

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF MOHAMED BOUDIAF - M'SILA

FACULTY OF LETTERS AND LANGUAGES
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH
N°:.....



DOMAIN: FOREIGN LANGUAGES
STREAM: ENGLISH LANGUAGE
OPTION: LITERATURE & CIVILIZATION

**The New Scramble for Africa: The American Chinese
Dispute**

**Dissertation Submitted to the Department of English in Partial fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Master's Degree**

Candidates:

SAIDI Islam

Board of Examiners

Mrs.....	University of M'sila	Chairperson
Mr. Ghafsi	University of M'sila	Supervisor
Mr.....	University of M'sila	Examiner

2023

Declaration

I hereby declare that the dissertation entitled, “The New Scramble for Africa: The Chinese American Disrupte” is my own work and that all the sources I have cited have been acknowledged by means of references.

Dedication

I would like dedicate my thesis to those who motivated me when I was lacking motivation. To the ones who always believed in me even when I did not believe in myself. To those who saw the light in me when all I saw was darkness. To you my beloved parents. My words cannot explain the amount of eternal gratitude and thankfulness I have got for having you beside me.

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I want to express my gratitude to **The Almighty Allah** for giving me the endurance and determination to complete this work. I want to sincerely thank my supervisor, **Dr Abderrezzaq Ghafsi**, for all of his efforts, guidance, and assistance in getting this research done. Still, I owe a debt of gratitude to the members of **the Jury** for examining this thesis and giving it a part of their precious time. Last but not least, I would like to thank all of my professors and coworkers for letting me spend the previous five years with them.

Abstract

The term 'New Scramble for Africa' describes the revived interest that foreign nations have in the African continent, notably in terms of resource exploitation, financial gain, political dominance, and strategic localization. This occurrence is reminiscent of the colonial era when European countries partitioned Africa for their interests. Investing substantially in African infrastructure and resources, China has been at the vanguard of this new race. To compete with China for access to resources such as oil and minerals, the United States and European nations have significantly boosted their presence on the continent as well. This dissertation examines the Chinese and American competition in Africa. Special attention will be given to the rivalry of these two countries in the Sahel region and northern Africa particularly Algeria. Unlike many studies conducted on this topic, this dissertation aims at analyzing rather than demonstrating the competition. The results are encouraging since they indicate that the Chinese are outperforming the Americans in Africa.

Keywords: New scramble, Exploitation, Investing, Infrastructure, Resources, Africa, China, The United States.

List of Acronyms

US United States

UN United Nations

NLF National Liberation Front

USSR The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

FOCAC The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

TICAD Tokyo International Conference on African Development

OECD The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

MINURSO The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

FDI Foreign Direct investments

CADF The China-Africa Development Fund

YALI The Young African Leaders Initiative

GES Global Entrepreneurship Summit

BUILD Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development

IDFC International Development Finance Corporation

BRI Belt and Road Initiative

USAID The United States Agency for International Development

MDGs The Millennium Development Goals

CARI The China-Africa Research Initiative

IMF The International Monetary Fund

CSCEC The China State Construction Engineering Corporation

MOU Memorandum of understanding

CNMC China Nonferrous Metal Mining Corporation

CBD Central business district

GDP Gross Domestic Product

Table of Contents

Declaration.....	II
Dedication.....	III
Acknowledgment.....	IV
Abstract.....	V
List of Abbreviations.....	VI
Table of contents.....	VII
Table of figures.....	IX
General Introduction.....	1
1. Background of the Study.....	1
2. Research questions.....	3
3. Statement of the Problem.....	3
4. Literature review.....	4
5. Motivation.....	7
6. Research design.....	8

Chapter One

The New Scramble for Africa: Historical Context and implemented policies.....	9
Introduction.....	10
1.1 Common Interests & Contradictory objectives.....	11
1.2 Historical context.....	12
1.2.1 History of Sino-African Relations.....	13
1.3 Chinese Foreign Policy towards Africa in the 1980s.....	13
1.3.1 China African Policy in the 90s.....	14
1.3.2 The new Era: The 21 st century.....	16
1.3.3 Beginning of the 21 st century.....	17

1.3.4 Sino-African Relations from 2007 until now.....	19
1.4 US policies in Africa.....	20
1.4.1 U.S. Africa Policy during the Obama Administration.....	21
1.4.2 The Trump Administration.....	23
1.4.3 Biden’s Administration's New Approach to Africa.....	25
Conclusion.....	26

Chapter Two

The Western-Orient Spread in Africa: Visions of the Economic, Military, and technological deadlock.....	27
Introduction.....	28
2. The Economic Rationale for the African Scramble.....	29
2.1 Monetary Investments and Infrastructure Projects.....	30
2.1.1 Chinese Trade and Investments with Africa.....	30
2.1.2 Western Criticism: Debt Trap Diplomacy.....	35
2.1.3 Insights on U.S. African Trade and Investments.....	42
2.2 Strategic Competition for Overseas Basing in Africa.....	43
2.2.1 The U.S. Military Presence.....	43
2.2.2 The Chinese Military Doctrine	45
2.3 The competition for the Tech industry in Africa.....	46
2.4 Reflecting African Perceptions on the Chinese American Scramble.....	47
Conclusion.....	51

Chapter Three

American and Chinese Involvement in Africa: in the Case of North and Sub-Saharan Africa.....	52
Introduction.....	53

3.1 The Strategic Importance of North Africa.....	53
3.1.1 Case study: North Africa.....	54
3.2 Assessing the U.S.-Chinese Competition and Collaboration in Sub-Saharan Africa.....	58
3.2.1 Case Study: Sub-Saharan Africa.....	59
3.3 Positive and Negative Implications for the New Scramble for Africa.....	62
Conclusion.....	67
General conclusion.....	68
Works Cited.....	70
Appendices.....	81
ملخص.....	84
Resumé.....	84

Table of Figures

<i>Figure 1: China and US direct investments to Africa (2003-2019)</i>	29
<i>Figure 2: African trade with China from 2010 to 2022.</i>	29
<i>Figure 3: Chinese bilateral trade with Africa (2003 to 2021)</i>	35
<i>Figure 4: Chinese FDI to Africa between 2003 and 2020</i>	32
<i>Figure 5: Chinese loans to the African continent between 2001 and 2018</i>	36
<i>Figure 6: US two-way trade with Africa between the beginning of the century and 2021</i>	42
<i>Figure 7: China's Perception among African Citizens 2014/2015</i>	47

General Introduction

Background of the study

The Scramble for Africa refers to the period when colonial European powers unilaterally divided Africa into colonies, cruelly enslaving its people and stealing its immense mineral wealth in the late nineteenth century. Cold War rivalry made Africa's post-independence governments weak puppets in the global economy, as their colonial background severely hampered their ability for economic growth and political stability (Conteh, 2019).

The New Scramble for Africa however, is a term describing the competition that has emerged as another front in what is widely viewed as a Cold War-esque pattern of competition for influence and economic ties with Africa's emerging markets between the U.S. and China. This active competition between the two powers shapes both strategic debates and real political, military, and economic dynamics. Using opposing policies to expand influence in the continent and to protect their interests and hegemony, sparking many geopolitical changes, challenges, and strategic depths, has had some unfavorable consequences on development sustainment in the continent (Li & Voncujevi, 2022).

Pádraig Carmody makes the following claim in his book, "The New Scramble for Africa": "In the New Scramble for Africa, there is geoeconomic Competition between different world economic powers to open up resource access for their companies, in addition to subsidiary diplomatic support in the United Nations". This demonstrates how the second scramble encompasses new disciplines and that its scope includes the geopolitical competition between emerging regional and global powers, whereas the previous scramble was mostly about European dominance by exploiting resources and seizing land.

Limiting the New Scramble for Africa to its established rivals, however, is demonstrably incorrect. Geopolitical analyses offered by academics primarily concentrate on

how the United States and its traditional European allies work to counteract Chinese and Russian influence in the region, ignoring the growing engagement of new players, particularly some emerging economies such as India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and the role that these nations have to play in the coming years in both promoting African development, security, and the balance of power on the continent (Rubidge, 2022).

While the US-China geopolitical competition dominates global events, Russia is generally regarded as a Chinese ally. This shared narrative is principally motivated by resistance to the US-led international order, long-held joint geopolitical aims, shared suspicion of the West, and their mutual ambition to challenge US "hegemony" in world affairs, which they both desire from the Ukraine crisis. But in reality, there is no alliance; rather, there is a Sino-Russian collaboration. China won't support Russia in Ukraine any more than Russia will support China in the Far East. Aside from continuing to purchase Russian oil and gas, like the majority of the globe, China has not joined the West in applying economic pressure to Russia. Western media frequently ignores scenes of conflict between Chinese and Russian contractors over mining projects in Africa since both countries are depicted as allies (Lieven, 2022).

But while borrowing from China has increased and has been dubbed the "Chinese debt trap" by Western government officials and media, African nations have also resorted to France, Germany, Japan, and international lenders. All of this is taking place while debt distress, which occurs when nations cannot pay their debts in full and must renegotiate the terms of their debt, is increasing in Africa. According to the World Bank, this is partly because interest rates are rising globally (Ibid).

This increased pursuit of wealth and power coincides with the rise of Africa's capacity for collective action in the twenty-first century, the development of the continent's energy

resources and agricultural industry for the benefit of the world, and the rising tide of consumers and easily accessible technology. This new race for the continent's wealth will undoubtedly differ greatly from Europe's 19th-century grab for the fruits of colonialism thanks to Africa's rising awareness and three-decade struggle to overcome war, poverty, and political unrest(Ibid.).

Research Questions

In light of the research problem, this dissertation poses several primary and secondary research questions which will be fully answered and discussed throughout the thesis:

- 1- How did American and Chinese ties with Africa come to be what they are today?
- 2- What are the Chinese strategies for the race of influence in Africa and are they effective?
- 3- Does China's policy of non-interference promote authoritarianism in the continent?
- 4- Does the US-China rivalry affect the growth of African nations especially where the competition is intense, i.e., is this competition beneficial or detrimental for Africa?

Statement of the Problem

Never before has the American-Chinese rivalry for influence in Africa been as heated as it is now. In a region that is underdeveloped but has a lot of potential, resources, labor, and a promising consumer market to disseminate diverse items and extend their goods, both nations recognize the need for increased capital investments and trade opportunities. From another angle, though, it appears that most of these African nations are often compelled to select between the two possibilities.

Some African governments are concerned that by offering the two superpowers the opportunity to invest heavily in their nations, the risks associated with debt (debt trap) may worsen. The use of other nations as a front for a future conflict between China and the U.S. might result in political division inside such nations, with one party siding with American

ideology and the other with the Chinese model of development. The imbalance of commercial links between African nations and China also draws a lot of criticism, along with questions about the motives of the Chinese and American governments.

Literature Review

This subject has attracted the interest of several researchers. The rising US-Chinese rivalry in North Africa has been criticized for its long-term consequences on the entire globe and for how the Chinese are stepping in to fill the gap left by the US's withdrawal from the region.

Adel Abdel Ghafar and Anna Jacobs, in their essay "China in the Mediterranean: Implications of Expanding Sino-North African Relations" (2020), are two specialists who made an effort to evaluate the topic. The article emphasizes how the COVID-19 pandemic and domestic political unrest have caused America's influence in North Africa to diminish. According to the report, the Chinese took advantage of these situations. The report also examines China's soft power strategies, including its cultural and economic ties with Morocco and Tunisia, and expanding markets in Algeria and Egypt, in which it seeks to exploit and expand its influence.

In a similar vein, Conteh Morgan Earl stated in an article published in the Turkey Insight magazine in 2018, that this rivalry is considerably more about business than it is about using military force and engaging in an open conflict. The American foreign policy in Africa is based on respect for universal human rights through humanitarian aid and the promotion of democratic ideas using the IMF and World Bank institutions. In contrast to the Chinese perspective on Africa, which is solely focused on extracting Africa's oil and other strategic minerals in Algeria, Libya, etc., and extending its involvement in Africa through aid, trade, loans, and investments without tending to interfere in the internal affairs of these countries.

He also contends that China's strategy to undermine the US significantly depends on solidifying its alliances with wealthy African nations, offering an alternative to the African nations that the West has targeted for economic sanctions and dominance. China was able to increase its reputation with the North African nations thanks to its emphasis on commercial interests, adoption of a non-interference policy in Africa, and disregard for political corruption in its partnerships. Contrary to the United States, many African nations consider the imposition of democratic norms across the continent to be an act of meddling.

Additionally, Michael Robbins is among the scholars expressing interest in this topic. He spent a lot of time conducting research for his article titled "US and China's Competition Extends to MENA" (2021), in which he contrasts the impact of the US and China in North Africa and the Middle East. According to him, China's involvement in the area is mostly economic, whereas US involvement is more often political. The proportion of whom the pedestrians perceive as a major threat—China or the United States—is then compared and shown by Robbins in a critical poll (Robbins, 2021).

He concludes that Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians all have the same belief that the US poses a greater danger to their national interests than China does and that they also prefer the Chinese foreign policy to the US. For instance, 42% of Algerians believe that Chinese President Xi Jinping's foreign policy is good, compared to 12% who favored the precious US President Trump's foreign policy. The deals of the century, for which the Trump Administration is partially responsible, are the motives driving this perspective. The majority of common Algerians and people of North Africa oppose these agreements (the Normalization of Relations between Several Arab Governments and Israel). However, the shift in US foreign policy wouldn't be sufficient enough to change the views toward the US because it requires a position that favors Arab countries more when dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as Robbins also demonstrates that the Biden Presidency has higher

chances of relevance and competition against China in the region than the Trump Administration.

Michael Zaremba examines the Chinese-American competition via the development support advancement of African countries by the two superpowers in his research at the University of Lodz, which is entitled "The development assistance for Africa as part of the Chinese-American rivalry." The two countries are aware of the wide range of areas where Africa needs help. While the US pursues what is known as "colonizers policy" in Africa, emphasizing the implementation of its old programs aimed at enhancing security, institutions, and modest infrastructure projects, the Chinese assistance is focused on investing in massive infrastructure projects, ignoring any environmental or political conditions that, according to Zereмба, will have numerous outcomes shortly. Chinese Assistance Although not entirely voluntary, China does give loans and donations to African nations in return for raw commodities. Many experts also point out that China's "neo-colonial" strategy in Africa is a reimagined version of Western policy.

Motivation

Recently, academics have been drawn to the growing American-Chinese competition throughout the world, particularly in Africa. The fight to work together to maintain peace, keep the area stable, and avert a future direct conflict, may directly affect the cultural, economic, and political dynamics in an already unstable continent. The theory aids in revealing the true motivations for US and Chinese loans and investments. It also offers fresh perspectives on the evolving African continent and its various areas of influence. Additionally, it aids in understanding the strategic focus of both world superpowers. Knowing the reasons why both nations want to do this helps determine whether they will adopt a block strategy or one where one new state assumes leadership of all initiatives on the African

continent. For example, to prevent other superpowers, such as the US from gaining access to new economic routes and diplomatic relations, or to lessen their hold on existing superpowers.

Furthermore, international competition for Africa needs to be thoroughly reviewed, especially as it has been gaining an increasing strategic dimension in recent years, especially after the Cold War; it is not just a continent in a strategic position, or it contains important straits (Gibraltar Strait, Bab al-Mandab Strait) and major navigating routes for world trade, and it is the second largest continent in terms of 30 million km of land area, accounting for approximately 20% of Earth's land area, with an estimated 800 million people representing approximately 15% of the total global population, with 53 independent States.

Research design

This study will rely on the two categories of scientific research methodologies, just like any other research.

The qualitative approach will include textual and analytical types of research, such as journal articles, previous research papers, and articles comparing and contrasting American and Chinese strategies, while utilizing methodological tools like the case study method to broaden the conversation and make the problem in the field easier to solve. As well as comparing the American and Chinese foreign policies that differ from one another and determining which is more persuasive for influence. It also examines the containment strategy, a successful American tactic employed during the Cold War against the Soviet Union, which is being utilized in US foreign policy, but this time against newly developing competitors, primarily China. The quantitative approach, on the other hand, is the second scientific approach that will be briefly discussed. It consists of questionnaires, quotes, and reports about the research issue. In the context and according to the nature of this research, the two approaches are related to one another.

Chapter 01

***The New Scramble for Africa: historical context and
implemented policies***

Introduction

During the mid-to-late 20th century, Africa witnessed a series of revolts against European imperialist powers as numerous nations sought independence. In this period, both the United States and China played substantial roles in supporting the independence movements of several African countries. The United States guaranteed political support for liberation groups at the UN and offered financial assistance. John F. Kennedy, the American president, highlighted in a speech he gave in South Africa in 1966 that "the US should be on the side of anti-colonialism and self-determination, not on the side of the colonialists." On the other side, Communist China embraced several values, one of which was its support for the independence of African nations. The Chinese government provided financial and logistical assistance to liberation armies such as the FLN in Algeria. In exchange, Algeria played a significant role in assisting China in 1971 to secure a seat at the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council. After the post-colonial era, this shared narrative of Africa quickly devolved into an indirect struggle. The sub-Saharan region of Africa is at the center of this struggle. The two superpowers aimed to establish their dominance by implementing "soft or hard power" tactics in nations with considerably weak economies. The US maintains its strategy of a military presence in the region, establishing some military bases to safeguard its interests.

The United States hard and soft power tactics in Africa are destined to fail as a response to China's soft power measures and overarching plan. Due to its economic non-interference approach, China has been able to position itself close to its main African Allies, securing their allegiance (Natulya, 2018).

Besides being the world's most promising growth market, the enormous natural resource potential of Africa is something that both the U.S. and China are interested in (Signé, 2021). Its rapid population growth may have some demographic benefits, but it may also pose

long-term risks to the stability and prosperity of the world, which both powers would seek to avoid (Ibid.). In recent years, the continent has seen the growth of middle-class household consumption and spending. Indeed, since 2010, the continent's consumer spending has increased at a compound annual rate of 3.9 percent, reaching \$1.4 trillion in 2015, and by 2025, this amount is anticipated to reach \$2.1 trillion. The rise of global partnerships influenced the competition between traditional players on the continent, the United States and Europe, and new powers, specifically China and Russia (Ibid.).

1.1 Common Interests & contradictory objectives

For both China and the United States, the stability of Africa is of paramount importance. The stability of the African continent is necessary for both states to reap the economic benefits they both desire (Harris, 2021). Additionally, both seek to strengthen their ties with their African partners, their consistent diplomatic backing, and the image of world leadership that each seeks to realize. However, it is noteworthy that both countries do not have overarching mercantilist economic goals that would motivate them to seek out widespread regime changes. Because the resulting instability inhibits development, hinders close bilateral relations, casts doubt on global leadership, and frequently portends instability in neighboring states, the conflicts that have been common in some parts of Africa interfere with the interests of both governments. Relatedly, both states have a growing interest in taking on violent extremists and cross-border criminal networks. To date, the United States has taken a much more active role in fending off these dangers. Transnational organizations are starting to explicitly target Chinese facilities and citizens living abroad, despite what was previously mentioned. The growing Chinese presence, investments, and interests in Africa will make it harder for Beijing to ignore networks that undermine stability generally and specifically target Chinese interests (Thrall, 2015).

Both states have a desire to expand African economies and improve the continent's infrastructure, both of which are necessary to encourage trade and investment. Furthermore, both states' interests in African stability are significantly connected with economic growth. The efficient and cost-effective production of Africa's natural resources is also made possible by these advancements. So, more potent African markets for the consumption of products from both states are produced by developing African economies and operating infrastructure (Ibid).

From the American perspective, China's politicized economic relations with Africa have undercut good governance, aided authoritarianism, and slowed the political transformation of Africa. Further, it places a strong emphasis on free-market mechanisms, constitutionally restrained democracy, the development of civil society, and adherence to international human rights standards, both generally and in Africa (Thrall, 2015).

Unlike America, China has prioritized political and economic connections while mostly ignoring human rights issues and openly condemning what it sees as Western meddling. Given the different environments in which American and Chinese media operate, it is not surprising that they frequently disagree on the importance of other nations in economic progress (Ibid.).

1.2 Historical context

Understanding the historical context and motivations for both Chinese and American engagement in Africa helps in comprehending the nature of their relations with African nations and the policies pursued by both to expand their influence through investments, technological advancements, and internal conflicts.

1.2.1 History of Sino-African Relations

Chinese-African relations have succeeded in expanding into a wider stage of collaboration in every field by persevering despite various international setbacks. Independence movements, the Cold War and its aftermath, and the New World Order are only a few examples. Faced with Western powers that exploited Africa to the fullest, China offered itself as a model to many growing African nations. It maintained reciprocal benefits while offering significant aid in many other disciplines. The high-level collaboration between China and African countries was strengthened by repeated visits by decision-makers from both sides, which also broadened political, economic, and cultural interactions (Harper, 2019).

Two phases define Chinese foreign policy toward Africa. One of disinterest, mainly during the 80s and 90s, and the other of intensive engagement, mainly at the beginning of the 21st century.

1.3 Chinese Foreign policy towards Africa in the 1980s

The insignificance of Sino-African cooperation is what defines the 1980s. After the failure of African economies to generate development following independence, and China's loss of justification for backing both anti-Soviet and anti-American activities in Africa, it considered Africa "insignificant" to its quest for modernization. As a result, Chinese aid to Africa declined, shifting attention more to other parts of the world, mainly Japan and the US, and later on its rapprochement policy with the USSR. High-level visits between Chinese and African leaders were rarely initiated. The election of former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) and the desire to modernize as quickly as possible, was mostly unrelated to Africa. By failing to embrace free trade and opening their markets to international competitors, African nations further distanced themselves from China's goals set by Xiaoping

mainly focusing on a rapid economic revolution based on investments, which at that period had little to no effect on their relationship with the continent. This coincided with Chinese harsh criticism of the African model of socialism, mainly because of its failure, and the corruption in which socialist African leaders were involved. Besides that, Xiaoping claims that “without developing the productive forces and improving people’s living standards, you can not say you are building socialism” (Shinn, 2019). This attests that African socialist countries were not appreciated by China due to their passivity in improving people’s welfare states.

1.3.1 China African Policy in the 90s

In the 1990s, China seized the chance to increase its influence in Africa in the aftermath of the Cold War and the declining ambitions of many Western countries. Due to China's commitments to financial support and aid, particularly in response to Taiwan's funding strategies, several African countries, including South Africa, Chad, and various Sub-Saharan countries, gravitated towards Beijing. China's foreign policy goals aimed at isolating Taiwan and garnering greater diplomatic recognition in Africa. It is worth noting that out of the 45 African nations, Taiwan is officially recognized only by Eswatini (Abidde,2020).

The Western censure of the Chinese leadership at the time in light of the Tiananmen Square protests and the mass killing of protesters by the Chinese government led to a reevaluation of Chinese foreign policy at that time. When Western ambitions for China to adopt a Western model faded, Africa emerged as the alternative. In response to the "Revolutionary Rebellion" that occurred in Tiananmen Square, other African nations expressed their support and sympathies. The establishment of this common ground was aided by several factors, including the belief shared by both China and Africa that Western imperialism or neo-imperialism was their common enemy and that Western attention to

human rights cases served as a strategy to impede the rapid development of Third World (non-aligned) nations. Along with it, there is a common narrative about Western dominance. Following Tiananmen, China ensured that Africa would be on its side by continuing to provide financial aid to numerous nations; this source of income was warmly welcomed by the leaders of the continent, who both expressed their gratitude and heightened criticism of Western influence in the region. To strengthen ties with the continent, China's foreign minister, Qian Qichen, traveled to 15 African nations in 1992. But the true motivation behind the trip was to win African support against Western pressure, particularly in the wake of the collapse of the bipolar world order and China's perception of unchallenged American hegemony globally, and to confirm the non-interference policy as the cornerstone of Sino-African relations (Taylor, 1998).

In the economic sphere, hardly many reforms were put into place during that period. Chinese bilateral trade with Africa experienced significant growth, rising from 1.6 billion dollars in 1990 to five billion dollars in 1997, representing a 431 percent increase. However, in comparison to China's bilateral commerce with countries outside of Africa, these numbers remained relatively small and insufficient. Between 1990 and 2000, Chinese investments in Africa amounted to only \$300 million, which was still a small amount. In addition, President Jiang Zemin offered a "Five Points Proposal" in his 1996 speech to the Organization of African Unity and during his visits to six African countries, aimed at establishing a long-term economic strategy and forging a more structured collaboration between China and Africa. These actions laid the ground for the creation of the Beijing-based Forum for China-African Cooperation in 2000 (Ibid.).

Chinese-African cultural exchanges also made their relations stronger. China received 28 ministerial-level cultural delegations from Africa and also sent several governmental

cultural delegations to visit 17 African countries. They have played key roles in promoting cultural relations, which were mainly based on cultural exchange (China.org, 2022).

1.3.2 The New Era: early 21st Century

The 2000s, described as the New Millennium for the Chinese- African relationship, experienced many improvements in their relationships in every aspect. The second millennium as far as the Chinese African relations can be grouped into several periods such as:

1.3.3 The Beginning of the 21st

Amidst China's growing claims of global hegemony, its rising power has indisputably maneuvered itself closer to African states since the dawn of the 21st century. China and Africa increased exchanges between their high-level leaders, congresses, and parliaments. The Forum for China-African Cooperation was established in Beijing in 2000. The Forum consists of 44 primary African members and has been guiding China-Africa relations through its triennial plans and its growing institutional arrangements since then advanced China's long-term African vision. In 2003, the Forum was held again, this time discussing the progress that has been made and the proposal of debt cancellation and relief, as well as introducing several new aid packages (Yu, 2022). The Forum was created as a soft power nexus to challenge the many other organizations that stepped up in partnering with Africa, such as the Eu-Africa summit, the US Africa Business Forum, and Japan's TICAD. China introduced its first African policy paper in 2006, publicly announcing Africa's strategic importance and stressing the interest in furthering such cooperation in the future. Another remarkable issue that characterized this period was the concern about immigration between China and Africa (Tryon, 2016).

In 2004, 43 Chinese companies were operating across Africa. Chinese investments in Africa represented only \$840 million out of the \$15 billion in total direct investments in Africa (Brautigam, 2017). The Chinese financial support for Africa grew significantly, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, from \$1.3 billion in 2003 to \$4.5 billion in 2007 (Foster, 2008). However, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) insists that few of that monetary aid meets the standards set by the international organization (.Ibid).

In 2005, China became Africa's third-largest trading partner, behind only France and the United States. Chinese African trade has grown from 10 billion dollars in 2000 to approximately \$28 billion in 2005. In addition, China's rapid economic growth (nine percent) triggered a need for raw materials as well as achieving energy Security. With new reservoirs being discovered, Africa's energy role in supplying China with these requirements became crucial as Chinese oil companies sought the chance for potential exploitation, which in turn required significant Chinese military, economic, and political presence in a continent containing eight percent of the world's oil reserves, however full of corruption (Smith, 2019).

The first phase of the second millennium period saw an increase in the Chinese military presence on the African continent. Chinese soldiers were deployed abroad after China's commitment in January 2005 to fulfill its United Nations peacekeeping duties. Chinese soldiers were sent to many African hotbeds, from Liberia to Western Sahara as part of Operation MINURSO, and to Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, and the Republic of Congo (Rogers, 2007). However, China, through its military interventions and UN peacekeeping operations, seeks to enhance its reputation as a growing force and a desirable partner that is an accountable member of the global community (Dyrenforth, 2021).

In addition, China aims to create a counter-image to the Europeans' excessive intervention in the internal affairs of its African counterparts, which was the aspect of Western-African ties that Africans detested the most (Enuka, 2011).

China interfered militarily and diplomatically in the FUC rebellion in Chad and Sudan. It provided full support to overthrow Idriss Déby, a pro-Taiwan leader. With Sudan maintaining a pro-Chinese stance, rebels received Chinese diplomatic support as well as light weapons. In Chad, China has pursued its interests in replacing Deby with a more pro-China leader. In 2006, the Chinese backed a coup d'état in Chad. The coup failed after the French intervention. Deby then switched his support to Beijing, fearing another Chinese-supported uprising, with the apparent defeat becoming a strategic victory for China (UCHEHARA, 2009).

China has established several strategic alliances with six influential African states, four of which are major oil suppliers: Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria, and Egypt. In Sudan, which maintains great relations with China, when the UN Security Council passed the 1564 resolution, imposing sanctions against the government, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Guyangya threatened to veto the resolution. This shows how the Sudanese-Chinese alliance influenced the politics of both countries, most notably that of Sudan. Many other resolutions passed against African countries that China either vetoed or abstained from indicate the solid ties between both African governments and China (Kraguland, 2009).

1.3.4 From 2007 until now:

The Chinese leader Xi Jinping delivered a speech to the Zimbabwean President at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on April 3, 2018, in which he avows that "No matter how the international situation changes and to what stage China develops, China will, as always, stand with all developing countries, including African countries, and be a sincere friend and a

reliable partner of Africa”. his speech reveals China’s amiable view of African countries and that Africa is no longer a market but a strategic partner for China.

In 2007, a boost in China’s foreign direct investments (FDI), growing 3.5 times between 2007 and 2009 due to the establishment of the China-Africa Development Fund (CADF), pushed for more cooperation in the economic sphere (Kragelund & Van Dijk, 2009). Due to Chinese investments in the same year, Africa's overall economic growth reached its highest level ever. Irene Yuan Sun, an associate partner at McKinsey and the author of a book on Chinese investment in Africa, argues that the biggest chance for industrialization in Africa in this generation is Chinese manufacturing investment. Sun attributes the feat to China's cheap, high-quality construction of infrastructure projects, including roads, bridges, and other minor projects and contributions. Moreover, Chinese peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Darfur helped to further solidify their position as a major actor in African political affairs (Feng & Pilling, 2019).

China-Africa relations went another step ahead with the adoption of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. The latter is an ambitious infrastructure project that plans to develop new trade routes connecting China to the rest of the world. It also aims to develop and expand the Chinese market and investments, and to grow China’s economic and political power. Nearly 43 African countries are part of this initiative (Mcbride & Berman, 2023).

Chinese banks have funded numerous projects in Africa, including a major gas pipeline and railways in Nigeria, along with projects in Uganda, Egypt, Ethiopia, and many other countries (Devonshire-Ellis, 2020). The nature of cooperation under the Road and Belt Initiative differs from one country to another. In Kenya, for instance, the China Road and Bridge Corporation built what became known as the first high-speed railway on the African continent, which runs between Mombasa to the capital Nairobi. The project has provided jobs

and training for a local workforce to operate the railway, but the project funded by Chinese loans raised critics about the essence of loans and Kenya's ability to service these loans, but undoubtedly entitled China with much-needed Kenyan support for the Chinese presence in the rest of the east African region. This prompted one of Kenya's most popular newspapers, the Daily Nation (2018), to praise the role of Chinese engagement with their country, commenting: "China is a worthy partner in its efforts to break the age-old poverty trap, based on centuries of underdevelopment."

1.4 U.S policies in Africa

Realizing the efficiency of Chinese soft power foreign policies pursued in Africa, the United States is gradually re-shaping its new U.S.-Africa Policy so that it meets the requirements to regain its lost hegemony. The American strategy in Africa underwent numerous stages of change as different governments came into power, all the while taking into account international trends and decision-makers (Hanzhi, 2022).

Historically, Since the fall of the Soviet Union, American global hegemony remained unmatched, resisting several Global setbacks from global economic recession to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, American strategy seems to be ignorant of its developmental duties, and the needs of Africa. The American foreign policy tends to follow a self-serving approach instead of a mutually beneficial relationship. The emblem "America first" was always the primary focus of its foreign policy in Africa. Instead of focusing on strengthening its ties with African states, successive US administrations sought to discredit China as a challenger of the international-based world order, while not recognizing its failed-tumultuous relationship with Africa (Ibid).

Despite the US-Africa history of the relationship being mainly resembled by hard power policies and direct military intervention. Africans questioned their legitimacy and tarnished their reputation. Recent administrations realized the need for a policy change, releasing soft power policies. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barak Obama, among other American presidents, all launched significant initiatives there that helped advance trade, health, and energy, among several other areas, but their administrations paid the continent only scant, sporadic attention, which constrained the success of the American agenda in Africa (Temin, 2021). Hence, an analysis of these soft power policies allows us to figure out their nature and context, and the strategies to counter Chinese influence. Indeed, the main threat to America's long-term strategy in Africa is China and not terrorism (Ibid).

As the Chinese policies in Africa are shaped in terms of periods, America's relations with Africa are structured according to presidents' agendas and policies. Some of the prominent American policies in Africa are:

1.4.1 The Obama-Africa Policy

Being the first president in U.S. history of an African background does not necessarily make Obama's legacy in Africa particularly historic. The US relationship with Africa was challenging because of Obama's African heritage. The "birther conspiracy," which casts doubt on his right to be elected, influenced the criticism of his foreign policy, particularly from Hillary Clinton's supporters, claiming that it would focus too much on the continent and devote insufficient resources to its development (Zurcher, 2015).

The main focus of Obama's African policy, however, was centered around security assistance. In Kenya, for example, Obama maintained a strong relationship despite the post-2007 elections' political dilemma and human rights violations. In addition, American drones

carried out operations against the Al-Shabab terrorist group in the northeast of the country. The Pentagon increased military support against Boko Haram in Nigeria and other terrorist groups in Cameroon and Chad, respectively. Also, America put more pressure on African governments to issue reforms (Livingston, 2016).

Although the U.S. provided Africa with roughly 8 billion dollars of aid, mostly directed to sub-Saharan Africa, Obama's main emphasis was on trade and investments. Obama asserted that "African People are not interested in being given aid but in building capacity (infrastructure)" (BBC, 2017). Here, The US aims at transforming Africa from simply a passive continent relying on American support and help into a productive one through the building of African economic infrastructure, which would help in developing Africa.

Furthermore, President Obama implemented two notable training programs, namely the 'Young African Leaders' (YALI) and 'Up to Africans,' as part of his collaborative efforts with Africa across various domains. These initiatives aimed to equip the younger African generation with the necessary skills and preparation for assuming leadership roles (Ibid.).

In his second term and after his victorious reelection, foreign direct investments (FDI) from the United States increased by 70%, from \$37 billion in 2008 to an all-time high of \$64 billion in 2015. Two Global Entrepreneurship Summits (GES) in favor of innovation and development were hosted in Africa. The summits highlight the vast prospects in both northern and sub-Saharan Africa. Over \$1 billion in capital was raised for African entrepreneurs by the GES (White House, 2016).

To increase access to power in the area, the Africa Energy Initiative was launched in 2013, concentrating on funding renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa. With the \$7 billion investment, the United States hoped to solidify its position as a major player in Africa's

energy destiny. Liberata Mulamula, the former Tanzanian ambassador to the United States, explained the significance of American investments in renewable energy sectors in his nation while contending that they are insufficient to maintain energy security in Tanzania, where access to electricity was only 21% in 2013 and 26.17% in 2015 (Basu, 2013).

Moreover, the first US-Africa summit was held during Obama's first administration in 2014. The primary drives of this summit were influenced by Africa's huge demographic power and its growing middle-class-based economic market. Its major takeaways include economic, political, and cultural agreements with Africa as well as a long-term cooperation plan. It reflected Obama's administration's recognition of the importance of a successful partnership with Africa as well as its role in global affairs (Ibid.).

Sarah Margon, Washington Director at Human Rights Watch, highlighted the issue of aid support to authoritarian countries in Africa. She argued that such support weakened the political system and damaged citizens' rights in these countries. She was among the first to criticize Obama's visit to Ethiopia, asserting that Obama failed to hold Ethiopia accountable for the clampdown on civil society (Matthews, 2015). Moreover, the intervention in Libya led to intense criticism. The U.S. left the country in a state of deep instability. Obama himself expressed regret, calling it his "biggest foreign policy regret" (Ibid.).

1.4.2 Trump-Africa policy

In general, the U.S. reputation and role in Africa have declined under the presidency of Donald Trump. Faced with domestic challenges and Trump's isolationist approach, authoritarian competitors like China and Russia capitalized on the opportunity to gain geopolitical advantages in Africa. Both presented their autocratic form of governance as a model to undermine liberal democratic ideals. As a result, U.S. policy in Africa failed miserably to protect America's interests, relying heavily on the resilience and longevity of its

democratic institutions. Trump refused to embrace America's historical responsibility as a protector of democratic values in Africa (Magsamen et al., 2018).

To add, although Africa received an annual of \$7 billion in the 3 years after his election, US-Africa bilateral trade fell from 100 billion dollars in 2008 to 41 billion only in 2018 due to Trump's disengaging policies. These harsh measures, which Trump believed would "encourage free trade", ended up undermining the growth of various small African countries, such as Lesotho. Rwanda was suspended from the tariff-free access fee to the US market. America's direct investments (FDI) declined by 14%, from 50.4 billion in 2017 before Trump's election to 43 billion in 2019 after his election (Owusu & Carmody, 2020).

Furthermore, Trump's "Muslim travel ban", denying entry of citizens from several Muslim countries, including some African countries allowed, for further divergence between the US and Africa (Ibid.). Trump's main African policy focus was mainly on addressing the Chinese debt problem and countering its economic and political influence in Africa. However, this obvious approach toward Africa did not hinder China's influence, on the contrary, it allowed it to take over in many fields and gain more support from African states (Landler & Wong, 2018).

Despite this, Trump's administration backed initiatives to end the civil war in Cameroon and the democratic transition of power in Sudan and The DRC (Campbell, 2020). Trump's administration's signature initiative, known as Prosper Africa, is designed to assist U.S. companies seeking to do business in Africa. But unlike his predecessors, Trump does not appear to be personally involved in this initiative or other aspects of U.S.-Africa policy. Despite the administration showing no interest in African investment, both Congressmen Tibor Nagy, administrator of USAID, and Mark Green, assistant secretary of state for Africa,

carried out U.S. assistance programs and conflict-resolution initiatives. They visited Africa frequently and built positive relationships with African political leaders (ibid.).

Introduced by nine U.S. Senators, the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act of 2018 led to the establishment of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC). The IDFC allowed the US to double its investment limits from 29 billion to 60 billion (Ibid.).

1.4.3 Biden's Administration's New Approach to Africa

With the election of Joe Biden, US-World policy changed completely. Amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine's upheaval and the aftermath of the Corona pandemic. A summit was held for the third time in December 2022. This time, taking into consideration the geopolitical dynamics. Most importantly, the spread of extremist organizations in sub-Saharan Africa and China's rapid engagement in Africa (Duss & Yabi, 2022).

To reclaim its hegemony in Africa, the stage was set for U.S. re-engagement. Among the major takeaways from the summit were the creation of the President's African Diaspora Advisory Council, a U.S.-Africa Space Forum, and formal support for the membership of the African Union in the G20. The US pledged a \$55 billion commitment to enforcing the effective implementation of the African Union's Agenda 2063 framework by funding transport infrastructure, food security, and digital transformation initiatives (Ibid.). Biden's emphasis on the importance of avoiding geopolitical rivalry, engaging in Africa according to African terms, and filling their needs sparked sophistication among African leaders. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other senior officials' frequent visits to Africa last year show the highly-renewed degree of American interest in Africa.

In his address to the African Union Summit in February 2021, held amidst the global pandemic, President Biden outlined his administration's objectives, focusing on four key development strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa. These strategies were deemed crucial for advancing global priorities and strengthening the partnership between the United States and Africa. These strategies were deemed crucial for advancing global priorities and strengthening the partnership between the United States and Africa. Biden's strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa is centered around four objectives: advancing pandemic recovery and economic opportunities, supporting conservation, climate adaptation, and a just energy transition, fostering openness and open societies; and delivering democratic and security dividends (The White House, 2021). With this new strategy, which is a critical first step, the Biden administration intends to alter the U.S.-Africa relationship. It calls for enhancing and modernizing U.S. ties with Africa, working together to find novel solutions to new challenges, leveraging cutting-edge research and technology, and investing in long-term power sources while catering to immediate needs (Muyangwa, 2022).

Conclusion:

To sum up, After the European dominance over Africa in the 20th century, the US got more involved in African affairs, mostly to confront the Soviet presence and the spread of communism in Africa. On the other hand, China's involvement in Africa experienced a significant surge in the 21st century, especially in the second decade with the introduction of The Belt and Road initiative, which was well-received by several African nations. In addition, the US greatly assisted in the humanitarian crisis and the war against terror by establishing some military outposts under the aegis of AFRICOM, the American Africa Command. But compared to its expanding rival China, the US has fallen short of the goals that both its administrations and African states sought to jointly achieve via its strategies.

Chapter 02

The Western Orient Spread in Africa: Visions of the Economic, Military, and technological deadlock


Introduction

The indirect great power rivalry between the United States and China in Africa has evolved beyond a solely political standoff, encompassing economic aspects such as investments, trade, and debt. For instance, multinational corporations like Google from the U.S., Huawei from China, and DP World, a port company, are all actively pursuing trade agreements with different African blocs. This competition extends further to encompass the control of social media and e-commerce platforms. This gives America and China leverage in the new all-out technological competition that is quickly emerging in the region. Additionally, Chinese mining businesses are actively utilizing Africa's mining industry to exploit minerals such as nickel, cobalt, platinum, etc. competing fiercely with other global corporations, mostly British and Australian (Bartlett, 2022). In a more recent development, the United States has adopted a range of restrictive policies, grounded in national security concerns, along with initiatives like the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) to ensure the responsible production, processing, and recycling of critical minerals. The aim is to enable countries to fully unlock the economic development potential of their mineral resources. Introduced in June 2022, the MSP is anticipated by African nations to be a commitment from the United States to its objectives, rather than using it as a geopolitical tool to counter China's influence and diminish its control over the global supply chain (Byamungu, 2022). The United States renewed focus on mining ventures may be attributed to its concerns regarding the growing mining ambitions of Russia. Additionally, multilateral cooperation in this domain is also evident. China, together with other BRICS members—Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa—established the New Development Bank to provide financial support for projects in developing countries. In 2021, the bank established its headquarters in Shanghai. Military competition between rival nations primarily revolves around the establishment of overseas bases to safeguard their military presence and protect their interests (DeMarco, 2023).

2. The Economic rationale for the African scramble


In the race to establish hegemony in Africa, the rivalry between the United States and China primarily manifests in economic terms, as mentioned earlier, with both countries formulating policies based on their economic and financial interests. China maintains that its policies are not aimed at securing economic dominance over the United States, but rather at protecting its interests, much like any other country would. However, the current U.S. strategy in Africa appears to be more focused on diminishing China's influence rather than presenting a comprehensive framework (Cheng, 2022).

Figure 1: China and US direct investments to Africa (2003-2019)



Source: Olander, E. (2021, January 15). *New stats reveal China-Africa Trade, aid flows rose in 2019, but FDI kept falling*. The China Global South Project. <https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2021/01/15/new-stats-reveal-china-africa-trade-aid-flows-rose-in-2019-but-fdi-kept-falling/>

Figure 2: African trade with China from 2010 to 2022.



Source: Bociaga, R. (2023, January 27). *China-africa trade soars on Spike in commodity prices*. Nikkei Asia. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/China-Africa-trade-soars>

on-spike-in-commodity-prices#:~:text=KAMPALA%2C%20Uganda%20--%20Africa%27s%20bilateral,to%20%24282%20billion%20in%202022.

The figures commutate the growing economic relationship between China and Africa in the 21st century, yet a dip in American interest in Africa is illustrated in the decrease of US capita flow to Africa, both in investments and trade relations at the same time.

2.1 Monetary Investments and Infrastructure Projects

2.1.1 Chinese Trade and Investments with Africa

The Chinese influence in the African continent manifests in a variety of interconnected ways including, migration, trade, investments (both state- and privately-driven), and development assistance (including tariff exemptions and debt relief). Furthermore, Chinese FDI is desperately required. According to Asiedu (2004), Africa must cover a 64 billion dollar yearly resource gap to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Kragelund & Van Dijk, 2009).

Additionally, General Stephen Townsend of the United States Africa Command has expressed his concerns regarding China's increasing influence in Africa. He stated that China's significant investments in Africa, considering it as its "second continent," and its assertive pursuit of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative are contributing to Chinese economic growth and surpassing the United States in exploiting opportunities for its advantage (Yousef, 2022). The level of anxiety the United States has for China's efforts in Africa is evident from his remark, which is unparalleled.

The founder of MORE Architecture, Daan Roggeveen, has asserted that "right now you could say that any big project in African cities that is higher than three floors or roads that are longer than three kilometers is most likely being built and engineered by the Chinese" (Shepard, 2019). Roggeveen's assertion highlights both the substantial influence


Chinese businesses play in the economies of African nations as well as the significant Chinese engagement in the construction of Africa's infrastructure.

Subsequently, the Chinese FDI occurs during a time of absolute advancement, but a relative reduction in FDI to Africa (Kragelund, 2009). Although absolute FDI flows to the continent reached a historical high in 2005, other parts of the world, notably other developing regions, received considerably more FDI (Ibid.).

The volume of Chinese-African trade has witnessed substantial growth, escalating from 10 billion dollars in 2000 to approximately 50 billion in 2005 and reaching a staggering 282 billion in 2022, surpassing that of the United States. By early 2008, China had emerged as the largest importer of goods to Africa, accounting for approximately 18 percent of the total imports. Notably, the magnitude of loans extended by China to African countries exceeds the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI), totaling a substantial \$696 billion between 2000 and 2020 (Jones, 2022).

Figure 3: Chinese bilateral trade with Africa (2003 to 2021)

The graph displays the volume of commerce that took place between China and Africa between 2003 and 2021, reaching a record-breaking \$254 billion at the end of the same year



Source: Fleck, A. (2022, August 1). *Infographic: China - Africa Trade Hits record highs in 2021*. Statista Daily Data. <https://www.statista.com/chart/27880/trade-between-china-and-africa/>


Accordingly, data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (2015) suggests that Chinese investment in Africa through loans enables more flexible arrangements, processes, and repayment structures. Between 2001 and 2018, China invested a total of \$41 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. In 2015 alone, Chinese contracts for projects on the continent reached an impressive \$55 billion.

Hence, China's involvement in Africa includes the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects and the establishment of twenty-five economic and trade cooperation zones. These zones are regarded as models that can be replicated in other developing regions.

The flow of Chinese investments in Africa surged after the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. With support from the Chinese government, African countries have undertaken and are currently implementing numerous infrastructure projects that are vital for their economies. Over the period from 2000 to 2022, China's assistance to Africa resulted in the construction of approximately 13,000 kilometers of railway and roads, 80 power facilities, 130 medical facilities, and 200 schools.

Figure 4: Chinese FDI to Africa between 2003 and 2020

The figure above depicts the enormous rise of Chinese FDI Flows and Stocks to Africa between 2003 and 2020 in US dollars.



Source: Fu, Y. (2021, November 22). *The quiet china-africa revolution: Chinese investment.* The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/the-quiet-china-africa-revolution-chinese-investment/>.

Since 2013, China has become the country with the highest amount of FDI flow to Africa, surpassing the United States for the first time in the history of investors on the continent.

In 2020, Chinese contractors accounted for 31% of all African building projects with a budget of \$50 million or more. China provided funding for the majority of major construction projects in the region, covering approximately 15% of the total funding gap, estimated to be between \$68 billion and \$108 billion. China's focus on infrastructure development in Africa is evident as it extends railways, highways, and airports deep into the continent. Notable projects include the \$12 billion Coastal Railway in Nigeria, the \$5 billion Addis Abeba-Djibouti Railway, and the \$11 billion mega port and industrial zone at Bagamoyo. Moreover, China and Egypt's collaboration through the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) aims to study and finance the administrative portion of Egypt's new capital. This partnership signifies China's interest in supporting Africa's infrastructural growth.

China's engagement with Africa is also influenced by its domestic concerns, such as future labor shortages and rising domestic wages. Africa's fast-growing population provides a potential solution to these challenges. Additionally, Chinese businesses view Africa's expanding middle class as an opportunity to access new consumer markets, particularly in the communication and technology sectors. According to research by McKinsey in 2017, Chinese businesses in Africa generated \$180 billion in annual sales, and this figure is projected to reach \$250 billion by 2025. This demonstrates China's recognition of Africa's economic potential and its desire to tap into emerging opportunities on the continent.

Chinese investments in Africa have faced criticism due to concerns about labor standards and working conditions. Some Chinese business owners have been accused of disregarding international labor standards, resulting in unfavorable working conditions, lax health regulations, and low wages for African workers. This disregard for workers' rights, including the right to a fair wage under Zambian law, has been a source of contention. The criticism was further fueled by the 2005 mining disaster at a CNMC (China Nonferrous Metal Mining Corporation) mine, where 46 people lost their lives. This incident brought to light the concerns surrounding Chinese investment practices. The incident was heavily criticized during the Chambishi riots of 2006, where protesters demanded improved safeguards for employees, assurances regarding their health and well-being, and attention to various issues such as the shortage of drinking water, higher wages, and safety gear. These instances highlight the need for stronger labor protections, occupational health and safety measures, and adherence to local laws and regulations in Chinese investments in Africa. Both Chinese companies and African governments must address these concerns and ensure that workers' rights and well-being are prioritized in the pursuit of economic development and investment projects (Hsiang, 2023).

The former president of Zambia, Michael Sata, emerged as a prominent critic of China and symbolized the anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa during his election campaign in 2008. Sata raised questions about the nature of Chinese investments in Zambia, acknowledging their importance in sustaining economic growth and developing infrastructure in the country and across Africa. However, he emphasized the need for Chinese investments to respect the interests and well-being of the Zambian people (African Business, 2014).

Solange Chatelard, a researcher specializing in Sino-Zambian relations, responded to Sata's statements by writing to the China Global South Project Magazine. Chatelard argued


that Sata's remarks should not be misconstrued, as he was not solely targeting Chinese investment but was critical of all forms of foreign exploitation. The researcher highlighted that Sata recognized the differences between present-day China and past colonial powers like Britain, and he aimed to challenge any foreign investment that he perceived as undermining Zambia's interests and sovereignty. This perspective suggests that Sata's concerns extended beyond Chinese investment and were not solely directed at China. These contrasting viewpoints demonstrate the complexity of the discourse surrounding Chinese investment in Africa. While some critics, like Sata, highlight the need for responsible and respectful investment practices, others argue against viewing Chinese investment in isolation and emphasize the broader issues of foreign exploitation and economic influence in the region (Olander, 2010).

2.1.2 Western Criticism: Debt Trap Diplomacy

Rush Doshi's book *The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order the Former* (2021), illustrates the Chinese strategies to displace American hegemony in Africa. Doshi classifies three strategies of containment. The first strategy of containment (1989-2008) was to diffuse the American influence on China itself. The second period coincided with the global financial crisis of 2008 and aimed to challenge American influence in neighboring Asian countries. The third phase began with the establishment of the Belt and Road initiative and extended to Brexit, Trump's, and Biden's administrations, and the poor Western management of the COVID-19 pandemic. Its objective is to expand China's economic and political hegemony in the whole world, with African countries being fundamental to the strategy (Gulati & Babu, 2022).

Figure 5: Chinese loans to the African continent between 2001 and 2018

The figure illustrates Chinese-indebted African nations from 2001 to 2018.



Source: Jones, C. D et al. (2022, January 24). *Chinese economic engagement in Africa: Implications for U.S. policy*. Foreign Policy Research Institute. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/01/chinese-economic-engagement-in-africa/> .

The Chinese Debt Trap Diplomacy is a theoretical term related to the Chinese geostrategic vision coined by Brahma Chellaney. It describes the amount of unsustainable Chinese loans that overwhelm poor African countries and force them to hand leverage and cede assets to China in exchange for these loans. There is still no evidence to back up the presence of such diplomacy in Africa (Bloomberg Originals, 2022).

Furthermore, Challeney refers to the debt policy in one of his tweets as “colonization by debt”. According to an AP report, China’s Belt and Road Initiative are central to the debt trap diplomacy, and it has saddled developing nations with \$385 billion in “hidden debts,” raising the risk of these countries falling into debt traps (Nensee, 2023). The problem is that eight of the 68 countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative currently face unsustainable debt levels (Ming, 2018). Whereas Chinese loans present a new option for countries that would rather not go to the IMF. Many argue that China is trying to compete with the IMF. In Angola, before the drop in oil prices, China accepted the government’s offer to extend the

short-term loan contract and provide more than 19 billion worth of concessional loans in one year (Elwatanian TV, 2022).

Advocates of the Chinese debt claim contend that certain African nations are facing considerable challenges in repaying the substantial loan amounts they have received from China. Consequently, these countries often find themselves compelled to surrender vital assets within their borders or request debt cancellation, which is typically declined (Wang, 2022). One example is Djibouti, where public debt is projected to reach approximately 88% of the country's GDP. As payment for its debt to China and affiliated state firms, Djibouti granted China a 99-year lease on the Dolareh port (Brautigam, 2018). This issue has been raised repeatedly by Western-driven African media. Janet Eom, a researcher at CARI and a representative from Djibouti, expressed concerns about Africa's mounting debt to China in an interview with DW (2018). However, oversight of the proportion of Chinese loans in certain African countries undermines China's position in utilizing debt as leverage. In Kenya, for instance, Chinese loans account for only approximately 10% (Chinese Embassy in Kenya, 2022).

The same goes for the most populous African country. Nigeria, where there is concern that China is utilizing it as a new frontier in its rivalry with the United States. China is offering military assistance to avoid collateral damage from terrorist attacks on infrastructure, and to protect Chinese nationals in the country. But with only 3 to 4 percent of total debt, Beijing uses these loans to fund Nigeria's many infrastructure projects (Bociaga, 2022).

In a related context, during her visit to Zambia on January 24, 2023, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen, highlighted the outcomes of a new "mutually beneficial" American strategy toward Africa. She also addressed the matter of Chinese loans to Zambia, advocating for "extraordinary measures" to curb the increasing influence of its rivals,

specifically Russia and China, on the continent. In response, the Chinese embassy in Zambia emphasized that the United States should cease its endeavors to shift its debt burden onto other nations (Aljazeera, 2023). Indeed, the data indicating that Chinese debt constitutes only 17.6% of Zambia's total external debt suggests that the Zambian government bears significant responsibility for the debt crisis. The government had received sufficient warnings about the escalating debt burden from economists, opposition groups, as well as international advisors such as the IMF, the World Bank, and donors. This evidence highlights the need for Zambia to take responsibility for its actions and decisions, and it underscores the necessity for reform in the country's approach to foreign investment overall. While China's involvement in the debt situation is a factor, it should not be solely blamed for the crisis (GIN, 2023).

What's more, the article titled "How China should handle its bad loans to poor countries," published in *The Economist Magazine* in early August 2022, shed light on the criticism of Chinese lending policies. It emphasized the need to examine how the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aligns with China's long-term strategy in Africa, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Many developing nations have faced challenges with "sovereign debt" and have sought debt restructuring agreements with China, their primary lender. The success of the initiative largely relies on China's responsibility and actions in addressing these issues (Ajnoti, 2022).

Moreover, a detailed examination of Chinese loans to Africa reveals stark differences compared to loans provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Loans from the IMF are characterized by clear terms and are subject to review by multiple intergovernmental organizations and stakeholders (PolyMatter, 2021). Conversely, commercial loans offered by Chinese banks feature distinct terms that are shrouded in secrecy, carry significantly higher interest rates, and are swiftly disbursed to neighboring countries (Ibid).

Indeed, it is crucial to consider the perspectives of Africans themselves when assessing China's endeavors in Africa, regardless of Western criticism. The African people are the ones best positioned to evaluate China's intentions and the impact of its actions. China has been actively involved in various initiatives aimed at improving the quality of life in impoverished African nations and bridging the infrastructure gap. This is of significant importance as the African continent faces substantial infrastructure financing requirements, projected to reach up to \$170 billion annually by 2025, according to estimations by the African Development Bank. China's contributions to addressing these needs and promoting development in Africa have been recognized by many Africans. Their perspectives provide valuable insights into the positive impact that China is making in the region (Jafrani, 2021).

While concerns have been raised by various organizations, such as the World Bank and former president David Malpass, regarding Chinese loans, it is worth noting that China's strategic approach of providing infrastructure loans offers the potential for long-term productivity gains. Unlike loans from the United States, which are often provided in times of urgency to address temporary deficits and debt shortfalls, China's focus on infrastructure development aims to promote sustainable economic growth and enhance productivity in the long run. This approach recognizes the importance of investing in infrastructure as a catalyst for development and improving the overall socio-economic conditions in recipient countries. However, it is important to assess each loan individually and consider its terms, conditions, and long-term implications to fully evaluate its impact (Ibid).

In addition to the views expressed by Chinese officials, such as Xue Bing, China's special envoy for the Horn of Africa, and Wang Wenbin, China's foreign ministry spokesman, who dismiss the concept of a debt trap as a "Western-created" myth, there are several economic indicators that suggest Africans are generally satisfied with their trade relationship with China and are not currently trapped in a debt crisis. Measures such as export/import data,

trade volumes, and foreign direct investment illustrate the positive nature of trade between Africa and China. China's recognition of this paradigm has allowed them to adapt their policies accordingly, while the United States and other Western powers have been slower to re-align and re-evaluate their approaches to Africa. Additionally, specialized data on Chinese lending to Africa indicates that China's significant role in debt-distressed countries is limited to only a few out of the fifty-four low-income African nations identified by the IMF (Vines et al., 2022).

In her scholarly article titled "A Critical Look at Chinese Debt Trap Diplomacy: The Rise of a Meme," Deborah Brautigam (2020) examines the emergence of the debt trap myth propagated through Western media and publications, including renowned outlets like The Guardian and The New York Times. Brautigam argues that the myth was portrayed as an unquestionable historical truth, lacking in-depth investigations and critical analysis. She draws a parallel between the Japanese story of Rashomon and the narratives surrounding Chinese involvement in Africa, highlighting the need for objective neutrality in academic papers that seek to analyze the Chinese lending system. In the same sphere, In their article titled "The Chinese Debt Trap is a Myth" (2021) published in The Atlantic Magazine, Brautigam and Meg Rithmire, an associate professor at the Harvard Business School, argue that the notion of a Chinese debt trap is unfounded and exaggerated. They contend that not all forms of Chinese involvement in developing countries, including loans, investments, and economic cooperation, should be automatically framed in a negative light. The authors suggest that certain Western-led criticisms are influenced by biases and perceptions of China as a new imperial power, rather than objectively assessing the potential benefits of China's engagement for the African continent. Their article challenges the prevailing negative narrative surrounding Chinese involvement in Africa, urging for a more nuanced and balanced perspective. In a parallel context, Moreover, a report from the British NGO Debt (2022)

reveals that approximately 35 percent of Africa's external debt is owed to Western private lenders, who charge an interest rate of around five percent. In contrast, only 12 percent of the debt is owed to China, with an interest rate of nearly three percent. This data underscores the varying sources and terms of Africa's debt obligations. Furthermore, China Express (2023) highlights the positive impact of Chinese loans specifically targeted at developing infrastructure in 15 African countries, noting their contribution to economic growth. These findings shed light on the complex dynamics of Africa's debt landscape and the potential role of Chinese loans in fostering development.


The debt crisis in Africa became a geopolitical battle. Western propaganda put all the blame on Chinese lenders while ignoring the IMF lenders which are far more responsible for the debt crisis, as well as Western institutions, companies, etc (BreakThrough News, 2023).

In addition, dependence on Chinese finances and debts provided China with many political advantages, as many African states need China more than it needed them. For instance, the Chinese embassy in Mauritius forced the cancellation of the Hakka Affairs Council culinary cultural event in a hotel, even threatening to forbid Taiwanese officials from entering the country (Maluki, 2019).

2.1.3 Insights on U.S. African Trade and Investments

Figure 3: US two-way trade with Africa between the beginning of the century and 2021

The graph depicts the height of trade between the United States and Africa between 2000 and 2010 when it exceeded \$113 billion in value. Afterward, two-way commerce began to decline, falling to \$52 billion in 2015 and \$64 billion in 2021. What is noteworthy, though, is that China's participation in Africa has increased at the same time as trade relations between the United States and Africa have deteriorated.



Source: Pecquet, J. (2022, September 22). *US-Africa Trade: Lofty goals, lagging investment*. The Africa Report.com. <https://www.theafricareport.com/240175/us-africa-trade-lofty-goals-lagging-investment/>.

Despite peaking at \$38.1 billion in 2014, the year of President Barack Obama's first US-Africa summit, US exports of products to the continent barely surpassed \$26.7 billion in 2021, according to the US International Trade Commission. From a record of \$141.9 billion in 2008 to \$64.3 billion now, or barely more than 1% of US global commerce, two-way trade has fallen. A significant proportion of the fall in bilateral trade has been brought on by a decline in oil and gas sales to Africa since the US has become an energy exporter over the past ten years as a result of shale drilling. Despite this, according to Aloysius Ordu (2022), the US still has a competitive advantage in certain significant industries, such as food, transportation equipment, manufacturing, refined fuels, and technology (Pecquet, 2022).

2.2 Strategic Competition for Overseas Basing in Africa

2.2.1 The U.S. Military Presence

China has emerged not as an economic and strategic rival for America but as a new military force on a global scale as a result of advancements in the weaponry industry and military technology during the past ten years. However, despite these advancements and the

fact that China outperforms the United States. Economically, it still pales in comparison to the United States military power in Africa.

The United States has special troops stationed in roughly twenty-seven African nations as part of operations against terrorism and through agreements negotiated with various African governments. Since 9/11, these forces have participated in numerous operations and training exercises against terrorist organizations, piracy, and smuggling, particularly in the Sahel region. These bases are crucial to ensuring that the US has a presence in Africa despite recent soft power initiatives on the continent (Harper, 2022).

Following the announcement that the U.S. plans to move the headquarters of its Africa Military Command (AFRICOM) from Germany to an African nation, Biden appointed several knowledgeable councils and ambassadors in African affairs. To eradicate terrorist organizations and carry out peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, AFRICOM, which was established in 2008, works in North, Sub-Saharan, and East Africa. Additionally, it seeks to improve security cooperation with Africa and give African partners new opportunities (Ibid).

Djibouti is also essential to the US military strategy in Africa. Washington applies pressure on Djibouti out of concern over a Chinese military buildup. The Biden administration reportedly increased the size of its Cape Verde military base in the Sahel. He also pledged to invest \$100 billion in the nation's economy, hoping to take advantage of Cape Verde's dependency and precarious position to secure agreements that would permit the stationing of American troops there, and then empower it to conduct anti-terrorism operations in West Africa. To avert the big power battle between the U.S. and China, the Cape Verdean government has signed security arrangements with the Chinese company Huawei as well (Pangea Risk, 2021).

In Niger, the U.S. built the drone airbase, also known as Niger Air Base 201, near Agadez. U.S. special forces increased their presence in Niger following the Diffa and Arlit ambushes. They are also providing training and assistance to Niger's battalions and counter-terrorism forces against militant extremist groups in the Lake Chad region (Turse, 2013).

In the Horn of Africa, President Trump's decision to pull American troops out of Somalia in 2020 has had a significant impact on its stability. The Withdrawal permitted rivaling nations such as Russia and China, which had previously established their first foreign military station in Djibouti back in 2017, to gain strategic footing in East Africa (Detsch, 2022). Additionally, it gave terrorist organizations a tactical edge. One such organization is al Shabab, the wealthiest and most powerful terrorist organization in Somalia, and a crucial link in the global al Qaeda network. As a result, al Shabab increased its activities on all fronts and constituted a rising threat to US interests in the area. The organization regrouped, strengthened its capacity to attack in the Horn of Africa area, and overran forward operating sites in African countries by taking advantage of Somalia's political instability following the U.S. exit. However, in May 2022, US President Joe Biden gave his approval to redeploy U.S. soldiers back to Somalia. The choice made had some geopolitical considerations. In response to Chinese and Russian gains in the Horn of Africa, the United States planned to re-establish its presence in Somalia. Particularly now that Eritrea has consented to participate in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and that Ethiopia, the key US partner in the past in East Africa, is turning away from Washington (Ali, 2022).

Moreover, Maintaining American military footprints in Africa to face challenges from other powers such as China and Russia prompts the government of the United States to invest more in these bases, which are used as both soft and hard power tools of dominance.

2.2.2 Chinese military doctrine

For decades, China's non-interference behavior has had many positive implications for strengthening its economic relations with Africa, but at the same time, it has impeded its military relevance in Africa in comparison to Western powers such as France and mainly the US. However, as the war in Ukraine continues, Chinese officials seek to maintain their non-interference policy, but this time adding a new framework to their already-established African policy that relies on reinforcing defense and security engagement. Its involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa served as a pretext to advance the development of its Blue Water Navy in the Indian and Pacific oceans through Africa. As well as, widening its joint military exercises and increasing its military exports to Africa, including private security contractors (PMSC) and minor arm sales. Numbers suggest that between 2000 and 2018, nine African countries, including Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia received most of their weapons from China. But these weapon transfers remain insignificant in the total African arms market, accounting for just 2.5 percent (Hendrix, 2020).

In actuality, China created its first formal naval station outside of its boundaries in Djibouti over Washington's worries. Djibouti was chosen because of its strategic location as the entry point for Chinese commodities into Africa and Europe, as well as the Strait of Aden, which ensures the security of oil and natural gas supplies into China. The US feared that The Chinese military's full-scale incursion into Africa would start in Djibouti. But this runs counter to the reality, which is that China, along with many other Western nations, hosts a military base in Djibouti (Caliskan, 2021).

China's impact is still very small, especially when contrasted to Western nations like France, whose military participation in African politics has been substantial and continues to

be so. In terms of offering educational and military initiatives, China is especially unable to compete with the former colonial powers (Ibid).

2.3 The competition for the Tech industry in Africa

African tech companies from China and the United States are slowly but surely engaging in competition as they try to close the technology gap. China controls the African telecommunications market through its largest tech company, "Huawei." Chinese products using the Android operating system are often more popular in most African nations than American brands, which are more frequently expensive. The market share of Chinese-made phone brands in Africa is 64 percent overall (Tugendhat, 2021).


Through the use of technology, specifically mobile brands and their associated operating systems, China and the United States can hinder each other's agendas. Apple and Google, American corporations, have developed operating systems, while Huawei, a Chinese company, has created its own known as Harmony OS. Huawei introduced Harmony OS to address the adverse effects of the sanctions imposed by the US government in 2019, which had a significant impact on Huawei's global market and resulted in a 29% decline in sales in 2021. This allowed Huawei to exert control and impose limitations on content and privacy for its African users (Ni, 2021). As a result, Huawei's Harmony OS enabled the accessibility of websites and applications that are typically restricted in China. Additionally, to rival the American global positioning system, Google Maps (GPS), Huawei's system is expected to incorporate the Chinese satellite Beidou (BDS) as a navigation system. However, the acceptance and implementation of this new system rely on two key factors. Firstly, it depends on whether the Chinese government will allow users to choose between the Harmony OS and the Google-controlled Android system. Secondly, the success of Huawei phones will also play a significant role in determining the adoption of the new navigation system (Ibid.).

To conclude, Concerns about the involvement of the Chinese government, fuelled by Western disinformation, continue to dominate the narrative of Chinese technology in Africa. As both nations compete to offer higher-quality brands targeted at their African consumers, the tech rivalry between the two industries will benefit the African mobile market (Ibid).

2.4 Reflecting African Perceptions of the Chinese-American Scramble

Figure 4: China's Perception among African Citizens 2014/2015

The following figure depicts China's positive perception in Africa, both as a development model and an economic powerhouse, while also highlighting some of the factors that have contributed to both its somewhat positive image—which is primarily due to expanding infrastructure—and other negative perceptions—which are undoubtedly caused by the subpar products that China exports to Africa.



Source: Lektorwe, M et al. (2016, October 23). *ADI22: China's growing presence in Africa wins largely positive popular reviews*. Afrobarometer. <https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad122-chinas-growing-presence-africa-wins-largely-positive-popular-reviews/>

Overall, the competition between the United States and China has been mostly beneficial to Africa. Questions were raised about which of the two superpowers Africans prefer dealing with. The answer to that question is that Africans are not interested in "who" but in developing their relationship with both China and the US to solve Africa's economic,

political, and security problems, and find solutions to poverty, and overpopulation. Using their experience, China and The United States can assist Africa in sustaining development (Olewe, 2021).

Similarities between Chinese and many African governments in terms of means of governance sort of explain the tendency to adopt the Chinese authoritarian model of development. Meanwhile, democratic regimes in Africa are more likely to witness more Economic, and political American engagement. This tendency stipulates the adoption of democratic ideals that will be a minor representation of the American agenda in the developing sphere, while the bureaucratic model will base its ideals on enforcing rule and propaganda through one stream of governing (Qingmin, 2016). By Manipulating election results and term limits, harassing political opponents, and tossing out rules to strengthen their grip over the country, African leaders find themselves in the image of Chinese leaders.

China's significant role in African politics and disregard for democratization and its non-interference stance indirectly contribute to the rise of authoritarianism on the continent. It leads to more human rights abuses, most prominently in its two closest allies in Africa. In countries like Zimbabwe, where President Mugabe abused the opposition, and Sudan, where China continued to trade with the regime despite worldwide criticism following the Darfur genocide committed against the people, China works with authoritarian leaders and does not enforce human rights requirements on trade the way the US does. Due to its democratic nature, the United States is more likely to draw criticism than China.

Moreover, China grants support to its authoritarian allies in Africa through its economic institutions and companies. In Zambia and Uganda, through the giant tech company “Huawei”, China provided technicians targeting opposition and helping arrest pro-opposition opponents (Luongo, 2022).

The African Youth, a poll performed by the Ichikowitz Family Foundation in 2022, demonstrates the rising optimism regarding the relationship with China and the good impact it offers to development across Africa Surpassing the U.S. It has long been considered as the most favorable Foreign influence for Most Africans, particularly because of the Trump administration's failed policies on the other hand. The poll includes 4500 youngsters from 19 different African nations. it concluded that 76% of the participants who believe in China's positive role are from countries where China is involved in much of their industrial and agricultural fields, Building roads, Bridges, airports, etc, providing loans, increasing beneficial investments, and providing access to cheap goods. These pro-China attitudes were highest in Rwanda, Malawi, and Nigeria while 72% in the U.S., decreasing from 83% in 2020 and before that within the Obama administration (Bartlett, 2022).

The Sahel region, known for its significant underdevelopment, has witnessed a notable increase in Chinese involvement. Chinese companies are primarily involved in mining projects and smaller infrastructure initiatives in countries such as Burkina Faso and Guinea. The local population in the region greatly values this engagement, as it contributes to positive perceptions of China's expanding influence and its developmental approach

Given that China took a more active role in improving Burkina Faso's infrastructure, the percentage of individuals who had favorable attitudes toward the nation climbed from 20% in 2016 to 39% in 2020. The same is true for Guinea, where the research reveals that 80% of participants, up from 76% in 2016, recognize China's essential role in boosting the standard of living. The most recent survey, undertaken in 18 African nations between 2019 and 2020 by the research group Afrobarometer, found a relatively comparable appraisal of both powers. 59 percent of participants regard China's political and economic influence on their own countries favorably. While 58 percent of individuals questioned believe the United States has a beneficial economic and political influence, proving that despite the failed

policies and negligence on the part of the U.S., America is still seen favorably within African populations (Link, 2021).

Moreover, Chinese loans continue to be of medium concern in these countries. The Afrobarometer poll found that less than half (48%) of African residents are aware of Chinese loans or financial aid to their country. Among those who claimed they were aware of Chinese assistance, more than 77% were concerned about loan repayment, the genuine purpose of these loans, and their influence on economic stability in the short and long term. A majority (58%) said their governments had borrowed too much money from China. The Western media's discussion of debt and its "debt trap" narrative, which raised suspicions about the legality of Chinese loans and help, is to blame for the worsening in public opinion of Chinese participation (Soule & Selormey, 2021).

Conclusion

To sum up, Africa's business opportunities and potential have motivated both the U.S. and China to implement their policies there as part of the new global order, despite concerns that it would become a new playground in the larger competition between the U.S. and China. Many African nations refuse to pick sides in their rivalry, preferring to advance equality in their partnerships with both Chinese and American economic operators in light of the history between the two powers and Africa. As The outcome of a serious strategy adopted by the Chinese government, Chinese domination over trade and investments has seen an extraordinary development in the twenty-first century, giving China an advantage in its indirect competition with the United States. However, the US still has time to reevaluate its African strategy in light of its own needs as well as the needs of African states to guarantee an all-out successful cooperation between the two parties. Why not also consider a future understanding with China to collaborate on the outlook for future generations?

Chapter 03

**American and Chinese Involvement in Africa: in the Case
of North and Sub-Saharan Africa**

Introduction

China had to take on a larger role in new regions of the world, including those that were under American surveillance or closer to the influence of Europe, because of its growing prominence in the world and particularly in Africa. China has been promoting its development model to several North African nations over the past two decades under the leadership of Xi Jinping. Despite Western warnings that China intends to use debt and investments to dominate their economies, the majority of these nations have been open to adopting this successful model. Likewise, there has been a rise in American interest in the sub-Saharan region of Africa, one of the least developed and politically unrest-prone regions on the globe. This is mostly due to American concerns about Chinese initiatives and their potential long-term effects.

3.1 The strategic importance of North Africa

Since the Arab Spring, which offered the US and its allies the possibility of supporting a successful democratic transition, the US has been demotivated to engage actively with North African nations, except for Egypt. In addition, instead of reconsidering its hasty and unplanned intervention methods utilized in North Africa, the United States did not further its engagement. This limited their ability to do business with countries in North Africa, and it indicates that the United States' choice for political ambivalence and indifference only has terrible implications in such a crucial part of the world (Al Ghwell, 2022).

However, in recent times, additional factors have emerged that contribute to the significance of North Africa in Western engagement with the region. These factors include the rise of transnational militant extremist groups, the influx of migration from south to north, the vulnerability of domestic sociopolitical environments, the intensification of competition among major powers, and the presence of abundant energy resources. Given that North Africa

is geographically close to Europe, these developments have solidified the region's importance in Western involvement. Furthermore, the attempts of Saharan Africans to pass through countries in North Africa, where many of them become trapped, have led to increased socioeconomic tensions and the destabilization of the region (Ibid).

Furthermore, Russia's invasion of Ukraine recently heightened Western concerns about its meddling in North Africa, as well as the worries that China and Russia's intrusion will thwart democratic processes and the promotion of better governance, in addition to the increased instability in the region, especially in light of recent events in Libya and Sudan. Moreover, the immense solar energy potential of North Africa has contributed to enhancing its relevance in a world that is aggressively working to minimize its reliance on fossil fuels and build pathways for less-painful transitions away from hydrocarbons to the export of clean energy (Ibid).

3.1.1 Case study: North Africa

A new player is subtly gaining more sway across North Africa as the United States gradually withdraws from the Middle East and as Europe struggles with domestic issues. China has deliberately increased its interaction with nations like Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, which are situated at the confluence of the Middle East, Africa, and the Mediterranean. Beijing's expanding presence in these nations spans a range of activities, including commerce, infrastructure development, ports, shipping, financial cooperation, tourism, and manufacturing. China's relationship with North African nations, particularly Algeria and Egypt, dates back to the anticolonial struggle and is rooted in its ideological support for national liberation movements. Notably, China was the first non-Arab nation to recognize Algeria and assist its revolutionary battle on a political and military level. At the close of the

20th century, however, China's interest in North Africa changed away from "revolutionary romanticism" and toward economic and strategic considerations (Ghafar & Jacobs, 2019).

China is positioning North Africa to play a crucial role in connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe through this engagement, which is a fundamental objective of President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI's function in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) area has been the subject of previous investigations that have underlined how difficult it is to define and how contentious its exact parameters are (Ibid.).

Furthermore, beyond the economic and cultural areas, Chinese collaboration with North African nations has significantly increased, extending to the spheres of diplomacy and defense as well. Additionally, China is demonstrating a development strategy that aims to fuse authoritarianism with economic development, a tactic that has caught the attention of governments around the MENA region, with Egypt serving as a perfect example. As a result, China's expanding influence in North Africa is expected to have profound effects on the region's and the world's economies and geopolitics (Ibid.).

Moreover, strategic partnerships (SPs) and comprehensive strategic partnerships (CSPs) are the two primary forms of "partnership diplomacy" China uses in the North African region and MENA in general. In contrast to SPs, regular high-level meetings between the top leaders of the two partner nations is a common feature of CSPs, which often entail a greater degree of institutional communication between Chinese and North African officials. Considering the significance of both nations in the area, China developed CSPs with Egypt and Algeria, their primary trading and arms sales partners. China thus emerged as both nations' biggest trading partner (Ibid.).

Egypt has become a significant gas center in the eastern Mediterranean and holds control of one of the most strategically important waterways in the world, the Suez Canal.

With one of the largest armed formations in Africa under its command, it also serves as another significant regional security supplier. A new field of investment for the Chinese was also stimulated by Egypt's green hydrogen potential. With a proposal to generate green hydrogen production that will begin in May 2023, Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly signed an agreement with China's energy chairman, Ye Jianming (Zawya Institution, 2023).

To add, Algeria is yet another nation where a potential US-China competition may develop. The North African country has a vital economic and security role in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Sahel regions, and is the main energy partner for many European countries. However, the US's European allies are worried about its increasing military spending and the potential repercussions it may have on the Mediterranean region's power dynamics. According to the Middle East Institute (March 8, 2023), Algeria spent roughly \$9.6 billion to develop its military equipment in 2018 and 18 billion in 2023, thus having the highest military budget in Africa and is undoubtedly the top "regional security provider" in North Africa. In the past, Algeria has served as a gateway to Africa as well as to important regional blocs like the African Union. It has also tried to arbitrate some regional disputes, including those in Mali and Libya. However, China's expanding influence is still small and largely economic and cultural in nations like Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia (Ibid.).

Generally speaking, China's soft power strategies in the area and its influence in North Africa will only increase due to its advantageous location on the southern beaches of the Mediterranean, particularly in the economic arena. It is noteworthy that China's relations with these countries are guided by its declared policy of non-interference in political concerns, in contrast to the strategies of its previous Western partners (Ibid).

The US officials have given North Africa less attention than they have given the rest of Africa or the MENA area, even though North Africa is an equal component of both regions. Because of this ignorance, China and, more recently, Russia have been able to establish themselves in a vital international region. Given the unstable international environment at the moment, the US's interests in the region are threatened by the two ideologically opposed powerhouses' expanding presence in the Maghreb region. This development could also threaten the stability of the US and its European allies and have serious short-term repercussions (Yerkes & Hill, 2021).

The United States has long been interested in bringing about democratic change in the Maghreb, which might be a strategic instrument for its vision and strategy. The so-called "Arab Spring" uprising of 2011 gave the US the ideal occasion to interact with northern African states. However, a significant fall in the US interests overtook their ties with North African governments when the revolt in these countries (except for Tunisia) failed. In the instance of Libya, Col. Muammar Qaddafi's overthrow and the following dissolution of state institutions have produced a chaotic environment where armed non-state actors and aspirant regional hegemony are engaging in increasing bloodshed. Unchecked violence poses a serious threat to multiple US allies and military partners, endangering its interests throughout the Middle East and Africa as well as NATO's integrity and military efficiency (Ibid.).

The Trump administration's decisions have exacerbated the deterioration in ties between the US and some strategically important North African countries. The United States' relationship with Algeria, which used to be an important security partner in the MENA area, for instance, has drastically declined. The level of animosity between the Algerian and Moroccan governments reached an all-time high after Trump's presidential proclamation recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara back in December 2020, leading to escalating instability and a rise in potential terrorist activities.

Additionally, some of the most delicate regional problems where Algiers and Washington have significant disagreements include the Abraham Accords, the Syrian crisis, and Iran's nuclear program. Algeria, a country with a strong pro-Palestinian majority, has expressed anger over the officialization of Moroccan-Israeli relations, which was supported by the American government. It has made a special effort to express its opposition to the Abraham Accords, a set of joint normalization declarations that were first made between Israel and various Arab governments, including Morocco, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. Israeli and Moroccan propaganda about Algiers sponsoring Iranian-backed non-state actors throughout Africa, which American officials seem to believe are all reasons for relations between the US and Algeria being at their worst levels in years (Cafiero, 2022).

Furthermore, the Covid-19 pandemic led to further unrest, corruption, and exposure of the medical industry in North African states. The Biden administration is unlikely to raise foreign aid funding in the face of these difficulties, especially for non-humanitarian and global health efforts (Ibid.).

As the war in Ukraine rages on, the Russians are willing to divert their investments elsewhere, possibly to their historically North African allies, Egypt and Algeria. As a result, America's unwillingness to reengage with North African states may result in greater Chinese and Russian influence in the region (Carafano, 2022).

3.2 Assessing the US-Chinese Competition and Collaboration in Sub-Saharan Africa

Given the significance of environmental and human rights issues in Sub-Saharan Africa, both American and Chinese engagement in the region is primarily driven by a desire to assist African nations manage their new oil and gas resources and improve their access to energy, as well as meeting the needs of the region. Besides, governments in sub-Saharan

Africa are vital for the national security and economic interests of both China and the United States. As a result, there is an opportunity for combined US-China collaboration to achieve shared goals in the area through mutually advantageous methods (Banks, 2023).

3.2.1 Case study: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA region)

In terms of strategic relevance compared to other regions, Sub-Saharan Africa is not a top priority for China, Russia, or the United States. Most of these governments' core interests are in Asia, Europe, the Western Hemisphere, and the Middle East. However, in more recent decades, this has gradually shifted. Africa's sub-Saharan region is increasingly crucial to China's geopolitical and economic goals. China is also particularly significant to SSA nations since it offers itself as a substitute for the World Bank and the IMF to finance initiatives in the area. China imports natural resources, minerals, and agricultural goods from Sub-Saharan nations in exchange for investments in infrastructure. Due to this, China's oil imports from SSA nations grew by more than 100% in 2019 to reach 1.5 million barrels per day. Between 2006 and 2020, China signed 600 construction contracts and made investments worth a total of \$303 billion in sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of which were in non-landlocked nations. These contracts were mostly in ports, which are essential to the BRI plan, transport, and energy sectors. China also outperformed the United States and the other SSA partners in Europe. China's share in global trade increased from 4% in 2001 to 25% in 2020. When it comes to voting in the United Nations and other international bodies, the majority of these countries support or agree with Chinese policy, which is leveraged by Chinese economic diplomacy in Africa. Additionally, state-run media in China and diplomatic organizations supported the development of cultural links between the Chinese and their African allies (Murphy, 2023).

Moreover, to enhance its favorable reputation among residents Through Xinhua, China Radio International (CRI), and China Global Television Network (CGTN), China gave free content to new regional channels. Chinese involvement went beyond the economy, bolstering its soft power through investments in human resources, the management of training initiatives, and the provision of financial aid to professionals in Africa. Furthermore, China has to be a major financial and personnel donor to UN peacekeeping missions due to its enormous influence in the regional politics of SSA nations and by tackling security challenges that directly and indirectly endanger Chinese interests. For instance, China is also the leading exporter of weapons to the region. The United States shipped barely 5% of all weaponry to the SSA between 2010 and 2021, at \$473 million, trailing both China (\$2.04 billion) and Russia (\$2.24 billion). China's military ties with SSA nations were strengthened by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In particular, the sanctions imposed by the United States on Russian defense contractors have had a significant impact on the 2021 deal between Moscow and Lagos. As Nigeria hunted for alternatives, Chinese defense companies increased their military exports to Nigeria. Additionally, local governments' requests that China steps up its security and anti-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa caused American officials to worry about the possibility of Chinese military and naval outposts there (Ibid).

It is a reality that, compared to China, the United States and its allies have utterly failed to expand their relations with the SSA nations and offer technical and financial aid to meet the demands of both parties. Prior American trade and investment policies did not affect the region's waning Western supremacy.

In response, President Biden first revealed the New U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2021. Its goals include promoting pandemic recovery in the post-Covid era, increasing economic opportunity in the SSA area, and supporting conservation, climate

adaptation, and a just energy transition. Additionally, promoting openness and open societies is important. Delivering democratic and security dividends is particularly important (Ibid.).

The United States also highlighted the PGII and the Africa strategy, both aimed at funding and developing renewable infrastructure projects in the region, as a result of realizing the enormous \$108 billion infrastructure gap in a region where only 48% of the population has access to electricity, 30% to safe drinking water and 33% to basic sanitation. This, together with revisions to the governance structures of Western-dominated finance institutions like the IMF, would undoubtedly aid the United States in containing China's expanding influence. Why not use this opportunity to position the United States as a trustworthy partner and an option rather than China for SSA countries?

Concerning China's military base threat in sub-Saharan Africa, the United States should concentrate on preventing bases on the continent's west coast, which could give China access to the Atlantic, and bases in the continent's east, which could have a significant impact on SLOCs and give China more ability to project power in the Indian Ocean (Ibid).

Less worry should be shown about other prospective Chinese encampments in the area. The US should not be very concerned about Moscow's basing efforts since it has little to no security interests in sub-Saharan Africa and is now preoccupied with the conflict in Ukraine. Based on their multiple common security interests in the area, Washington ought to look for chances to collaborate with China there. Russia and the US are unlikely to cooperate given their aggressive actions in Ukraine and disruptive actions in sub-Saharan Africa.

The Chinese approach to Equatorial Guinea is considered by U.S. leaders as a long-term threat to their national security. Chinese strategies to establish a military facility on the Atlantic Coast, notably on the coastlines of Bata, were foreseen by the US Defense

Department. Concerns regarding Chinese threats to U.S. commerce routes on Africa's eastern and western coastlines were also expressed by the U.S. Africa Command. The dictator of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, denied the claims, considering China to be a trustworthy friend and a strong partner (Ibid.).

3.3 Positive and negative implications of the New Scramble

Both good and bad repercussions may result from the US-China rivalry, considering the nature of this competition and its big scale and diverse fields. To begin with, African consumer markets and important input industries may promote quicker economic growth and reduce poverty. African nations will probably gain from increasing investment in vital fields like infrastructure, energy, and mining as a result of this rivalry. Additionally, the geopolitical struggle will fuel new regional conflicts and exacerbate those that already exist.

Likewise, Western nations are following suit and will want to expand their business ties with African nations in the future to challenge China's economic policies. For instance, the US's new Africa strategy emphasizes the necessity of making direct investments in Africa with an emphasis on healthcare, agriculture, and energy, in addition to its customary "soft power" initiatives to strengthen democracy and increase political accountability. Senior visits by US officials have also underscored the US's desire to gain access to crucial minerals needed to support the energy transition away from fossil fuels. Following recent trips to Zambia and Congo (DRC), two of the world's largest producers of copper and cobalt, respectively, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and US Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen both emphasized the significance of cooperation on the development of electric vehicles. Given other US domestic objectives, these visits have not yet resulted in investments of a magnitude and scope to match those of China. However, it is projected that the US will greatly increase its diplomatic and commercial engagement in the years to come. Considering

that the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), which grants African nations preferential access to US markets, is slated to expire in 2025, this is particularly the case. Kenya, for example, has tried to take advantage of this. On February 13, Kenya and the US finished the first phase of negotiations for a new Strategic Commercial and Investment Partnership (STIP) that will direct bilateral commercial relations. All of these anti-China measures taken by the U.S. administration out of concern about losing yet another significant emerging area on the globe would only benefit African interests (Ferchen, 2022).

Furthermore, this dispute enables several African states to push the West into a position of greater and long overdue humility in its interactions with Africa, starting with an admission that the money it has lavished for years under the ill-defined umbrella of "capacity-building" has been a boondoggle for nongovernmental organizations, nonprofits, and consultants in Washington and European capitals, in contrast to China, where they seek to tarnish its reputation, yet it has plowed billions into plowing infrastructure (Ibid).

The Americans indirectly referred to China and Russia when they cautioned African leaders to be aware of the hollow promises of authoritarian governments that lead to reliance, corruption, debt, and instability on the continent. the need to engage with democratic nations and push for democratic reform. Given the inevitable need for Chinese investment in Africa's development initiatives, African leaders should make it clear that they do not want to be exploited as puppets in a proxy conflict and that partnership diversification is their top strategic objective. However, some observers contend that the inclination for neutrality among African leaders is inadequate. Others have argued that it would be risky to accept Chinese state assistance for the development of administrative buildings and that this may damage ties with the US, especially following the finding of Chinese-gifted monitoring equipment in the African Union's headquarters. The African economy has been in turmoil following the

COVID-19 epidemic. Leaders should make use of the advantages that tremendous competition offers and form many partnerships. In other words, the nations that formerly pitted the US against the Soviet Union may now do the same with China and the US. This rivalry should be seen as a benefit for developing nations because it will give them leverage to obtain more resources (investment flows, development assistance, funding for infrastructure, and better trade agreements) to increase their growth and decrease poverty. Plus, developing nations like India, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates have boosted the number of their embassies on the continent, which has sparked a vibrant economic diplomacy aimed at opening up markets and building infrastructure for their particular interests. These nations' contractors are vying with Chinese companies for mining contracts in Africa, which might be advantageous if talks are handled skillfully. Chinese and Russian rivalry predominates in Guinea's mining industry, and negotiators there saw a silver lining in setting the two sides up against one another. When the Guinean government used the "Russia card," Chinese negotiators were more eager to review the contract's terms and comply with demands (Ibid.).

The first allocation of telecom licenses in 2021, known as "the deal of the century," provided an advantage to Ethiopian negotiators who strategically played one competitor against another. The Ethiopian government intentionally limited the number of competitors by prioritizing its national interests, requiring new operators to either build their infrastructure or lease it from the state-owned Ethio Telecom, rather than using independent tower operators. This approach allowed them to avoid a final bidding war between the MTN/China-supported consortium and the Safaricom-Vodafone firm, which had the backing of the US and received a USD 850 million package in return for creating employment opportunities and developing infrastructure (Ibid.).

African governments should adopt a strategic approach to integrating proposals from competing partners into their national development goals. It is crucial to avoid accepting

opportunistic, short-term offers and instead focus on utilizing loans, grants, and contributions to fund initiatives that directly enhance the standard of living for people in African countries. These initiatives should align with the national development objectives of each country, ensuring a long-term and sustainable impact on the overall development of the nation (Soulé, 2022).

Furthermore, African countries should prioritize the implementation of comprehensive and integrated policies. A good example of this is Senegal, which established the Bureau de Prospective Economique (Economic Prospective Unit) under the presidency. This unit developed a strategic plan known as Plan Emergent Senegal, which included specific goals for various sectors. In selecting foreign partners, the unit carefully considers their capacity to contribute towards achieving these goals. By adopting such an approach, Senegal has been able to reduce its dependence on both its recent connections with China and its traditional partnership with France. Instead, the country has diversified its partners through a strategic and selective approach (Ibid.).

Another important aspect is to learn from the experiences of other regions, such as Southeast Asia and Latin America, in dealing with the competition and managing their relations with both China and the US. By studying how these regions handle geopolitical challenges and respond to the interests of different global powers, African countries can gain valuable insights and potentially enhance their policy approaches. This knowledge exchange can help African nations improve their strategies and navigate the complex dynamics between China and the US, ensuring they make informed decisions that align with their national interests and guaranteeing their development goals.

Moreover, developing an internal pool of specialists familiar with China, Russia, Turkey, and India's modes of operation, cultures, and languages is necessary for a cogent

approach to improving African bureaucracies' ability to engage with these countries. African authorities may rely on the knowledge and linguistic abilities of former African students who received their education in the universities of these nations shortly. Increased local knowledge creation and expertise generation for African governments might result from the establishment of more research centers in regional African universities that are specifically focused on the study of these nations.

Last but not least, African governments should promote more trilateral or quadrilateral collaboration between new and established partners, such as the joint infrastructure projects run by Chinese and French businesses, to achieve the best of both worlds. Through different types of cooperation, rivalry may be overcome, mobilizing more financial resources and preventing project duplication. African nations should also consider the views of their people on this matter. According to a recent Afrobarometer study performed between 2019 and mid-2021 in 34 nations, 62% of respondents saw China's impact in Africa as good, which is close to the 60% of respondents who stated the same about the US. This shows that for common African citizens, the US-China conflict may not provide an either-or choice but rather a win-win scenario. It is the responsibility of African governments to take advantage of the benefits that these rivalries provide (Ibid).

Conclusion

To conclude, China's transition from a mostly regional power that primarily focused on events in its neighborhood to a world power emerged as a challenge to American hegemony, forcing it to implement several novel ways to reduce its influence, mostly on the economic sphere. China has firmly established its position as one of the few nations with global interests and the ability to pursue them. Its influence may today be felt throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in North Africa. As Russian and Chinese business owners slowly penetrate the African markets through arms sales and infrastructure projects, mostly green energy future deals, the U.S.'s limited engagement with those two regions and denial of their geostrategic importance had some minor repercussions. Given the expanding significance of the area in world politics, it will undoubtedly have some significant long-term effects as well.

General Conclusion

The New scramble for Africa is a phenomenon that has recently been observed. However, it is different from the previous one in that it includes developing countries like the UAE, India, and Brazil. The scramble is characterized by increased investment, trade, and diplomatic engagement with African countries by foreign powers, mostly China, Russia, and the United States.

It has an impact on African nations in both beneficial and detrimental ways. On the one hand, these developing nations are spending a lot of money on infrastructure, which is essential for economic expansion. Additionally, they are fostering commerce between African countries and their respective countries while also producing jobs. On the other hand, natural resource depletion, environmental deterioration, and debt traps are issues that raise worry. Some critics contend that these developing nations solely care about using Africa's resources with little consideration for the social or environmental costs.

To conclude, the new race for Africa offers the possibility of economic growth and progress, but it is essential to ensure that it benefits all parties involved and does not lead to exploitation or harm to local inhabitants or the environment. The international community must work together to ensure that the new scramble for Africa does not become another chapter in a long history of exploitation and conflict on the continent. And while it may bring about short-term gains, African countries must remain vigilant about protecting their sovereignty and ensuring sustainable development for future generations.

The US and China's engagement in Africa are generally portrayed in terms of zero-sum economic rivalry over influence and infrastructural investment in the region. Both Nations largely import natural resources from African nations in return for these investments. Yet, U.S. and Chinese patterns of engagement diverge in other areas due to their respective

political goals. While China holds Sub-Saharan Africa as a top priority, The region has substantially less relevance to the US agenda. In addition to its long-held non-interference policy, China does not advocate any specific Political or ideological Agenda, maintaining a modest Military presence based on multilateral and indirect approaches in the form of UN peacekeeping missions, bilateral arms sales, and training programs. It also adheres to its “One China” policy, by isolating Taiwan and impeding its recognition among African nations. Meanwhile, American intervention is centered on democratic advancement and the War on terrorism as a political priority. In addition, While China contends that development should come before democracy and rigorous Western ideals do not always apply in Africa, the United States considers economic growth and social progress as unsustainable without individual liberty and the rule of law (Hanauer & Morris, 2014).

Works Cited

- Abidde, S. (2020, July 15). *China and Taiwan in Africa: The struggle for diplomatic recognition and hegemony*. <https://networks.h-net.org/node/73374/announcements/6163833/china-and-taiwan-africa-struggle-diplomatic-recognition-and>
- African Business. (2020, October 21). *Sata and the Chinese*. African Business. Retrieved <https://african.business/2014/11/economy/sata-chinese>
- Ajnoti, R. (2022, October 11). *The complete story of debt-trap diplomacy*. The Geopolitics. <https://thegeopolitics.com/the-complete-story-of-debt-trap-diplomacy/>
- AL-GHWELL, H. (2022, April 9). *North Africa's strategic importance to the West*. Arab News. <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2060001>
- Ali, A. M. (2022, June 13). *Why are US troops returning to Somalia?*. The New Arab. <https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-are-us-troops-returning-somalia>
- Al Jazeera. (2023, January 25). *"cope with your own debt", China tells us over Zambia debt relief*. Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/25/china-fires-back-at-us-over-zambia-debt-relief>
- Banks, J. (2023, March). *Top Five reasons why Africa should be a priority for the United States*. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04_africa_priority_united_states.pdf
- Bartlett, K. (2022, March 17). *From nickel to cobalt, Chinese mining interests in Africa face challenges*. VOA. <https://www.voanews.com/a/from-nickel-to-cobalt-chinese-mining-interests-in-africa-face-challenges/6489077.html>
- Bartlett, K. (2022, June 14). *China Wins Battle of Perception Among Young Africans*. VOA. <https://www.voanews.com/a/china-wins-battle-of-perception-among-young-africans/6617568.html>

- Basu, T. (2013, August 9). *Obama Africa Energy Project seen as small first step*. USA Today. <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/08/08/obama-energy-africa-tanzania/2632949/>
- BBC. (2017, January 18). *Barack Obama: How will africa remember him?* BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38649362>
- Bociaga, R. (2022, October 31). *Minerals and China's military assistance in the DR congo*. – The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/minerals-and-chinas-military-assistance-in-the-dr-congo/>
- Blommborg originals. (2022, March 17). *The myth of the chinese debt trap in Africa*. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-QDEWwSkP0>
- Brautigam, D. (2017). PEDL | Private Enterprise Development in low-income countries. https://pedl.cepr.org/sites/default/files/PEDL_Synthesis_Papers_Piece_No._2.pdf
- Brautigam, D. (2021, April 12). *The Chinese “debt trap” is a myth*. The Atlantic. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/>
- Breakthrough News. (2023, January 23). *Who's responsible for Africa's debt trap: China or the west?* YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9rcTr_pIEwk&t=54s
- Byamungu, C. G. (2022, December 12). *On China, minerals, and power competition*. CSIS. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-minerals-and-power-competition>
- CAFIERO, G. (2022). *Why us-Algeria relations are at their lowest point in years - TRT World*. TRT WORLD. <https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/why-us-algeria-relations-are-at-their-lowest-point-in-years-52926>

- ÇALIŞKAN, G. (2021, October 22). *The only place in the World China has a military base: Djibouti - ankasam: Ankara Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Merkezi*. ANKASAM. <https://www.ankasam.org/the-only-place-in-the-world-china-has-a-military-base-djibouti-v/?lang=en>
- Campbell, J. (2020, April 6). *Trump's Africa policy is better than it looks*. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/trumps-africa-policy-better-it-looks>
- Carafano, J. J. (2022, October 27). *Is America AWOL in North Africa?* GIS Reports. <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/america-north-africa-policy/>
- Cheng, K.-C. (2022, April 14). *Why is the US fixated on China's rise in Africa?* Quartz. <https://qz.com/africa/2154820/why-is-the-us-fixated-on-chinas-rise-in-africa>
- China Org. (2003, December 10). Cultural Exchange between China and Africa. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/China-Africa/82031.htm>
- Conteh-Morgan, E. (2019, March 13). *Militarization and securitization in Africa: The role of Sino-American geostrategic presence*. Insight Turkey. <https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/militarization-and-securitization-in-africa-the-role-of-sino-american-geostrategic-presence>
- Detsch, J. (2022, May 26). *Somalia's Al Qaeda branch has gotten "bigger, Stronger, and bolder" since U.S. exit*. Foreign Policy. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/26/somalia-terrorism-al-shabab-us-military/>
- Dyrenforth, T. (2021, August 19). *Beijing's Blue Helmets: What to make of China's role in UN Peacekeeping in Africa*. Modern War Institute. <https://mwi.usma.edu/beijings-blue-helmets-what-to-make-of-chinas-role-in-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/>
- Duss, M., & Yabi, G. (2022, December 21). *The major takeaways from the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit*. Carnegie. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/21/major-takeaways-from-u.s.-africa-leaders-summit-pub-88691>

- Gin. (2023, February 1). “*debt trap diplomacy*” blamed for *Zambian Debt Crisis*. New York Amsterdam News. <https://amsterdamnews.com/news/2023/02/02/debt-trap-diplomacy-blamed-for-zambian-debt-crisis/>
- Gulati, S., & Babu, A. (2022, June 1). *The Chinese debt trap: A myth or a sinocentric world order?* LSE International Development. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/internationaldevelopment/2022/06/01/the-chinese-debt-trap-a-myth-or-a-sinocentric-world-order/>
- Hanauer, L., & Morris, L. J. (2014). Implications for U.S. Interests. In *Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy* (pp. 89–120). RAND Corporation. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt6wq7ss.14>
- Hanzhi, M. (2020, August 10). *US' self-serving 'africa strategy' contradicts the continent's needs*. Global Times. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202208/1272701.shtml>
- Harper, T. (2019, August 23). *The Chinese model in Africa and its wider challenge*. Asia Dialogue. <https://theasiadialogue.com/2019/08/27/the-chinese-model-in-africa-and-its-wider-challenge/>
- Harper, M. (2022, May 31). *US troops back in Somalia to fight Al-Shabab*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-61631439>
- Harris, G. (2021, February 4). *Why Africa Matters to US national security*. Atlantic Council. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/why-africa-matters-to-us-national-security/>
- Hendrix, C. S. (2022, September 16). *Arms and influence? Chinese arms transfers to Africa in context*. PIIE. <https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/arms-and-influence-chinese-arms-transfers-africa-context>
- Hsiang, E. (2023, January 25). *Chinese investment in Africa: A reexamination of the Zambian debt crisis*. Harvard International Review. <https://hir.harvard.edu/chinese-investment-in-africa-a-reexamination-of-the-zambian-debt-crisis/>

- Jafrani, N. (2012, February 9). *China's growing role in Africa: Myths and facts - carnegie endowment*. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/09/china-s-growing-role-in-africa-myths-and-facts-pub-47140>
- Jones, C. D. (2022, February 3). *Chinese economic engagement in Africa: Implications for U.S. policy*. Foreign Policy Research Institute. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/01/chinese-economic-engagement-in-africa/>
- Kragelund, P., & van Dijk, M. P. (2009). China's investments in Africa. In M. P. van Dijk (Ed.), *The New Presence of China in Africa* (pp. 83–100). Amsterdam University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n2kj.6>
- Landler, M., & Wong, E. (2018, December 13). *Bolton outlines a strategy for Africa that's really about countering China*. The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/john-bolton-africa-china.html>
- Li, C., & Voncuji, S. (2022, December 16). *China-US competition seems to be working for Africa*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/china-us-competition-seems-to-be-working-for-africa/>
- Lieven, A. (2022, November 6). *This is why there is no "china-russia alliance."* Responsible Statecraft. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/11/05/this-is-why-there-is-no-china-russia-alliance/>
- Link, J. (2021, November 4). *5 things U.S. policymakers must understand about China-Africa relations*. Center for American Progress. <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/5-things-u-s-policymakers-must-understand-china-afr>
- Livingston, I. (2022, March 9). *Obama's legacy in African Security and Development*. Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/07/25/obamas-legacy-in-african-security-and-development/>

- Luongo, A. (2022, July 3). How Chinese non-interference enables African authoritarianism: Democracy in Africa. Democracy in Africa | A Resource for the Study of Democracy in Africa. <https://democracyinafrica.org/how-chinese-non-interference-enables-african-authoritarianism/>
- Magsamen, K., Bergmann, M., & Fuchs, M. (2023, April 26). *Securing a democratic world*. Center for American Progress. <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/securing-democratic-world/>
- Maluki, P., & Lemmy, N. (2020, May 18). *Is China's development diplomacy in Horn of Africa transforming into debt-trap diplomacy? an evaluation*. The Horn Bulletin. https://www.academia.edu/43088455/IS_CHINA_S_DEVELOPMENT_DIPLOMACY_IN_HORN_OF_AFRICA_TRANSFORMING_INTO_DEBT_TRAP_DIPLOMACY_AN_EVALUATION
- Matthews, D. (2015, July 22). *Vox sentences: Obama's going to Ethiopia. human rights groups aren't happy*. Vox. <https://www.vox.com/2015/7/21/9011989/sentences-ethiopia>
- McBride, J., & Berman, N. (2023, February 2). China's massive Belt and Road initiative. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>
- Ming, C. (2018, March 5). *China's Mammoth belt and road initiative could increase debt risk for 8 countries*. CNBC. <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/05/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-raises-debt-risks-in-8-nations.html#:~:text=Eight%20could%20have%20problems%20servicing%20debt&text=Those%20countries%20include%20Pakistan%2C%20Djibouti,%2C%20Montenegro%2C%20Tajikistan%20and%20Kyrgyzstan>
- Murphy, D. (2023, February 8). *Strategic competition for overseas basing in sub-Saharan africa*. Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/strategic-competition-for-overseas-basing-in-sub-saharan-africa/>
- Muyangwa, M. (2022, November 17). *Assessing the Biden administration's U.S. strategy toward Sub-Saharan africa: Testimony: Africa*. U.S. Agency for International Development. <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/congressional-testimony/nov-17-2022-written-statement-monde-muyangwa-assistant-administrator-bureau-africa>

- Nantulya, P. (2021, September 3). *Grand strategy and China's Soft Power Push in Africa*. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/grand-strategy-and-chinas-soft-power-push-in-africa/>
- White house. (2016, September). *U.S.-Africa cooperation on trade and investment under the Obama Administration*. National Archives and Records Administration. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/21/fact-sheet-us-africa-cooperation-trade-and-investment-under-obama>
- Nensee, K. (2023, January 15). *The complete story of China's debt-trap diplomacy*. StartupTalky. <https://startuptalky.com/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/>
- Ni, V. (2022, March 28). *China's Huawei reports sales fall amid US sanctions but profits hit record*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/mar/28/china-huawei-sales-us-sanctions-profits-meng-wanzhou>
- Olander, E. (2010, July 23). *China in Africa: Who is Michael Sata?* The China Global South Project. <https://chinaglobalsouth.com/podcasts/podcast-china-zambia-michael-sara-solange-chatelard/>
- Olewe, D. (2021, December 9). *Africa needs China and the US to work together*. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59531176>
- Owusu, F., & Carmody, P. (2022, December 9). *Trump's legacy in Africa and what to expect from Biden*. The Conversation. <https://theconversation.com/trumps-legacy-in-africa-and-what-to-expect-from-biden-150293>
- PANGEA RISK. (2021, August 11). *Expansion in Africa*. <https://www.pangea-risk.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/AFRICA-US-LACK-OF-TRANSPARENCY-IN-US-MILITARY-FOOTPRINT-EXPANSION-IN-AFRICA.pdf>
- Pecquet, J. (2022, October 10). *US-Africa Trade: Lofty goals, lagging investment*. The Africa Report.com. <https://www.theafricareport.com/240175/us-africa-trade-lofty-goals-lagging-investment>


- Polymatter. (2021, December 24). *The truth about China in Africa*. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7gwgcIfzttA>
- Qingmin, Z. (2016). Bureaucratic politics and Chinese foreign policy-making. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 9(4), 435–458. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow007>
- Robbins, M. (2021, January 12). *U.S. & China's competition extends to mena*. Arab Barometer. <https://www.arabbarometer.org/2021/01/u-s-chinas-competition-extends-to-mena/>
- Rogers, P. D. (2007). CHINA AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA. *Naval War College Review*, 60(2), 73–93. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26396822>
- Rubidge, L. (2022, September 22). *Global geopolitical competition hits Africa: Can it maintain its voice?*. ACCORD. <https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/global-geopolitical-competition-hits-africa-can-it-maintain-its-voice/>
- Shepard, W. (2022, October 12). *What China is really up to in Africa*. Forbes. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2019/10/03/what-china-is-really-up-to-in-africa/?sh=6e59429f5930>
- Shinn, D. H. (2019, April). *China–Africa Ties in Historical Context*. Academic.oup.com. <https://academic.oup.com/book/42633/chapter/358095103>
- Signé, L. (2022, March 9). *US trade and investment in Africa*. Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/us-trade-and-investment-in-africa/>
- Smith, E. (2019, October 9). *The US-China trade rivalry is underway in Africa, and Washington is playing catch-up*. CNBC. <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/09/the-us-china-trade-rivalry-is-underway-in-africa.html>

- Soulé, F. & Selormey, E. (2022, September 13). *How popular is China in Africa? new survey sheds light on what ordinary people think*. The Conversation. <https://theconversation.com/how-popular-is-china-in-africa-new-survey-sheds-light-on-what-ordinary-people-think-149552>
- Soulé, F. (2022, March 21). *Zero-sum? benefitting from Great Power Rivalry in Africa*. APRI. <https://afripoli.org/zero-sum-benefitting-from-great-power-rivalry-in-africa>
- Taylor, I. (1998). China's Foreign Policy towards Africa in the 1990s. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36(3), 443–460. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/161792>
- Temin, J. (2023, April 19). *Africa is changing-and U.S. strategy is not keeping up*. Foreign Affairs. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2021-10-08/africa-changing-and-us-strategy-not-keeping>
- Thrall, L. (2015). Sino-American Interest Correlation in Africa and Conclusions. In *China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for U.S. National Security* (pp. 75–92). RAND Corporation. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt15zc655.11>
- Tugendhat, H. (2022, May 14). *The evolving u.s.-china tech rivalry in Africa*. United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/05/evolving-us-china-tech-rivalry-africa>
- Turse, N. (2023, February 20). *Less than a mile from drone base, bandits stole bags of U.S. tax dollars in broad daylight*. The Intercept. <https://theintercept.com/2023/02/20/niger-military-base-contractor/>
- Tyron, J. (2016, December). *Sino-African relations in the 21st century: Consistency*. union college. <https://digitalworks.union.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1217&context=theses>
- UCHEHARA, K. E. (2009). China-Africa Relations in the 21st Century: Engagement, Compromise and Controversy. *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations*, 6(23), 95–111. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43926454>

- Vines, A., Butler, C., & Jie, Y. (2022, December). Research the response to debt distress in Africa and the role of China. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-12/2022-12-15-africa-china-debt-distress-vines-et-al.pdf>
- Wang, K. (2022, January 6). *China: Is it burdening poor countries with unsustainable debt?*. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/59585507>
- White House. (2022, August). *U.S. strategy toward SUB-SAHARAN Africa*. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf>
- Yerkes, S., & Hill, T. (2021, February 23). *A new strategy for U.S. engagement in North Africa*. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/02/23/new-strategy-for-u.s.-engagement-in-north-africa-report-of-north-africa-working-group-pub-83926>
- Yousef, N. (2022, November 22). *How did China outperform the United States in Africa?: Al-Estiklal Newspaper*. Al-ESTIKLAL. <https://www.alestiklal.net/en/view/15997/how-did-china-outperform-the-united-states-in-africa>
- Yu, S. Z. (2022, February 15). *What is FOCAC? Three stages in the new china-africa relationship*. Africa at LSE. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/02/03/what-is-focac-three-stages-the-new-china-africa-relationship-trade-economics/>
- Zawya. (2023, March 9). *China energy to start establishing \$5.1bln green hydrogen plant in Egypt in May*. ZAWYA. <https://www.zawya.com/en/economy/north-africa/china-energy-to-start-establishing-51bln-green-hydrogen-plant-in-egypt-in-may-yeaaysaq>
- Zurcher, A. (2016, September 16). *The birth of the obama “birther” conspiracy*. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37391652>


Appendices

Appendix A: US Military bases across the African continent



Source : Sndden. (2015a, October 27). *The “hippo trench” across Africa: US military quietly builds giant security belt in middle of continent.* snddenJPIC.
<https://snddenatun.org/2015/10/27/the-hippo-trench-across-africa-us-military-quietly-builds-giant-security-belt-in-middle-of-continent/>

Appendix B: A western caricature representing China's evolving presence in Africa



Source : Kohnert, D. (2021, August 11). *Cartoon: 'what will China do if its interests in Africa are threatened.* ResearchGate. https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Cartoon-What-will-China-do-if-its-interests-in-Africa-are-threatened---African_fig3_357186531

Appendix E : US African strategy in a nutshell



Source : Hanzhi, M. (2022, August 10). *US' self-serving "africa strategy" contradicts the continent's needs*. Global Times.
<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202208/1272701.shtml>

ملخص :

يصف مصطلح " التنافس المتجدد من أجل الظفر بخيرات إفريقيا " الإهتمام المتجدد الذي حظيت به القارة من طرف القوى الأجنبية، لاسيما من حيث إستغلال الموارد الطبيعية والمكاسب المالية. هذا الحدث الذي يعيد إلى الأذهان الحقبة الإستعمارية عندما قسمت القوى الإستعمارية الأوروبية القارة إلى مناطق نفوذ تخدم مصالحها. تعد الصين في طليعة هذا السباق حيث تستثمر بشكل كبير في البنية التحتية والموارد المتوفرة في القارة. عززت الولايات المتحدة و معها الدول الأوربية كذلك بشكل كبير وجودهما في القارة، منافسين بذلك النفوذ الصيني للحصول على الموارد المهمة مثل النفط والمعادن.

الكلمات المفتاحية : التدافع من اجل افريقيا, استغلال, تستثمر, البنية التحتية, الموارد, القارة الافريقية, الصين, الولايات المتحدة.

Resumé :

Le terme "Nouvelle ruée vers l'Afrique" décrit l'intérêt ravivé que les nations étrangère portent au continent africain, notamment en termes d'exploitation des ressources et de gain financier. Cet événement rappelle l'époque coloniale où les pays européens ont divisé l'Afrique pour leurs intérêts. Investissant de manière substantielle dans les infrastructures et les ressources africaines, la Chine a été à l'avant-garde de cette nouvelle course. Pour concurrencer la Chine pour l'accès à des ressources telles que le pétrole et les minéraux, les États-Unis et les pays européens ont également considérablement renforcé leur présence sur le continent.

Mots-clés : Nouvelle ruée vers l'Afrique, exploitation, Investissant, les infrastructures, les ressources, l'Afrique, la Chine, les États-Unis.