القرار في مذهب أوباما.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** الربيع العربي، منطقة الشرق الأوسط، مذهب أوباما، مدارس المثالية والواقعية، خيبة امل أوباما.