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The role of the CIA in the Soviet- Afghan War (1979- 1989)

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Dedications

For our dear parents,

Summer without you is Winter, and Winter without you is even colder;

For my fond brother,

you will always be in my heart, in my mind, and you are still alive even soil hides you

For our sisters, brothers, friends, and all the family

For the palm tree,

My love for you shall live forever

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Finally, there are our friends Isamahane, Bariza, and Asma. We were not only able to support each other by deliberating over our problems and findings, but also happily by talking about things other than just our papers.

Declaration:

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own original work, which I have created myself.

All the literature I used is properly quoted and is listed in Bibliography.

I declare that I worked on my final master's dissertation on my own using only cited literary sources, other information and sources in agreement with the disciplinary regulations for the Faculty of Letters and Languages at the University Mohammed Boudiaf of M'sila and with the regulations and laws of research of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in Algeria.

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Abstract:

The present paper explores one particular strain of the Cold War: the Soviet- Afghan War and the role that the United States strategy played, through the CIA, in affecting the outcome of the war. The Americans first sought to increase costs for the Soviet Union by supplying funds and Soviet- style arms to the Afghan *Mujahadeen*. Following the Soviet's invasion, the US administration, together with many world countries, worked to remove out the Soviets from Afghanistan.

It is worth to mention that US administration, during the Carter's and Regan's presidency, relied heavily on the CIA to implement its foreign policy which prepared the thousand of Mujahedeen in Pakistani preparatory camps, piped billions of dollars, and supplied arms against Soviets in Afghanistan.

We reach three conclusions: First, Presidents Carter and Reagan, as part of a "bleeder" strategy, supplied funds and Soviet- style arms to the *mujahadeen*. Second, the escalation by the United States in 1985-1986 sought to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Third, the covert campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan was part and parcel of larger strategy, the "Reagan Doctrine", which sought to roll-back Soviet gains in the Third World. Ultimately, this helped to end the Cold War.

Key words: USSR, Afghanistan, US, CIA, Mujahideen, Red Army, covert operations.

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List of abbreviations

AIG: Afghan Interim Government.

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency.

DOD: Department of Defense, United States.

DOS: Department of State, United states.

DRA: Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

GNP: Gross National product.

ISI: Inter- Services Intelligence, Pakistan.

KHAD: Afghan security service.

LOC: Lines of Communication.

LZ: Landing Zone.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NSC: National Security Council.

PDPA: The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

PRC: People's Republic of China.

SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

SAM: Surface- to- air missile.

UN: United Nations

US: United States.

USSR: United Soviet Socialist Republic.

VDV: Airborne troops.

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General introduction

1. Background of the study:

The Cold War was a lengthy struggle between the United States and the USSR that began as a result of the Second World War. Both powers engaged in the struggle and gradually built up their own zones of influence dividing the world into two opposing camps. From 1947 onwards, the two adversaries, employing all the resources at their disposal for intimidation and subversion, clashed in a lengthy strategic and ideological conflict punctuated by crises of varying intensity. Periods of tension alternated between moments of détente or improved relations between the two camps. The USSR invasion of Afghanistan led to a cooling of relations between them. By the 1960's foreign governments started to take a very threatening interest in Afghanistan; for it was perceived as a key strategic point in the Cold War dividing the two superpowers, the USSR and the allies of the US. The US foreign policy response to the 1979 Soviets military intervention in Afghanistan had never restricted to a merely diplomatic condemnation; however, during the ten years of the conflict, the CIA was immediately directed by US policy makers to begin covert actions' program to beat back the communists. The US issued secret operations and directed the CIA to go ahead and use all means to help the Afghan resistance.

2. Statement of the problem:

In the US government, there are important institutions that are responsible for watching and providing security of the US both inside and abroad. Among these important institutions that have two- fold objectives, both military and intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which throughout the US history, has played major roles in conducting military and intelligence operations for the sake of protecting US interest.

The present dissertation explores the role played by the CIA in the Soviet-Afghan War, and how its covert operations turned the tide of the war in favor of the Afghans and led to a terrible withdrawal of the Soviets.

3. The literature review:

Afghanistan is one of the most isolated barren lands on earth. It is difficult to believe that any empire would want to invade it, but it is become the unlikely target and obsession of some of the world's greatest empires and superpowers. The Afghan history, both ancient and modern is so difficult to understand and so often overlooked. Still matters are deeply ambiguous for all of us and continue to preoccupy comment actors.

Many superpowers have gone charging into Afghanistan had no idea about this part of the world. They invaded it with lack of knowledge about its history and tribes. Each of the invaders of Afghanistan became out of touch failing to grasp the complexity and resistance in this land. Hungry to sense some of the

complexity that the Afghanistan was dubbed the graveyard of empires, several studies still try to find out what went wrong and what is it about this land.

Rory Stewart (1973) who once walked across Afghanistan makes the case that the intervention of the invaders was doomed from the outset that they always lacked the knowledge, power, or legitimacy fundamentally transform Afghanistan.

Similar finding was also allocated by Peter Tomsen (1940). In his book, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, Tomsen focuses on the late 1970's onwards. He presents the British attempts to satisfy their security needs on their Indian frontier as the first of many modern examples of failure in outsiders' efforts to achieve their ends in the Afghan quagmire. These failures he attributes principally to foreign governments' misunderstanding of the complicated mosaic of Afghan tribes and the influence of religious leaders. Armed with this argument, Tomsen moves on to elaborate his understanding of how this complicated mosaic works. For Tomsen, Afghanistan's political community can described as a tribal incubator, but alongside this analytical lens he places the competing influences of Islam, state, and ethnicity. Tomsen's book has provided a comprehensive account of Afghanistan's recent conflicts. It demonstrates how these failures have often been due to misperceptions concerning the nature of the Afghan state, its society, and its political community.

Lester W. Grau (1952) and Michael A. Gress (N.D) edited another study presenting the Russian view of how the war started, how it progressed, and how it ended. Their study shows how a modern mechanized army organized and conducted a counter guerrilla war; chronicles the major battles and operations;

and provides valuable insights into Soviet tactics, strategy, doctrine, and organization across a wide array of military branches. Along the way, it vividly reveals the increasing disillusionment of seeped back into the Soviet society and how it contributed to the collapse of the USSR.

In addition, Lester W. Grau's (1952) *The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and the Other Side of Mountain* provides a revealing portrait of war in general, tactics in particular, and coincidentally, the soldiers human condition. This collection of vignettes was written by Soviet junior officers describing their experiences fighting the Mujahedeen guerrillas. It is generally an outstanding look at commentary on Soviet tactics against the Mujahedeen fighters from 1979 to 1989.

All in all, this review of literature illuminates what some of the foremost experts on the conflict identified as the biggest mistakes of the long war.

4. The significance of the study:

Foreign policy practitioners and scholars viewed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 as a historical turning point in the struggle of the Cold War. All the events that the history has witnessed during the late 70's and 80's including: the Soviet invasion, the CIA's intervention, and the withdrawal of the Soviets. Those events represent a major phase experienced by both superpowers, US and USSR, in the Cold War. Thus, it is significant to analyze the US response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and how the CIA's covert

operations helped the Afghan Mujahedeen to turn the tide of the war into their side.

Also, the present research will be beneficial for master students of civilization since it explores an important issue in the US foreign policy during this period of the Cold War.

5. The research questions and hypothesis:

The present study explores one particular stain of the Cold War: The Soviet-Afghan War and the covert operations used by the CIA in affecting the outcome of the war. Therefore, this research is based on the following research questions:

- ✚ What were the reasons for the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan in 1979?
- ✚ What was the US response to the said invasion?
- ✚ How could the CIA's intervention help the Afghan Mujahedeen?
- ✚ How the CIA could make Afghanistan as a theatre of performing different covert operations?
- ✚ What was the aftermath of the Soviet- Afghan War?

In response, the following hypotheses have been put forth in the light of the present research. These are as follows:

- ✚ The CIA played a cognitive role in directing the US foreign policymaking towards the Soviet- Afghan War;
- ✚ During the Soviet- Afghan War, the CIA was a means of supervision over foreign policy approaches by both US Presidents and the country's politicians;

- ✚ The CIA relied heavily on covert operations in the Soviet- Afghan War to help the Mujahideen which turned the tide of the war.

6. The purpose of the study:

Since the British invasion in 1840's to Afghanistan had been known as the Great Game where it is easy to get into this part of the world, but it is just getting out port is very difficult. Although, Afghanistan becomes a target for some of the world's greatest empires. The Soviet- Afghan War made terrible correlations between the two most world's superpowers, the US and the USSR, this conflict that occurred in Afghanistan territory led to US response which intervened secretly through covert operations headed by the CIA.

In this regard, the objectives of the present dissertation are:

- ✚ Firstly, to explore the means and strategies of the CIA in performing its covert operations in the Afghan War,
- ✚ Secondly, to show the real goals of the CIA in its intervention in the said war.

7. The structure of the study:

The present dissertation is basically divided into four chapters. The first chapter introduces general overview of Afghanistan in terms of geographical location of the territory, ethnic divisions of the population, languages and a brief recount of the emergence of Afghanistan.

It is worthy to recount the USSR invasion of 1979. The second chapter generally presents the history of the invasion starting by highlighting the reasons pushed the USSR to intervene in the territory and its implications on the neighboring countries, throw light on the international response to the Soviet invasion, and finally describing the Soviet military occupation and how it was confronted by Afghans armed resistance.

The CIA's covert war against the USSR in Afghanistan makes for an excellent case study of US foreign policy during the Cold War. The research presents in the third chapter the role played by the CIA in the Afghan War.

This chapter is divided into three subtitles to firstly underline certain causes of the US aid to Afghan Mujahideen and how the CIA through its covert operations waged war in Afghanistan and support the Afghan resistance to the USSR presence in the territory.

The last chapter is certainly established to portray the political, economic and social impacts of the Soviet- Afghan War.

Chapter one: Introduction to Afghanistan:

Introduction:

Afghanistan is a landlocked nation that is found around in the focal point of Asia. It is bordered by Pakistan in the south and east. Since the late 1970s Afghanistan has suffered brutal civil war in addition to foreign intervention as the 1979 Soviet invasion. The geography of Afghanistan is arid and mountainous. It is an Islamic Republic; the chief of state and head of government is the president. Afghanistan has a controlled economic system in which the central government directs the economy regarding the production and distribution of goods. Afghanistan is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Afghanistan is the meeting place and center of four ecological, cultural and strategic territories; the Middle East, Central Asia, the Indian sub- continent, and the far East, for the Pamir Mountains incorporate into Chinese Sinkiang. The cultural landscape of this crossroad territory is as dramatic and fluctuated as its forbidding terrain. A comprehension of Afghanistan's basic cultural patterns is the initial step to an awareness and appreciation of Afghanistan' s diversity in terms of ethnicity, religious affiliation, and ethnolinguistic.

One of the keys to understanding the significance and complexity of Afghanistan and its role in several events lies in its geography and cultural landscape.

1. The geographical location of Afghanistan:

Being a landlocked country, which is located in Central Asia, Afghanistan is a center eastern state situated in south- central Asia. The country is 252,830 square miles (655,000 square Kilometers) (The Russian General Staff, 2002, p. 1). The geographic area of Afghanistan lies at roughly 33° North scope and 65° East longitude (Palka, 2001, p. 10). It is verged on the West by Iran and on the North by the previous Soviet republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The upper East tip of Afghanistan touches China, while Pakistan deceives the East and South (Otfinoski, 2004, p.1).



Map 1: Geographic Location Map of Afghanistan (Source: www.afghan-web.com/geography).

Taking a gander at the land highlights of Afghanistan, it is a subtropical mountain desert country situated on the Eastern edge of the Iranian tor. It is a tremendous dry desert that reaches out from the numerous of the near and Middle East. Around 85% of the land is secured with mountains. They gone through the center of the territory and strongly separate the country into two outskirts areas, a Northern and Southern. Between these mountains lay interior highlands and huge deserts (The Russian General Staff, 2002, p. 3).

The Paropamisus and Hindu Kush mountain chains characterize Northern Afghanistan. These chains broaden exactly 745 miles (1,200 Kilometers) from then, the Soviet border to Iran along the Paropamsus highlands. The width of this mountain massif extends from 186 to 311 miles (300 to 500 Kilometers). Mountain ranges peak from 6,562 to 24,428 feet (2,000 to 7,760 meters). Customary battle is not conceivable in this region (The Russian General Staff, 2002, p. 3).



Map 2: The Paropamisus and Hindu Kush Mountain Chains Map of Afghanistan

(Source: www.freeworldmaps.net/asia/afghanistan/map.html).

In spite of the mountains, the central region is the most crowded in the country and incorporates the capital city of Kabul and numerous smaller urban communities and towns (Otfinoski, 2004, pp. 2- 3).


The almost closed Suleiman mountain range extends in the range of 435 miles (70 Kilometers) along Afghanistan's Eastern fringe with Pakistan. This mountain range is 155 to 248 miles (250 to 400 Kilometers) in width and the mountain tops stretch out from 6,562 to 11,484 feet (2,000 to 3,500 meters) in height. These mountains run parallel to each other at a few spots, making separated restricted gullies. Little military units can work in these gulches (The Russian General Staff, 2002, p. 3).

The zones of sandy desert are the Khash, Deshti_ Margo, and Registan, which stretch out from the West to East about 335 miles (540 Kilometers) and North to South in the range of 360 miles (580 Kilometers) (The Russian General Staff, 2002, p. 3).

The river network is spread unpredictably crosswise over Afghanistan. There are numerous rivers in the mountains; however, the couple of waterways on the fields are generally isolated. A large portion of the mountain rivers begin high in the mountain and have a current of three to five meters for every second (10 to 16 feet per second).

The Amu Darya is the mightiest waterway in the southwest of the country. It extends to 714 miles (1,150 Kilometers), has a width of 98 to 383 yards (90 to 350 meters), and a profoundly of one to three to six and a half feet (two meters). The Kabul River streams in the Eastern part of the country and is joined by the vast Kumar River. In the territory around Jalalabad, the Kabul River spreads to a width of 219 yards (200 meters) and has a depth of 16 to 23 feet (five to seven meters). Every river of

Afghanistan, with the exception of the Amu Darya, can be forded amid high water, they are serious obstacles (The Russian General Staff, 2002, p. 4).




Map 3: The Amu Darya River in Southwest Afghanistan. Source: (www.freeworldmaps.net/asia/afghanistan/map.html).

In spite of being not bottomless, ground cover in Afghanistan is adequately fluctuated. Less than five percent of the land is forested, while two thirds is secured by mountain landscape with practically no vegetation (The Russian General Staff, 2002, p. 4).

A constrained freshwater supply makes drinking water promptly accessible to not as much as a large portion of the populace. Boundless overgrazing, soil erosion, salt tainting and water logging have diminished agricultural efficiency. Half of the landscape is desert; the rest is farmland and field (Male, 1982, p. 16).

The atmosphere of the country is subtropical to pointedly mainland because of the dryness complex with the daily fluctuating and regular air temperature. July is the most blazing month in the majority of the nation, when the normal month to month temperature ranges from 30° to 52° Celsius. January is the coldest month, with the exception of in the mountains, where February is the coldest month. Snow cover in the valleys and fields is 4 to 6 inches (10 to 15 centimeters) and up to six and a half feet (two meters) in the mountains (The Russian General Staff, 2002, p. 4).

The winds are delicate on the intermountain highlands, yet the Sistan Basin encounters extreme snowstorms from December through February. In the Western and Southern regions, a North wind, known as “the winds of 120 days” blows amid June through September. This wind is normally joined by serious warmth, dry season, and dust storms. Tidy and hurricanes often happen during the summer months on the flats in the Southern part of the country. Clean winds progress at 60 and 110 miles/ hour (97 to 171 Kilometers) expanding at early afternoon (Male, 1982, p. 13).



Map 4: Climatologic Map of Afghanistan Source: (afghanistanmap.facts.com).

Afghanistan is on the Southern edge of the Eurasian structural plate, which can slam into the Arabian structural plate toward the South and the Indian plate toward the Southeast and cause quakes of differing degrees. It is difficult to identify the epicenters of quakes that happen in Afghanistan, particularly in Northwestern Afghanistan where tremors happen in the hull at shallow and at profound depths (more prominent than 70 Kilometers) (Male, 1982, pp. 14- 6).

The nation has an inadequately created thruway arrange 11,800 miles of roads- 4, 8 miles for every 100 square miles (3 Kilometers). The country is dominated by rough mountain ranges, which by large keep running from the upper east toward the Southwest. Mountains occupy all but the North central and Southwestern areas, which are dominated by fields and desert. Military and business roadways through the Slang and Tang_ e Gharu mountain passes, North and East of Kabul, individually, were seriously harmed amid the Soviet occupation and guaranteeing clashes. Provincial roads, which additionally got substantial harm amid clashes for the most part, have not repaired since the end of threats. The primary road arrange is a harsh circle interfacing Kabul, Pulikhunri, Herat, Andkhoy, Kandahar, Mazar_ e Sharif, and Kabul once more (The Russian General Staff, 2002, p. 3).

2. Afghan ethnic groups:

Afghanistan is situated at the crossroads of several civilizations, and its people reflect a diverse culture. It is geographically associated with the Indian subcontinent, the Iranian highland, China, and central Asia. Subsequently, numerous Afghans share culture, ethnicity, and dialect with a portion of the people of these locales. The in excess

of 30 million people living in Afghanistan have a place with about seventy distinctive ethnic groups (Mazhar, Ozair Khan, and Goraya, 2012, p. 11).

Actually, there had been no ethnic term of Afghan ethnic groups till the nineteenth century when the outside scholastics and governments started to isolate Afghan culture deliberately into ethnic classes by contrasts in dialect, group, culture and so on. Afghanistan in that capacity comprises of five major and many minor ethnic groups (Mazhar, Ozair Khan and Goraya, 2012, p. 11).

2.1. Major ethnic groups:

Afghanistan is a multiethnic and mostly- tribal society. It has a wide variety of ethnic groups with each having different linguistic, religious and ethnic identities. The Afghan population is divided into major and minor ethnolinguistic groups. The minor ethnic groups consist of the Pashtun, the Tajik, the Uzbek, the Hazara, and other ethnic groups, including the Nuristani, the Kirghiz, and the Brahui.

2.1.1. The Pashtun:

Afghan's biggest ethnic group is Pashtun, which makes up half to 54% of the aggregate populace. Pashtun are of Mediterranean and Caucasian ancestry and talk varieties of the Pashto dialect. While most Afghan Pashtuns live in the Eastern and Southern territories, numerous more Pashtuns are found in Pakistan and do not perceive the Afghan Pakistan fringe. Most members of the Taliban were Pashtuns from the Southern districts of Afghanistan (Male, 1982, p. 33).

The Pashtuns comprise of in excess of sixty groups, with around 12, 5 million in Afghanistan and around 14 million in Pakistan (Male, 1982, p. 33). They have customarily held the highest positions of power in both the military and the government, yet because of the Soviet intrusion and it's going with political fracture among the clans and strengthening of other ethnic groups, the pretended by the Pashtuns in the Afghan culture and the rising force structure has fairly declined (Mazhar, Ozair Khan, and Goraya, 2012, p. 101).

Verifiably, Pashtuns have led a tribal, agrarian way of life. They live by a conventional good code called "Pashtunwali" that directs social request and duties. Pashtunwali gives moral codes for aspects of tribal life including honor, fortitude, disgrace, the right to blood feuds or revenge, the obligation of hospitality, and protection of house guests. The Pashtuns are generally Sunni Muslim and their esteems have been molded by Islam and their tribal heritage ('Afghanistan', n. d., p. 34).

2.1.2. The Tajik:

Tajiks, Afghanistan's second biggest ethnic group, extend from 26% to 30% of the populace. They are of Mediterranean ancestry and commonly have dim hair and light skin (Male, 1982, p. 34). Inside Afghanistan, Tajiks are concentrated in the Northeastern part of the country with pockets in the West (Palka, 2001, p. 49). They usually live in urban zones or changeless structures. Urban Tajiks are more taught aggregate in Afghanistan and hold numerous administration and business positions. While not sorted out by ancestral lines, Tajiks as a rule allude to themselves as having a place with geographic groups, taking the name of a valley or inception in which they live. Most

Tajiks are Sunni Muslims and thought to be less fundamentalist and conservative than Taliban government (Palka, 2001, p. 49).

2.1.3.The Uzbek:

As an ethnic group, Uzbeks possess a vital topographical scene between the Hindu Kush and the Central Asian region beyond the Amu Darya. Involving around 8% of total population, Uzbeks are one of the smallest ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Uzbeks moved from Central Asia to Afghanistan hundreds of years ago and they talk a Turkish lingo called Uzbek. A few Uzbeks are rural and work in farming, yet numerous live in urban communities as dealers or goldsmiths, leatherworkers, and floor covering producers. They are for the most part Sunni Muslim with the additional impact of conventional convictions (Male, 1982, p. 35).

2.1.4. The Hazara:

Hazaras ethnic group are not natives like Uzbeks, they came as a part of attacking crowds of Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century (Mazhar, Ozair Khan, and Goraya, 2012, p. 101). They talk a Dari tongue called Hazaraji, which has minor impacts from Turkish and Mongolian dialects (Mazhar, Ozair Khan, and Goraya, 2012, p.101). Hazaras contain 7% of the total population (Mazhar, Ozair Khan, and Goraya, 2012, p. 101). They live in the mountains areas in central Afghanistan called Hazarajat. Some of them have perpetual ranches, while others travel and raise animals. Most Hazaras are Shi'a Muslim, although some are Sunni (Male, 1982, pp. 34- 5).

2.1.5. Other:

Major remaining ethnic groups in Afghanistan incorporate Nuristani, Kirghiz, and Brahui groups. The Nuristani occupy a region of Eastern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan known as Nuristan. Once in the past known as the Kafir, this group were compelled to change over to Islam amid the nineteenth century and given the name Nuristani, which means “enlightened” (Palka, 2001, p. 49).

The Brahui are a little gathering in all nations that live among the Baloch. They talk a dialect that is Dravidian in source, a dialect family that overwhelms in Southern India and which incorporate Tamil and Telugu (Palka, 2001, p. 50).

2.1. Minor ethnic groups:

The population of Afghanistan includes many different ethnic groups. As there are major ethnic groups led by the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and the Hazars, there are also some minor ethnic groups which represent the Afghan population. The minor ethnic groups in Afghanistan include the Aimaqs, the Turkmen, and the Balochs.

2.2.1. The Aimaq:

The Aimak are minority ethnic group who live primarily in the Northwestern Afghanistan. They talk a Dari dialect and are for the most part Sunni Muslim. The Aimak keep on identifying themselves through tribal ties and lead an agrarian or peaceful way of life. They are found in the zones between Herat in the West and highlands of Hazarajat in the East. They are divided into following four factions: Jamshedis, Taimani, Taimuri, and Firozkohi (Mazhar, Ozair Khan, and Goraya, 2012, p. 101).

2.2.1. The Turkmen:

Turkmen are a small minority live primarily in regions of the Northwest part such as Herat and Balkh close to the Turkmenistan fringe. They talk a Turkish vernacular and are slipped from clans that moved from East of the Caspian Sea. Turkmen are a tribal and partly nomadic people who live in dome- formed tents with collapsible wooden casings. Turkmen are transcendently Sunni Muslim (Male, 1982, p. 36).

2.2.2. The Baloch:

They live in a huge zone that incorporates parts of Southern Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Known as Baluchistan (Baluchistan), this dry, segregated region prompts numerous to live as traveling shepherders. This separation has brought a distrust of central, outside authority, and the Baloch have occasionally made endeavors to increase more prominent self- governance from the administration of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. Most Baloch are Sunni Muslims and speak an Indo- European dialect that is to some degree identified with Kurdish (Palka, 2001, p. 50).

3. Religious affiliations

It is usually realized that Afghanistan is basically a Muslim nation. Actually, supporters of Muhammad's (PBUH) teachings make up more than 90% of the populace. Islam likely entered Afghanistan more than 1200 years ago, yet the present religious scene has been influenced by numerous occasions throughout the hundreds of years.

Invaders brought new types of religion and the rise and fall of dynasties changes the nature of spiritual life in the region. The destruction of 200 years of age Buddhist statues by the Taliban government in mid- 2001 alludes to that early religious thoughts thrived before Islam, as do separated Hindu and Jewish people group in the nation.

3.1. Sunni Muslim:

The vast majority of Muslims in Afghanistan are adherents of the Sunni branch of Islam, which represents around 10% of all Muslims around the world. Sunni Muslims are approximately 85% of the Afghan population.

Unlike most Sunnites, some of Afghanistan's Sunnites including members of the Taliban are very fundamental and conservative in their practice. The fundamentalist thoughts of Wahabism from Saudi Arabia and Deobandism from Pakistan have become increasingly important among some Afghani clerics and rulers.

Muslims share a core of beliefs in light of the five mainstays of Islam. The primary column is a calling of confidence that Allah is the only God and Muhammad (PBUH) is his prophet (there is no god but God, and Muhammad is his messenger). Through prophet Muhammad (PBUH), Allah gave the world his assertion, recorded word for word in Arabic on the pages of the Qur'an. The rest of the mainstays of Islam basic practices of day by day and religious life. A Muslim must pray five times each day toward the Ka'aba, the sacred cube known as the Holy House of God in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The third column requires a Muslim to offer aid to the religious group and to the poor. The fourth column orders fasting one month during the year, Ramadan.

The fifth and final column orders that each Muslim who is able must make a journey, the Hajj, once amid his or her life to the blessed city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia.

Another part of Islam that ought to be comprehended is the significance of Islamic law, or Shari'a. Drawn from the Qur'an, the traditions of prophet Muhammad (Sunna), custom (Hadith), scholarly and reasoning thinking, and group agreement, Shari'a principles administer both religious life and the common, regular day to day lives of Muslims.

Under Taliban's control in Afghanistan, Shari'a is the primary lawful structure. Conservative forms of Islamic law manage clothing standards, for example, the wearing of cloak for women (the burqa) and facial hair for men. Alcohol is disallowed, similar to the eating of pork (Palka, 2001, pp 43- 6).

3.2. Shi'a Muslim:

Shi'a makes up 14% of the Afghan Muslim population. This Shi'ite/ Sunnite split in Islam resulted over political contrasts inside the religion in the years following the death of prophet Muhammad (PBHU) in 632 C. E. Shi'ites were adherents of Ali, Muhammad's (PBHU) son- in- law, and after his demise contended that the pioneer of the religion, the caliph, should originate from his ancestry. Sunnites felt the soberer mindedly and acknowledged caliphs drawn from pioneers inside the group. The greater part of Shi'ites in the nation is from the group usually alluded to as Twelvers. Within the early Shi'ite community, the heir to Muhammad's authority was known as the imam.

Twelvers acknowledge a line of twelve imams, starting with Ali and consummation with the vanishing of a child around 874 C. E. a few Shi'ites, be that as it may, questioned the authority of the seventh imam, Musa, during the eighth century. This group upheld the authenticity of Musa's sibling Isma'il. Today, devotees of this splitter group are known as Isma'ilis or seveners (Palka, 2001, pp 43- 6).

3.3. Others:

In the twentieth century, little groups of Bahia's, Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jews, and Sikhs lived in the country, although most members of these groups emigrated during the times of civil war and Taliban rule. By the end of Taliban control, non- Muslim populace had been virtually disposed of with the exception of small populace of native Hindus and Sikhs. Since the fall of Taliban, a few people from religious minorities have returned, numerous settling in Kabul (Male, 1982, p. 3).

There are two dynamic gurdwaras (Sikh places of worship) in Kabul and ten in different parts of the nation; there were 64 gurdwaras throughout the country before the war. Four Hindu mandris (temples) exist in three urban communities; tow mandris are situated in Kabul, one of which shares a wall with a mosque, one is in Jalalabad, and one in Ghazni. Eighteen others were demolished or rendered unusable because of plundering during the mujahedeen civil war. One Synagogue situated in Kabul, but it is not being used for absence of a Jewish people group. There is no open church since the courts have not upheld the church's claim to its 99- year lease and the landowner destroyed the building (Male, 1982, p. 3).

4. Languages in Afghanistan:

Afghanistan has two official languages, Pashto and Dari. Pashto (35%) is talked by the Pashtun individuals. The Dari (50%) and its dialects are talked by Tajiks, Hazaras, and Aiamks. It is the most widely recognized language utilized for inter-ethnic correspondence. Turkic languages (11%) are talked by Uzbek and Turkmen. Thirty minor languages (4%) are talked by Afghanistan's numerous ethnic minorities. Numerous Afghans talk various languages relying upon their locale. English and German are utilized by senior authorities.

4.1. Official languages:

The two noteworthy languages in Afghanistan are Pashto and Persian, referred to in Afghanistan as Dari. Both are Iranian languages. The Iranian languages frame one branch of the Indo- European languages that incorporate the Romance languages, for example, French and Spanish and the Germanic languages such as German and English. Pashto and Dari are, thusly, indirectly identified with English (Robson and Lipson, 2002, p. 27).

4.1.1. Pashto:

Pashto is the language of the Pashtun ethnic group found in South Central Asia. It is arranged as an Eastern Iranian language with a wide range of vernaculars. Between around 45%- 60% of the general population of Afghanistan communicate in Pashto. It is one of the official languages of the nation and the second most regular language in Pakistan also (Claire, 2015, para. 4).

It was assigned a national language by the Pashtuns in the different constitutions, and in the time of modernization, all non- Pashto talking government workers were required to take in the language (Robson & Lipson, 2002, p. 28).

4.1.2. Dari:

An assortment of Persian that is talked in Afghanistan, Dari is once in a while called Dari Persian or Afghan Persian. It is the other official language of the country, alongside Pashto. Around 25% to 50% of the nation's populace speak Dari as their native language. Dari additionally fills in as a lingual Franca all through the nation and is commonly and is mutually intelligible with Iranian Persian. Numerous other Asian languages like Bengah, Punjabi, and Hindustani were altogether affected by Dari amid the reason of persocentric Mughal Empire (Claire, 2015, para. 5).

Languages need to lead business or generally communicate. Be that as it may, there are distinctive weights supporting the utilization of either Dari or Farsi. Dari speakers are more various, counting Tajiks, Hazaras, and Aimaq among their numbers. In Afghanistan, all instruction above grade school is directed in Dari, aside from particular Pashto language examine. Pashto speakers are as often as possible bilingual in Dari, yet Dari speakers rarely learn more few words of Pashto. While they are distinctive languages, they share regular roots in the Iranian group of languages. In that capacity they share normal letters and a few words, and verb frameworks are comparable. They are both composed utilizing the Arabic letters in order (Robson & Lipson, 2002, p. 28).

Dari has an arrangement of consonants very like those of English. There are short and long vowels, and stress is on the last syllable of the word. Pashto has seven vowels, and for the most part indistinguishable consonants from Dari does, yet also has a progression of retroflex consonants /t/, /d/, /n/, /r/ and in the Kandahar tongue /sh/. Retroflex consonants are made by curving the tongue in reverse; the English /r/ is a retroflex (Robson & Lipson, 2002, p. 29).

Dari and Pashto have numerous words in common, because of both being Iranian languages and along these lines having the same hereditary words and of having been talked one next to the other for a considerable length of time. The two languages have as well various words obtained from the languages talked by Islamic people groups (Robson & Lipson, 2002, p. 29).

4.2. Regional languages

In the thirteenth century, Genghis Khan cut an incredible south crosswise over Central Asia, through what are presently the nations over the Amu Draya from Afghanistan- Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the Turkmenistan- and westward into what is currently Turkey. Whenever Britain and Russia chose that the Amu Draya was to be the northern fringe amongst Afghanistan and Russia, the Kirghis, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen on the southern side of the waterway moved toward becoming Afghans. With the exception of the Tajiks, these people groups speak Altaic languages. Which are fundamentally the same as Turkish and a totally unique group of languages from the Iranian languages.

4.2.1. Uzbek:

The Uzbeks are the biggest of the Altaic groups. The official dialect of Uzbekistan, Uzbek, is a Turkic language native to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia. In light of alternate languages talked where it is a local language, Uzbek has been affected by Russian, Persian, and Arabic. Around 9%- 10% of the number of inhabitants in Afghanistan communicate in Uzbek and their local language. Uzbek utilizes three diverse writing systems: Latin, Cyrillic, and Arabic. Cyrillic is the most across the board despite the fact that Latin is the official written work framework, and frequently two or three composition systems will be utilized as a part of a similar populace (Claire, 2015, para. 6) .

4.2.2. Turkman:

It is additionally a Turkish language and is the official language of Turkmenistan. Just around 3% of the number of the inhabitants in Afghanistan speaks Turkmen, a large portion of whom live in the northwestern district of the nation. It is one of a group of languages that have vowel congruity and is agglutinative, which means new words, can be shaped by including additions to existing words (Claire, 2015, para. 6).

4.2.3. Balochi:

Balochi is an Iranian dialect talked in south-eastern Iran, south-western Pakistan, southern Afghanistan, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Turkmenistan, India, East Africa, and these days additionally by migrant Baloch in North America, Europe, and Australia. Balochi is known in the writing of territories studies and linguistics as a

progression of tongues, generally mutually intelligible, contrasting basically in vocabulary and the level of impact from neighboring languages, for the most part Persian ('The Balochi language project'. n. d., para. 2).

Endeavors to set up a standard composed Balochi started with the ethnic mindfulness that developed amid the time of British Suzerainty (1839- 1847). It was perceived as one of the national languages of Pakistan in 1948. Comparative acknowledgment was allowed to Balochi in Afghanistan after the communist Putsch in 197, yet with absence of critical impact (Sponner, 2012, p. 1).

4.2.4. Pashayi:

Pashayi or Pashai is a language spoken by the Pashai people in parts of Kapisa, Laghman, Nuristan, and Kunar provinces in northeastern Afghanistan. It belongs to the Dardic branch of the Indo- Aryan languages ('Pashayi: A Language of Afghanistan'. n. d., para. 3).

4.2.5. Nuristani:

Nuristani dialects have a place with the Indo- Aryan subgroups of the Indo- Iranian branch of the Indo- European language family. The Nuristani are ordinarily Sunni Muslims. Yet proceed with a large number of their conventional roots dating from before their conquest by the Afghans ('Nuristani languages', 2018, para. 5).

5. A brief history of the emergence of Afghanistan:

Unlike some sloping terrains, Afghanistan has never been a parcel to exist amiably separated from whatever is left of the world. It has rather wound up at pivot of majestic goal-oriented since the start of written history, from the world's first cross-country superpowers, the Persian Empire, to its most recent, the United States. In the middle of persisting or opposing attacks from each purpose of the compass, the Afghans have sharpened their material abilities by battling among themselves, in landscape that encourages divisions of energy and opposes the ideas of unified control.

As the hundreds of years have advanced, the inquiry "what is an Afghan?" has turned out to be effectively replied, if more intricate, as the immense movements have stopped and political fringes have been drawn. Today we realize that an Afghan is essentially somebody who originates from Afghanistan. The term now incorporates ethnic Pashtuns, Turks, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, Hazaras, redheaded Nuristani, brown skinned Brahui, and various different groups. In any case, while depicting the Bactrians or Ghaznavids; for instance, both of whom ranged for outside however would in the end enter the crease, we are just after components that would constitute Afghanistan, the old land that just as of late settled borders.

5.1. Pre-Islamic Period:

The rise of the Persian Empire in 55 B. C. denotes the start of written history. The Persians were nearly trailed by the Greeks who watched the realm intently. The Greeks, and their similarly inquisitive Roman successors who took a shot at Greek essential

sources, have in this way left us the greater part of what we think about Afghanistan in antiquated circumstances (Otfinoski, 2004, p. 3).

The Aryans were the first wave of people to invade and conquer Afghanistan. These were a people from central Asia who moved into Afghanistan around 1500 B. C. Upon their arrival to the land, the early Afghan tribes intermarried with them; thus, making a new race. The Aryans ruled for a thousand years and built up the principal distinctive Afghan culture in what ended up known as Ariana, in present day northern Afghanistan. Cyrus the Great, originator of the Persian Achaemenian dynasty, attacked Ariana around 540 B. C. Accordingly, the region turned into a territory, or satrap, of the Persian Empire, known as Bactria. However, the Persians lost the Afghan territory to a great conqueror, the Macedonian King of Alexander the Great (356- 323 B. C.), who crushed them in 330 B. C. at the skirmish of Gaugamela. By 328 B. C. Alexander the Great had moved into Afghanistan, catching the city of Herat close to the Persian fringe and later Kandahar toward the South. Alexander was an extraordinary admirer of Greek culture and spread it wherever he went. Confirmation of his impact in Afghanistan has been found in the archeological remains of a Greek- style city from 235 B. C. at Ay Khanam, which was presumably established by Alexander or his followers (Otfinoski, 2004, p. 4).

After Alexander the Great's death in 323 B. C., the five areas of Afghanistan went under the lead of his commanders. The Bactrians revolted in 246 B. C., making their own particular Graeco- Bactrian Kingdom that incorporated the Kabul district and parts of India which preserved for a long time (Otfinoski, 2004, p. 4).

As the new thousand years drew nearer, the Kushans, originally from western China, conquered Bactria. The Kushans presented Buddhism, one of the first of several major religions to be introduced in Afghanistan. As talented merchants they changed Bactria into one of the considerable powers in Eurasia, equaled just by Rome, China, and Parthia, a land in western Asia (Otfinoski, 2004, p. 5).

Following three centuries of ruling, the Kushans declined and fell under the control of the new Persian dynasty called Sassanid. The Sassanians seized parts of Afghanistan by 241 A. D. Also, aside from the break when the Hephthalites of Central Asia assumed control over their territories, stayed in control until 642 A. D. the Sassanians took after the religion of Hinduism, which started in India, and spread it all through northern Afghanistan. More confirmation of their impact was discovered as of late when a Hindu temple was excavated north of Kabul (Otfinoski, 2004, p. 5).

5.2. Islamization and Mongol Invasion:

The new powers that were to invade both Persia and Afghanistan originated from Arabia. They were furnished with standards and also weapons. Toward the end of the seventh century the Arabs pushed into Afghanistan, they defeated the Sassanians in the battle of Qadissiyah, now in present day Iran, and assumed control the vast majority of Afghanistan by 714 A. D. (Tanner, 2002, pp. 75- 6).

A considerable lot of the Islamic dynasties were fleeting and had little power bases. The primary extraordinary Afghan ruler who made an extensive and unified kingdom was Mahmud of Ghazna (now Ghazni) kept going from 971 A. D. until 1030 A.

D. His Ghaznavid Empire in the long run extended from northern India to Persia and crosswise over Central Asia (Otfinoski, 2004, p. 6).

After Mahmud's death in 1030 A. D. the empire started to vacillate, as the Turks from the steppe picked up force and his successor, Masud, stayed more intrigued with India. The deathblow to the empire, however originated from another power inside Afghanistan, more baffling than any that had preceded, the Ghorids. In 1140 A. D. the Ghorid lord Ala-Ud-Din sacked and burned Ghazni (Tanner, 2002, pp. 77- 8). In any case, more prominent and furious winners were moving towards Afghanistan from the north (Otfinoski, 2004, p. 6).

The Mongols were great warriors and horsemen from Central Asia who swept across Afghanistan in the early thirteenth century, drove by their great leader Genghis Khan (ca. 1162- 1227) (Otfinoski, 2004, p. 6). Genghis Khan was a dauntless, charismatic warrior when young, as well as a splendid strategist and cool, creative tactician. He styled himself "the Emperor of all Men" (Tanner, 2002, p. 84). The Mongols crushed Herat and other Afghan urban areas. Buddhism was wiped out by the invaders; however, Islam, which had turned out to be more dug in, survived and became more grounded. Quite a bit of Genghis Khan's Mongol Empire went into disrepair on his death in 1227, and neighborhood chieftains and lesser Mongol sovereigns took control in a confuse of little city-states.

The following great hero of Afghanistan was Tamerlane (1336-1405) otherwise called Timur, a relative of Genghis Khan. He built up the Timurid dynasty by 1370. Dissimilar to Genghis Khan, the Timurids brought culture and learning to the conquered land, reconstructing Herat to make it their capital and cultural center (Otfinoski, 2004, p. 7).

5.3. The Hotak dynasty and Durrani Empire:

The Timurid brilliant age finished unexpectedly when the Turkic Uzbeks, a nomadic people from Central Asia, caught Herat in 1507. The Mongol prince Babur (1483- 1530) conquered the territory and moved the capital to Kabul. Babur and his relatives, the last great successor of Genghis Khan, would go ahead to great engineering of immortal style and magnificence, the most well-known example being 1632's Taj Mahal. Babur had likewise settled a seat of energy in India that, as the Mongol Empire, would toward the end in some frame until the middle of the nineteenth century (Tanner, 2002, p. 107).

In 1709, a hotaki chieftain, Mirwais (1673- 1715), drove a rebel against the Persians in Kandahar. When he had driven out the Persians, Mirwais Khan turned into the territory's new ruler. He started to unify the assorted clans of Afghanistan but died in 1717 before accomplishing his objective (Tanner, 2002, p. 114).

In 1736, a Turkish Afghan leader, Nadir Shah, made himself the Persian Shah. He conquered the majority of Afghanistan, including the region north of the Hindu Kush and was killed in 1747. His lieutenant, a Pashtun chief named Ahmed Khan Sadozai (ca. 1722-1772), took control. Ahmed pronounced a free Afghan state and put in the following twenty-six years building the country out of the conquered territories and the

different tribal clans that occupied them. He took the title durr-i-durrani, signifying “pearl of pearls”, and the position of royalty name Ahmed Shah Durrani (Otfinoski, 2004, pp. 7-8).

At the point when Ahmed died in 1773, no strong ruler came to hold the state together. For forty-five years his successors and ancestral boss battled for control. In spite of the fact that Ahmed Shah Durrani’s Empire started to deteriorated nearly from the moment of his death, his persevering accomplishment was to expel Afghanistan from its part as a junction for victory or as an interwoven of areas on the edge of more noteworthy forces. The test for the Afghans would be kept up their semi national freedom in spite of brutal inner disunity and even with new world realms that were on the ascent (Tanner, 2002, p. 129).

5.4. British invasion and influence:

In the half century following Ahmed Shah’s death, whatever remains of the world had changed radically, and by the 1830’s four separate powers had started to press against Afghanistan from each purpose of the compass. From the west, a resurgent Persia had recovered Khorasan, the present eastern Iran; from the east, Rnjit Singh’s nascent Sikh nation had conquered the Punjab, including the Afghan winter capital, Peshauar. But the bigger dangers were people groups the Afghans had never observed and scarcely known about, yet who were progressively merging on Afghanistan from north and south. These were from Russia and Great Britain, the two biggest forces of Europe (Tanner, 2002, p. 129).

In 1809, a British official Mountstuart Elphinstone had driven a mission to Afghanistan and recorded impressions that still reverberate over the hundreds of years. The internal government of the tribes, he wrote, “answers its end so well that the utmost disorders of the royal government never derange its operations nor disturb the lives of the people. A number of organized and high-spirited republics are ready to defeat their rugged country against a tyrant; and are able to defy the feeble efforts of a party in a civil war” (Tanner, 2002, p. 133).

At the point when the battle for control in Afghanistan was over, another pioneer rose, Dost Mohammed Khan (1793- 1863). He announced himself emir and his Barakzay clan ruled Afghanistan into the twentieth century. Dost Mohammed confronted the two most intense countries in Europe. Great Britain needed Afghanistan keeping in mind the end goal to secure its most significant state, British India, from a northern assault. Russia, trying to expand its power in Central Asia, needed to move south through Afghanistan and to increase unchallenged access to the Indian sea. The two nations’ struggle to control Afghanistan became known as the Great Game.

Dost Mohammed requested that the British send help to contribute drive the Indian Sikhs out of the eastern Afghanistan. When they refused, he swung to the Russians for help. This annoyed the British and decided that Dost Mohammed had to go. English troops attacked Afghanistan in 1838, setting off the First Anglo-Afghan War. Dost Mohammed fled Kabul and the British introduced previous lord Shah Shuja. The population of Kabul revolted, compelling the British soldiers to escape (Otfinoski, 2004, p. 9).

In the Second Anglo- Afghan War (1878-1880), arguments about potential Russian impact on Kabul again created a British final proposal, and indeed countered by proclaiming war on Afghanistan (Colling, 2011, p. 16). Abdur Rahman, a grandson of Dost Mohammed Khan, progressed toward becoming emir of Afghanistan. In 1881, the British consented to turn over interior control of the nation to Abdur Rahman. Nonetheless they retained control of Afghanistan's foreign policy. In 1839, Abdur Rahman was compelled to acknowledge the Durrand Line drawn by the British to isolate Afghanistan from India. It likewise partitioned the Pashtuns, leaving a third of them in Afghanistan and two thirds in western India; which later became modern Pakistan (Collins, 2011, p. 16). Abdur Rahman endeavored to reinforce a feeble national government while decreasing the traditional power of the tribal chieftains. When he died in 1901, Abdur Rahman was prevailing by his son Habibullah Khan (1872- 1919) (Otfinoski, 2004, p. 11).

In the first two Anglo- Afghan Wars, the Afghans earned a very much advocated notoriety as furious contender. The Afghan pioneers fought against British infringement, but in the wake of besting or seriously vexing the British to set up that independence, often ended up taking subsidies from them. The British in return received control over Afghan foreign policy (Collins, 2011, pp. 16- 7).

5.5. The emergence of independent kingdoms:

Another century held up numerous progressions to Afghanistan as the Third Anglo- Afghan War set up full freedom. The war finished British appropriations and Great Britain's infringement on Afghan sovereignty.

5.5.1. Habibullah Khan's Rule (1911- 1929):

Habibullah Khan was resolved to proceed with the changes started by his father and modernize his retrogressive country. He kept the peace with the British and focused his endeavors on inside change. During his early two decades of power, Habibullah nullified the act of slavery, established new, common schools, including a western-style college and a military academy, introduced western medication in Afghan hospitals, and set up the nation's first weekly newspaper. He preferred to keep Afghanistan neutral during the First World War (1914- 1918). Numerous Afghans supported the Ottomans, who joined the war later, and wanted to fight besides them against Great Britain.

Habibullah's refusal to do so costed him his death. He was succeeded by his son, Amanullah Khan (1892- 1960), who did not share his father's solid ties with Britain. He announced Afghanistan's aggregate independence from Great Britain and launched an attack on British India. This started the Third Anglo- Afghan War, the last clash between the two nations. The British forces grew tired of fighting for four years successively of a world war, and rapidly moved to conclude a peace treaty with the Afghans in August, 1919. Under the bargain of Rawalpindi, they granted Afghanistan full freedom, with complete control over their own foreign policy (Otfinoski, 2011, pp. 11- 2).

Amanullah Khan started modernizing his kingdom. He was the primary Afghan ruler to take help and military assistance from the Soviet Union. He announced reforms and needed to put down rebellions in the east over taxation, conscription, and different social changes.

In 1928, Amanullah Khan needed further changes by expelling the veil from women, pushing education, and forcing Afghans to wear western- style clothing in the capital. Afghan people refusal of most reforms led to the Civil War of 1929. The Afghans abdicated Amanullah and Habibullah Khla Khani was crowned to rule Afghanistan. The crowned ruler was assassinated by Nadir Shah in 1933 (Collins, 2011, pp. 18- 9).

5.5.2. Mohammed Zaher Shah's Rule (1939- 1973):

After Nadir Shah's death, his son, Zahir Shah, prevailing to the position of authority. From 1953- 1973, Zahir Shah ruled with different prime ministers, the first was his cousin, prince Mohammed Daoud. During Zahir Shah's rule, Afghanistan figured out how to stay neutral in the Second World War, started to grow economically with the assistance of foreign aid, made an advanced military with the USSR, and remained at an uneasy peace with its neighbors (Collins, 2011, p. 19).

Daoud, the ruler cousin, served as prime minister from 1953 until the beginning of the constitutional government in 1964, which ended his term (Collins, 2011, pp. 19- 20). The 1964 constitution was a landmark in modern Afghan history and a model for other Asian countries. Under it, Afghanistan turned into a constitutional monarchy. This implied the ruler still controlled, however his acts had to be approved by the lawmaking body comprising of two bodies- the House of the People and the House of the Elders. In the election of 1965, four legislative seats went to members of the newly formed People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a pro- communist group. One of the four elected was Nur Mohammed Taraki, who, with Babrak Karmal led the PDPA. The two leaders later split over personal differences.

By 1973, Daoud Khan led a military over through and seized the government. Ruler Zahir Shah resigned, Daoud annulled the government and proclaimed Afghanistan a republic (Otfinoski, 2004, pp. 21- 2).

5.5.3. The Communist movement in Afghanistan:

A general view among the Afghan public is associated with today's political parties and its origins to the conflict of 1979 to 2001; when the communist groups seized power in 1978 and the mujahedeen based in Peshawar and Quetta during the 1980s and 1990s and with the destruction of the civil war. Looking at parties as political entities rather than fronts for military organization is difficult for most Afghans.

The communism movement in Afghanistan has its origins in 1973, when Daoud Khan led a military coup and seized the government. Daoud abolished the monarchy and declared the country a republic. Daoud established a dictatorship state and appoint himself both president and prime minister. He dissolved the legislature and outlawed all political parties. The government enlarged with the Soviet Union and signed a 10- year Soviet- Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Non- Aggression in 1975. This action disturbed Afghanistan's Muslim majority who rejected the communists holding power over them. Consequently, the Great Saura (April Revolution) took place on April 27; 1978. The leftist military officers took over the capital and killed Daoud and hundreds of his followers. The country recovered and renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and Taraki was elected president and prime minister. Taraki forced a communist way of life, established stronger economic ties with the Soviets, and changed the Afghan flag to be on the Soviet Union's flag colors.

However, Taraki was overthrown and suffocated to death on the orders of his vice-president, Hafiz Ullah Amin. Amin was as well a tyrant president and used his private police force, the National Organization for the Defense of the Revolution, to oppress the people. A rebel movement continued to grow and was born amongst the Afghan Muslims. As the situation worsened, the USSR government convinced Amin to moderate his Marxist policies to gain the support of the people. In 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan based on the justification that its intervention was necessary to support and aid the legitimate Communist government in Kabul. Afghanistan, once more, was about to enter a long bloody period of war and destruction (Otfinoski, 2004, pp. 22- 3).

Conclusion:

Afghanistan's strategic location in South- Western Asia has put it in the way of endless champions and trespassers. The Afghan people built up a forceful position to fend off these trespassers and geography has helped them protect their country from outside invasions.

Chapter two: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:

Introduction:

The USSR military forces were structured, equipped, and prepared for nuclear and high-intensity war on the immense northern European plains and the plains of northern China. Nonetheless, their political administration pushed them into the center of Afghanistan's civil war to reconstitute and help an ostensibly Marxist-Leninist government.

The Afghan war began in the late 1978 as a general uprising against the endeavors of the Communist Khalq government's efforts to compel Soviet-style Communism on a profoundly high conservative, religious nation. The Soviets advocated their intrusion of Afghanistan as an important factor to support and aid the legitimate communist government in Kabul. Their actual purposes turned out to be clear when Mohammed Amin was toppled and killed in a Soviet-motivated upset two days after the intrusion started. The Soviet armed force was arranged and trained only for high tempo, mechanized war.

Everything was geared to the demands of operational art within the context of strategic offensive operations. It did not have a fitting tenet for counter-insurrection, and it set aside a bewildering long time for the armed force to learn and adapt. The Mujahideen made full use of possibilities offered by the ground for hid move, ambushes, and resistance.

1. Prelude to the war:

The Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979- 1989) was an attempt by the Soviet Union to strengthen its control within Soviet Central Asia, which was comprised of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Contrary to what many viewed as an aggressive maneuver by the Soviets to gain strategic territory, the real motive for war was based on fear.

In the 1970s, the Muslim population, which was once the minority within Soviet Central Asia, had grown tremendously. With the growth of the Muslim population came the development of a nationalist ideology- one that did not include communism. Concerned that its satellite republics in Central Asia would be jeopardized by internal revolution, the Soviet Union decided to send a message to the nationalist movement that had developed in Afghanistan. The Soviet expectation was that a decisive victory in Afghanistan would not only crush the Muslim independence movement, but it would strengthen the Soviet Union's grip on Central Asia (Hoodbhoy, 2014, pp. 1- 2).

The road toward war began in 1973 when Mohammed Daoud, once a prime minister of Afghanistan, overthrew King Zahir, the leader of Afghanistan. When Daoud captured power in Afghanistan, he was tasked with healing the divisions within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the PDPA)- a political structure that supported communism. Prior to his ascent, the PDPA split into the Parchamists, led by Babrak Karmal, which remained loyal to Daoud, and the Khalqis, which was a radical group led by Noor Taraki (Fitzgerald and Gould, 2009, p. 161).

Realizing that the split placed Afghanistan in danger of civil war, Daoud attempted to move away from communism and welcome Western relations. This decision resulted in Daoud being executed during a coup led by the Khalqis in 1978. Noor Taraki assumed power in Afghanistan and entered into a pact with Babrak Karmal to realign the PDPA. The two factions then launched a national campaign in an attempt to transition Afghanistan's rural Muslim population into supporters of communism. Needless to say, this was unacceptable to the Muslim population because communism was seen as an atheist ideology (Fitzgerald and Gould, 2009, p. 177).

By mid-1979, Muslim insurgents, known as the Mujahedeen, armed themselves and began moving toward important cities in Afghanistan; such as, the capital city Kabul. After being alarmed, the Soviet Union deployed several divisions to the border of Afghanistan, but held off an invasion in the hope that Taraki could quell the insurgency. Much to the chagrin of the Soviet Union, internal politics had hamstrung the anti-insurgency effort (Matthews, 2011, p. 6).

Karmal had been removed from his position within the Taraki regime and replaced by Hafiz Ullah Amin. While Karmal threatened a coup following his removal, it was Amin who executed Taraki and took control of Afghanistan in October 1979. At this point, the internal strife had allowed the Mujahedeen to gain greater control of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was forced to react (Matthews, 2011, p. 8).

1.1. The Soviet- Afghan relations :

A genuine connection between the USSR and Afghanistan did not emerge until the formation of the Afghan Communist Party, namely, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Relations between Moscow and Kabul were to a great extent in light of economic linkage. The foundation of the (PDPA) in 1965, with sufficient consolation from Moscow witnessed the improvement of a formal institutional linkage between Afghan Socialist and Moscow (Wolf, n.d., p.2).

The Soviet union's monetary participation with Afghanistan was the driving factor to its search for an exerting influence on the Afghan military. Accordingly, thousands of Afghan armed forces and aviation- based armed forces were sent to the Soviet association for military trainings and preparations, and the Afghan armed force and military officers were the target to Marxist- Leninist influence and procommunist views. On the other hand, Afghanistan and the USSR concurred on a progression of advancement ventures identified with development of thruways and bridges, but the most astonishing accomplishment was the development of "air all climate" street connecting Kabul with the USSR borders (Siddiqui and Butt, 2014, p. 623).

The connection between Afghanistan and the Soviet association prompted the devastating of the US; it gave an importance of Afghanistan to the Soviet as far as in the financial side. These relations prompted the extension of the Soviet influence, and it could drive to encircle itself with socialist administration which inevitably prompted the downfall of the Soviet Union.

1.2. The Saur Revolution:

The Saur Revolution of April 1978 began when the PDPA seized control in a coup and slaughtered the nation's head of state ("the Soviet occupation", 2006, p.1).

The coup d'état occurred after the death of Miir Akhber Kheiber (1925-1978). Both Taraki and Karmal accused the legislature for being responsible of Kheiber death. They attested that the murder was another progression of a sorted- out intrigue which arranged by Mohammed Daoud (1909- 1978) to hush continuously the PDPA. The coup was known as the Saur Revolution. It started when a group of Afghan armed force unit was sent to Mohammed Daoud's castle to overthrow and topple him down. Following that, a savage clash nearly took one night between the extremists and the guards of Daoud. At the end, Mohammed Daoud and his family were executed (Emir, 2013, p. 101).

After that, vote- based Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was announced and eventually Nur Mohammed Taraki (1917-1979) became the head of state of (DRA), Hafiz Allah Amin (1929-1979) was designated the Secretary of the PDPA, and Karmal was made convey head (Emir, 2013, p. 102).

1.3. Division among the PAPA:

On January ,1,1965, a group of Marxists met at Taraki's home in Kabul and framed the PAPA. The prompt stimulus for the establishment of PAPA was Zahir Shah's proposition, based on new 1964 constitution, to expand the scope of political movement, later on, numerous issues prompted the division of the PAPA, the first real issue separating the PAPA was the remain to be received toward the Zahir Shah

administration. Two groups created around equal daily paper Khalq, the official organ of the PAPA related with the party's Secretary General, Nur Mohammed Taraki, and Pacham, related with Babrak karmal (1929- 1996) and Mir Akbar Khyber. The split came over the best possible reaction to the administration activity in restricting Khalq in 1966 (Male, 1982, pp.25- 9).

However, the arrangement of this contention in the PAPA was proposed by Karmal. He proposed a compromise: Khalq ought to obscure the red column on the masthead and guarantee the ruler that we are not communists, it is improbable that such a straightforward gadget would have adjusted the administration's disposition. Notwithstanding that, keeping in mind the end goal to compel the issue, he influenced the cardinal mistake of presenting his abdication to key to committee. The six staying full individuals partitioned evenly, three for tolerating Karmal's resignation (Taraji, Zeary, and Panjshei), and three restricted (Kishtmad, Shahrullah shahpun and Badakhshi), some individuals from each gathering, on edge to recuperate the rift, opened transactions in the accompanying month, they clearly met at Taraki's home, which could scarcely be viewed as nonpartisan region (Male, 1982, pp. 30- 1).

Relations were positively as terrible as they had ever been, both the Pacham and khalq groups were guaranteeing to be the genuine PAPA, the focal board of trustees proclaimed that there was just a single party, named popularity based Khalq party in Afghanistan and that Babrack was not the pioneer of the party, in the other hand Babrak karmal had not relinquished framing a unified front (Male, 1982, p. 36).

2. The Reasons of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan :

As far as the reasons of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are concerned, the Soviets planned their invasion to Afghanistan a long time ago. The invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 by USSR troops was achieved through the help of the Afghan Communist government in its contention against socialist Muslim guerillas during the Afghan War 79- 89. The Soviet predictions were that a decisive victory in Afghanistan would not only spread the socialism to neighboring countries, but likewise to investigate in the geographical position of Afghanistan.

2.1. The Soviet intention to spread Communism:

During 1970's and 1980's, the Soviet Union was ideologically dedicated to supporting what it was viewed as a dynamic power in the world, the development and progression of Marxist- Leninist administration and prominent development has been a goal examined simultaneously with the before specified interests. In spite of the prior sharp ideological contrasts that Islam has with communism, the Soviet association still figured out how to make pockets of socialist inclining state in Afghanistan. Although socialism has made progress in the neighboring states, it needed to go far before it is at last settled and acknowledged by the greater part, the help of socialism administration remains a vital point on Soviet outside strategy Agenda. In this context, Victor Grishin, stated that 'socialist internationalism obliged us to help the Afghan people defend the April revolution gains' (Nawaz Khan, 1986, p. 28).

The driving force for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the Communist ideological guideline set forth in the Brezhnev Doctrine, it demanded the Moscow style Socialism must be kept up all through the Soviet range of prominence and that the USSR has a privilege to mediate to safeguard and ensure it, Moscow saw world socialism as indissoluble and unavoidable, the Kremlin made it their obligation to intervene at whatever point a socialist administration was debilitated by counter-progressives (Eflein, 1992, p. 22).

The Afghan Communist government arranged Afghanistan ended up unsteady and fell outside the socialist authoritative reach, the Soviets would endure a resultant misfortune in notoriety. Along these lines, the Soviets had a personal stake in guaranteeing that its neighboring Communism state remained Socialist. The USSR endeavored to underline and venture, through military and financial guide, a "great neighbor" picture to other Third World countries. The "great neighbor" picture advanced the Soviet picture as an Asian power worried about the welfare of lesser-created countries.' The nine-year control of Afghanistan, to some degree discolored this 'great neighbor' image a socialist-oriented Afghanistan became unstable and fell outside the communist sphere of influence, the Soviets would suffer a resultant loss in prestige (Eflein, 1992, pp. 21- 2).

2.2. Soviet geographical benefits:

The geographical congruity of Southern Asian to USSR has dependably exhibited blended gift to the latter. The district offered lucrative open doors which if acknowledged process the possibility to put the Soviet association in a lucky solid position against the

US. On the other hand, manipulation of this flighty and unstable zone by UK, the US and China had dependably delivered genuine security repercussions, and even undermined the very trustworthiness of the Soviet Union.

2.2.1. India and the Indian Ocean:

Each power has its own particular dynamics oppressive means, expansionist inclinations, and building fanatical need to stomp the feeble. With Afghanistan merging itself against its southern neighbor, there was a recovery in the Soviet Union of the vision of Russian expansionism in Asia. According to this theory, whoever controlled the heartland, containing South- Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Afghanistan, with access to the Indian Ocean, held the way to global control (Marguns & Naby, 1998, p. 23).

After the British left India in 1947, and an undeniably inside flimsy Afghanistan, the Soviets saw their possibility for global control. Hence started a progression of Soviet suggestions towards the nation. As expressed before, through different diplomatic, monetary, military and political agreements, the Soviet Association kept up a perpetual nearness in Afghanistan. Exploiting factional strife inside this land-locked nation, Moscow contributed its troops there, while simultaneously placing itself in a superior position to advance toward "warm waters" through the deliberate develop of transportation framework (Margun & Nbay, 1998, p. 24).

Russia also share its due interest in building Zarang- Dilaram route as this would connect Afghanistan's Garland Road under India- Iran- Russia, North-South exchange hallway. In this unique circumstance, both nations were working intently to prevent the re-rising up out of securing the Taliban to ensure the exchange route between India,

Iran Afghanistan. Furthermore, Tajikistan. Subsequently, as past, the two India and Russia would keep the Northern Alliance fortify through offering help militarily and politically (Siddiqui & Butt, 2014, p.21).

2.2.2. Protecting USSR's security (border):

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was depicted by the US administration and media as a remarkable demonstration of unmistakable aggression. The prevailing topic originating from the representative of the Carter administration was that the Soviets were surrendering their previous arrangement of utilizing intermediaries to help transformation and were presently embraced coordinate military activities went for extending their impact (Gregory, 1986, p. 8).

Truly, the Soviets have dependably been fixated security on their borders ; thus, Soviet history is packed with cases of invasions by unfriendly neighbors, the most recent of which happened in 1941 from Moscow's point of view the most ideal approach to secure their borders was to annex frontier areas. For example, the Baltic states or to set up an obedient client state in neighboring nations whose faithfulness was secured by the presence of substantial quantities of military and police powers as in western Europe and Mongolia. This is precisely what the Soviets needed to do in Afghanistan and their ability to acknowledge the dangers included was predicated on what they saw to be a breaking down security circumstance along their whole Southern borders (Gregory, 1986, p. 9).

2.2.3. Gaining access to natural resources (oil & gas):

The Soviet were interested in expanding their enthusiasm on the "rimland" of the center east oil producing nations. The Soviet "rimland" technique was a piece of a general Soviet arrangement to conceivably deny access to Middle East oil stores toward the west. The Soviets realized that the Persian Gulf oil fields contained around 60% of the worldwide oil saves and that Europe and Japan were intensely subject to its supply. Thus, a vital circle of the Middle East by the Soviet and their partners could have made a Soviet aggregate security system. Soviet power and impact was developing the Southern *rimland* of the Persian Gulf. This control projection combined with the Iranian upheaval and the helplessness of the Saudi regime, as confirm by the fruitless upset in Mecca, allowed the Soviet to set their impact by attacking Afghanistan, this intrusion secured Soviet power and impact in the Northern zone had the Soviets won in Afghanistan and prevailing in their key goal to encompass the Gulf oil fields with a Soviet presence (Eflein, 1992, pp. 20- 1).

The Soviet Union has taken part effectively in the improvement of petroleum gas assets in northern Afghanistan for a few decades. Since 1967, gas supplies from those fields have to a great extent been traded to the Soviet focal Asia. The Soviets adapted to adjusting the cost of Afghan imports for advancement purposes. These shipments have all earmarks of being settling the cost of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The gas conveyed has discharged Soviet supplies for transmission to European Russia and to Eastern and Western Europe. The Soviet established the most intensely guarded filed gas in the north of Afghanistan (Noorzoy, 1985, p. 53).

2.2.4. Containing China from the Western borders:

China was USSR 's rival in the Afghan issue. USSR's communication with China were firmly connected with its security and trade in central Asia. USSR viewed itself additionally competing for trade. Yet, it was situated as a potential partner on at any rate some issue in contrary to the US (Karrar, 2009, p. 161).

During the seventies, the Soviets had accomplished the status of a honest to goodness superpower, they stayed fixated with the apparition of a solid China on their flank later on. The Soviet arrangement was in this way went for politically detaching China and avoiding or if nothing else delaying the procedure of China securing a similar superpower status. China's rapprochement with the United States and the West further extended their doubts concerning future Chinese expectations (Nawaz Khan,1986, p. 27).

On the other hand, Chinese censure the Soviet moves as not guarded but rather hostile went for outmaneuvering and surrounding China because of its failure to send and venture control long ways past its outskirts, and its absence of political impact in the Middle East, China could not manage the Soviet presence and contain it more remote far from its fringes in the Middle East and Gulf locales. Consequently, the significance of the land "join" between the Middle East and South Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan expected basic significance as the customary route of invasions and control of South Asia (Nawaz Khan, 1986, p. 27).

2.2.5. Growth of Islamic fundamentalism:

Historians contended that a standard factor in the Soviet option to invade Afghanistan was the apparent need to put down the aggressor Islamic fundamentalists, previously their perspectives tainted Soviet border republics and hastened inner revolts against Moscow. This government gave off an impression of being fairly probable in light of the fact that the three potential Islamic republics (Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan) may cause some trouble for the Soviet Union among Soviet Muslims. This circumstance would positively be manageable. The interior legislative component in Soviet focal Asia, which incorporate the military and mystery police, were settled, commanded by slaves and kept on being altogether control; therefore, the likelihood of Muslim revolts in the Soviet union was somewhat remote (Gregory, 1986, p. 11- 2).

The Soviet needed to stop Muslim fanaticism. On the other hand, the Soviets viewed the rise of fundamentalist Islam as a danger to the supported Communist government in Afghanistan. Although Afghan Islamist groups prevailed in Afghanistan. They had no chance to toppling socialism, driving out the Russians, they trusted a chain response could start. In this situation, the Muslims in Central Asia would have endeavored to imitate their effective partners. This would have made a risk of Islamic fundamentalism spreading to the Southern USSR (Eflein, 1992, p. 23).

2.2.6. Regaining USSR's military power :

Condoleezza Rice's (1954-), who was the National Security Affairs Advisor of the ex- US President George W. Bush, portrayed the Soviet Union military power as "Reliance on the military power of the state, acquired at great cost and organized like

that of military powers of the past, was handed down to the Soviets by historical experience” (Cassidy, 2003, p. 9). The Soviet military that attacked Afghanistan were organized and prepared for vast scale regular fighting. Also, Soviet military tenet conceived the work of Soviet powers on level, undulating territory, as the fields of central Europe (Cassidy, 2003, p. 9).

3. USSR’s invasion and its implications on the neighboring countries:

By the end of December 1979, the Soviet Union sent a huge number of troops into Afghanistan, and instantly expected to finalize its military and political control of Kabul and the total territory of the country. This occasion started a ruthless, decade- long endeavor by Moscow to stifle the Afghan common war and keep up an agreeable and communist government on its border. Because of the contentions of various world and provincial power, peace is far away dream in Afghanistan, the most recent three decades of war in Afghanistan has obscured the fate of Afghanistan's people. It has brought pulverization and influence to the entire region, additionally the Soviets could implicate the neighbor's countries of Afghanistan in the war.

3.1. Pakistan:

Pakistan's commitment to the 24- year-old clash in Afghanistan has been colossal. Amid the Soviet nearness in the nation, Pakistan expected cutting edge status of courses, and turned into the travel course for the supply of arms, and military guide to Afghans battling for their home- arrive. Taking into account its geopolitical position, social, and religious proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan highlighted unmistakably in

nearly all UN, local and reciprocal peace activities. It was a characteristic accomplice in any exchange on Afghanistan's future. Pakistan was in charge of accomplishing more bad than great. Obviously, it remained a potential danger to all peace recommendations. Numerous an open door for settlement of conflict was damaged because of Islamabad's obdurate role (Marguns and Naby, 1998, pp. 29- 30).

Afghanistan's disaster was Pakistan's gain, because Pakistan played key role to pass through American aid from CIA to Afghan Mujahedeen. The cost advantage investigation of the contention proposes that Islamabad gotten near US \$8 billion from the United States and Saudi Arabia amid this campaign. This financial largesse not just spruced up its resistance foundation versus the most despised adversary India; however, the guide likewise added to the nation's financial development and affected the bigger financial advancement (Margun & Naby, 1998, p. 32).

3.2. India:

The Soviets have endeavored to elevate India's suspicious about Pakistan's goals and its security association with the United States, keeping in mind the end goal to encourage Indo- Pakistan pressures and increase New Delhi's reliance on Moscow, in the Soviet perspective, conflict amongst India and Pakistan would progress in the direction of taking care of Moscow's Afghan issue and would give Moscow chances to reinforce its situation in south Asia. The Soviet would probably overlook even an Indian preemptive strike against Pakistan's atomic offices in the conviction that it served Moscow's interests by debilitating Pakistan; however, a preemptive Indian assault on Pakistan atomic offices is improbable in the close term. Nonetheless, India is probably

going to wind up progressively worried about long-extend Soviet aims in the region and could end up pushing toward showdown with the Soviets if Pakistan were adequately neutralized (Hafeez, 1987, pp. 88- 9).

3.3. China:

Beijing viewed the Soviet attack of Afghanistan as a dismal augmentation of Moscow's military emphatics that undermines China's outskirts vital interests, China will keep on supporting Islamabad in helping the insurgents but has restricted potential for helping Pakistan notwithstanding more noteworthy Soviet pressure. The Chinese; however, would not need Pakistan arrangement to bring about effective Soviet endeavors to kill Pakistan since Islamabad's part advertisement Beijing key south Asia partner is considerably more imperative to China than it is not contrary to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Yusufi and Afridi, 2014, pp. 70- 1).

3.4. Iran:

Iran's ties with Russia were significantly more muddled than its relations with India or Pakistan. For different authentic reasons, Iranians have for quite some time been suspicious of Russian aims: To be a dependable global partner.

Meanwhile, Russian benefits from a disengaged Islamic Republic, favoring Iran to remain a lesser accomplice. The reality that the two nations were real exporters of vitality additionally plays into Moscow's long- haul Iran strategy; Russia stands to lose in case of an all- inclusive incorporated Iran. Currently, notwithstanding, Tehran and Moscow share an enthusiasm for countering a solid U.S. nearness in the area. They

are; too, worried about the spread of Sunni radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Therefore, Russia's interests in Afghanistan adjust most intimately with (Alireza, Schotten, Rahmani, and Stewart, 2014, p. 37).

4. The International response to the Soviet invasion:

International response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been overwhelmingly negative, although in changing shades of power. On account of a few states, negative private response among government pioneers has been covered by quiet or at times tepid open help for the invasion, the idea of the responses and the thought processes behind the diverse states have shifted with every nation's topographical economic, military, and religion concerns.

4.1. The US response :

In regard to the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, the US response was mostly negative, the US administration presumed that occasion in Afghanistan destabilized US impact in the area. More significantly, at once basic to its advantage, to perceive that it was difficult to straightforwardly intercede in the undertakings of Democratic republic of Afghanistan (DRA). With the point of supporting the Afghan opposition, the US government, by achieving a choice to send directly arms and specialized supplies to Pakistan, up to the entirety of \$ 100 million, directed discussion with the pioneers of Pakistan and China, and in like manner inside the NATO (Liakhovsky, 2000, p. 194).

The further improvement of occasions demonstrated the Afghan issue intrigued the US and its partners in as much as it empowered following a course of expanded showdown with the USSR. Applying various strategies for weight, the Americans endeavored to misuse the circumstance that had emerged here as one of the variables in their outside arrangement, in the wake of having propelled a broad crusade to ruin the USSR (Liakhovsky, 2000, p. 195).

The United States did all what it could make the Soviet Association pay a high cost for its contribution in Afghanistan, choosing Afghanistan as a polygon for conclusive balance against "Soviet development." Defeat of the last needed to realize not just the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that nation and the ruin of the "master Communist Kabul administration," yet in addition destabilization of the circumstance in the USSR itself (Liakhosvsky, 2000, p. 197).

4.2. The UNO's response :

The U. N. intervention efforts tended exclusively to accomplishing an arranged answer for the global parts of the Afghan clash. The advancement of a coalition government was past its formal order. Certainly, U.N. part states oppose what they thought about interruptions into their inside undertakings. Nevertheless, when the U.N. reasoned that the parties concerned were unwilling or unfit to set up a wide based Afghan government, the U.N. chosen to bend its own standards and made propositions for a political solution in Kabul that were to a great extent ignored by the superpowers (Cordovez & Harrison, 1995, p. 8).

4.3. China's response :

China steadily heightened its judgment of the Soviet Union following the Soviet-backed coup in Kabul and the working of Soviet powers all through Afghanistan. In authoritative press and government statements, China viewed that this improvement represents an immediate danger to Chinese security and check the most genuine praise of Soviet expansionism abroad in finished 10 years. China could not vow legitimately its help for the furnished protection from the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Among the other notable features of China response, China noticed that the Soviet objectives in Afghanistan range far beyond a desire to control that country and represent an important step in the Kremlin's plan direct access to the India ocean and control western oil supplies ('Afghanistan task force', 1980, p. 34).

4.4. UK response :

UK had a long history of supporting and working close to Islamic countries when the Soviets crossed the Afghan border, yet the plot with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan was an alternate request to these prior scenes. Openly, the head administrator and other British pioneers denied British military association in Afghanistan and guaranteed to look for simply conciliatory answers for the contention. In all actuality, British covert aid to the Afghan resistance started to stream even before the Soviet invasion, while Whitehall approved MI6 to direct tasks in the principal year of the Soviet occupation, composed by MI6 officers in Islamabad in contact with the CIA and Pakistan's knowledge benefit, the ISI. English and US secret preparing programs were basic, since a large number of the indigenous Afghan powers, and by far most of the jihadi

volunteers touching base in Afghanistan, had no military preparing. It was an arrangement that was to have significant results (Curtis, 2016, para.2-4).

5. The Soviet- Afghan War (1979- 1989): The Phases

Among the outcomes of Second World War were the ascent of the US, the USSR, and shortly afterward, China. The two superpowers; namely, the US and USSR, had risen with enormous populations and cross- country interests as well as with nuclear weapons so crushing that they preceded advance extraordinary power wars. Communist Russia and Democratic US, at the leader of their separate coalitions, could just battle a Cold War, much of the underlying preferred standpoint of countries, for example, Afghanistan, which could be a budgetary and also an ideological rivalry for its allegiance.

5.1. Creating the PDPA:

From 1919 through 1933, there were a progression of assassinations and reforms caused by attempts to change and modernization, which estranged some moderate individuals from the conservatives. In 1933, king Zahir Shah accessed to power and ruled until 1973. He presented a vote- based constitution that permitted the development of political parties. One of these parties was the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) (Palka, 2001, p. 40).

The PDPA was one party with two different factions. The Khalq (Massea) group, with great quality in the security services, was led by Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin. A moderate and broad- based group, the Parcham (Banner) group,

was led by Babrak Karmal. The party was soon pushed aside and its leader was sent to another country on ambassadorial duties. The leaders of the Khalq group, Taraki and Amin were radical ideologues with an affinity for fast modernization. their program-shaped over Soviet protest appeared to be relatively intended to achieve an insurrection. Its primary highlights were land reform, usury reform, and equivalent rights for ladies (Collins, 2011, p. 25).

These were disagreeable. Land reform was especially destabilizing. It was brutally applied and was most unpopular among peasants, who considered to be corrupt and conflicting with Islam. Over the greater part of this, the PDPA changed the national flag's color from Islamic green to communist red. Moscow was freely eager about the prospects for the new regime yet worried that the PDPA was distancing the general population. They contended the PDPA to go moderate every step of the way (Collins, 2011, p. 26).

From the first day, there were serious contrasts between these two leaders that prompted Karmal's expulsion from the central council. His place was taken by Hafiz Ullah Amin. Subsequently, the group was split into two groups, both of which battled autonomously for their objectives. However, Daoud's resistance to governmental issues against the two groups of the PDPA and furthermore restraint of PDPA members. PDPA immediately drove the group to cover their disparities and region to battle the regime. On April, 27, 1978, the PDPA seized control of the country. The prime minister and head of state was Nur Muhammed Taraki; his vice president was Babrak Karmal (Grau & Cress, 2002, p. 8).

5.2. Military support:

Simply after rehashed rebukes from Washington in the late 1940s and early 1950s did Kabul acknowledge Moscow's long-standing offer of military guide. In addition, this choice demonstrated politically earth shattering. The Soviet Union soon turned into Afghanistan's sole provider of arms. Furthermore, in 1978 a small group of liberal Afghan armed force and air force officers, huge numbers of whom had been trained in the USSR, seized control and made the political conditions that encouraged the Soviet mediation in December 1979 (Amstutz, 1986, p. 22).

By 1954, the Afghans started negotiations with the Soviets on their offer to supply arms. In July 1956 the Soviets consented to a \$ 32 million concessionary credit for the buy of Soviet weapons at shoddy costs. Other Soviet arms agreements took after. Furthermore, by 1978 the entirety estimation of Soviet arms sold to Afghanistan totaled \$ 1,250 million (Amstuts, 1986, p. 22).

By 1963 Soviet military educators had totally supplanted to long-standing unexpected to Turkish officers. Of just about 4,000 Afghan military officers who went to the USSR for training, all were obliged to take on courses in socialism (Amstuts, 1986, p. 22).

One impact of relatively added up to Afghan reliance on Soviet calculated arms bolster, including spare parts, ammunition, and gasoline, was that Afghanistan certainly would never act military against any outside nation without Moscow's endorsement. Another advantage to the Soviets of their improved and pervasive presence in the Afghan military, with consultants appointed down organization level, was the open door it gave the Soviets to select Afghans for insight purposes, and to suggest those Afghans

who were most agreeable for professional success and for training in the USSR (Amstuts, 1986, p. 22).

The changes that Taraki embraced were not bolstered by members from the legislature, the armed force, or the civilians. Floods of turmoil shook the new regime and conveyed new leaders to the surface; one of the more dynamic was Hafiz Ullah Amin. On October, 14, 1979, there was an overthrow and a usurpation of power. N. M. Taraki was killed by Amin's supporters. Another wave suppression poured over the armed force and nation. However, this did not ensure the practicality of the new regime, which was subtly restricted within the government and openly contradicted by equipped resistance groups. Moreover, this armed opposition started to develop in strength and spread all through the nation (Grau & Cress, 2002, pp. 8- 9).

Initially, the Islamic fundamentalist movement gave the establishment to the armed restriction. The Islamic fundamentalist movement emerged in the mid- 1960's and promoted the resurrection of Islam, in view of its unique standards and cleansed of its later improvements. In 1968, supporters of the fundamentalists combined in the Union Muslim Youth. This current association' s central goal was to battle any member of the country ruling circle who pandered to the modernization of Islam or the penetration of the nation with socialist thoughts. The association built up their program and turned into a changeless protection in hopeless resistance to all the progressive administrations that ruled Afghanistan for short or long periods of time (Grau & Cress, 2002, p. 9).

In June 1975, the fundamentalists attempted to overthrow the regime of Muhammed Daoud. However, the regime powers effortlessly crushed the uprising, and a sizeable part of the insurgents left the nation and settled in Pakistan, where they had complete

freedom of action. In May 1978, the insurgents established their first base in Pakistan to train armed groups for combat in Afghanistan. A short time later, comparable bases were established in Iran and Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Grau & Cress, 2002, p. 9).

Ethnic minorities likewise gave solid equipped groups that needed to grab some power and control from the larger part Pashtun. Through the efforts of the fundamentalist and the armed insurrection against the central power and different nationalities started, and, thus, numerous districts of the nation went under the entire control of the Mujahideen. Civil war raged all through the nation in 1978 and 1979. Neither of the contradicting sides could accomplish triumph over the other without net worthy assistance from the outside. Under these conditions, the decision makers in Kabul sought the USSR for help (Grau & Cress, 2002, pp. 9- 10).

The Soviet-Afghan military collaboration has a long history. As far back as 1919, the Soviet government gave Afghanistan gratuitous aid in the form of a million gold rubles, small arms, ammunition, and a couple of aircraft to help the Afghan protection from the British conquerors. In 1924, the USSR again gave military assistance to Afghanistan. They gave them small arms and aircraft and directed training in Tashkent for unit officers from the Afghan armed force. Soviet Afghan military participation started in 1956, when the two nations consented to another arrangement. The Soviet Minister of Defense was presently in charge of training national military units. In 1972, up to 100 Soviet experts and technical specialists were sent on disengaged duty to Afghanistan to train the Afghan military. In May 1978, the administrations consented to another worldwide agreement, sending up to 400 Soviet military advisers to Afghanistan (Grau & Cress, 2002, pp. 9- 10).

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Moscow signed a treaty of friendship, good neighborliness, and cooperation in Moscow in December 1978. The treaty enabled the government of Afghanistan to ask for that the administration of the USSR send powers into Afghanistan and give the legitimate premise to such an activity. The regime of N. M. Taraki more than once asked for the presentation of Soviet powers in Afghanistan in the spring and summer of 1979. He asked for the Soviet troops to give his security and to build the adequacy of the battle against the Mujahideen. On April 14, the Afghan government asked for that the USSR send 15 to 20 helicopters to Afghanistan, and on 16 June the Soviet administration reacted and sent a unit of tanks, BMPs, and groups to protect the government of Afghanistan in Kabul and to secure the Bagram and Shindand airfields (Grau & Cress, 2002, p. 10).

The DRA requests became no longer for individual crews and subunits, but for regiments and longer units. The USSR government was in no hurry to grant these requests and the Kremlin made the final decision to commit Soviet forces to Afghanistan on 12 December 1979 (Grau & Cress, 2002, pp. 10- 1).

In all, the aim of the Soviet strategy to fortify the Afghan regime was to reestablish and rise the abilities of the DRA security powers. Consequently, military assistance was the most vital part of Soviet aid. In the period 1968- 1979, total Soviet assistance to Afghanistan was \$ 69,5 million every year. The military aid continuously expanded until 1984, when it reached 366,3 million rubles (37% expansion from 1980) (Minkow and Smolyneec, 2007, p. 4).

5.3. Cultural support:

Factored by internal clash and foreign mediation for quite a long time, Afghanistan made a few speculative steps toward modernization in the mid- twentieth century. In the 1960s, a portion of the greatest steps were made toward a more liberal and westernized way of life, while endeavoring to keep up a regard for more moderate groups, Afghanistan was persuade and impacted by the USSR amid the Cold War, accepting Soviet machinery and weapons. This time was a brief, relatively serene time, when current structures were built in Kabul close by more seasoned conventional mud structures, when burqas ended up discretionary for a period, and the nation gave off an impression of being on a way toward a more open, prosperous society (Taylor, 2013, para. 1).

Advance was stopped in the 1970s, as a progression of ridiculous upsets, invasions, and civil wars began, turning around the greater part of the means towards modernization which took place in the 1960s (Taylor, 2013, para. 1).



Fig. 1: Modern new Finance Ministry building in Kabul. Source: (www.theatlantic.com/photo/2013/07/afghanistan-in-the-1950s-and-60s/100544).



Figure 2: A view of one of the new mosques erected in the suburb of Kabul. Source: (www.theatlantic.com/photo/2013/07/afghanistan-in-the-1950s-and-60s/100544)



Fig. 3: Architecture in Kabul. Source : (www.theatlantic.com/photo/2013/07/afghanisyan-in-the-1950s-and-60s/100544)



Figure 4: Two Afghan medicine students and their professor at the Faculty of Medicine in Kabul. Source: (www.theatlantic.com/photo/2013/07/afghanistan-in-the-1950s-and-60s/100544)

5.4. Economic Support :

Similarly, as Moscow turned into the most vital arm provider to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union continuously developed as Afghanistan's vital trading partner and economic aid donor. After 1949, Pakistan banned the Afghans for signing a four-year trade concurrence with the USSR. Moscow consented to give oil-based goods, cotton material, sugar, and different products in return for Afghan wool, cotton, fruits, nuts, and furs. This exchange assertion was restored and extended when it terminated. Petroleum gas found in northern Afghanistan was sent out to the USSR. With the revelation of this gas, the estimation of exchange between the two nations developed altogether (Amstuts, 1986, p. 23).

As indicated by the International Monetary Fund, the USSR in 1970 represented 30% of Afghanistan's outside exchange; by 1977, however, the USSR's offer had dropped to 23%. Official Afghan measurements for the financial year ending March 1978 demonstrated the Soviet offer to be higher - 42% of Afghan exports and 28% of imports (Amstuts, 1986, p. 23).

Afghanistan was a particularly supported recipient of Soviet monetary aid. Not exclusively was Afghanistan the main non-communist nation anywhere to receive Soviet economic aid in the pre- and post Second World War, yet by 1979 it positioned first among all non-comrade nations in the aggregate estimation of Soviet aid advertised. In the post Second World War era, the Soviet aid to Afghanistan started in January 1954 with a \$ 4,5 million concessionary (3%) credit for the development of grain lifts, a flour process, and a bakery. This aid was followed in that same year by three other Soviet aid assertions worth \$ 8,2 million for two cement plants, a natural product cannery, and different things (Amstuts, 1986, p. 24).

In 1978, 2,000 Soviet technical and economic experts and advisers were available in Afghanistan. The USSR was engaged with both small, yet openly unmistakable tasks, for example, building apartment complexes, and additionally in expansive financial improvement activities, for example, fabricating the solid parkway framework associating the Soviet fringe with Kabul and Kandahar, including the longest interstate passage on the planet, the Salang Tunnel (Male, 1982, p. 3).

The coming to power of the people's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime in 1979 military mediation significantly changed Soviet vital goals and the relating monetary strategies. The Soviet administration immediately understood that the general Afghan change of 1978- 79 against Amin's administration could not be settled by a fast military intercession and by introducing another regime. Long term commitment and support in both the military and financial fields would be important to settle the new government (Male, 1982, pp. 6- 7).

By 1978 Afghanistan's overwhelming reliance on Soviet exchange and military and financial aid empowered the Soviets to appreciate level of impact. A previous senior authority of the Ministry of Information and Culture, talking about Soviet impact during that period, said that " Afghans had a terrible fear of Russians". Soviet requests in the cultural and instructive fields quite often were truly, he reviewed; the rationale was " it's unwise to fool with the Russians" (Amstuts, 1986, p. 26).

The developing impact and power of the USSR were clear in different ways. Political relations were represented by the Afghan- Soviet bargain of nonpartisanship and nonaggression of June, 24, 1931, a settlement that was restored intermittently until the point when it was superseded by the 1978 agreement of companionship and collaboration. On international issues Afghanistan was mindful to avoid antagonizing the Soviets, to the point that "Kabul's foreign policy was as close to Moscow's as that of any nonaligned country," one American scholar has concluded (Amstuts, 1986, p. 26).

Over the twenty years, Soviet pressure on the Afghans succeeded with regards to getting the Afghans to consent to restrict all remote financial aid ventures slated for the northern, Soviet- bordering provinces to just the Soviets. The Soviets secured a virtual syndication position in Afghan oil and mineral misuse; even UN specialists were avoided from access to Afghan geologic and topographic maps. The most huge case of Soviet impact was President Daoud's reluctance to expel numerous imperative radical officers from the military and air force, or to cleanse known pro- Soviet Marxists from the police and civilian ministries (Amstuts, 1986, p. 26).

6. The Soviet's Intervention and Military Occupation (Dec, 1979- Feb, 1980):

When Soviet military forces invaded Afghanistan in late 1979, the intrusion was, at once, an endeavor to spare a tottering Marxist government and a notice to both east and west that the *Brezhnev Doctrine* of "necessary intervention" would be implemented. At first, the Soviets were against military mediation as Leonid Brezhnev realized that the use of power in Afghanistan would be a propaganda defeat. Afghanistan with its regressive economy was not worth to risk but rather as the circumstance weakened between May and December 1979, with their favored Afghanistan communist Nur Mohammed Taraki losing force and his life in a battle with his fellow communist Hafiz Ullah Amin, the Soviets altered their minds.

The broad additions made by Islamic fundamentalism, including the Iranian insurgency that set Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini in control, were as much a notice to the Soviets as they were to the American. The Soviets did not have any desire to lose Afghanistan to Islamic fundamentalism. They dreaded the spread of this wonder into the Muslim Central Asian republics of the USSR. Along these lines the Soviets considered intercession the best way to guarantee Afghanistan remained a buffer state.

6.1. Deployment :

Military intervention in Afghanistan was viewed as a fundamental safety effort for the USSR, and it became one of the dire contentions for intervention. In light of military-political missions and progressing battle of the Soviet- Afghan War can be separated into different phases. The USSR intercession in the nation started with the entry of Soviet forces into the region, their stationing in garrisons, and their last association for securing bases and different establishments.

Recruitment for service in Afghanistan for the most part took place after built up Soviet peacetime staffing methodology, with some critical varieties that have turned out to be more articulated over the span of the war. An outstanding variety in staffing practices was seen during the assembly of the original invading force in the second half of 1979. Regardless of whether for reasons of convenience or surprise, or in light of the fact that it thought little of the potential protection, the Soviet military authority fleshed out understrength units with neighborhood reservists in regions of the Turkestan Military District nearby Afghanistan, as opposed to sending battle trained units for the underlying push (Alexiev, 1988, p. 5).

Accordingly, most of the Soviet powers were comprised of Muslim Central Asian reservists. Impressive quantities of these troops presumably needed fundamental military skills, and they were not liable to have been exceptionally energetic to complete tasks against the Afghan Muslims (Alexiev, 1988, p. 5).

The initial Soviet attacking power went into Afghanistan in December 1979 with little, special training for the type of warfare in which it was soon to engage. Training of the troops reserved for Afghanistan continued along ordinary lines, with the conceivable exemption of some exceptional reason units. Significant consideration is likewise paid to the agreement for tasks in the mountain- landscape in which the USSR expeditionary power experienced impressive challenges in the beginning times of the war. Mountain - warfare training centers have been set in Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan, and most likely somewhere else also. All military drivers are trained to drive in the mountains previously being sent to Afghanistan (Alexier, 1988, p. 15).

6.2. The Soviet intervention and the Coup:

This stage started with the entry of military powers into Afghanistan, their positioning in garrisons, and their last association for securing bases and different installations (Grau, & Cress, 2002, p. 12). From the earliest starting point of the war, the USSR mediation in the nation was advocated to Soviet servicemen as a legitimate aid to a brotherly regime under assault by outside powers.

A member of political lectures reviewed the message given to the troops only before to entry in Afghanistan as follows:

We were told by political officers that out of the twenty- six provinces in Afghanistan only two or three were in the hands of the government. The rest of them were controlled by mercenaries or by bandits. The mercenaries, they said, were from China and the United States. And they told us that the Chinese were in the Eastern part of Afghanistan. Also, the weapons of the Afghan bandits were provided by China and the United States. We were being sent in to provide fraternal assistance to the Afghan people so, they can live normal lives. (Alexier, 1988, p. 18)

The unrefined and rather purposeful publicity line has been kept forward, with no obvious endeavors being made to give a more believable sound to Soviet intervention. Essentially, the majority of respondents had heard minor variations on the same story of bandits and mercenaries while being advised before deployment to Afghanistan. The following comments are typical:

We were told that we would have to help the Afghan people defend their revolution from foreign mercenaries. They said that there were many mercenaries from Pakistan, China, and the United States in the country... . Just before we went to Kabul, we were informed by our zampolit that we would have to fight Iranian and Pakistan forces that had entered the country from outside... . What we were told before arriving in Afghanistan was that we would be fighting primarily Chinese mercenaries dressed in Afghan grab. (Alexier, 1988, p. 19).

During this stage, the insurgents conveyed similarly capable powers against the Soviet forces. The USSR powers did not stay away from coordinate clash with them. The Soviets, battling close by DRA powers, took the most troublesome missions for themselves. The Afghan forces were inadequately trained to direct autonomous actions and assumed an auxiliary part in the satisfaction of operational and tactical missions (Grau & Cress, 2002, p. 13).

The passage of Soviet military into Afghanistan was the flag to overthrow the regime. On December 1979, a little group of conspirators removed and executed Amin. Babrak Karmal took control as the republic's prime minister and general secretary of the PDPA.

Most of the populace saw the landing of foreign army without enthusiasm. They saw Babrak Karmal as a political enemy as well as Moscow's protege. there were two outcomes from this result; to start with, the resistance development spread over the entire territory of Afghanistan. Second, after a period of relative calm, the opposition started to equipped animosity, especially against the Soviet forces (Grau & Cress, 2002, p. 18).

The Mujahideen developments that battled the Soviet forces were similarly solid forces and they did not back off from coordinate contact. This permitted the USSR forces to destroy strong antirevolutionary groupings near Faizabad, Taleqan, Takhar, Baghlan, Jalalabad, and different urban areas (Grau & Cress, 2002, p. 18, 19).

The leadership of the Afghan resistance having conflicted with a relentless military power, rapidly understands that in the event that they kept up their vast, genuinely, traditional powers, they would be decimated. They surrendered their expansive scale strategies and divided their formations into guerrillas and separation of 20 to 100 men to

begin to conduct guerrilla fighting. The USSR now were looked with the subject of how to utilize its powers and assets against small, exceedingly mobile groups of Mujahideen conducting maneuver tactics (Grau & Cress, 2002, p. 19).

6.3. The Soviet tactics and offensives in Afghanistan:

The guerrilla resistance in Afghanistan was a standout amongst the longest and bloodiest guerrilla battles of the twentieth century. For the Soviets, it was their first war since the end of the Second World War. At the time when the USSR interceded in Afghanistan in December 1979, they most likely expected that their military, together with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan armed forces, would have the capacity to conciliate the nation during a year. Rather, the USSR soon found that the Soviets dubious control of the DRA declined. The five years of battling brought some military changes to both sides, the USSR powers and the Mujahideen.

USSR classic offensive and pursuit against Mujahideen detachments did not work. This raises various issues about the deficient planning of Soviet powers. The enormous experience that Soviet powers picked up their battle with the Basmachi movement was essentially overlooked. The later experience of Fascist Germany during the Second World War and the experience of different armed forces that directed counter guerrilla activities in local wars were practically disregarded. Accordingly, the USSR powers in Afghanistan needed to utilize trial and errors to define another military act to battle their unaccustomed enemy. The Soviets took over four net worthy military related strategies to squash the revolt. Just restricted achievements were accomplished, and the cost to Afghan citizen masses was extreme.

6.3.1. Using scorched earth policy:

The Soviet forces at first failed to ensure their logistical and communication lines, however, they immediately adjusted these oversights and brought in better troops, including helicopter pilots trained for mountain fighting. Starting from mid- 1980 onwards, the Afghan guerrillas never grabbed any significant Soviet offices or avoided major troop deployments and movements. At the point when Soviet officers moved, in mid- 1983, to a counterinsurgency strategy of burned earth strategies and the use of vigorously equipped special operations forces, their advance against the guerrilla accelerated (Kramer, 2004, para 3- 4).

The bombarding of disengaged towns with no key significance and the annihilation of yields and animals were cases of the technic for terrorizing. So, too, was the April 1983 " carpet bombing" of Herat, the nation's third- biggest city, with a populace of 150,000. The besieging was greatly substantial, brutal, and brought about a large portion of the city being leveled and the victims of an expected 3,000 civilians. Terrorizing strategy was obvious by their on- ground seek and wreck missions in the farmland. After serious assault of towns associated with supporting guerrilla exercises, tanks and armored vehicles would move into devastate the remaining earthen dwellings. Food, stocks, wheat fields, livestock, and water wells were destroyed so that the local citizen denied of the methods for survival, would be forced to move away (Amstutz, 1986, p. 145).

Soviet troops certainly sought after a strategy of consuming Afghan cropland to fight the rebels, a strategy that divided Afghan agricultural production and could bring about boundless starvation if substantial quantities of numbers of refugees return home. International agriculture experts, discharging an overview of the Afghan ranch

circumstance, told a news conference their report demonstrated Soviet and Afghan government powers sought after a scorched- earth policy in their 8- years war against the guerrillas. The Mujahideen rebels controlled 80% of the nation, so to crush them, the Russians endeavored to destroy their food base; Morrison said (Ljung, 1988, para. 5).

Chief of the review Azam Gul, an outcast Afghan and a previous chairman of the department of agronomy at Kabul university, said agriculture yield in 1987 had dropped to 53% or less of production before the 1979 Soviet invasion. Gul blamed the decline on the Soviet policy of bombing villages and burning crops, also the circuitous hardship of living in a combat zone, such as low accessibility of work, animals, and fertilizers (Ljung, 1988, para. 6).

6.3.2. Using war ambush tactics:

The Soviets and the DRA did not make much use of ambushes for the assurance of armies. They were, however, the most preferred Soviet tactic in the in- going battle to circuitous guerrilla lines of communication. Lory sections of pack animals offered defenseless targets. These ambushes, regularly by Spetnaz, were usually well laid due thoughtfulness regarding security; for example, groups would be conveyed by helicopter to a LZ far off from the ambush site, with the approach walk led in the hours of darkness (Dick, 2002, pp. 12- 3).

The Soviet policy that most beset the resistance, starting in 1982, was subversion. This strategy included infiltrating informers into resistance groups, using professional killers to execute resistance leader, and trying to buy off Afghan clans or guerrilla leaders. It is worth to mention that at the Panjshir Valley, guerrilla forces were "the enemy ... spending much time in underground activities because they cannot defeat us militarily. They are using secret tactics, long- term tactics to make us tired of fighting" (Amstutz, 1986, p. 146).

DRA infiltration had some achievement. DRA sources were credited with pinpointing shrouded guerrilla positions in the Panjshir Valley amid the 1982 Soviet- DRA offensive. DRA professional killers were accepted to be in charge of the mysterious shooting of a leading resistance figure in Peshawar's in 1981 (Amstutz, 1986, p. 146).

Attempts to pay off guerrilla officers and clans had blended achievement. At the point when in 1980 the DRA Minister for Tribal and Frontier Affairs brought a formerly agreed-on bribe of \$ 28,000 to a frontier tribe, in return for its collaboration with the Kabul regime, the tribesmen slaughtered the minister and kept the funds. Guerrilla leader Amin Wardak announced that few times the DRA sent emissaries to him from Kabul who offered him nourishment, supplies, and even weapons, on the off chance that he would stop his guerrilla exercises and disjoin ties with other resistance organizations (Amstutz, 1986, p. 148).

6.3.3. The plating of mines:

Mines used by the USSR look like butterflies or, better, such wing-shaped seeds of the maple of tree. This shape enabled the mines to spin to earth gradually when dropped from the air. They were dropped in the many thousands on passes and around towns. They were painted green or brown colored to mix with the landscape, contingent upon the terrain. When exploded they were intended to pass over a foot or a hand, injuring instead of murdering. The greater part of their casualties were children or domesticated animals. By 1983 the Soviets to a great extent had quit using butterfly mines, to some extent in light of the fact that the Mujahideen had figured out how to lift them up and use them against Soviet- DRA forces (Amstutz, 1986, p. 170).

Soviet Maj- Gen. Oleg Satin and Col. Lev Dvoretzky estimated that between 1980 and 1985, Soviet specialists laid 91,000 people killing mines. Helicopter alone dropped over a million mines, and, in 1983 and 1984, aircraft using the Vilyui framework laid an extra 1,7 million mines. Mines filled two purposes. First, the Soviets used them to maim or disable Mujahideen who might then require the assistance of their companions to achieve an aid station therefore diminishing the measure of the operational insurgent force in the field at any given time. Second, mines laid along the resupply routes disabled diminishing the volume of provisions streaming to the resistance (Westermann, 1999, p. 4).

6.3.4. Using chemical weapons:

The Soviet task went for driving the villagers out of their territories with an end goal to create a cordon Sanitary in which the guerrillas would discover no support. Soviet attempts to create a barrier went for removing the guerrillas' logistic lifetime also extended to the use of chemical agents.

In 1980, there were impressive incidental proof to help Mujahideen claims of Soviet chemical weapons deployment. Soviets used chemical weapons for both offensive and defensive roles. The majority of assaults happened in the spring and summer of 1980 and 1981 at the high periods of Mujahideen labor and supply penetration into the nation (Westermann, 1999, p.4).

6.3.5. Using USSR Air Force:

By the end of 1981, it was clear that the use of extensive automated and armor forces did not constitute a tactic for triumph. During this period, airpower started to assume an expanding part as a " force substitute" in Soviet efforts to dispose of the Mujahideen rebellion while limiting their own casualties. Toward the start of 1981, the VVS air request of fight included around 130 jet fighters, dominantly MIG- 21 Fishbeds, MIG- 23 Floggers, and Su- 17 Fitters among an aggregate of 300warrior aircraft and transports (Westermann, 1999, p. 5).

Likewise, the Soviets kept up a power of around 600 helicopters in Afghanistan. Helicopters, including Mi- 6 Hook and Mi- 8 Hip transports, and particularly, Mi-24 Hind gunships demonstrated invaluable to the Soviet strategy, and turned into the absolute most important weapon in the Russian arsenal. The assorted scope of helicopter

mission in Afghanistan included close air support, forward air control spotting for fixed-wing aircraft and artillery, troop transport and resupply, medevac, chemical weapons delivery and reconnaissance (Westermann, 1999, p. 5).

The significance of assaults and transport helicopters in combating the rebellion cannot be exaggerated. Previous Afghan General Mohammed Y. Nawroz and US intelligence analyst Lester W. Grau contended that "without the helicopters' gunship, the Soviets may have withdrawn years earlier. Its firepower and mobility and initial invulnerability put the guerrillas on the defensive. The Soviets used helicopters extensively and ruthlessly against the unprotected guerrillas" (Westermann, 1999, p. 6).

During the first three years of the occupation, helicopters led customary watches along the procession routes in the expectation of spotting Mujahideen supply movements. The 1,400-mile fringe between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the mountainous nature of the terrain made procession discovery from the air to a great difficult task (Westermann, 1999, p. 6).

In addition, the Mujahideen, after gearing the approach of the helicopter, would tumble to the ground. This strategy was both low tech and astounding viable in making the insurgents undetectable from the air- Kurt. Lohbeck, a journalist who traveled extensively with the Mujahideen, portrayed his own particular experience as Soviet helicopters twice flew over his group's position at an altitude of only one hundred feet without detecting them. Mike Martin, a British journalist who went with the Mujahideen, noticed that the insurgents without the weapons with which to battle the vigorously equipped Mi- 24 Hind successfully" feared them more than anything else" (Westermann, 1999, p. 6).

6.4. The Soviet military operations in Afghanistan :

The nine years of control of Afghanistan incorporated the work of the full range of Soviet conventional weapons and a different scope of their chemical weapons stock trying to overcome the Mujahideen. The initial conduct of military operations in Afghanistan was reminiscent of the previous Soviet achievement, in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakia encounter shaped the political and military desires of the Soviet initiative for the control of Afghanistan in 1979. The Russian arrangement in Afghanistan was basically the same as that used as a part of Czechoslovakia in 1968, including the seizure of key airfields, government institutions, and control centers.

6.4.1. Operation Storm- 333 (Dec, 1979):

On December 27, 1979, the Soviet army executed operation Storm- 333. Elements of the Muslim Battalion and Spetsnaz troops stormed the presidential Palace and killed Hafiz Ullah Amin. The operation took forty- three minutes and the Soviets suffered light casualties. The initial Soviet plan called for a change in Afghan leadership, to garrison the cities, protect key bases, and enable the Afghan army to fight a low- level insurgency. The Soviets installed Babrak Karmal as the new leader (Arniston, 2004, pp. 8- 9).

The operation plan in Kabul provided also for the seizure of the most important facilities; the Taj- Bek Palace, the Cc PDPA buildings, the DRA ministries of Defense, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Communication, the General Staff, the HQ of the air forces and the HQ of the Central Army Corps, military counter intelligence, the radio

television Center. It was planned to blockade Afghan units and DRA Armed Forces formations located in the capital at the meantime (Arniston, 2014, p. 10).

6.4.2. The capture of Panjshir (May, 1982- June, 1985):

By 1982, the Afghan populace whether in the insurgent controlled zones or inside the Soviet and DRA possessed urban areas, now constituted an open target for massed firepower. They parallelly used airpower in striking at the insurgents. A joined arms task into the Panjshir Valley in the spring incorporated the dedication of 12,000 Soviet and DRA troops and in excess of 200 sorties by fixed- wing aircraft and helicopters. The goal of the joint Soviet and DRA thrust centered on destroying the 3,000 men forces of Ahmed Shah Massud, along these lines securing the northern way to deal with the Kabul- Termez roadway (Westermann, 1999, p. 7).

The first phases of the offensive into the Panjshir Valley depended on airpower. The Soviets likewise exhibited expanding creativity in the use of their aviation assets. The offensive began on, May, 10, with change over An- 12 cub transports serving as airborne reconnaissance and target assignment platforms. Also, the Su- 25 Frog foot ground assault airplane made its introduction in the theater and demonstrated viable in the close air support role (Westermann, 1999, p.7).

Before the dedication of ground power, soviet planes directed seven days in length besieging of suspected insurgent positions utilizing conventional high explosive loads. On 17 May substantial scale heliborne insertion of the 103 rd Air Attack division started. In help of the 103rd, the 108th Motor rifle Division started pushing up the valley. Following fourteen days the Soviets left, making the triumph firmly pyrrhic for the

Russians and their DRA allies. The Soviets rehashed the offensive into Panjshir in late August with a similar outcome. In this offensive, the Soviets lost around 300 men and again left the valley once more in the hands of the Mujahideen (Westermann, 1999, pp. 7- 8).

The Panjshir offensive featured the Soviet emphasis on using airpower in various courses including aerial fire direction observation, troop transport, and Close Air Support (CAS) in the help of the joined arms offensive (Westermann, 1999, p. 9).

The low danger condition experienced by the helicopters was clear in the Soviet strategy of building up a high circle over the objective territory. Undoubtedly, the absence of offensive against aircraft defenses was a glaring weakness among the insurgents in 1982. Interestingly, the Mujahideen accomplishment against personal carriers and tanks featured the helplessness of motorized powers in rocky territory. Finally, operations in Afghanistan outlined the significance of having forward air controllers to direct CAS.

In the last examination, the offensive into Panjshir failed in spite of the Soviets capacity to arrange into an effective combined arms team. Soviet commandants were taking in an intense and baffling lesson, much as their American partners had fifteen years sooner in Vietnam. This lesson was that insurgents, in view of their strategies and their use of landscape, may demonstrate moderately resistant to conventional operations even when these operations were supported by massive airpower (Westermann, 1999, p. 9).

6.4.3. The Veil (April, 1984):

In 1984, the Soviets started to alter their air and ground strategy in an attempt to more viably use their assets against the guerrillas. The Soviet lessons drawn from the initial three years of the war including the need for fast portability and massive, responsive fire support generally constituted a restatement of conventional Soviet doctrinal presents. The attention on vertical envelopment, however, set up another accentuation for Soviet operations including the massed use of heliborne tasks by exceptionally trained airborne and air assault forces (Westermann, 1999, pp.10- 1).

The Soviet Airborne (VDV) had demonstrated indispensable in directing tasks to secure key establishments all through the nation during the initial invasion. The following eyewitness account by a former Mujahid appropriately depicted the unique abilities of VDV forces in unconventional warfare:

We had taken positions close to the top of a mountain overlooking a valley and were shooting at the Soviets with BM- 12s and mortars. Then, all of a sudden a VDV company of about 90 men appeared and attacked us from behind. They had climbed straight up the mountain during the night...we fought for two days there, and many people were killed. (Westermann,1999, p. 11)

This story shows the abilities of the VDV and also indicates a move in Soviet strategy toward night activities. By 1984 VDV (airborne), DShB (air assault), and specially trained troops constituted the primary forces for leading night assaults and ambushes (Westermann, 1999, p. 11).

6.4.4. The Wolf Hole:

In 1986, the Mujahideen had clearly shown an expanded capacity to battle Soviet airpower and had constrained Russian planes to work at higher heights in this manner diminishing their accuracy. The more prominent number of substantial automatic rifles among the insurgents also prompted an expanding ability to threaten the mainstay of Soviet aviation in Afghanistan, their helicopters (Westermann, 1999, p. 14).

Toward the beginning of April, Soviet and DRA forces launched a joined operation for catching the significant Mujahideen fortification at Zhwar, three kms from the Pakistan border. In attempting to break the Mujahideen resistance, the offensive making progress towards Zhawar depended vigorously on huge scale heliborne tasks with a specific purpose to give the iron block to the sledge of the progressing automated powers. Brig. Abdol Gafur, the DRA commander for the operation, used elite Soviet and DRA battalions in air assault landings behind the Mujahideen lines. Soviet aircraft also supported the DRA forces by conducting strikes on Mujahideen positions. After nearly three weeks of battling, Zhawar fell to the DRA and Soviet forces (Westermann, 1999, p. 15).

6.4.5. The Magistral (Nov. 1987):

The DRA and Soviet forces took part in a temporary ceasefire in January and February but led major operations in Kandahar and Pakistan regions. From November to January 1988, five Afghan and Soviet divisions participated in operation Magistral, a task to relieve the besieged city of Khost. The Afghans performed well and showed they could overcome the Mujahideen in an ordinary fight. Loses for the 40 th army in 1987

declined to 1,215 slaughtered and 1,004 injured, while they expanded for the DRA to 6,229 murdered and 12,786 injured (Fivecoat, 2012, pp. 45- 6).

7. Afghan's armed resistance to the USSR presence:

Almost immediately after the April 1978 coup, resistance bunches started to uncover themselves in Pashawar, Pakistan, and in Tehran, Iran. Every one of them were committed to overthrowing the government in Kabul. The groups in Peshawar were the most vociferous and best financed. However, in 1980, their impact scarcely emanated beyond the outcast camps in Pakistan or in a few border provinces in Afghanistan. The resistance groups basically were accumulations of devotees of some resistance figure. While a few groups pushed democracy for any post- Soviet Afghanistan, the fundamentalist Moslem groups sought to a Khomeini- type progressive Islamic republic.

Inside Afghanistan, the greater part of the resistance bunches were autonomous guerrilla groups representing a cluster of villages, a valley, a section of a province, or a tribe. Their political inspiration was basic. They saw themselves battling to expel an imperialistic remote power and to save Islam and conventional Afghan ways (Amstutz, 1986, p. 89).

7.1. The rise of national feeling and Jihad:

The Muslim clans of Afghanistan framed guerrilla groups to battle the Soviets and the Afghan Army (Otfinoski, 2003, p. 25). The remote attack incited a revelation of Jihad from a huge number of Mullahs, instilling a grim determination in the deep- rooted warrior culture of the countryside (Tanner, 2002, p. 243).

They gradually composed a resistance movement, led by local warlords who set aside their disparities to battle a typical enemy. They called themselves the Mujahideen, which implies "blessed warriors" in English. The different Mujahideen groups battled the Soviets with similar guerrilla strategies that their ancestors had used successfully for a considerable length of time.

Small groups of warriors would assault a Soviet installation with lightning speed and then dissolve away into the mountains, where pursuit was difficult. While vastly outnumbered by a Soviet force of from 90,000 to 104,000 troops at any one time, the Mujahideen had the upside of surprise and a close learning of the landscape. They were additionally supported by military supplies and weapons given by the US, China, and Pakistan (Otfinoski, 2003, p. 25).

The Mujahideen warrior fought for his family, his clan, and his religion. He did so out of an adoration for flexibility and feeling duty, as a volunteer without pay. Generally, fighters were local men with family responsibilities. In that capacity, they were untrained and fundamentally part-time; the spoils of war were significant to them as a source of income. The Mujahideen rank and file were natural guerrillas. They were tough, stoical, fearless, familiar with the use of weapons in a land where struggle was endemic. They knew the landscape initially in their own localities and could move quickly over considerable distances. They were excellent in night combat (Dick, 2002, p. 3).

The primary weapons of the Mujahideen were the AK-47, PK light machine guns and the RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launcher. As time passed by, they gained expanding quantities of substantial, team-served weapons. Most important operations highlighted the use of 60mm, 83 mm, and at times 107 mm mortars, 82 mm recoilless operations to

tank firearms, BM- 1 single 107 mm rocket launchers, 7,62 mm and 12,7 mm substantial assault rifles and sometimes howitzers; air defense was provided by 12,7 mm and 14,5 mm weapons, frequently surprising effective, particularly in ambushes in mountains. From 1988, the Stinger SAM, a show- stopper for Soviet aviation's low- level actions. The Mujahideen were also defenders of mine fighting. They generally use anti-vehicle mines and delighted in improvising huge home- made mines (Dick, 2002, p. 4).

7.2. The role of political and religious factions in promoting the Holy Jihad:

Scarcely a month after the April 1978 upset, the world learned of the presence of a composed group committed to overthrowing the communist regime in Kabul. this group was the National Rescue Front, built up in Peshawar by Dr. Burhanuddin Rabbani, a previous Islamic law teacher at Kabul college. The front crumbled during a half of year. For the following Six and half years, through 1984, attempts at unification proceeded however with blended achievement. Coalitions occasionally framed, just to crumple and afterward re-rise in somewhat unique shapes (Amstutz, 1986, p. 99).

7.2.1. Jamiat- I- Islam: (Islamic Society, lead by professor Burhanuddin Rabbani):

For the most part Tajik, in ethnic composition, Jamiat was overwhelming among guerrilla groups in the northern belt of areas extending from Badakhshan region in the northeast to Herat in the northwest. It was generally efficient and incorporated some of Afghanistan' s best guerrilla officers, for instance, Ahmed Shah Massud (Panjshir Valley), Zabiullah (Balkh province), and Ismael Khan (Herat). Throughout 1982- 83,

Jamiat developed in quality among guerrilla groups. The group tried to build up an Iranian- style Islamic progressive government in Kabul, however without Khomeini' s fanatic component (Amstutz, 1986, p. 99).

7.2.2. Hezb-i- Islami (Islamic Party, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar):

This association once had the reputation as being Afghanistan' s best sorted out and practical resistance organization. By 1982 its impact and esteem were winding down, to a limited extent on the grounds that Hezb- subsidiary guerrilla groups frequently were blamed for battling rival guerrilla groups. Gulbuddin was the most dubious figure of the Peshawar- based resistance leaders; numerous leaders hated him, while others championed him. Politically, he was the most radical Muslim progressive of the Peshawar figures plainly was against west. Until 1983, his association seemed to appreciate more Arab and Pakistani support than other group (Amstutz, 1986, p. 99).

7.2.3. Itihad- Islamic Baraye Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for Liberation of Afghanistan, led by Abd-i- Rab Rasoul Sayaf):

A strong individual, Sayaf had been executive of the 1980- 81 Alliance, and, after the formation of the Fundamentalist coalition, became the coalition's chairman. Like Gulbuddin, he was strongly in favor of an Iranian- type revolutionary Islamic government and was hostile to west. In Afghanistan, Sayaf had just a small numbers of guerrilla affiliates (Amstutz, 1986, p. 100).

7.2.4. Hezb-i- Islami (Islamic Party, led by Yunis Khalis):

This breakaway group of Gulbuddin's party was substantially smaller than earlier of the Gulbuddin and Burhanuddin's organization. They became a military group with guerrilla units working mainly in tow areas, Nangarhar and KabulKabul (Amstutz, 1986, p. 100).

Conclusion:

The Soviet Armed Forces that marched into Afghanistan was trained to battle inside the sitting of a performance center war against an adversary who might obligingly involve defensive positions. The Afghan War constrained the USSR armed force to change tactics, equipment, training, and force structure. However, they did eventually make some compelling light infantry used proper strategies. These were incorporated with artillery, assault helicopters, and specialist ground attack aircraft which posed real problems for the Mujahedeen, but there were excessively few of them to make a significant difference, and the advent of the Stinger SAM in 1988 definitely abridged the exercises of aviation.

Chapter three: The role of CIA in the Soviet- Afghan War (1979-89):

Introduction:

The CIA was largely responsible for determining US aid to the Afghan resistance through Pakistan's ISI, which play a critical role in determining how the US support to Afghanistan was used.

US covert aid to the Afghan Mujahideen and broader support to Pakistan as an ally and intermediary began during the Carter administration who authorized the covert aid to the Afghan resistance in order to battle up the Soviet, the CIA played an important role in supporting the Mujahideen through different means; such as, weapons, money, and it also strengthened the Afghan resistance through creating plans with Afghanistan's neighbors. The CIA helped the US to defeat the Russians and throw them out of Afghanistan.

Within this context, this chapter presents the role played by the central intelligence agency (CIA) during the Afghan-Soviet war (1979- 89). Also, the present chapter explores the different covert operations that the CIA used during this war. Additionally, we wil discuss some causes that led the US Support the Afghan Mujahideen.

1. The causes of the US support to the Afghan Mujahideen:

On Reagan's inauguration day in January of 1980, the annual US spending plan for help to the Afghan Mujahedeen was about \$30 million. Yet, by the mid 1980s, this same spending plan had surged to \$650 million per year. This important increase in anti-communist aid can be credited to different causes (Viret, 2012, p. 13).

US strategy towards Afghanistan from the 1970s forward must be analyzed through the prism of Cold War rivalries. The Afghan crisis of 1978-79 was incited and later confused by the impact of superpowers. From one perspective, the USSR specifically affected the new communist regime in Kabul, while on the other ; the US had started its undercover activity of helping resistance powers and destabilizing issues there. The circumstance turned out to be basically tense in 1979, when the USSR intervened in Afghanistan and the Soviet-Afghan War started (Grogan, 1999, p.4).

One possible explanation for this rise in help is that the Reagan Doctrine. Reagan's arrangement for offering open military help to anti- communist rebels in the attempt to move back communism was the center goal of Reagan's assertion to the Americans that the US was offering military help to the mujahedeen recommends that Reagan defined a tenet regarding the Soviet War in Afghanistan and then implemented it, rather than having a variety of various strategies. Therefore, the Reagan Doctrine was the de jure reason for American military assistance to the mujahedeen (Viret, 2012, p. 13).

1.1. The Reagan Doctrine:

The Reagan Doctrine was actually implemented in Afghanistan over three presidential administrations, since aid started in the Carter administration and finished in the Bush administration. President Carter settled on the choice to arm the Afghan mujahedeen. The US kept on helping the Afghan anti- communist, persuades a diplomatic settlement, and viewed the USSR pull back in mid 1989. Regardless of this achievement, the Reagan Doctrine was stretched out until 1991 to enable the revolutionaries to expel the regime that Moscow left in control when it pulled back (Grogan, 1999, p. 5). The US foreign policy reaction to the 1979 soviet military invasion in Afghanistan advanced gradually over the span of three presidential administrations spanning a total of fourteen years (Grogan,1999, p.7).

The Reagan Doctrine highlighted to achieve three specific objectives. In the short term, assisting the mujahedeen could limit Soviet advances by constraining the Soviets and their partners onto the defensive, and could deflect future Soviet adventurism by influencing it to clear that they would bring about overwhelming resistance. In the medium term, the key goal was to win in at least one of the nations. Such a triumph would illustrate that communist rule, once introduced, is reversible. Finally, the long term objective was to use a progression of such triumph to accomplish a protected peace by eventually beating the Soviet's evil empire (Grogan,1999, pp. 7- 8).

Originally articulated in January 1983, Reagan emphasized this vision in 1987 when he stated:

Our goal has been to break the deadlock of the past, to seek a forward strategy; a strategy favored peace and freedom...forces of freedom grow steadily in strength, and they put ever greater pressure on the forces of totalitarianism. (Grogan, 1999, p. 8)

At time numerous critics viewed this new strategy could not be implemented without impinging on customary notions of state sovereignty, while others concentrated on the genuine or saw weaknesses of the opportunity warriors the US was supporting. At last, critics had two fears concerning the Reagan Doctrine in Afghanistan.

First, if inadequate support was provided to the mujahedeen then they could fail, leading to further bloodshed on all sides. Second, if enough aid was given then the rebels threaten the Soviets and their puppet regime. This might incite a perilous encounter between the US and the USSR (Grogan, 1999, p. 8).

Several actions were put in reaction to these events. Carter ordered approvals to rebuff the USSR ; including, postponing the SALT 2 ratification, canceling grain sales, restricting trade severely, curtailing Soviet fishing privileges in US waters, boycotting the 1980 Olympic Games being held in Moscow, and recalling the US Ambassador in Moscow. Moreover, Carter resolved to give Pakistan more military and other assistance to strengthen its defenses, asked an increase in American defense spending, particularly to create a power equipped capable of rapid deployment to the Persian Gulf,

and reported its aim to increase security collaboration with the PRC and to extend the offer of military innovation (Grogan, 1999, pp.9- 10).

The Carter administration extended its small covert assistance programs for the resistance. Brzezinski noticed that 'plans were made to further enhance US cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Egypt regarding Afghanistan' (Grogan, 1999, p. 10). While Carter had acquired a sensational redirection US Middle East policy, getting under way the political and military basis important to help the new doctrine, it was left to his successor Ronald Reagan to manage and change the policy after 1980 (Grogan, 1999, p. 10).

Despite a desire to break neatly with the approaches of Carter when Reagan took office in January 1981, he did little to significantly change security strategies in regards to Afghanistan. Debate over the following eight years would just concentration the level and sort of support to be given to the Afghan Mujahedeen. In addition, Reagan developed Carter's diplomatic efforts, creating new pressures using diplomacy and publicity to convince Moscow to end its occupation of Afghanistan (Grogan, 1999, pp. 10- 1).

Expanding on the existing Carter policy, the first phase of the use of the Reagan Doctrine in Afghanistan was described by steadily increasing funding levels, starting in October 1982. Choices were made on three events to build the amount and nature of the weapons gave to the Mujahideen. Because of Reagan's decentralized style of administering, the parts played by his best advisors weighed heavily on US policy toward Afghanistan. Reagan's key assistants included Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense; George Shultz, Secretary of State; and William Casey, CIA Director. Weinberger and Shultz were disparate on most issues including Afghanistan, which put

forth US strategy expressions appear to be detached and opposing over this period. In contrast to Weinberger and Shultz, Casey perceived that Afghanistan offered a noteworthy open door for the US to connect with the USSR and influence then 'to pay in blood' for the misfortunes US had endured in Vietnam (Grogan, 1999, p. 11).

The program continued in 1981 and 1982 on a restricted premise with covert support assessed at around \$ 40 million. The US, through the CIA gave assets and a few weapons and for the most part managed aid for the Mujahedeen all around; however, day by day operations needs were handled by the Pakistanis ISI agency. The US side war ran solely by the CIA, growing into the largest covert operation ever conducted by the agency. The CIA trained Pakistani instructors who then trained the Afghan rebel forces (Grogan, 1999, p. 12).

In 1985, Reagan scolded a request giving high need to concentrate US arrangement on the expulsion of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Author George Lenczowski compresses the moves made by Reagan's outside approach as following:

- ✚ Devote substantial funds to assist Afghani Mujahedeen,
- ✚ Increase substantial amount and quality of arms and equipment to the rebels,
- ✚ Create parallel effort to provide appropriate means to transport assistance to the battle zones of Afghanistan,
- ✚ Foster continued cooperation and aid from non- regional states to support the Mujahedeen. (Grogan, 1999, p.14)

The second important policy of the covert program occurred in 1986 with the decision to approve providing the Afghan resistance with hand-held Stinger surface-to-air missiles (SAM) (Gorgan, 1999, p. 15).

Disregarding Soviet withdrawal, US support to Afghanistan proceeded with well into the Bush administration. American policy during this time had two key features. First, Bush proceeded with the Reagan legacy of supporting the Mujahedeen, funneled through Pakistan in order to replace the PDPA. Second, the absence of Soviet direct occupation in Afghanistan, compounded with Afghan spiraling into Civil War, fueled important debate over proceeded merits of the Reagan Doctrine implementation. However, Bush kept the Reagan Doctrine in effect for several years (Gorgan, 1999, pp. 17- 8).

Ultimately, three developments combined to force the abandonment of the Reagan Doctrine in Afghanistan. In the first place, the probability of political unification the rebels appeared to be increasingly remote. Although Bush attempted to center around the AIG when local Mujahedeen groups started assaulting each other, rivalries for leadership within this organization. Rendered it futile to American remote arrangement objectives. Second, the Gulf War of 1990-91, pitting Iraq against the US-led coalition, diverted attention from Afghanistan but also revealed another problem. It appeared that the Mujahedeen most vigorously financed by covert American assets was agreeing with Iraq against the US (Gorgan, 1999 p. 18).

Finally, Moscow's participation with the West during the Gulf War combined with the failed Soviet hard-liner coup in August 1991 and the end of the Cold War, prompted agreement to end American aid to the rebels. This brought to an end almost twelve years of application of the Reagan Doctrine in Afghanistan (Gorgan, 1999 p. 18).

1.2. Weakening the USSR through Several Sanctions:

Sanctions produce different effects at different points in time. They are in fact like many other public policies, in that they can have uncertain or unintended consequences and generate a wide variety of effects. In order to assess the effectiveness and usefulness of sanctions against the USSR, is not an exact science, but what is certain is that too much emphasis on short term effects of sanctions overlooks their long-term potential in bringing about a real change in the USSR foreign policy.

1.2.1. The US Department of State:

Despite the fact that Kabul Prime Minister Keshtmand charged that the US government openly helped the Afghan resistance, the US government never transparently admitted such a role. The US Department of State reliably declined to remark on inquiries concerning what the US was doing in this regard.

President Jimmy Carter indicated that not long after the Soviet invasion his administration chose to help the resistance as follows:

If the Soviets could consolidate their hold on Afghanistan, the balance of power in the entire region would be drastically modified in their favor, and they might be tempted toward further aggression. We were resolved to do everything feasible to prevent such a turn of events... . In a highly secret move, we also assessed the possibility of arranging for Soviet- made weapons to be delivered to freedom fighters in Afghanistan and of giving them what encouragement we could to resist subjugation by the Soviet invaders. (Amstutz,1986, p. 207)

At a press conference on March, 9, 1981, three months after taking office, President Reagan stated that if Afghan insurgents asked for weapons aid, he would consider complying with the request. Explained by President Regan, 'These are freedom fighters. These are people fighting for their own country and not wanting to become a satellite state of the Soviet Union' (Amstutz, 1986, p. 207).

1.2.2. The UNO's Security Council:

The UN has a long history of involvement in the contentions in Afghanistan and such proceeding with duty there, to the point that the failure would impact on the UN's already tarnished reputation

During the Soviet War the primary action was not in the Security Council, there the USSR could veto any immediate UN inclusion in the contention, so the council eluded the issue to the General Assembly under the UN's 'Uniting Peace" strategy. From that point on the contention was basically handled in the General Assembly and in the office of the Secretary– General' (Roberts, 2009, p. 13).

In January 1980, the General Assembly called for 'the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan' (Roberts, 2009, p. 13). Subsequently, under the sponsorship of the Secretary General, the UN started a decent workplaces capacity to help transactions from one viewpoint, and Pakistan from the other. This drove in the long run to the April 1988 Geneva Accords on Afghanistan, which was an essential point of interest in the completion of the Cold War. Later in 1988, the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) was built up. This was the principal UN peacekeeping mission since the foundation of UN Interim Force in Lebanon in March 1978, confirmation of the key part played by Afghan events in the post-cold War re- emergence of the UN (Roberts, 2009, p. 13).

In the meantime, the way toward closure the Soviet involvement represented a classic dilemma for the UN. The internal conflict displayed the fragile inquiry of the degree to which the UN, as an organization of governments, could be believed to negotiate with revolt powers that were doing combating it out all through the nation. As UNO's Secretary- General Javier Perez de Cuéllar placed it in 1988, it would be against our philosophy to be in contact with the adversaries of governments (Roberts, 2009, p. 13).

However, that is precisely what the UN began to do in the following year, in the attempt to encourage a complete political settlement and to set up a wide based government. In giving the UN this quandary, the war in Afghanistan was really normal for the post- Cold War period. The UN's restricted achievement in inducing the parties to a great extent interior clash to consent to a peace settlement would likewise be a harbinger of things to come (Roberts, 2009, p. 14).

2. CIA covert operations for supporting the Afghan Mujahedeen (1979- 1989):

Because of the Soviet Union's ill formed plan to invade Afghanistan, the infrastructure of the nation started to fell apart consistently. The CIA acted rapidly in furnishing Mujahedeen contenders in an opportune manner with a specific end goal to set them up for battling use against the Soviets. Further, the Reagan administration was in charge of this fast sending of troops, weapons, training and financing was approved by the organization inside long stretches of Reagans suspicion of office.

From this context, Brigadier Mohammed Yousaf, ISI member and director of covert operations in Afghanistan, described the strategy when he stated that: 'We must keep the pot boiling at a certain temperature. We must not allow the pot to boil over' (Hartman, 2002, p. 475).

2.1. Supporting the Muslim Fundamentalists:

In the 1980s the Reagan administration trusted that supporting Moslem fundamentalists was the most ideal approach to battle socialism and communism in predominately Moslem nations, in addition, bolster for Moslem fundamentalist groups was viewed with support by Saudi Arabia, the key U.S. partner in the Gulf Persian. Also, the Saudi administration, similar to the United States, detested the solid communist substance of generally modern Arab developments. To that end the United States supported Moslem fundamentalists from around the globe to join the Mujahideen in their battle against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The very reason that Sheik Omar Abduelrahman was allowed into the United States, despite his known ties to Moslem extremist groups in Egypt, was stated as follows:

Do you think we were naive enough to believe that the United States government was helping the Afghans because it believed in their cause-to raise the flag of jihad for Islam? That they were helping a people, a country, to free themselves? Absolutely not. The Americans were there to punish the Soviet Union. (Powelson, n. d., p. 300)

2.2. Training the Afghan Mujahideen:

The U.S government required collaotion with Pakistani government and its ISI's abilities including Pakistani land, at that point, American guide can be placed in the hands of Afghan Mujahedeen and can sort out a major restriction against the Soviet Red Army and star Soviet- Afghan government.

Without participation of Pakistani government, it was unthinkable for U.S government and his strategy creators to give help, prepare, and arm the Afghan Mujahedeen. Thus, to win the war, under U.S outside approach, American organization and his arrangement producers got favorable position of Pakistani- U.S coalition and the two organizations made arrangement to prepare and arms the Afghan flexibility contenders (Mujahedeen) in Pakistan against the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan (Imran, 2016, p. 146).



Fig. 5: Mujahideen targeting Soviet Soldiers in Kandahar, Afghanistan (1986) (Source : flickr.com)

Mujahedeen's preparation was assorted and Pakistani ISI and CIA started different distinctive specific courses for Afghan Mujahedeen. A most complete 10 days course offered how to utilize mortars and rocket pushed projectiles. Still other most basic projects were instructed to mentors that how to utilize auto, camel or bike shelling in urban territories and how to assassinate (Crile, 2003, p. 335).

To provide arms to Afghan Mujahedeen, American Administration piped the billions of dollars and most costly arms to Afghan Mujahedeen through Pakistani ISI. Pakistani organization make strict strategy to repel Americans from Mujahedeen preparing camps; however American high positioning authority Casey demanded ISI to visit preparing territories Mujahedeen training was underway under the U.S foreign policy and American's were watching all the game in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Imran, 2016, p. 146).

2.3. Arming the Afghan Mujahideen :

Pakistan's ISI assumed key part to go through American guide from CIA to Afghan Mujahedeen. U.S more built up its outside strategy towards this war and provided the more refined arms and war things to Afghan Mujahedeen. U.S dispatched huge amounts of C-4 plastics explosifs for attack reason and British made M16 for connect assault, to Afghan Mujahedeen chest through Pakistani ISI. After 1985, remote control detonator gadgets, electronic planning and "time pencil" a substance gadget that set off rocket or bomb and generally complex hardware "E Cell" postpone detonators were additionally provided to Afghan flexibility contender by CIA through legitimate channel. These perilous and modern gadgets were utilized by Mujahedeen against the Soviets and Afghan Government inside Afghanistan (Imran, 2016, p. 149).

The arming of the Afghan rebels was naturally connected to the decay of the Soviet Union. The Soviets were currently losing their capacity to manage the Saudi Arabian government, and even unwittingly losing control of specific aspects inside their own administration.

The US design was to deliver; however, much misfortune and harm on the Soviet Union as could reasonably be expected amid their residency in Afghanistan, making the not recommended intrusion as troublesome as could be expected under the circumstances. As this proceeded with, certain parts of the Soviet alliance would themselves turn out to be more defenseless to defilement.

This strategy was best explained by US ex- National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in the following statement when meeting with his staff:

The second course of action led to my going to Pakistan a month ... after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for the purpose ... to make the Soviets bleed for as much and as long as is possible; and we engaged in that effort in a collaborative sense with the Saudis, the Egyptians, the British, the Chinese, and we started providing weapons to the Mujaheddin, from various sources again ..., some Soviet arms from the Egyptians and the Chinese. We even got Soviet arms from the Czechoslovak communist government, ... and at some point we started buying arms for the Mujaheddin from the Soviet army in Afghanistan, because that army was increasingly corrupt (Billard, 2010, pp. 34- 5).



Fig. 6: Afghan Mujahideen During 1979- 1980 armed with a nice Soviet sub-machinegun. Source: (priterest.com).

2.4. Financing the Afghan Mujahideen:

Throughout the 1980s, the Reagan administration progressively ventured up help to the Mujahideen. His National Security Decision expanded guide to the Afghan rebels. By 1987 the USA was supporting the mujihadin to the tune of \$700 million every year in military help. US covert help to the Afghan protection in the 1980s cost American citizens over \$3 billion. By 1984, the US finished endeavors to disguise the starting points of the weapons going to the Mujahideen (Hartman, 2002, p. 476).

In 1985, the authoritative branch approved the shipment of US made Stinger rockets the most effective in the world to the Mujahdeen. The consent to supply the mujahadin with Stingers was made regardless of insight group worries about “leakage” of Stingers under the control of terrorists. Stingers were soon utilized for assaults against regular citizen air transport. The Reagan administration appeared to provide and train the mujahadin with the way to wage urban guerilla warfare (Hartman, 2002, p. 476).

2.5. Operation Cyclone:

As a major part of the Reagan Doctrine, the secret action made against the USSR in Afghanistan has genuinely concise aims. The US wanted to help components on the ground that were anti-Soviet and against the current communist government in Afghanistan. The arrangement was to drain the Soviets of gold and moral in a difficult war. This would satisfy the US foreign policy requirement of containment as well as to reduce the impact of the USSR in the area. The support of the Mujahedeen had begun much like every other intervention. The CIA provided them with non-deadly guide like communications equipment and humanitarian aid. However, when the USSR showed how genuine and stubborn they were in terms of how much they wanted to invest in Afghanistan, the US increased their level of aid. The turning of the tide was the CIA choice to arm the Afghans with the new FIM- 92 Stinger (Krazkiewicz, 2012, p. 1).

Operation Cyclone went on for a strong decade from December of 1979 to February 1989. The arrangement was to help the Afghan resistance and Mujahedeen as long as the Soviets proposed to stay in the conflict. Keeping in mind the end goal to end such a rigorous task, the US used the Assistance of the Pakistan government. At the disposal of the CIA was Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and their framework they had created. Pakistan's intelligence resources could give channels and means by which the US could arm the Afghan resistance. Moreover, the US could locate an important partner in General Zia-ul- Haq. Further aiding the need for Pakistan's involvement was the ethnic ties Pashtuns Pakistani had with Pashtuns Afghanis. This blood bond helped the Afghan resistance, the Mujahedeen, of which a great portion was Pashtun (Krazkiewicz, 2012, p. 2).

Operation Cyclone worked so well that any denial of the part of CIA and the US fell that all over. It was obvious that the relatively novice and ragtag Mujahedeen were on the receiving end of extensive external support and aid from Capitalist America (Krazkiewicz, 2012, p. 2).

In devastating the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, the US laid the basis and foundation for their adversaries. In expelling the Soviets and communist puppet in power in Afghanistan, a power vacuum was made. Seizing this opportunity was the leftovers resistance and spiritual leaders of the regional Afghani madrassa. This coalition ended up known as the Taliban. What's more, as history has widely appeared, it was the Taliban that gave place of refuge to Al- Qaeda when they were on the keep running from Yemen and North Africa. This inferred alliance set the arranging ground for various assaults against the US- most eminently the 9/11 assaults (Krazkiewicz, 2012, p. 3).

2.6. Providing Afghan Mujahedeen with Stinger Missiles:

The presentation of the Stinger missile weapon framework, alongside all other surface- to- air rocket launchers, would turn out to be the last significant hit to the already crumbling Soviet Empire. The explanation behind the Stinger came to fruition because of the requirement for a more open hostile to air ship weapon in rugged landscape (Billard, 2010, p. 33).

The significance of this weapon framework is much more prominent due to the actuality that it existed as a transportable weapon; in the mountains of Afghanistan this is precisely what the Mujahedeen expected to bring down the Soviet invasion (Billard, 2010, p. 33).

At an early stage in the US inclusion in this contention, the Pakistani knowledge benefit had restricted CIA agents from having any immediate contact with Afghani Mujahedeen. This strategy was slackened after some time and in the long run overlooked all together. The CIA could now straightforwardly pirate weaponry over the outskirts and give it straightforwardly to Afghan extremists, and in this way the gathered need to shroud the way that the Americans were straightforwardly supporting them ended up old. This excessively aided the presentation of the Stinger weapons framework, fit for clearing the skies of the risky "Rear" Russian helicopter (Billard, 2010, p. 33).



Fig. 7: An Afghan mujahideen aims a FIM-92 Stinger missile at passing Soviet aircraft, 1988. Source : (rarehistorical photos.com).

2.7. Recruiting Arab fighters to battle the Russians:

The part of the supposed Afghan Arabs in the ten-year war against the Soviet occupation is the subject of much open deliberation and misled critique. By mid 1980, the call to jihad (heavenly war) had achieved all corners of the Islamic world, drawing in Arabs youthful and old and with a assortment of inspirations to movement to Pakistan to wage war and cross the outskirts to battle against the Soviet intruders in Afghanistan (Bearden, n. d., p.10).

As the war delayed, various Arab states attentively discharged their jails of homegrown troublemakers and sent them to the holy jihad with the intense expectation that they won't not return. Over the ten a long time of war upwards of 25,000 Arabs may have gone through Pakistan also, Afghanistan. At one time the CIA considered having volunteer Arab armies partake in the war, yet the thought was rejected as incautious and unworkable. Regardless of what has frequently been composed, the CIA never

enlisted, prepared, or generally utilized the Arab volunteers who touched base in Pakistan (Bearden, n.d., p .10).

The possibility that the Afghans by one means or another required warriors from outside their way of life was profoundly imperfect and overlooked fundamental authentic and social certainties. In the few months of 1987 and 1988, Arab finance raisers in both Pakistan and their home nations raised as much as \$25 million for their generally helpful and development ventures. Among the more conspicuous of these Arab pledge drives was one Osama Ben Ladin, the child of a Saudi billionaire and the legend of military (Bearden, n.d., p .10).

2.8. Operation Hill 3234:

The Mujahedeen base camp of Sarani was a key target during Operation Magistral. It located close to the point where the main road turned east to Khost and where the Mujahedeen supply followed from the Shah-i Kot Valley interdicted that road. The devastating of the base was a major setback Mujahedeen but it was also the principal indicator that the USSR force did not intend to hold the route open for a broadened timeframe (Grau, 2011, p. 223).

As the escorts were conveying supplies to Khost, the Mujahedeen who had taken their families to Pakistan started to return. Major leaders, such as Jalaluddin Haqani, General Gulzarak Zadran, and Mawiawi Abdul- Rahman entered the territory with fortifications and set up base camps in the mountains west of the main road. There were bits of gossip that units of the "Black Storks", a commando unit of the Pakistani Army,

had also crossed the border by helicopter and set up near Hill 3234 with a specific end goal to retake it (Grau, 2011, p. 224).

In the wake of taking Sarani base camp, Lieutenant Colonel Vostrotin chose to set up a solid point defense in a wide semi-circle around the zone. The 3rd Battalion would have the southwest area; the 8th and 9th company would set up solid point safeguards as would the battalion reconnaissance detachment. Unit Scouts held the heights of Hill 3234. When the Mujahedeen discharged from a separation at Hill 3234, it was difficult to know where the shots were originating from. The folds and canyons wrapped the sound about until it finally emerged from a different location. The paratroopers could not react adequately since they could not figure out where the fire was coming from (Grau, 2011, p. 224).

The 3rd Platoon of the 9th company moved to the highest point of Hill 3234, permitting the contingent scouts to move again into reserve. The 9th company had survived the most exceedingly awful of the assaults and they had sufficient ammunition, they were in much better shape to survive future ambushes. The climate turned colder and it snowed intensely once more. They then transformed control of the Khost Highway to the armed forces of the DAR and withdrew. Within a week the Mujahedeen once again controlled the road (Grau, 2011, p. 230).

Mountain defense is difficult since the territory frequently avoids incorporated fields of fire, mutually supporting battling positions, and well-constructed foxholds and trenches. FM radio correspondences are as often as possible at the exceptionally best of the mountain, however this may not be the best place for guard. Usually, occupying the peak does not allow the defenders to lead powerful longer-range fires in light of the fact

that mountains sides have substantial spaces of dead zone that cannot be observed from the peak. The 9th company had this problem and their enemy could approach genuinely near their positions before they could be engaged (Grau, 2011, p. 230).

The paratroopers believed that they were fighting Special Forces from Pakistan alongside some supporting Mujahedeen. They referred to blocked radio traffic and an airlift of combatants from Pakistan on board helicopters. A few claims that the enemy were in black uniforms and were very much trained fighters. They assert that during Christmas night and during the next day, they could hear helicopters conveying the injured back to Pakistan. Provided that this is true, this would be unique.

Pakistan, at times, sent advisers into Afghanistan to accompany the Mujahedeen; however, submitting a formally dressed national military power on national helicopters into a foreign country is a very different proposition and could be translated as a deliberate provocation and escalation. The paratroopers were hit by a prepared, very much provided compel that was resolved to overwhelm them. Regardless of whether the enemies were proficient fighters or toughs guerrillas, is one of the puzzles of Hill 3234 (Grau, 2011, pp. 230- 1).

3. The end of the war and the Soviet phases of withdrawal:

Over eight years after they interceded in Afghanistan to help the procommunist government, Soviet troops start their withdrawal. The occasion denoted the start of the conclusion to a long, ridiculous, and unproductive Soviet control of Afghanistan.

By 1988, the Soviets chose to remove itself from the circumstance. Russian pioneer Mikhail Gorbachev saw the Afghan as an increasing drain on the Soviet economy, and the Russian individuals were tired of the war. The Soviet Union started to pull back its troops in May 1988, with add up to withdrawal to be finished by 15 February 1989, which considered the entire conflict a Cold War gain to the U.S. government and its Middle East allies. The Soviet planned different sessions to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and the final withdrawal didn't complete till 1989.

3.1. Diplomatic efforts and Geneva Accords (1983- 8):

Since the start of the Soviets invasion of Afghanistan, the US squeezed the USSR, through discretionary intends to withdraw from Afghanistan. The Soviets, then again made a decent attempt to indicate it was anything but an involving power and would leave Afghanistan once its security concerns were expelled. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the USSR had guaranteed that Soviet powers had entered Afghanistan keeping in mind the end goal to shield the Afghan administration from remote powers mediating— Pakistan bolstered Mujahideen (Azam,1993, p. 1).

Geneva accords were signed on April, 14, 1988 between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the USA and the USSR serving as guarantors, encouraged the withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan. The Accord contained arrangements for the timetable of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. It formally started on 15 May 1988 and finished by 15 February 1989, in this manner putting a conclusion to a nine-year-long Soviet control of Afghanistan. The Afghan Mujahideen were neither party to the transactions nor to the Geneva Accord and, therefore, declined to acknowledge

the terms of the agreement. Afghan Mujahideen were absent all the while, however at times and ineffectively informed by Pakistan. Pakistan as a matter of fact went about as specialist for Afghan protection. Accordingly, the war proceeded after the consummation of the Soviet withdrawal. The Soviet-sponsored administration of Najibullah, however neglecting to win famous help, an area, or universal acknowledgment, could stay in control until 1992, when it crumbled and was overwhelm by the Mujahideen (Azam,1993, p. 1).

3.2. The Soviet withdrawal: The first phase (Apr. 1985- Jan. 1987):

Mikhael Gorbachev came to control with a want to end the Soviet intercession, yet with no very much characterized thoughts regarding how to deal with the Afghan circumstance, and he gave no quick signs that he would look for a brisk withdrawal.

During his first year in office, he to a great extent give the war a chance to run its course, despite the fact that he bit turned out to be more engaged with choice making. Indeed, even after he wound up persuaded that separation from Afghanistan would require more straightforward mediation on his part he moved mindfully, liking to attempt each alternative accessible before at last abandoning helping the Afghan administration win the war (Kalinovsky, 2011, p. 96).

Gorbachev set the first of a few due dates for the withdrawal of Soviet troops: by summer 1986 Soviet troops would be out and the Afghans would need to "protect the unrest" themselves. Najibullah, who was at the group later said that Karmal's face went white when he heard this. Shocked, shouted "on the off chance that you leave now, next time you will send in a million soldiers, Gorbachev told his Politburo associates that

Karmal "not the slightest bit anticipated such a turn, was certain that we require Afghanistan more than he does, and was unmistakably expecting that we will be there for quite a while, if not until the end of time." Gorbachev was taking in the most difficult way possible that the Afghan communists would endeavor to undermine any withdrawal design he could devise (Kalinovsky, 2011, p. 97).

3.3. The Soviet final withdrawal (Jan. 1987- Feb. 1989):

The serious arranging process for the withdrawal began in Jan 1987. Gen Boris Gromov was selected to order 40th Army and plan and actualize the withdrawal. He set up an extensive arranging staff of amazingly all around qualified officers who stayed set up until the point when the withdrawal was finish, along these lines guaranteeing capability, progression and responsibility.

Gromov is presently Governor of the More noteworthy Moscow Region and could be drawn nearer for his recommendation on a NATO withdrawal. Beginning in 1987, awesome endeavors were made to guarantee that a stable Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) Government with viable military and security powers would have the capacity to keep working after the withdrawal. A Soviet General Staff Operational Group was set up under General Varennikov to this end ('Lessons of the Soviet withdrawal', n. d., p. 1).

The Soviet-appointed Afghan leader Najibullah instituted a broad reform of the state system and introduced a reconciliation and re-integration programme implementing the withdrawal. The Withdrawal was by rolling up Soviet garrisons from South to North on two axes to a defended lager area on the Soviet border. The Soviet main force crossed back into the USSR between February, 11– 14, 1989 ('Lessons from the Soviet withdrawal', n. d., p.2).



Fig. 8: Soviet troops leaving Afghanistan,1989. Source : (Findingdulcinea.com).

Conclusion:

To conclude, this chapter illustrated the role of the US administration and its strategy in helping the Afghan Mujahideen during the war. The US strategy was successfully filled and mainly implemented by the CIA, with the help of Arab countries and the neighbouring country of Pakistan, which played the vital role during the Soviet-Afghan war (1979- 1989).

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S Administration, and its policy makers changes their foreign policy towards Afghanistan war and built up strategy which made them work together with the Afghans against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The U.S and Pakistan were key external actors in the conflict. They funneled billions of dollars, world's unsafe arms, and preparing to Afghan flexibility warriors chest through Pakistan ISI and the CIA.

They likewise set up many Madrasas and prepared camps in Pakistan for training the Afghan Mujahideen and sending arms to them for rebuffing the Soviets in Afghanistan. Because of the CIA covert support to Afghan Munahideen, they became much stronger that they succeeded to expel out the Soviet from Afghanistan .

Chapter four : The impacts of the Soviet- Afghan War:

Introduction:

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 aroused both global and regional reactions from different countries which had common borders with Afghanistan; such as, China, Pakistan, and Iran; international level; such as the US and UK; and Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia.

Global public opinion has become reluctant to any major state intervention in the affairs of minor states. Despite all the Soviet claims of this is legitimate intervention, since it was based on the repeated request of the legitimate government of Hafeez Allah Ameen; however, the majority of world countries condemned this intervention, which turned into a military occupation and lasted for nearly ten years.

Amongst the significant impacts of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the rising of anti- feelings, or attitudes of the peoples of the developing countries against the ex-USSR. It is worth to mention that, years ago, the Soviets supported the developing countries to achieve their independence and maintain their freedom. However, when the USSR invaded Afghanistan, people found that the USSR had no longer been a reliable ally. Accordingly, as the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, they could invade any country as well.

The occupation of Afghanistan caused irreversible internal conflicts between the Soviet republics and the central government in Moscow. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev became the general secretary of the Community Party, he ordered the *Red Army* to withdraw from Afghanistan. Along with the Soviet withdrawal, the economic and military

resources for the invasion were drained. The aftermath of the Soviet invasion can be categorized as political situation, economic crisis, and social conflicts. This chapter explores a number of issues in order to figure the impacts of the Soviet invasion on Afghanistan in different perspectives.

1.The political Impacts:

The Soviet- Afghan War significantly changed the socio- political structure of Afghanistan. The Soviets wiped out the existing political elite by another political order in light of Leninist- Marxism philosophy of raunchy society; hence, it presented a different type of government under a single political party and ideological framework which was alien to Afghanistan, and its tribal Pashtun and different groups in three major ways. Firstly, it pulverized the pre- war elites and the social framework that upheld them on ancestral and Islamic lines. Secondly, it sprouted a strong social response against the nonbelievers, and in the third instance, it isolated the otherwise nescent Afghans on sharp ethno ideological lines. They unmitigatedly used power to bovine down each another, and charged organizations together for mutual gains. Indeed, even they used better military innovation than uphold their writ in their separate territories, which dove the nation into rebellion and turmoil (Khan, 2012, p. 26).

In fact, the close political agitation took after the expansion of high- innovation weapons among the whole Afghan populace; named as 'Kalashinkovization'. The difficulty propagated even after the Soviet withdrawal which in the end deserted a simple political framework that scarcely capacities today (Khan, 2012, pp. 26- 7).

During the Najibullah's period (1986- 1992), different tribal groups and their militias were acquainted with joining the government to facilitate the elimination of the resilient Afghan groups. These progressions divided traditional ethnic loyalties among the four principle Afghan ethnic groups: the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. An assortment of political developments were shaped in and over the ethnic groups. These developments included ethnic nationalities; Centrists or Afghan nationalists, Islamists, and Communists. The political effect of these progressions was especially among the minority Tajiks and Uzbeks (Khan, 2012, p. 27).

Since religion was a prominent indicator of a vibrant social role, among the political and religious groups that jumped up in this turbulent time was an obscure group of extreme fundamental religious teachers of Pashtun background from the rural regions. They called themselves 'the Mosquitoes of Islam', they were the Taliban, a group whose name implies students (Otfinoski, 2004, p. 30).

The vast majority of the Taliban initiative was made out of either Mujahideen and small-unit leaders, or else the pupils in Pakistan Madrassas. The average Taliban teenager has been illiterate, often orphan or from a family hit by the war. His insight came from within a very conservative framework (Khan, 2012, p. 29).

With the damage of the inbuilt socio-political structure and the impact of foreign hand and refined war innovation, Afghanistan is driving towards a fiasco which overflows Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia and other regional and sub-regional neighbourhood (Khan, 2012, p. 30).

The destiny of the Afghans appears to be dreary with no real leap forward accomplished by the US and Pakistan powers against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Only Killings including the civilians multiply and the Afghan society at all level is gone up against with assortment of intense dangers and difficulties. The institutions are broken beyond repatriation unless some enduring peace gets in the nation. The local authority has excessively numerous difficulties in the way of nation building and the strengthening of Hamid Karzai's administration would not create miracles when he is under the Western command (Khan, 2012, p. 31).

2. The economic Impacts:

Before 1978, agriculture and pastoralism were the significant segments in the country. As much as 85% of the village populace, on a very basic level, blossomed with agriculture supported by trade and village crafts. As such, 90% of the cultivated land was utilized for nourishment grains of which wheat was developed on two thirds of the territory sown. Other agrarian produce included cotton, dried, and fresh fruits for both domestic consumption and export. While the conventional Afghan economy was broken, an opium- heroin monetary sector in light of medication trafficking developed to supplant it during the wars (Khan, 2012, p. 9).

Accordingly, the conventional financial arrangement of rural Afghanistan, adjusted due to the wars and clashes during the Soviet occupation. Under the Soviets, agriculture, its produce, trade and distribution was declared a state monopoly. Additionally harm to the farming sector was a result of infighting between the Soviet

troops and Afghan Mujahideen, therefore, food supply frequently fell short in the consumption centres (Khan, 2012, pp. 9- 10).

Ten million of the aggregate domesticated animals: horses, bulls, cows, donkeys, goats, and lambs, constituting some portion of the Afghanistan capital, were annihilated. In addition, a wide range of roads, connecting the important agricultural regions with significant populace centres, were seriously harmed attributable to the substantial utilization of Soviet tanks and heavily clad vehicles. Part of the damage was inflicted during bombarding and cordon- and- search military operations, ordinarily on the roadways. In some key zones, as Panshir Valley, besieging and strike by ground troops annihilated supplies as well as made the land uninhabited because of forced migration (Khan, 2012, p. 10).

The pulverization of the Afghan rural economy was manifold. First, the countryside was exhausted of its labour drive as the majority of the Afghans joined the armed struggle against the Soviets. Scarcely few geographic zones were either totally crushed because of besieging or emptied inspired by a paranoid fear of war. While doing military tasks against the Mujahideen, the suspected villages and their immediate surroundings were heavily bombed, homes were pulverized and harvest was burned forced the villagers to abandon their villages.

The following tables explain the position during 1978- 1982:

Crop	1978	1981	1982
Wheat	37.3	18.7	13.9
% age change	100%	50%	37.2
Corn	5.5	2.8	2.1
%age change	100%	50.9%	38.1
Barely	7.3	4.5	3.1
%age change	100%	61.6%	43.5
Rice	9.7	3.0	2.0
%age change	100%	30.9%	20.6
Cotton	4.4	1.8	0.7
%age change	100%	40%	15.7

Table 1 : Average Aceage and Farm Production per-Jerib in Sairs

Crop	1978	1981	1982
Wheat	2,084.6	796.5	425
%age change	100%	38.2%	20.4
Corn	345.8	129.4	78.1
%age change	100%	37.4%	22.6
Barely	316.6	132.7	81.4
%age change	100%	41.9%	25.7
Rice	417.3	183.7	108.5
%age change	100%	44%	25.9
Cotton	258	73.1	31.4
%age change	100%	28.3%	12.2

Table 2 : Farm Production per-Jerib Sairs

The data in the tables above indicate the sharp decrease in territory statistics and farm production. The trend began with the Soviet occupation and proceeded all through their rule in Afghanistan (Khan, 2012, pp. 10- 2).

As indicated by a SCA survey in 1985, half of the farmers in Afghanistan reported about bombing of their villages, one quarter destruction of irrigation systems, and in excess of a quarter shooting of their domesticated animals and comparable number revealed about the decrease in the accessibility of essential inputs and services. Thus, from 1978- 1986, yields diminished by around 50% for dry land and around 33% for flooded land, while no less than a third of the land was abandoned (Khan, 2012, p. 13).

Nature of Damage	1978	1980	1985
Destruction of irrigation	0	13	24
Burning of crops	0	4	11
Bombing of village	0	23	53
Destruction of grain store	0	7	13
Livestock shot	0	9	23
Livestock killed by mines	0	2	2

Table 3: Decline of Agricultural Capital in Conflict Zones by 1987. Source: (Based on the reports of the settled villagers).

Nature of Damage	1978	1980	1985
Destructio of irrigation	0	12	36
Burning of crops	0	2	10
Bombing of village	0	21	65
Destruction of grain store	0	3	10
Livestock shot	0	9	31
Livestock killed by mines	0	2	11

Table 4: Decline of Agricultural Capital in Conflict Zones by 1987. Source: (Based on inputs from the migrant villagers).

On account of a stagnant economy, Afghanistan depended intensely on outside assistance. During the 1990s, the Kabul government inferred basically the greater part of its income from Soviet aid, offers of gaseous petrol to the USSR, and getting from the Central Bank at inflated rates of interest. The Mujahideen or subsequent Taliban government spent a large portion of their assets on proceeded with military battle for which Pakistan yearly gave \$10 million from its budget (Khan, 2012, p. 15).

No doubt, the overall economic situation deteriorating in the first years of the Taliban regime as inter- regional trade continued in regions under their domain. Agriculture recovered and grain production ascended in 1998 to levels near those current preceding the outbreak of the war in 1979- 1980. The Taliban declared reasonable measure to enhance farming and revive industrial units. The change took after political steadiness and repatriation of the villagers to their farm lands. Similarly, they declared concessions to businessmen for the advancement of trade as a boost to the economy. In addition, they encouraged foreign investment in Afghanistan. However, these measures had little significance in the absense of a basic infrastructure (Khan, 2012, p. 16).

3. The social Impacts:

The Soviet policy of subjugation and sovietization depended on physical eradication with a totalist phylosophy to break Afghanistan' s social, cultural, and religious legacy. Soviet war policies contributed to what is named as "migratory genocide" and wide spread violations of human rights and international law.

By the 1990s there were 2,6 million Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, and hundered thousand Afghans in Europe, the US and different parts of the world. The Soviet strategy was stretched out by indiscriminate damage suffice to demonstrate the extensive of the destruction; countless individuals were killed, injured and rendered homeless. With the ouster of the Taliban regime, the displaced person issue was believed to be over as more than 2- 3 million people returned home by 2003 (Khan, 2012, p. 3).

The 1979 census reports estimated the nation' s pre- war populace at 13,05 million; however, different reports indicated that the Afghan population was between 15 and 17 million including the nomadic population. Though the level of deaths reduced with the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, it did not end there. This is demonstrated by the quantity of casualties that followed ethnic cleansing with the fall of Mazar- i- Sharief and Bamiyan to the Taliban in September- October 1998 (Khan, 2012, pp. 3- 5).

In short, the immediate impact of the Afghan wars on the populace has been staggering. The effect was constantly felt in the urban cities, towns, and villages where houses, mosques, schools, hospitals, industrial structures, roads, bridges, orchards, and fields were damaged. The Soviets, through their strategies, were intended to demolish the rural base of popular support for secessionism. The assaults were coordinate to crush agrarian zones, water facilities, and livestock. While violating Geneva protocols, they used different nerve gas, mustard gas, and other chemical weapons in several areas. Consequently, the enormous bombings and food shortage, drove millions of peasants out of their villages. Over half of Afghan villages were transformed into apparition villages, and millions of antipersonnel mines, in particular

the little butterfly mines fixed by the Soviets, maimed millions in the countryside (Khan, 2012, pp. 6- 7).

Like different fragments of society, the Afghan culture has been a major causality during the war. Culturally, if not ethnically, Afghanistan represented a heterogeneous whole with various social groups having distinctive cultural traits, dialect, religious practices, physical appearance, conventions and traditions. The solidarity at household and town levels has without a doubt changed due to foreign invasions. Only foreign invasions can unify them for a common cause (Khan, 2012, pp. 31- 2).

The harm to social standards, values, traditions and conventions are perhaps more dangerous than those to the economic structure. Every branch of popular culture was influenced in the course of recent decades, including art, music, architecture, customs, education, literature, etc. The attack started with the Soviets who subjugated the whole set of Afghan culture to Leninism-Marxism and perceived no culture other than the one identified with communism. This is why city cinemas demonstrated just Russian movies and films about the Second World War. likewise, Kabul T. V. showed quickly documentary films on "Our Great Northern Neighbour" which celebrated Soviet culture. The Soviet- centric newspapers; such as, *Yuldis* (the star), *Girash* (the struggle), and *Sab* (the revolution) were distributed in minority dialects for flow among the Afghan individuals to tame their minds on Soviet lines (Khan, 2012, pp. 32- 3).

Soviet books, pamphlets, periodicals, and posters were also disseminated free through book shops to sharpen the Afghans to the Soviet contribution in Central Asia. The Soviet focuses of science and culture were developed to promote communist culture to the impediment of the non- atheist Afghan heritage (Khan, 2012, p. 33).

Like the Soviets, the Taliban also contributed to demeaning the cultural heritage of Afghanistan. Actually, they fixed whatever had slipped the Soviets, and brought to ground every such cultural reminiscence which did not fit the Islamic framework. The destruction of Buddha's statues at Bamiyan offered the the typical example of Taliban vandalism. Their inflexible approaches in view of Shariah cut over the Afghan conventions of peaceful co- existence of otherwise divergent ethno- religious, cultural, and linguistic communities. For all intents and purposes, every common type of popular culture was prohibited for being non- Islamic. These included cinema, art, TV, radio, music, photography, and depiction of human images (Khan, 2012, p. 34).

Conclusion:

To conclude, it is worth to mention that the war affected both countries of Afghanistan and the USSR very differently. The current chapter identified some of the more important of these effects, In Afghanistan, the war produced a multilayered destructuring of politics, economy, and society, in ways which remain massively apparent at the beginning of a new century.

General conclusion:

Having been located in Central Asia, Afghanistan, through its strategical and geopolitical position, has been that kind of state whose importance is determined by the confrontation of great powers. The borders of Afghanistan shaped as the *Great Game* attributed a special mission to Afghanistan: being a buffer state to fill the zone between Russia and Great Britain. While the Russians were slowly advancing towards India, Britain followed the pre-emptive war strategy to halt them before they had been a threat to Indian trade routes. Due to the Russian- British rivalry in Asia, Afghanistan turned into a highway of invasions and incessant armed conflicts.

What made the Afghan case interesting is the events after the "Saur Revolution." From 1919 to 1978, Afghanistan was governed by non- communists leaders, prior to the coup there was no sign of Soviet aggression. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to settle a contention among competing leagues within the recently installed communist government, and to suppress the anti-communist resistance that the Afghan government's ideology had inspired among the population.

The present dissertation examined the Soviet- Afghan War which was as a crucial event at the cold war final stage. It explored the US strategy of involvement in the conflict, with focus on the role filled and played by the CIA. This role symbolized the US foreign policy towards Afghanistan during the period of the conflict (1979- 1989). The Reagan Administration adopted an armoury of measures against the "evil empire" (the USSR): the Soviet Union was conceived as a great, dangerous power that menaced world wide peace and security. Accordingly, the US felt it necessary to engage in

opposing the USSR. Since the Afghan Mujahideen were depicted unfair and humiliated, with US administration's historic mission being to support them in battling the Soviet, operation cyclone was one of the most expensive and extensive of the cold war.

Not only did the Soviet- Afghan War have a strong impact on the USSR's socio-political and socio-economic development, but it put an end to the policy of Détente, radically changed the situation in Western and Central Asia, and triggered the radicalization of Islamic movements. The Soviet- Afghan War changed the shape of the world: it brought an end to the communism movement that the USSR wanted to spread in the world. Also, it led to the emergence of the US as a super power in the world.

In the light of the current research conducted, we have concluded that the US' Afghan policy in the 1970s and 1980s exploited the ideas of American exceptionalism in its foreign policy strategy to use its agenda. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the US presidents, their cabinets, and other executive/ and legislative authorities fully supported the idea of independence for Afghanistan. They did so to defeat their main rival, the USSR. The Reagan administrations also articulated an unshakeable belief that supporting Afghan Mujahideen was fully consistent with American democratic values.

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Glossary

Abdul Al Rahman: Also known as the "Iron Emir". He seized the throne of Afghanistan in 1880 after the Second Anglo- Afghan War. He succeeded to establish stability in the country.

Ahmed Shah Durrani: He founded the Durrani Dynasty in 1757, conquering the territory that today constitutes Afghanistan.

Airborne: parachute trained forces deployed by parachute or helicopter.

Akbar Khan: son of Dost Mohammed, played a primary role in forcing the British to embark on their disastrous 1842 retreat from Kabul.

Alexander the Great: king of Macedonia who conquered the Persian Empire, campaigned in Afghanistan and Transoxiana from 330 to 326 B.C.

Al Qaeda: A term meaning "the base". It is an international organization of Islamic radicals and terrorists led by Osama Bin Laden.

American Exceptionalism: is an ideology holding the US as unique among nations in positive or negative connotations, with respect to its ideas of democracy and personal freedom.

Babur: The founder of the Moghol Empire of India, buried in Kabul.

Bactria: It is ancient term for northern Afghanistan, centered on the area of Balkh.

Black Storks: an elite special operations unit with some ten battalions of high trained and motivated professional soldiers used for extraordinary missions. The unit is officially

called the Special Service Group. It belongs to the Army of Pakistan and is headquartered in or near the magnificent Attack Fort.

Brezhnev Doctrine: is a Soviet foreign policy outlined in 1968 which called for the use of Warsaw Pact troops to intervene in any eastern Bloc nation which was seen to compromise communist rule and Soviet domination.

Coup d'état: a sudden decisive exercise of force in politics, especially, the violent overthrow or alteration of an existing government by a small group.

Daoud, Mohammed: Durrani prince who served as president 1953-63 and then seized power again in 1973, exiling his cousin, King Zahir, killed in 1978 during the April Communist Revolution.

Detente Policy: (a French word meaning release from tension) is the name given to a period of improved relations between the US and the USSR that began tentatively in 1971.

Dost Mohammed: King of Afghanistan who was forced to leave office after the British invasion in 1838. However, he regained his throne in 1942 after the British withdrawal.

Durrani: formerly known as Abdali, a large tribal group in southern western Afghanistan.

Ghazni: city eight miles southeast of Kabul; once the capital of the Ghaznavid Empire.

Hazarajat: the domain of the Hazaras, descendants of the Mongols.

Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin: fundamentalist leader of the largest Pashtun mujahideen party during the Soviet occupation; fought Massoud in the civil war and later was forced to flee from the Taliban.

Insurgency: an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversions or armed conflict. Insurgency- sometimes-called guerrilla warfare presents unique problems for the host government.

ISI : The Inter- Services Intelligence is the premier intelligence agency of Pakistan, operationally responsible for gathering, processing, and analyzing national security information from around the world.

Karzai, Hamid: President of Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban in December 2001.

Khalq: is a faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Its historical leaders were presidents Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafiz Ullah Amin. It was supported by the ISSR and was formed in 1965 when the PDPA was born.

Kremlin: Kremlin remains the heart of the city, it is the symbol of both Russian, Soviet power and authority.

Massoud, Ahmed Shah: outstanding mujahideen leader during the Soviet occupation while based in the Panshir Valley northeast of Kabul; commanded forces during the following civil war; commanded Northern Alliance forces holding out against the Taliban until his assassination by Al Qaeda in September 2001.

Nadir Shah: self- made king of Persia, went on to conquer southern Afghanistan.

Osama Bin Laden: A Saudi wealthy man who was born in Saudi Arabia in 1957. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was a turning point in his life. He felt solidarity with the Afghans and gave millions of his money to support the mujahideen. In 1984, bin Laden moved to Pakistan where he worked closely with the radical Muslim extremist Abdullah Azzam. In 1986, he established a training camp for terrorists. Two years later

he founded al- Qaeda. Following the second bombing of the World Trade Center and the attacks on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent defeat of the Taliban by American forces, bin Laden has gone into hiding.

Mohammad Yousaf (Brigadier) : A Pakistani IT who served under General Akhtar Abdur Rahman for four years at the height of the Afghan war, but he carried the enormous responsibility for the struggle against what was then the Soviet superpower, for over eight years. He was also known as the 'Silent Soldier' because of his great humility and modesty. Few people, apart from his family knew him as well as I did until he was assassinated, along with President Zia-ul-Haq, in the plane crash in August 1988. At one blow the Jihad lost its two most powerful leaders.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, President Zia sent for General Akhtar, who had recently taken over as Director of ISI. At that time nobody in authority in Pakistan, and certainly no overseas government (including the US), thought the Soviet military might could be confronted. Afghanistan was written-off as lost. The only person within the military to advocate supporting the Jihad by Pakistan, and the only person to come up with a plausible plan for doing so, was General Akhtar. He convinced the President that not only was it vital to Pakistan's interests to fight the aggressors, but that there was every chance of defeating them.

Mujahideen: (those engaged in jihad). In its broadest sense, those Muslims who proclaim themselves warriors for the faith. The name was most closely associated with members of a number of guerrilla groups ; namely, Afghan resistance fighters, operating in Afghanistan that opposed invading Soviet forces and eventually toppled the Afghan communist government during the Afghan War (1979- 1989).

Parcham: is the name of one of the factions of the PDPA, the Parcham faction seized power in the country after the toppling of Hafiz Ullah Amin in December 1979.

Politurbo: the principal policy- making and executive committee of a communist party.

Rabbani, Burhanuddin: political leader of the Islamic Society, a mostly non- Pashtun party of mujahideen that included Massoud and Ismail Khan among its commanders; political head of the Northern Alliance; as a Tajik, denied interim leadership of Afghanistan after the Taliban collapse in favor of Pashtun leader Hamid Karzai.

Rice, Condoleezza (Nov. 14, 1954-): An American political scientist and diplomat. She served National Security Advisor (2001- 2005) and US Secretary of State (2005- 2009) in the administration of President George W. Bush.

Rimland: It is a theory which stated that Eurasia's Asia rimland, the theory states that the coastal areas is the key to control the world island.

Seleucus: Macedonian general who inherited eastern conquest; including, Afghanistan, after the death of Alexander the Great.

Shah Shuja: Durrani prince resorted to the Afghan throne by the British in 1838; assassinated after the British retreat in 1942.

Sistan: region of southeastern Iran bordering Afghanistan

Subunit: Soviet term for a battalion. company. battery. platoon or squad.

Spetsnaz: Special- purpose forces.

Taliban: A word meaning "students". It is an Islamic fundamentalist group, primarily Pashtun, that seized control of Afghanistan from feuding mujahideen parties in 1996; was unable to conquer the northeast corner of Afghanistan held by the Northern Alliance; overthrown by American- backed Northern Alliance forces in 2001.

Zahir, Mohammed Shah: ruled as king of Afghanistan from 1933 until being overthrown and sent into exile by Daoud in 1973; had established a constitutional monarchy in 1964; returned to Afghanistan in 2002 after the collapse of Taliban.

Résumé:

Le présent mémoire explore une tendance particulière de la guerre froide: la guerre soviéto-afghane et le rôle stratégique joué par des États-Unis, à travers l'intermédiaire de la CIA, pour influencer le résultat de la guerre. Les Américains ont d'abord cherché à augmenter les coûts pour l'Union soviétique en fournissant des fonds et des armes de style soviétique aux moudjahidin afghans. Après l'invasion soviétique, l'administration américaine, avec de nombreux pays du monde, a travaillé pour retirer les Soviétiques de l'Afghanistan.

Il convient de mentionner que l'administration américaine, sous la présidence de Carter et Regan, comptait beaucoup sur la CIA pour mettre en œuvre sa politique étrangère qui préparait les milliers de Moudjahidine dans les camps préparatoires pakistanais, injectait des milliards de dollars et fournissait des armes contre les Soviétiques en Afghanistan.

Nous arrivons à trois conclusions: Premièrement, les présidents Carter et Reagan, dans le cadre d'une stratégie de 'purgé', ont fourni des fonds et des armes de style soviétique aux mujahadeen. Deuxièmement, l'escalade des États-Unis en 1985-1986 visait à chasser les Soviétiques de l'Afghanistan. Troisièmement, la campagne secrète contre les Soviétiques en Afghanistan faisait partie intégrante d'une stratégie plus large, la doctrine 'Reagan', qui cherchait à faire reculer les gains soviétiques dans le tiers monde. En fin de compte, cela a aidé à mettre fin à la guerre froide.

Mots clés: URSS, Afghanistan, États-Unis, CIA, Moudjahidine, Armée rouge,

الملخص

تستكشف الأطروحة الحالية حقبة معينة من الحرب الباردة ألا وهي الحرب السوفيتية الأفغانية والدور الذي لعبته استراتيجية الولايات المتحدة، من خلال وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية، في التأثير على أحداث و نتائج الحرب. لقد سعى الأمريكيون أولاً إلى زيادة التكاليف بالنسبة للاتحاد السوفيتي عن طريق توفير الأموال والأسلحة على النمط السوفيتي إلى المجهدين الأفغان. بعد غزو الاتحاد السوفياتي، عملت الإدارة الأمريكية، إلى جانب العديد من دول العالم، على إزالة السوفييت من أفغانستان.

ومن الجدير بالذكر أن الإدارة الأمريكية، خلال فترة رئاسة كارتر وريغان، اعتمدت بشكل كبير على وكالة المخابرات المركزية لتنفيذ سياستها الخارجية التي أعدت آلاف المجهدين في معسكرات إعدادية باكستانية، وبأنتفاق مليارات الدولارات، وتقديم الأسلحة للمجهدين الأفغان ضد السوفييت في أفغانستان.

لقد توصلنا إلى ثلاثة استنتاجات: أولاً، قام الرئيس كارتر وريغان، كجزء من استراتيجية "الزيف"، بتوفير الأموال والأسلحة على النمط السوفيتي للمجهدين. ثانياً، سعى التصعيد من قبل الولايات المتحدة في 1985-1986 إلى دفع السوفييت للخروج من أفغانستان. ثالثاً، كانت الحملة السرية ضد السوفييت في أفغانستان جزءاً لا يتجزأ من الاستراتيجية الأكبر، "مذهب ريجان"، التي سعت إلى تراجع المكاسب السوفيتية في العالم الثالث. في نهاية المطاف، ساعد ذلك على إنهاء الحرب الباردة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الاتحاد السوفياتية، أفغانستان، الولايات المتحدة، السي آي آيه، المجهدين الأفغان، الجيش الأحمر، عمليات سرية.