

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research University

Mohammed Boudiaf of M'sila

Faculty of Letters and Languages

Department of English



The US involvement in the Persian Gulf War (1980- 88)

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Master

Degree in English Literature and Civilization

Submitted by:

Ablaoui Mohamed Cherif

Yahi Khaled

Supervised by:

Mr. Boutkhil Guemide

Academic year

2018- 2019

Dedications

In the name of Allah, the most Merciful and the most Compassionate and the great Teacher and messenger, Mohammed (Peace Be Upon Him), who highly taught us the real meaning of life,

We honorably dedicate our parents, who have always been so lovely supportive, and unconditionally never stop giving of themselves in countless ways and good examples have clearly enlightened the righteous path to work harder for the things we aspired to achieve.

This thesis is dedicated to our beloved brothers, sisters, and friends.

It is also dedicated to our best colleagues: always been a constant source of support and encouragement during the challenges of our college life.

Khaled and Mohamed

Acknowledgement

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful and the Most Compassionate.

Above all, all praise and thanks go to Almighty Allah, the Lord of the worlds; and prayers and peace be upon Mohammed his servant and Messenger, the great master and teacher, our example and guide.

We would like to express our special thanks of gratitude to our supervisor Mr. Guemide for his patience and guidelines throughout the course of this thesis. We are also thankful to all teachers of the English Department at M'sila University for their cordial support, valuable information and guidance which helped a lot to complete our university study.

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own original work, which I have created myself. All the literature I used is properly quoted and is listed in Bibliography.

I declare that I worked on my final master's dissertation on my own using only cited literary sources, other information and sources in agreement with the disciplinary regulations for the Faculty of Letters and Languages at the University Mohammed Boudiaf of M'sila and with the regulations and laws of research of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in Algeria.

I agree with the storage of this work in the library of the Faculty of Letters and Languages at the University Mohammed Boudiaf of M'sila and making it accessible for study purposes.

Ablaoui Mohamed Cherif

.....

Yahi Khaled

.....

M'sila:

Abstract:

Shortly after Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, Iraq assaulted Iran resulting in a costly war from 1980 to 1988, which certainly threatened the US interests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. From the beginning, the declared official US policy was strict neutrality, but the war had provided the US with an opportunity to promote relations with Iraq, particularly after Iran reversed the Iraqi offensive in the summer of 1982. Because the Reagan administration did not want let Iraq collapse, the US tilted significantly towards Iraq in contradiction of its declared policy. Interestingly, the tilt towards Iraq did not stop the Reagan administration from secretly dealing with Iran in 1985. Therefore, the disclosure of these dealings resulted in the buildup of US naval forces in the region to secure the shipment of oil, and eventually forcing an end to the war in 1988.

The war changed the political equations of the Middle East and its results had the greatest impact on the factors that led to the Second Gulf War or the so-called Desert Storm in 1991.

This message deals with the Iran-Iraq War, reviewing its roots and causes as well as American intervention during the course of the war and how it changed the balance of power during the war. We also review the most important gains made by the United States of America through this intervention in the Iraq-Iran conflict.

Key- Words: Iran- Iraq War, Islamic Revolution, US, CIA.

List of contents

DedicationsI

AcknowledgementsII

Declaration III

AbstractIV

List of contents V

List of abbreviations..... VIII

Contents..... XI

Contents:

General Introduction 1

- 1. Background of the study1**
- 2. Statement of the problem2**
- 3. The literature review2**
- 4. The research questions and hypotheses3**
- 5. The significance of the study 4**
- 6. The objectives of the study4**
- 7. The research methodology4**
- 8. The structure of the dissertation 5**

Chapter One: Overview of the Iraqi-Iranian relationships (1921-1979)

Introduction..... 6

- 1.1.The Iraqi-Iranian Territorial Disputes.....6
 - 1.1.1.The Signing Of Borders’ Treaty (1937) 7
 - 1.1.2.Signing The Algiers' Agreement (1975).....9
 - 1.1.3.The Triumph Of The Iranian Islamic Revolution And Its Threat To Iraq..... 11
- 1.2. The Causes Of The War..... 13
 - 1.2.1. The Boundary Disputes:14
 - 1.2.2. Al Khomeini 's Intention To Export The Islamic Revolution Overbroad....15
 - 1.2.3. Iran's Support Of The Kurds In Iraq..... 17
 - 1.2.4. Iran's Occupation Of United Arab Emirates' Islands (Abu Moussa Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tumb).....20

| | |
|------------------------------|----|
| 1.2.5.Saddam's Heroism | 23 |
| Conclusion..... | 24 |

Chapter Two: The Outbreak Of The War And The US Involvement:

| | |
|---|----|
| Introduction | 25 |
| 1.1.The Outbreak Of The Iraqi-Iranian War..... | 25 |
| 1.2.The US Involvement In The Iraq-Iran War | 29 |
| 1.2.1.The US Reaction To The Conflict..... | 30 |
| 1.2.2.The US Support To Iraq In The War: The Role Of The CIA..... | 30 |
| 1.2.2.1.Combat Planning And Battlefield Intelligence..... | 31 |
| 1.2.2.2.Providing Iraq With Unreported Loans..... | 32 |
| 1.2.2.3.CIA’s Aids To Iraq For Calibrating Mustard Gas Against Iranians:..... | 33 |
| 1.2.2.4.The US Shipment Of "dual-use" Exports | 36 |
| 1.2.3.1.Lebanon Hostage’s Crises | 38 |
| 1.2.3.2.Iran- Contra Affair..... | 40 |
| 2.1. Forcing an End to the War..... | 43 |
| Conclusion..... | 47 |

Chapter Three: Analysis Of The US Involvement In The Persian Gulf War:

| | |
|---|----|
| Introduction | 49 |
| 1.1.The Objectives Of The US Involvement In The Persian Gulf War..... | 49 |
| 1.1.1.The Geopolitical Objectives | 50 |
| 1.1.2. The geostrategic Objectives..... | 52 |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| 1.1.3.The Economic Objectives | 53 |
| 1.2.The US Involvement's Outcomes..... | 57 |
| Conclusion | 59 |
| General Conclusion..... | 70 |
| Works Cited List | 74 |
| Résumé | 83 |
| المخلص..... | 84 |

List of Abbreviation

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

IRGC: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

UN: United Nations

US: United States of America

NSC: National Security Council

General Introduction

1. Background Of The Study:

It is a matter of fact that since the Soviet Union's nuclear burst 1949, there was no event that attracted the US attention more than the Iranian Revolution in 1979. While the Korean War (1950- 3), Cuban Missile Crisis (1963), and the Vietnam War (1954- 1975) were serious conflicts, but at no point did any of these Cold War crisis change the strategic balance of power between the US and the ex- USSR. Thus, the major difference between these conflicts and the Iranian Revolution was the fact that Iran was of great strategic importance to the US. Accordingly, Iran is the largest state in the Persian Gulf region; for it shared a long border with the Soviet Union, and owned the fourth largest oil and second biggest natural gas reserves in the world.

Shedding lights on the historical relationships of the latter countries and western presence in the area, it is obvious that it was unpleasant and tensed relationship between both neighbors and US because of the territorial and political dispute between them, regardless to some agreements and conventions between neighbors and the US political dealing with both countries. However, this did not last long just after Algiers Agreement 1975 which had been canceled by Saddam Hussein himself shortly before he invaded Iran.

Following the Islamic revolution, Iraq unexpectedly started offensive strikes against Iran on September 22, 1980, and the US administration, during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, claimed to adopt an official policy of strict neutrality, merely because it had no other available alternative at that time, Since the hostages' crisis between Iran and the US, Iranian policymakers had no intention to agree on the fact of the US support in the conflict.

Likewise, a tilt towards Iraq was not possible since Iraq was hostile towards the US. However, the freeing of the hostages and the election of Ronald Reagan 1980 provided the

US administration with more flexibility in its approach to the war. With the hostages' crisis being resolved, the war provided the US with a perfect chance to promote its bilateral relations with Iraq.

Because of that Reagan's administration could not let Iraq collapse, the United States tilted heavily towards Iraq in defiance of its stated policy. Interestingly, the tilt towards Iraq did not stop the Reagan administration from secretly dealing with Iran in 1985, the disclosure of these dealings resulted in the buildup of American naval forces in the region to protect the shipment of oil, and eventually the use of force to end the conflict in 1988.

2. Statement Of The Problem:

Throughout history, the United States of America promotes its diplomatic relationships with foreign countries through political and economic collaboration beside conducting peace negotiations and attempting to make peace over the world whether in the involvement on making decision in level of The UN or through using its foreign policy's protocols, but regarding the case of the Persian gulf war, US played a major role in the outbreak of the war and its progress even in putting end to the war.

The present dissertation addresses the role played by US in the Persian Gulf war and how America implicated throughout the war, beside that it attempts to explore and analyze the reasons and objectives of American involvement in this war.

3. The Literature Review:

Interestingly, the first Persian Gulf War 1980- 8 is one of the most targeted events to discuss due to its effect on shaping US foreign policy towards the Middle East nevertheless; the US involvement in that war is the case of study in particular, because the role played by America in the war had a controversial debate both inside and abroad America, so that many researchers and scholars attempted to shed lights on the role of America in the war and the reasons and objectives that led America to involve whether secretly or publicly.

Obviously, one of the most accurate works which depicted the Iraqi Iranian conflict and the role of US in that most costly war is Bryan Gibson's *Covert relationships: American foreign policy, intelligence, and the Iraq-Iran war 1980-1988* (2010), in his books Bryan dealt with the origins of the conflict and carter's administration responses to the war he discussed American administration's actions from different aspects beside US policy during the Iran-Contra Affair.

In this respect, Dilip Hiro examined in his book *The longest war: Iran-Iraq Military Conflict* (1989) the causes and courses of Iran-Iraq conflict and assesses its impact on both neighbors as well as the its effect on the region and the rest of the world, he also revealed the multifaceted twists and turns of the international diplomacy including the US

An additional work by Theodore Draper *A very Thin Line: The Iran-contra Affairs* (1991) which in Theodore explains the labyrinthine scandal that briefly unnerved the Regan presidency, however; Theodore addressed in his work the issue of double dealing policy and how US took a side in the war by managing a deal of selling weapons to Iran

4. The Research Questions And Hypotheses:

The Persian Gulf War was a decisive opportunity to the US administration to win a trophy, that its personal interests have always come first. The US intervention in the war led to rise sensitive questions; such as:

- What are the main reasons that led the US to involve the war?
- For which side did the US intervened in the Persian Gulf War? And Why?
- How did the US involve in the war?
- What are the long- term objectives that led the US administration interfere in the war?

Based on the above questions, it is hypothesized that:

- The US intervened for in the conflict for both military and economic reasons;
- The US used a dual policy of dealing with both actors in the conflict. i. e. supporting

both countries of Iran and Iraq secretly in the war;

- The US gained some geopolitical and geostrategic objectives after the end of the war.

5. The Significance Of The Study:

The main point that makes this paper significant is the fact that it shows the United States of America as a world wild power, trying to dominate and lead the world through its several policies, Covering its interventions to other countries local affairs with the term "Peace "with not taking into account the massif damage that can these foreign policies cause to other nations. By looking to the big picture, the United states built its greatness above the bodies of innocent people. The research tries to be neutral and objective and will focus on real events and sources.

6. The Objectives Of The Study:

The objectives that will build the desertions on would be:

- ✚ To put a sight on the nature of the relationships between Iraq and Iran before the war;
- ✚ To reveal the reasons of the break out of the war;
- ✚ To show the true intention that brought the U.S inside the war and analysis;
- ✚ To announce the long term economic, geopolitical and geostrategic objectives;

7. The Research Methodology:

Searching about a significant issue in the American history demand the use of the analytical descriptive approach. Because in accomplishing this research, we will use books, videos, articles, websites, archival and historical documents to collect the necessary data needed to fulfill the requirements of this study, and the aim of using the analytical

descriptive approach is to analyze, define, show and broadly the historical events that took place during and before the Persian Gulf War, starting with the Iraqi-Iranian correlations passing through the commencement of the war to the US involvement and its objective from the intervention.

8. The Structure Of the Dissertation:

As far as the structure of the dissertation, this study is divided into three chapters. The first chapter is entitled: Overview of the Iraqi-Iranian relationships (1921-1979). It sheds light on the Iraqi-Iranian territorial disputes then it reveals some border treaties made between Iraq and Iran, also it clarifies the triumph of Islamic revolution, then comes to the causes of the first Persian Gulf War.

The second chapter is entitled: The outbreak of the war and the US involvement, this chapter addressed the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War 1980, moving to the role played by the U.S. in this war, and how the U.S. impacted the conduct of the war by playing a vital role by tilting towards one side against another. Besides, this chapter also reveals some crises and scandals during the war such as the Iran-Contra Affair and the Lebanon hostage crisis.

The third chapter is entitled: Analysis of US involvement in the Persian Gulf War, in which the US involvement is analyzed from several aspects, and clarifies what the US intervention resulted in, and why the US was involved; therefore, this chapter is addressing also the objectives of U.S. intervention in the Iraq-Iran War.

Chapter One: Overview Of The Iraqi- Iranian Relationships (1921- 1979):

Introduction:

The Iran- Iraq War was amongst the longest wars of the 20th century. It broke out between both neighbors Iraq and Iran in September 1980 and ended in August 1988. It led to serious casualties, leaving more than 1 million dead. Also, it severely damaged the economies of both countries.

The war broke out for a number of reasons, but the main motive was the Iranian propaganda which was based on the export of the revolution and the intensification of the dispute between Iraq and Iran on the demarcation of the border, especially in the Shatt Al-Arab region, overlooking the oil-rich Gulf in addition to the intermittent military clashes between the two countries.

1.1.The Iraqi-Iranian Territorial Disputes:

The Iran- Iraq War was an inevitable result both of long- term and instant causes. Analysis of the conflict shows that the points of disputation between the two countries have not changed for centuries and that some of the events of the past seem uncannily contemporary. However, Competition and contention between Iran and Iraq date back to the days of the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire under the Safa (1501-1722). Iraq was then the easternmost province of the Ottomans, whereas Iran was the nucleus of the Safavid realm. Disputes between the competing empires revolved around boundaries and interference in each other's internal affairs, conducted through ethnic and sectarian minorities across the common border (Hiro 7).

1.1.The Signing Of Borders' Treaty:

In most discussions of the Iran-Iraq War, it has become a common place to view the conflict as the latest manifestation of the millenarian Arab- Persian struggle for dominance over the Persian Gulf and the Fertile Crescent. Some historians claimed that the conflict could be originated in the pre-Islamic rivalry between the Achaemenid and the Babylonian empires; however, others to the 7th century Arab-Muslim destruction of the Sassanid Empire and the subsequent conversion of most Persians to Islam.

However, Karsh argue that the conflict is an extension of the historic struggle for power and control between Sunni and Shi'ite, whilst Arabs are mostly Sunni, and emphasize on the Holy Quran as much as they are committed to the religious law, Iranians adopted Shi'ism as a doctrine which was mainly derived from Islam, this minority group in Islam dates back to Ali Ibn-Abi-Talib, who is Prophet Muhammad's cousin (Karsh 7).

Yet, while these general causes may explain the high possibility of getting into conflicts, or even probable, they justify the occurrence of a particular war, but in spite of the lengthy periods of tranquility between the two countries. In order to understand why the Iran-Iraq War broke out in September 1980, it is required to seek for reasonable reasons, particularly the nature of the two governments at the time and their political and ideological objectives. In fact, the period of peace and co-operation between Iran and Iraq far exceeded those of hostilities and enmity. During the late 1920s and the early 1930s, Iraq and Iran joined their efforts in quelling ethnic insurgencies in both countries, in 1931, the two countries exchanged envoys and the following year Iraq have obtained full independence, then became a member of the League of Nations; however, the nature of the inter- state problems remained the same, because The Iranian regime thought that the Arabs of Khuzistan district were secretly supported by the Iraqi government in order to make them to revolt and rebel (Karsh 8).

Meanwhile, the Iraqi government assumed that harsh oppression was exercised by Iran against the Arabs of Khuzistan. This strategy resulted in a number of insurrections which obliged the Arabs of Arabistan/ Khuzistan to seek refuge in Iraq, The third issue which needed to be debated between the two governments was the position of Iraq in regard to the Shatt al Arab and its right to complete sovereignty over the whole river (Hiro 10).

Later on, Iraq decided to take the dispute to the League of Nations in November 1934, but in the spring of 1936 both states decided to withdraw the case from the League and resume direct negotiations. While these were in progress, a sudden internal developments in Iraq weakened its position, which was A coup d'état in October 1936 ushered in a government which was feeble and disturbing, and followed by continued pressure from Iran, supported by the British oil companies interests and government, Iraq approved the Thalweg Code for 4 miles opposite Abadan, which included a vast oil refinery owned by the Anglo- Persian Oil Company.

The result was the Iran- Iraqi Frontier Treaty signed on 4 July 1937 by which it was acknowledged that Shatt Al Arab was open for navigation to all the countries of the world, and reestablished the land boundaries as set out in the 1913-14 accords, and adjusted only the fluvial frontiers. Later on, Iraq claimed that it had signed the treaty under duress, an argument it was to repeat regarding the March 1975 Algiers Accord with Iran (Hiro 10).

Even though the 1937 Treaty was between two sovereign states, but the domineering presence of Britain was all too obvious, since British interests required exercising influence in both Baghdad and Tehran. And that was clear when A British dominated oil company had struck oil over the most northern regions of Iraq in 1927, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was massive and controlled almost Iran's industrial and commercial life (Hiro 11).

1.1.2. Signing The Algiers' Treaty (1975):

Shortly after the Ba'ath party rose to power, in 1968, the Iraqi government asked for the full control over Shatt Al- Arab on April, 19, 1969. Meanwhile, Iran abolished the 1937 Treaty, which was signed between Iraq and Iran to sort the territorial dispute, claiming that Iraq provoked Iranian boats sailing in Shatt Al- Arab (Bengio 17). In April 1969, both armies were deployed on the watersides of the Persian Gulf, after Iran taking control of four islands in the Persian Gulf, Baghdad came to have lots of diplomatic matters with Tehran which were unpleasant issues for both sides (Anthony & Abraham 51); so, Iraq called the Arabs of Khuzestan to start an uprising against shah of Iran Mohammed Reza

Besides, Iraq also excluded all Iranians out of Iraq; therefore, as a reaction to that Iran supported the Kurds secretly, so that the Iraqi condition was not comfortable enough, especially after the outbreak of Yom Kippur War, Iraq wanted to set up a new diplomatic relations with Iran, because of fears that Iran will attack them from the East, while most of Iraqi armed forces were fighting on the Syrian front, that led to the propose a new treaty to be agreed on Algiers negotiations (Pipes 79).

All of these circumstances and more led to the conclusion of an accord on 6 March 1975 in Algiers by the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi vice-president, during a summit conference of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The Algiers Agreement main concern was; Territorial integrity, sanctity of borders, and non-interference in internal affairs, provided that the two countries would undertake:

- ✚ Making a definite demarcation of their land border, that is based on Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the minutes of the Delimitation of Frontier Commission of 1914.
- ✚ Define the maritime frontier in accordance with the Thalweg line principle.

✚ Re-establish security and effective control that would force an end to all acts of infiltration of a subversive character from either side.

✚ To consider the arrangements referred above as integral elements of the comprehensive settlement. Any infringement of the component parts would be opposing to the strength of the agreement

✚ Restore traditional ties of good neighborly relations and friendship, to continue exchange of views on all questions of mutual interest and to promote mutual co-operation. (Abdulghani 157)

The signatories agreed to set the limits of their river boundaries basing on the Thalweg line, in order to stop all infiltrations of a subversive nature. A Treaty concerning the Frontier and Neighborly Relations between Iran and Iraq was signed in Baghdad on 13 June and ratified by both parties on 17 September, this led to appointing A joint commission in order to define the new border in the wake of Iran's compromise territory around the villages of Zain al Qaws and Saif Saad in the Qasr-e Shirin area to compensate Iraq for its concession on the Shatt al Arab (Hiro 17).

The Algiers Accord signified success and victory for Iran. It included the Iranian claim first made over 60 years earlier, that the Thalweg code be applied to the frontier alongside the Shatt al Arab. In addition, in 1937, the weakness of Iraqi government had led it to yield to Iranian pressure and accept this formula for Abadan harbor, so too now. Stressed and exhausted by the Iranian-backed Kurdish rebellion, the Iraqi government agreed to lengthen the Thalweg formula to the rest of the fluvial border. However, it was a bitter pill for Iraq to swallow, as was to be revealed later, that left its leaders acutely at odds, with military officers among them opposing the accord (Hiro 17).

1.1.3. The Triumph Of The Iranian Islamic Revolution And Its Threat To Iraq:

The Iranian Revolution, aka the Islamic Revolution of 1979, was a series of events that led to the overthrow of the monarch of Iranian Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and the founding of an Islamic republic governed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Al Khomeini. The latter intended to export the Iranian Islamic revolutionary model to its neighbors in the Middle East, especially Iraq which was a main target of the Iranian policymakers.

In this regard, Karsh supposes that the status which has been achieved by the Algiers Agreement was brought to an unexpected and traumatic end by the Iranian Revolution of January 1979, which was mainly headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Al Khomeini, who was a radical cleric. He had been expelled from Iran by the Shah in 1964 for his opposition to the regime. Accordingly, Al Khomeini adopted a militant religious doctrine rejecting not only the Middle Eastern political order, but also the whole international existing system since both perpetuated an unjust order imposed on the oppressed Muslims by the oppressive and unfair great powers. It was necessary to be substituted by an Islamic world order in which the territorial nation state would be exceeded by the wider and extensive entity of the *umma*. i. e. The universal Muslim community, and since Iran was the only country where the 'Government of Allah' had been established, it had the holy duty to protect Muslims and serve as the core of the *umma* and a spring board for the worldwide propagation of Islam's holy message. As he put it in his public speeches, 'We will export our revolution throughout the world', until he went further to say "there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of God" should be echoed all over the world (Karsh 12).

Al Khomeini made good his promise when in November 1979 and February 1980 widespread strikes started in the Shi'ite towns of the oil-rich Saudi province of Hasa, resulting dozens of fatalities. Meanwhile similar disturbances occurred in Bahrain during 1979-80, despite the fact that Kuwait became the target of a sustained terrorist and

rebellious movement. Yet, the main thrust of the rebellious effort targeted Iraq because of two main reasons:

- ✚ Firstly, Shi'ites accounted for about 60 per cent of Iraq's total inhabitants, and they intensely resented the longstanding discrimination practiced against them by the Sunni minority, the revolutionary regime in Tehran could, and certainly did, divert hopes that this Shi'ite community would follow and imitate the Iranian example and rise against Sunni as they claimed to be their oppressors;
- ✚ Secondly, given Iraq's Position as the largest and most powerful Arab country in the Gulf, it was seen as the main obstacle to Iran's quest for regional hegemony by the revolutionary regime. (Karsh 13).

In June 1979 the revolutionary regime began publicly urging the Iraqi population to rebel and remove the secular Ba'ath government from power, which had ruled Iraq since the summer of 1968. A few months later, Tehran escalated its movement by resuming support for the Iraqi Kurds which had been suspended in 1975 providing aid to subversive Shi'ite movements in Iraq and initiating terrorist attacks against prominent Iraqi officials. These reached their climax on April, 1, 1980 with a failed attempt to assassinate the Iraqi Deputy Premier, Tariq Aziz, during a public speech in Baghdad, Two weeks later, Latif Nusseif al-Jasim, the Iraqi Minister of Information, narrowly survived from a similar attempt, meanwhile at least 20 Iraqi officials were killed in bomb attacks by Shi'ite underground organizations (Karsh 14).

In this regard, Hiro argued that it was to such ideological offensives mounted from Tehran that Saddam Hussein felt obliged to respond, and as a reaction, he tried to turn the argument around. In order to paint that the Islamic Revolution or any other revolution to be Islamic, it must be complementary to the Arab revolution, he stated in a public speech in

October 1979 that “As an Arab revolutionary I realize the issue as such ... A true Islamic revolution would absorb the Arab ideology and remove any contradiction between it and this Arab ideology”.

At the same time, Saddam Hussein resorted to projecting himself as a devout Muslim by praying at numerous sacred shrines, Sunni and Shia. He undertook an extensive visit to the Shia districts and announced some procedures and programs for its socio-economic improvement. He affirmed Imam Ali's birthday a national holiday. He started identifying with the historical figures of early Islam and employing Islamic symbols (Hiro 34).

1.2.The Causes Of The War:

It is a matter of fact that, there is no region in the world where conflicts were widespread as much as the Middle East. Apparently, international media greeted with news reports and documentaries of rocket attacks, terrorist threats, and insecurity in this area. Yet, Middle Eastern states warned with each other for centuries, but one of the most volatile bloody conflicts was the Iraq- Iran war of the 1980s. This Persian Gulf War opened the door for countless of the further current issues in the Middle East.

Historically, the Middle East has a long story of series of conflicts. The seeds for the Iraqi- Iranian conflict were laid down years before the first shots were fired. Iran witnessed major regime changes prior to the war. For several decades, Iran had a pro- western government which did not satisfy the radical factions. In 1979, the Islamic Revolution of Iran overthrew the government and began founding the new Islamic republic.

Iraq had similar situation shortly before the war, in the lights of the 1960s Seizure of power which has been led by the Ba‘ath party. The latter was a provincial branch of a larger political movement which swept the Middle East that was a socialist in nature and had a strong nationalist petition, by July 1979 a leading Ba‘athist figure, General Saddam

Hussein became the new Iraqi president; thus, in 1979 both Iraq and Iran saw key leadership transformations that ultimately set the stage for years of conflict to come between the two countries.

1.2.1.The Boundary Disputes:

It is notwithstanding that the causes of the Iraqi- Iranian War are geopolitical in two vital ways: (1) territorial issues, including Shatt Al- Arab boundary and five other zones, which were a direct cause of disputation, and (2) the non- territorial conflicts also had key roles. However, territory was the measure to assess their outcomes, and dominance of disputed territory is the primary means of demonstrating prevailing power (Swearingen 2).

As a matter of fact, the changing of government in Iran, and the chaos surrounding it, provided Saddam Hussein's regime with the opportunity to fill the regional power vacuum that had been created. Iraq set its sights on the conquest of Khuzestan; an ethnically Arab province of Iran neighboring the Iraqi province of Basra and the Persian Gulf, which gave Iraq the opportunity to take control all over Shat Al-Arab after what Saddam named the Humiliation of Algiers Agreement 1975. This step; in fact, eliminated Iraq's landlocked situation (Iraq- Iran war 2).

In this respect, Hiro argued that after Saddam Hussein had accomplished his plans and secured the Saudi and Kuwaiti rulers active support in August. On September, 2, 1980, clashes erupted between Iraqi and Iranian troops near Qasr-e Shirin. A couple of days later, Iran bombarded the Iraqi towns of Mandali Khanaqin and from the disputed area of Zain al Qaws village. According to the Iraqi officials, the Iranian air force also bombed Khanaqin and Mandali and oil installations.

On September, 6, Iraq threatened to seize 115- 145 square miles in the Zain al Qaws

area- reportedly awarded to it according to an unpublished clause of the Algiers Accord if Iran did not cede the territory within a week. However, Tehran responded with more artillery fire at Iraqi border towns in the area. Baghdad claimed to have Zain al Qaws under its control on September, 7, followed by Saif Saad shortly after, and five border posts on 12-13 September; thus, compulsorily settling its dispute with Tehran on land boundary differences. The lack of any significant Iranian resistance to the Iraqi advances seems to have made Saddam Hussein thinking that time has come to take full control over the Shatt Al Arab (Hiro 38- 9).

1.2.2. Al Khomeini's Intention To Export The Islamic Revolution Overboard:

Since the success of the Iranian Revolution (1979) and the fall of the Shah's regime, Iran intended to spread its authority all over the Islamic world. Al Khomeini considered himself a "divine ruler" sent by Allah to save the mankind. The main objective was to export the Islamic Revolution to the neighboring countries in order to overthrow their old regimes, and replace them with Islamic ones.

Tehran believed that the Islamic revolution is of global phenomenon; it should have no borders, as well as it considered the survival of the Islamic Republic is closely tied as long as the revolution is only located in Iran. Al Khomeini asserted that the Islamic religion does not admit the borders between Islamic countries, and the exporting of the revolution is a religious duty, not just a political aim. He demanded from all the countries to join the revolution because it is intended to release the oppressed people around the world. In addition, Al Khomeini claimed that copying the Iranian Revolution by the rest of the world is the first step to collaborate with Iran to fight the Islam's enemies in the East and the West. In this context, he claimed, in 1979, that:

I hope that (Iran) will become a model for all the meek and Muslim

nations in the world and that this century will become the century for smashing great idols... O meek of the world, rise and rescue yourselves from the talons of nefarious oppressors; O zealous Muslims in various countries of the world, wake from your sleep of neglect and liberate Islam and the Islamic countries from the clutches of the colonialists and those subservient to them. (Halliday 91)

As long as the plan was to build an Islamic regional system rather than an Arabic one, Iran believed that it should support the neighboring countries to establish Iranian-style governments, by encouraging coups from within to change the systems that it considered them corrupt through the propaganda and planning, than attacking from abroad to uproot the state and replace it with the revolution government. Besides, the Arab Gulf states considered Iraq to be the first intended target of exporting the Iranian Revolution. Among the reasons were:

- ✚ Iran wanted to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein; indeed, Al Khomeini saw the Shias as an oppressed majority by the ruling party which he described it with the infidelity and atheism,

- ✚ Al Khomeini considered Iraq a fierce enemy that should be eliminated. In a press interview in Paris, he listed Iran's enemies and identified them as follows: (1) The Iranian Shah, (2) the US, and (3) the Iraqi regime.

- ✚ Iran intended, from exporting the Islamic Revolution, to control the holy shrines in Al Najaf and Karbala,

- ✚ Iran wanted to impose its full control over the area of Shatt Al Arab in order to control Iraq and destroy it, because Iraq is the eastern gate to the Arab

World, as a result, the other Arabic regimes will surrender without resisting. (Roni 3- 9)

As seen above, Ayatollah El Khomeini had the intention to lead the Islamic World through establishing a Shiite empire, including all the Islamic countries under the leadership of an Iranian guider, by which he used the concept of exporting the Iranian revolution as an excuse to reach the authority, not to get rid of the injustice. So, Al Khomeini's policy did not differ from that one of the Shah because both of them were dictators (Ostovar 74- 5).

1.2.3.Iran's Support Of The Kurds In Iraq:

The Kurdish problem dates back since the end of the World War I (1914- 18). After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish people began to look forward to establish a Kurdish nation. They have been stirring unrest in Iraq since the 1920s. Then, later in the 1940s, they resorted to armed struggle under the leadership of Mullah Mustafa Barzani in order to claim self- rule in Kurdistan, which comprised Kirkuk that produces more than 70 per cent of Iraqi oil. The Kurdish insurgencies have given Iran the opportunity to intervene in Iraqi affairs, which led to escalate the conflicts between the two sides (Nader 916- 8).

The Iraqi successive governments (1920- 1958) disregarded completely the Kurdish problem, and each party chose to adopt the military option. Therefore, the Kurds struggled to determine their fate; They made the July 14th 1958 revolution which contributed to the establishment of a temporary law in the Iraqi Constitution, which acknowledged that the Kurdish rights are among the Iraqi unity (Nader 918- 9).

Besides, President Abd Al Karim Qassim was afraid that northern Iraq will be divided by Turkey, or Iran; so, he allowed the Kurds to form political parties and issued an amnesty for Mullah Mustafa Barzani who was in the exile in the Soviet Union since 1947. When Barzani returned to Iraq, President Kassem provided him with money and weapons, and

used him to suppress the movement of the Shawaf. The reconciliation between the Iraqi regime and the Kurds continued until 1961 during which the Kurds became more ambitious to their demands. So, President Qassim turned against them and entered into a conflict with the Kurdish army (Bengio 250- 2).

Yet, the dispute between the Kurds and the Iraqi government continued during Qassim's reign till the 1963 revolution. President Abd Al Salam Arif began his rule emphasizing his recognition of the Kurdish rights in Iraq. In addition, he asked for a negotiation with Mullah Mustafa Barzani who accepted the President's offer. This paved the way for the declaration of the truce which was signed in 1964, and accordingly, the cease-fire was halted and the fighting in Northern Iraq ended (Bengio 253).

Later, Mullah Mustafa Barzani presented a memorandum to Iraqi President Abdul Salam Arif which contained such as: (1) the recognition of the decentralized system in the Kurdish region, (2) the Kurd must take over their affairs alone, (3) allocating one third of oil revenues to the Kurds, (4) the formation of an army from the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan, and (5) one- third of ministers must be from the Kurds. However, none of those demands have been agreed, therefore the fighting resumed again from 1966 till the rise of the 1968 Revolution during which the Baath Party took power. The party sought to control Iraq as a whole, but the Iraqi government was afraid of the Kurds because they were representing the strongest regular force after the central authority; So, for this reason the Ba'ath Party tried to solve the Kurdish issue peacefully without resorting to force through issuing several resolutions including: release a pardon to those who participated in the northern incidents, re- establishment of dismissed workers and establishment of a Kurdish University in Sulaymaniyah (Bali 212- 4).

The negotiations between the Iraqi government and the Kurds ended on March, 11,

1970 when the Iraqi Vice- President Saddam Hussein and Mustafa Barzani agreed on a joint- statement that was considered as the most important political development in the course of the Kurdish issue. The statement contained the following:

- ✚ The recognition of the Kurdish language as an official language in the predominantly Kurdish areas,
- ✚ One of the Vice- Presidents of the Republic must be Kurdish,
- ✚ Conducting a census of the Kurdish population,
- ✚ Forming a police force of 7,000 fighters from the ranks of the Kurdish rebels,
- ✚ The declaration of autonomy in its final form within a maximum period of four years from the date of the statement. (Beeman 4- 5)

Despite the agreement between the Kurds and the Iraqi government; however, there were some points that have not been agreed by the two parties that led to a deterioration of the relations. The most important one was the continuation of the secret relationships between the Kurds and Iran. The Iraqi intelligence agency discovered secret communications between the Kurdish leaders and the Shah of Iran in which the latter supported the Kurds and their demands in order to make Iraq more vulnerable. The Shah supplied the Kurds with large quantities of modern and sophisticated weapons, as well as providing them with direct military support by sending troops to the fighting sites. Also, he mobilized his forces along the borders with Iraq. Along with the large Iranian military support for the Kurdish insurgency, the Iranian forces maneuvered and moved along the eastern border of Iraq to distract the Iraqi army and to make its forces incapable of countering the Kurdish

insurgency (Yildiz 19- 21).

The Iranian support to the Kurds caused a deficit and a significant shortage of military equipment by the Iraqi side, therefore, the Iraqi government accepted to negotiate with Iran to have the opportunity to rebuild its military capabilities. As a result, the Algiers Agreement was signed in March 1975 under which Iran pledged to stop supporting the Kurdish rebellion. This led to the end the conflict completely.

On the other hand, Iraq provided concessions to Iran from its share of Shatt Al- Arab. After the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the rapprochement between Iran and the Kurds returned again. Ayatollah Khomeini met with Barzani's sons Massoud and Idris, and ordered to supply them with weapons and money to raise insurgency troubles in Northern Iraq and Baghdad. The Kurdish- Iranian rapprochement increased after the outbreak of the Iraqi- Iranian War. It was an opportunity for Barzani's supporters (Yildiz 22- 4).

1.2.4.Iran's Occupation Of United Arab Emirates' Islands (Abu Moussa, Greater Tunb, And Lesser Tunb):

Abu Musa Island is located at the entrance to the Arabian Gulf, 160 km exactly from the Strait of Hormuz and near to the Iranian coast. It is considered amongst the largest lands in the region. Besides, it contains a large amount of oil and suitable lands for agriculture. On the other hand, Greater and Lesser Tunb are located in the northeast side of Abu Musa Island. They belong to the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah. These islands are characterized by small population, strategic location, and dominance of the entrance to the Indian Ocean; therefore, Iran has called for the annexation of the these islands and it claimed that they were originally Persian. In 1844, Prime Minister Haji Mirza sent a memorandum to the British government claiming that all the islands that located in the Persian Gulf from Shatt Al- Arab mouth to Muscat were always Persians; however, the British government rejected Iran's request (Jalinusi and Arayee 2).

The Persian state had waited, for a long time, the right opportunity to combine the three islands. So, after the fall of El Qawasim castles, it took the advantage to eliminate the Arabian rule in Lenga that located on the east coast of the Gulf; then, the Persian forces occupied the Siri area that belongs to Abu Musa Island in addition to the island of Henjam that belonged to the tribe of Beni Yas. This; of course, led to the decline of trade in the port of Lenga. Accordingly, conflicts emerged between the Arabs and the Persians in the area (Al- Mazrouei 5- 7).

Great Britain has taken many measures to assert El Qwasim's right to take over the region. In 1900, the British mandate authority in India proposed that the Arabic flags must be flown on the three islands: Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa; however, in 1904 the Persian state dropped the flags from the three islands and placed the Persian flags. So, under the British pressure, it dropped its flags from the islands. In 1925, Reza Khan declared himself as a king on the Persian state. He had directly shown an aggressive policy that was represented in his intention to control the Arabian Gulf by dominating Bahrain and the three islands. Although the negotiations between the Persian state and Britain continued till 1933; however, all of them failed. Since Reza Shah surrendered his son to power and the occupation of Russia and Britain to Iran in addition to the start of the world war II, Iran retreated from demanding the Arabic islands (Al- Mazrouei 7- 11).

The British government issued a statement in January 1968 which confirmed its intention to withdraw from the Gulf region no later than 1971, and as a result, Bahrain and Qatar in August became independent states in the same year. Immediately after the departure of British troops from the region, Iran threatened to occupy Bahrain; however, this decision resolved by the intervention of the United Nations which issued a referendum by the majority votes of the member countries in favour of Bahrain (Mobley 628- 630).

When Iran failed to achieve its goal, it decided to compensate for its loss by occupying

the three islands Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa Island; thus, on October, 13, 1971, the Iranian Shah invited the leaders of many countries around the world to celebrate the 2500th anniversary of the establishment of the Persian Empire. During the ceremony, he gave them expensive and rare gifts in return for their agreement to the occupation. On November, 3, 1971, the Iranian army invaded the three islands with the British support. Thus, Iran succeeded in annexing them to its borders. In addition, Iran signed an agreement with Sultan of Oman which allowed him to control the entrance of the Persian Gulf, in exchange for Iran to send its troops to participate in the fight against the rebels in El Dhofar region (Al-Kaabi 7- 9).

Iraq had always considered that the three islands belong to the Arabs, because most of their populations are Arabs, and these lie within the Arabian territorial waters, therefore, the Iraqi government demanded from Iran to return the islands that they had captured to the United Arab Emirates. In addition, Algeria, Libya, and Yemen submitted a joint complaint to the UN Security Council regarding the Iranian occupation of the island of the United Arab Emirates; however, the Security Council failed to order the Iranian withdrawal from the islands; thus, the Iraqi government submitted a second complaint especially after the Iranian forces had committed aggression acts on the Iraqi borders. On the other hand, the United Arab Emirates had offered an initiative to resolve the islands issue in direct negotiations with the Iranian government or with diplomatic efforts, but Iran refused. It confirmed that the three islands will remain under the Iranian control and it was impossible to return them back to the United Arab Emirates (Yenigün 44- 5).

After the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979, the United Arab Emirates expected Iran to return the occupied Arab islands; thus, El Sheikh Saqr bin Mohammed Al- Qasimi, member of the Supreme Council and the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah, appealed to Ayatollah Al Khomeini to return the islands, but Al Khomeini did not respond, and declared his

commitment to hold the three islands as an Iranian territory (Al- Nahyan 53).

1.2.5.Saddam's Heroism:

Since the 1970s, Iraq has begun to think of leading the Arab region because of its:

(1) great financial capabilities, (2) oil revenues, (3) military capabilities, and (4) important geographic location. Also, Iraq was amongst the pioneering Arab countries which called for defending the Palestinian cause. Iraq considered the peace agreement signed between Egypt and Israel made the Arabian region as a hotbed of tension. Accordingly, Iraq rejected Anwar Sadat's policy since his visit to Jerusalem in November 1979 and the signing of Camp David Agreement in 1979. The Arab Summit held in Baghdad issued a resolution that includes the provision of \$ 5.000.000.00 annually to Egypt in order to retreat from the peace agreement with Israel; however, Al Sadat did not accept the offer. Therefore, it was an opportunity for Saddam Hussein to play a leading role in the region. Thus, Iraq would emerge as an effective and influential power in the Arab arena (Kinninmont, Stansfield, and Sirri 5- 8).

When Egypt retreated from the Arab rank, Saddam Hussein prepared himself for the leadership of the Arab world, which he claimed that all the Arab nations lacked the necessary elements of leadership which are wealth, power, ideology, and organization. He added that Iraq is the only Arab country which possessed those elements; so, it is the only capable country to lead the Arab countries in their struggle against Israel. However, the lack of the borders between Iraq and Israel had made a problem to Saddam Hussein because he faced a competition to win the leadership with countries which had direct borders with Israel. Therefore, the Iraqi policymakers, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, decided to create a new common enemy for the Arabs, by which Iraq will be the only country who facing it, and Iran was the only option (Woods et al. 1- 3).

Saddam Hussein's ambition to emerge as a heroic leader leading the Arab world and defending their interests against any external threat was based on the fact of leading a war between Iraq and Iran. Also, Saddam's mentality did not differ from A Khomeini's one: both of them sought to dominate the region in order to impose their ideas and beliefs and exert influence in the region (Woods et al. 4- 5).

Conclusion:

The conflict between Iraq and Iran dates back to pre-Islamic times. This conflict continued even after the independence of Iraq in 1922 from the British occupation. There was great disagreement between the two countries on the borders' issue, which led to the signing of the first treaty between the two sides in 1937. Once again, the Shah sought to impose his control over the Arabian Gulf region, which led him to occupy the three Arab islands (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa) and assisted the Kurds of Iraq in their rebellion against the Iraqi government. This; in fact, made Saddam Hussein negotiate with the Iranian Shah. Those negotiations ended with the signing of the Algiers Agreement in 1975.

After the end of the Shah's rule and the success of Khomeini's Islamic revolution, the latter announced his intention to export his revolution abroad, he also rejected the return of the Arab islands and called for the right of Iran in some Gulf countries, in addition to, the statements against the Iraqi regime and the Iranian border attacks. All these was considered by Saddam Hussein to be contrary to Algeria's testimony, so he canceled it, however, the Iranian aggressions continued leading the President Saddam Hussein to declare the war on Iran in 1980.

Chapter Two: The Outbreak Of the War And The US Involvement.

Introduction:

The Persian Gulf War started with the first raids from the Iraqi forces on the Iranian borders in 1980. These raids paved the way to the outbreak of the conflict between the two countries which continued for more than seven years, during which many massacres took a place against both Iranians and Iraqi peoples. The war also witnessed several foreign interventions, most notably the US involvement with military and financial support to Iraq, despite the fact of adopting the neutrality policy in the conflict. As a matter of fact, the US intervention was for protecting its own interests in the region. This; in fact, resulted in several scandals; such as, primarily, the "Iraq Gate" scandal and the "Iran-Contra Affair". Besides, the use of chemical weapons which are internationally banned weapons made the war end in 1988 with enormous human and material losses for both countries (Karsh 1- 2).

1.1.The Outbreak Of The Iran- Iraq War:

On September, 17, 1980, the Iraqi revolutionary Command Council took a decision to prepare for an attack against Iran in order to achieve a decisive military victory through which Iraq could impose its conditions on Iran. Thus, the Iraqi military leadership planned for destroying the Iranian air force bases, as well as carrying out intensive air raids in the internal Iranian spots and attacking with armored vehicles across Shat Al- Arab to the depth of Khuzestan. On the morning of September 22, 1980, an air strike of 154 warplanes was carried out on Iran's airports followed by a large number of tanks that advanced towards the Iranian borders on two fronts: the first one was in the central region of the border between the two countries towards the Palace of Shirin that the Iraqi forces

were able to occupy it, and the second front was in the southern region towards Khuzestan the rich and strategic region that was a primary target for the Iraqi forces (Al- Lihaihi 4-5).

The military situation continued to deteriorate dangerously on 23 September 1980. The Iranian air force bombarded six air ports, and carried out raids on Baghdad and the petrochemical complex in Basra. On the other hand, the Iraqi forces moved into the Iraqi territories which they had the ability to isolate the city of Khorramshahr and destroying a section from the oil refinery of Abadan, after that the Iranian government threatened to close the strait of Hormuz which Iraq considered as a total declaration of war. In addition, a means of foreign intervention in the local regional affairs. Although the Iranian army lacked management, maintenance services, and logistical support, they were able to withstand the shock of the Iraqi first strikes, and the Iranian forces resorted to various defensive methods that helped them to take advantage of remaining the weapons and necessary equipment in their possession to be used to block the Iraqi forces (Murray and Woods 61- 3).

On September, 28,1980, Saddam Hussein announced Iraq's readiness for a cease fire, and then to begin direct negotiations with the Iranian government to resolve the conflict. Although the war issue had been mediated by Islamic and international organizations to stop the war; however, Iran rejected all the mediation efforts, announced its intention to occupy Iraq, and to topple the ruling Iraqi regime, as well as establishing an Islamic state belonging to Iran. on the other hand, Iraqi's plans were not accurate because Iran did not give up from the first blow, and it proved to have the strength to wage a long-term war with Iraq (Murray and Woods 64- 6).

After the first attacks, Iraq did not achieve its major objectives, among which was restoring some of the disputed territories. Thus, the Iraqi government, on October, 5, 1980, offered a ceasefire option, for the second time, under the three conditions of: (1) ending the

attacks, (2) ending the exploratory operations, and (3) ending the media campaigns. However, the Iranian envoy to the United Nations had rejected Iraqi proposal for a ceasefire. He further declared that the offer was unacceptable unless the Iraqi forces would return to their pre-war positions. The Iranian rejection was an impetus to double Iraqi incursions into the urban areas in hope that the Iranian leaders would be forced to resort to negotiations to end the war. The following day, the Iranian air force bombarded several civilian and economic facilities in Baghdad, and meanwhile, Saddam declared that Iraq was determined to continue the war against Iran no matter how long it took (Murray and Woods 66- 9).

Iran freed the Shahs officers, prisoners, and pilots to take a part in the fight; however, despite all the supplies that arrived to Iran, the Iraqi forces were able to reach Khorramshahr through a difficult desert nature. On October, 24, 1980, they were able to seize the city after bitter fighting in which both sides suffered heavy losses. In revenge, the Iraqi forces managed to cross the Karun River, which is situated east of Khorramshahr, and; then, crossed the Bahmanshir canal, one of the ports of the Karun Delta to the Arabian Gulf before its outlet in Shatt Al-Arab. Thus, the Iraqi forces imposed a siege on Abadan, but the siege did not last for long; as the Iranian forces managed to tighten their control over Abadan. This; of course prevented the fall of the Iraqi forces. After that the fighting turned into a war of sites that lasted from 1980 until the beginning of 1981 („The course of the Iran-Iraq war“ 124- 5).

In 1981, Iran focused on reorganizing its armed forces to strengthen itself in order to outweigh the Iraqi forces. The Iranian forces began a series of reconnaissance operation targeting major and minor trends in the operational divisions. However, all attacks failed, and the Iranian forces suffered heavy losses. They were almost exterminated and lost most of their tanks; The Iraqis were able to collect them and rehabilitate 150 tanks. Iraq tried to

exert military pressure on Iran to force it to accept negotiations to end the war, which the Iraqi forces `tried to occupy the city of Sosngarat on 19-20 March 1981; however, they suffered a major defeat during that attempt, and in April 1981, Iran announced that it did want to negotiate because its goal was to topple the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. As a result, the Iraqi army raided on the city of Dahran in May, 1981. At that point, the Iraqi forces occupied large areas of Iranian territories; however, Iran regained quickly its balance, and Iranian forces began to try to regain some Iranian positions that were occupied by the Iraqi army (Takeyh 167- 8).

The Iranian President Abu Al Hassan Bani Al- Sadr felt it was necessary to negotiate with Iraq in order to stop the war; however, he faced fierce opposition from the headline groups under the leadership of Ayatollah Al Khomeini. So, Iran was divided into two factions: the first one led by Abu Al Hassan Bani Al- Sadr and the second one was led by Al Khomeini who insisted on continuing the fight until overthrowing the Iraqi regime (Takeyh 169).

On 21 July, 1981, Abu al Hassan acknowledged that the Iraqis were free to choose the system they wanted. The speech angered Al Khomeini and his followers; therefore, the Iranian Consultative Council voted in favour of deposing President Bani Al- Sadr, who was; then, forced to flee outside Iran on June 29, 1981, and sought asylum in France. After Abu al Hassan, Ali Al Khomeini assumed the presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Hashemi Rafsanjani became a chief commander of the armed forces (Karsh 13- 7).

Since September 1981, Iran had mobilized large forces from the regular army and the Revolutionary Guards, and Al Khomeini gave and recommended the priority to remove the siege on Abadan. Indeed, the Iranian army succeeded to liberate Abadan through an attack led by the Iranian Infantry Division on the Iraqi armoured division that besieged the city of Abadan. In addition, the Iranians relied on the method of pushing the human waves, where

the performance of the IRGC system emerged as a parallel force of the regular army, by which the first use of the human waves from the Iranian forces was due to the Battle of Busayteen in November, 29, 1981 (Karsh 18- 21).

When Al Khomeini declared the necessity of Jihad, about 20 million people gathered and were trained as volunteers in order to place themselves on the barbed wire of defensive positions. The Revolutionary Guards took advantage of the volunteer's bodies as a pathway to attack. As the Iranians exploited the night to carry out their strategies, they overtook the Iraqi forces. As a reaction, Iraq used a similar strategy which was based on the use of the SPLA militias to compensate for the lack of human capacity (Stern 131- 3).

1.2.The US Involvement In The Iraqi- Iran War:

The US intervention in the Persian Gulf region dates back since the beginning of the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was set up by the CIA for a quarter of a century. The US considered both Iran and Saudi Arabia as two main pillars in the region to support its political and economic influence; therefore, the US was disappointed by the success of the Iranian revolution and considered it as threat to its interest, especially when Iran was considered as a large commercial market for the US goods and a major importer of its weapons. In addition, the US fears had increased after the attack on the US consulate in Tehran on November 1979; namely, the “nest of spies”, which a number of hostages were kidnapped by the Iranians (Glickstein 3- 8).

The US wanted to find an alternative to the shah; so, Saddam Hussein seemed the substitute, and with the outbreak of the Iranian- Iraqi War (1980- 8). There was a major change in the relationships between the US and Iraq. Accordingly, the US adopted a new strategy called the “Carter Doctrine” which stated that the US would protect its own interests by intervening forcefully in the Gulf region. On the other hand, Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President, announced his acceptance of the two- resolution for the Palestine- Israeli

conflict. The US administration praised the Iraqi decision, and removed Iraq from the international list of the countries which support terrorism. In addition, the relations between Iraq and the ex- USSR had declined in the light of the Soviet desire to reach a rapprochement with Iran and refrain from providing weapons to Iraq under the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement with the Iran (Glickstein 9-14).

1.2.1.The US Reaction To The Conflict:

The US reaction to the Iraqi-Iranian conflict was paradoxical. Since the beginning of the war, Edmund Muskie, the US Secretary of State, and Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, met in New York to discuss the resolution of neutrality in the war. Both super powers and other countries decided not to intervene in the conflict. Despite the fact that the US remained its neutrality, it took steps to stand in the Iraqi side, and provided it with the necessary support. Moreover, the US called the six industrial countries of Great Britain, France, Canada, Japan, Germany, and Ireland for finding new ways to control the Strait of Hormuz. Since all the reports that had been released from the White House stated that the US did not want Iran to be victorious. In addition, the US opted for prolonging the war as long as possible. So, the US encouraged Israel to sell weapons to Iran and, in return, it allowed other parties to support Iraq militarily (Potter and Sick 197- 9).

1.2.2.The US Support To Iraq In The War: The Role Of The CIA:

After the four successive Iranian victories from September 1981 to May 1982, the tide of the wars started to turn in favor of Iraq. Accordingly, the Iraqi forces began to suffer defeats at the hands of the Iranian army. This did not bode well for American policy, by which the US was afraid that the scenario of Iran's victory would be achieved, which the Iranian forces would move directly towards Saudi Arabia and Israel; therefore, The US gradually abandoned the policy of neutrality and financed Iraq in its war against Iran, by

providing it with money, arms, satellite intelligence, as well as, chemical and bio-weapon precursors and more than 80 advisors supported the Iraqi army to pick targets for Iraqi air and missile attacks. Besides, Iraq had been removed from the State Department's list of countries that sponsor terrorism in order to transfer the dual- technology (Prados 1).

Since the beginning of the war, the CIA had been analysing the ever-changing situation on the battlefield. The intelligence reported a thorough analysis; namely, "Possible Consequences and Effects of the Iraqi- Iranian War", in which CIA analysts put several expectations for the course of the war. Amongst those expectations, it was reported that the Iraq's withdrawal would be followed by a ceasefire and long- term negotiations. However, in light of the Iranian rejection of the proposal, the CIA had to put several plans in order to end the war, or at least keeping its duration without harming the US interests in the Gulf region, especially ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the Islamic revolution (Gibson 81- 6).

The first option focused on Iraq's political support; however, with no military measures, the plan was likely to fail and highlight the US political deficit. The second option was to provide indirect military support; such as, the transfer of the Egyptian or Jordanian troops to the Iraqi front, but the data indicated that the number of the supported troops would not be enough to beat the Iranian army completely; therefore, the intelligence support was the best solution (Gibson 87- 90).

1.2.2.1. Combat Planning And Battlefield Intelligence:

The US had concluded that providing Iraqi forces with sensitive intelligence information will be the crucial point in turning the tide of the war in favor of Iraq. In addition, it maintains at least some degree of deniability. As stated in Bob Woodward's book, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987*, the US afforded Iraq with classified, tactical intelligence on Iranian forces progressions. Accordingly, Woodward claimed that:

...the CIA... established a direct top- secret Washington-Baghdad link to provide the Iraqis with better and faster intelligence from U.S. satellites. Casey had met with senior Iraqis to make sure the new channel was functioning and to encourage more attacks in Iran, especially against economic targets. (735)

The first treatment between the US intelligence CIA and the Iraqi intelligence was on July 27, 1982, where the US intelligence Thomas Tweteen arrived to Baghdad in order to share pictures taken by the US satellite reveal the locations of where the Iranian forces concentrated and their movements towards Baghdad and Basra through gaps on the borders. In addition, the sensitive areas that contained weapons stores, and the intelligence information, the US had appointed more than 60 defence intelligence agency officers in order to provide the Iraqi Army with combat planning assistance by developing offensive and defensive plans, as well as teaching the soldiers how to use sophisticated weapons technology including the chemical once (Hiro 116).

In 1986, the US President Ronald Regan sent a secret message to Saddam which contained that Iraq should set up its air war and bombing on Iran. The message was passed from the US Vice President to the Egyptian President Mubarak who gave it to Saddam Hussein. Similar strategic operational military advice was passed to Iraq though several European and Middle Eastern meetings. As a result, the performance of the Iraqi army had significantly improved, regained its strength and outperformed many battles (Hiro 120).

1.2.2.2. Providing Iraq With Unreported Loans:

In addition to the intelligence support, the US expanded its support plans for Iraq and accompanied it to win the war against Iran. During the economic crisis that caused by Iran's attack on the Iraqi oil tankers that made Iraq not able to afford new weapons, the US sent

Donald Rumsfeld, the President's envoy to Baghdad, who met with Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President, for 90 minutes in order to discuss the Iraqi- US relations, especially the possibility of providing assistance aimed at developing the Iraqi economic stability of Iraq. Thus, Iraq was added, in 1983, to the Commodity Credit Program (CCC) administered by the US Department of Agriculture to facilitate the provision of sufficient funds to the Iraqi government in order to continue the war (Morley 1).

Moreover, The funds that were flowing into Iraq by the US from 1985 till 1989 for the purchase of advanced weapons and high precision devices to facilitate the establishment of chemical weapons, in addition to the development of the weapons of mass destruction. Those funds were handed over by third party; namely, the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Bank, which was located in Italy, and headed by Christopher P. Drogoul under the auspices of the CIA in order to conceal the evidences that could show that the US supported one side in the war. In fact, the US mediated Iraq to take unreported loans from the BNL, which exceeded more than 5 billion dollars under the cover of agricultural support of the US Department of Agriculture for the Iraqi government. In addition, the US promised the banks that it would meet its loans if Iraq did not pay back (Shaw 1).

The process was done after the bank manager prepared the scheme in which he used his bank's immense credit rating in order to borrow from other banks. He would; then, return and supply Iraq with the funds at a higher benefit rate. All these remittances were recorded in a hidden set of separate notebooks; The negotiations between Drogoul, the bank manager, and the Iraqis leaders were conducted through phone telexes and faxes under the secret name of "Perugina" („Banca Nazionale Scandal“ 6- 7).

1.2.2.3.CIA's Aids To Iraq For Calibrating Mustard Gas Against Iranians:

Chemical weapons and riot control agents were essential part in the Iran- Iraq War since the early 1980s because they were a regular and frequent tactic in the conflict and are

likely to increase. As a matter of fact, both states have assessed that selective use of chemical weapons can improve and increase conventional arsenals in order to attain short-term objectives, or influence certain battlefield situations, and significantly increase enemy casualties. However, in the Iraqi- Iranian conflict, the US had an outstanding influence on the use and availability of chemical weapons in battlefield.

In this respect, Harris and M. Aid argued that, in 1988, during the waning days of Iraq's war with Iran, the US recognized through satellite imagery that Iran was about to expand a major strategic advantage by exploiting a hole in Iraqi defenses, U.S. intelligence officials provided Iraq with the location of Iranian troops. They were aware of the fact that Saddam Hussein would use chemical weapons, including Sarin Gas and Lethal Nerve Agent, to attack them (3).

The intelligence information support included imagery and maps which depicted the exact location of Iranian troops and traced their movements, as well as the locations of Iranian logistics facilities and information about Iranian air defenses. Iraq used Mustard Gas and Sarin Gas prior to four major offensives in early 1988 that based on U.S. satellite pictures, maps, and other intelligence means. These attacks played a major role to tilt the conflict in the Iraqi favor and brought Iran to negotiations. They ensured that Reagan administration's long-standing policy of securing an Iraqi victory would succeed. However, it is worth to note that they were also the last in a series of chemical strikes extending back several years that the Reagan administration knew about and did not disclose (Harris and M. Aid 3).

The US administration denied the fact that Iraqi would acquire chemical weapons, and insisted that Iraqi forces never announced that they were going to use chemical weapons in those operations. Within this context, Rick Francona, a retired Air Force Colonel, who served as a military attaché in the US Embassy in Baghdad during the 1988 strikes, draws a

different picture in an interview with foreign policy magazine when he said: “The Iraqis never told us that they intended to use the Nerve Gas. They did not have to. We already knew” (Harris and M. Aid 4).

According to recently declassified CIA documents and interviews with former intelligence officials like Francona, the U.S. authorities had a conclusive proof of Iraqi chemical attacks in the beginning of 1983. Meanwhile, Iran was publicly alleging that illegal chemical attacks were carried out on its forces, and was about to build a case to present to the United Nations. However, it did not have enough proofs and evidences to implicate Iraq, much of which was contained in top secret reports and memoranda sent to the most senior intelligence officials in the U.S. government. The CIA refused to comment for this story (Harris and M. Aid 4).

In this context, Maass argues that the recent declassified CIA documents show that the CIA Director William J. Casey, a close friend of the President Ronald Reagan, had been informed about Saddam’s intention to produce and buy enough Mustard Gas in order to meet its necessity of use and demand on the front lines. Moreover, William J. Casey stressed that “if the Iraqis produce or acquire large new supplies of mustard agent, they certainly would employ it against Iranian troops and towns near the border (2).

The new evidence proved that Reagan administration was aware that it is better for them to let Iraq continue with its attacks, and even draw attention to potential targets then let the war tip in favor of Iran. Besides, the documents showed and made clear some important blanks about the U.S role in the Iran-Iraq conflict, but it was revealed that although U.S was aware that Iraq was exploiting chemical weapons against Iran, Reagan administration provided Saddam with intelligence assistance (Maass 3).

In the late 1987, the DIA analysts in Francona’s shop in Washington wrote a top Secret Codeword report partially entitled “At The Gates of Basrah,” cautioning that the

Iranian 1988 spring attack was going to be successful because it was stronger and well planned. This offensive would provide Iran with the opportunity of breaking through the Iraqi lines and taking control of Basrah. The report warned that, if Basrah fell, the Iraqi military would certainly collapse, and Iran would win the war. The US President Reagan read the report, and according to Francona, he addressed the Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci in a note written in the margin says: "An Iranian victory is unacceptable" (Harris and M Aid 5- 6).

Consequently, the US decided to give the green light to The DIA in order to provide the Iraqi intelligence services with as much as available data about the deployments and movements of the Iranian troops. That includes satellite imagery and some sanitized electronic intelligence. Particularly focusing on the area east of the city of Basrah where the DIA was convinced the next major Iranian offensive would be. The agency also provided the Iraqi intelligence with information on the locations of key Iranian logistics facilities, and the strength and capabilities of the Iranian air force and air defense system. Francona considered much of the data as "targeting packages" suitable for use by the Iraqi air force to destroy these targets (Harris and M Aid 6).

1.2.2.4. The US Shipment Of "dual- use" Exports:

It is no secret that US supported Iraq in the war against Iran, but the matter is that beside giving the green light to Saddam in order launch his offensives against Iran, US provided Iraq with aids in an indirect way which counted to be more than \$ 7.000.000.00, in the form of shipment of dual- use exports which includes arming Iraq in first place. In addition, the US support of Iraq was classified issue. i. e. publicly known in the US to the extent that the Iraqi issue in the war was discussed in open sessions of the House of the Senate and House of Representatives. In addition, the US Presidents Reagan and Bush permitted and encouraged as much as the flow of funds, dual- use technology, agricultural

credit, and chemical weapons to Iraq.

In the light of US dual use export, Danvyes commented that, the case came to exist when Iraq succeeded to advance far into Iranian territory, and drove them back within months after the Iranian resistance in 1982. Iraq came to be on the defensive against Iranian forces, and the US decided that if the Iranians gained a victory, this would not serve its own interests. So, the US officials initially began supporting Iraq and. This process had been followed by the acceleration of US- Iraq relations. This was expressed in exchanged visits between high level officials, then followed by removing Iraq from State Department's list of states supporting terrorism in February 1982 (3- 4-5).

However; Iraqi were quite sure that Prolonging the war was phenomenally expensive. The high-level meetings resulted in Iraq receiving massive external financial support from the Gulf States, and backup through loan programs from the White House and Department of State made the Export- Import Bank to provide Iraq with funding to ameliorate its credit status and enable it to get loans from other international financial institutions. The US Agriculture Department afforded taxpayer-guaranteed loans for purchases of US merchandise, to the satisfaction of US grain exporters (Danvyes 5- 6).

In addition, the Reagan administration tilted from one side to another during Iran-Iraq conflict. The imminent Iranian victory in 1982 made Reagan and his advisors decide to start secretly supplying Saddam's military capabilities, including allowing shipments of dual-use technology that Iraq used later to produce chemical and biological weapons. Meanwhile, congressional inquiries and other investigations managed to spot one of these facts over the years. The Bush administration continued to pass over the stories and ignore them continually. For example, Newsweek reported that the Reagan administration in the 1980s had given the green light to companies to sale Iraq computer Data bases that Saddam apparently could use to track political opponents and shipments of bacteria (Oller 332).

The US relationships with Iraq during the crippling conflict with Iran was rife and campaigned with such ambiguities, though the US was externally neutral. It tilted into Iraq and even monitored talks toward vending military equipment to Iraq through private American contractors. This proved when the exclusive director of National Security archive Tom Blanton said “Saddam had chemical weapon in 1980s , and it did not make any difference to U.S. policy, beyond those dual- use supplies there were another blind spots relate to whether the vice president Bush at that time encouraged Saddam to use greater rage in order to wage his war with Iran, which was a direct reason that made Iraqi air forces manage to bomb centers in Tehran and other Iranian cities in 1986 and even to use those chemical weapons which they had already purchased from US (Oller 335-6).

1.2.3.1. Lebanon Hostage’s Crisis:

In 1982, while the Iraqi- Iranian conflict was reaching its highest battlefield clash, the US had been through one of the most remarkable events which made US change its whole policy towards the conflict in the Middle East, The US hostage’s crisis 1979- 1992 was a serious event for the US, but, on the other hand; it was the most vital for Lebanon. It took place in 1982 during the Lebanese Civil War (1975- 1990) when a group of 104 foreign nationalities were taken as hostages in Beirut by Hezbollah militants with the support of Iranian government. Most of the hostages were Americans, and consequently, the US moved immediately in order to release them. However, it resulted in mostly costly scandals that absolutely led to weakening and questioning U.S. credibility inside and abroad the US.

With a regard to origin and motive of this crisis, Ambrose and Brinkley argued that it was an attempt from Iran and Hezbollah to decrease possibilities of retaliation by any power especially US. After Hezbollah was accused with the assassination of 241 Americans, and mostly 58 Frenchmen in the Marine Barracks and embassy bombings in Beirut (312).

Ranstop went further to affirm that the operation was an Iranian foreign policy agenda which served its interests. It involved extracting or getting concessions and ransoms that serves the Iraqi Iranian conflict. He also assumes that Hezbollah and kidnapers have serious ties to the extent that they could be regarded as allies of Iran. Besides, the successful security measures taken by the kidnapers prevented the rescue, thus US was obliged to breakdown with anti- terrorism rule that prevent any negotiation with terrorism and led it to negotiate with the hostage- keepers secretly in a scandal known as the Iran- Contra Affair (145- 7).

In this respect, McMannus argues that while the kidnapers captured a TWA plane and hijacked 39 US hostages in Beirut 1985, the public posture and standing policy of the US President Ronald Reagan was clear: The US administration does not negotiate with terrorists, but secretly the US position was totally diverse. Therefore, the Reagan administration arranged with Israel to make a transaction with the kidnapers, to swap Israeli- held detainee for American hostages that certainly released the TWA captives, and marked the beginning of an enormous exchanges of prisoners across Israel's northern boundary. Moreover, in spite of the US claim that negotiating with terrorists is impossible and there is no way to get through in order to resolve the issue. Israel certainly made negotiations as an obvious phase and part of its approach to release hostages. Starting with the 1985, TWA kidnapping through the Iran- Contra affair to the Bush Administration's crisis, the US has managed to give a try to Israel's approach in dealing with such matters (2- 3).

Eventually, the strategy led to freeing of the US hostages, but it resulted in a remarkable damage on the standing of the US position. Indeed, some officials considered that the 1985 drama undoubtedly led to the Iran- Contra scandal in which Reagan approved secret arms“ deals to Iran in hope of achieving his plan to release of the lasting hostages.

That agreement, too, was set in motion partly at Jerusalem's instigation: Some Israeli officials managed to persuade the US Administration to arrange a deal that could result in the hostages' release (McMannus 4- 5).

Currently, Israeli officials claimed once again that Israel has common interests with the US, even if the strategies seem dissimilar. "We sometimes take different course of action, but we both share the hope of recovering all the hostages to their families." Peleg said (McMannus 6).

1.2.3 2. Iran- Contra Affair:

The scandal of the Iran- Contra Affair emerged in the late summer of 1985 when members of (Nsc) the White House National Security Council staff, including President Ronald Reagan's home land Security consultants John Poindexter, and Robert McFarlane cooperated with each other involving a group of mercenaries and international arms salesmen, who were mostly Israeli, beside Iranian officials to organize a sequence of secret deals of U.S. weapons to Iran (Lynch Bogen 12).

However, the key coordinators of these operations were Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North, who pretended to be civilians as an NSC staff member. It was extensively assumed that the transactions were managed and approved, by several leading Cabinet members, vice president, the director and officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the president Reagan himself, despite the fact that, intention and size of these officials' contribution remained in suspicion, it was obvious that members of the pertinent intelligence supervision agency of the US were not aware of theses dealings. The vending involved a Hawk (ground-to-air) missiles and TOW (antitank). They were approved with the anticipation that this transactions would certainly result in the freeing of US hostages detained in Lebanon by a fundamentalist Islamic group, and also intended to use the transaction's money to finance the rebellious movement in Nicaragua (Lynch Bogen).

These operations, and the correlation between the sales and the liberate of the hostages, dishonored frequently the US stated policies against dealing and supporting "terrorist" states that supposedly includes Iran, and against paying ransom for releasing hostages. The US administration denied and defended the arms deals by claiming that they were intended to institute a cooperative correlation with "judicious" political hordes that might come to power in Iran and succeed Ayatollah AlKhomeini, but related notes, memos, and records that had been gathered at the time pointed to that, securing the release of the hostages was an outstanding, if not the only purpose of the arms sales (Lynch Bogen 13).

On the other hand, there were a compensation in the Iran- Contra Affair, as the monetary arrangements allowed money to be transferred to the Contras. Oliver North informed Poindexter that he planned to transmit money to the rebels, but, later, he was surprised that the President had not approved the dealings, and announced at the congressional investigation that all the way through, he assumed that the President had definitely allowed such action. In a hopeless attempt to make express contact with Iranian moderates, later, a risky expedition was undertaken to Tehran by North and senior colleagues. Yet, this, too, ended with no clear assurance of further advancement and a variety of logistical complexity. Although there were no missiles that had been transferred, Lawrence Jenco was freed in July 1986. Meanwhile, the US was looking for a new possibility to get in touch with the kidnappers in order to negotiate for the release of the hostages. Wishes for any major progress wrecked when an unknown group kidnapped three more Americans in the autumn of 1986 (Busby 60).

Regardless of the setback, the US sent extra missiles to Iran as a sign of US good will. New information; then, exposed all current operations. The Iranian officials had publicly disclosed the secret expedition which had been made to Tehran by NSC supplies earlier that year, and the confidential effort of these assistant would soon or later be a public

knowledge. The arms' sales were characterized by confidentiality, narrow consideration of publicly stated policy position and a random implementation of operations.

Moreover, President Reagan had nevertheless a limited significant role to take part in the development of the arms sales program, signing result in a retroactive effect and deputizing considerable policy resolution to superior aides in the NSC. Furthermore, the arms' sales progressed without completely fulfilling their primary purposes: the freeing of the US hostages in Lebanon. Later, the White House public statement required to put into words the notion that the transactions were for political reasons, not directly associated with the hostages' affaire, but the current Congressional estimation rested upon the conviction that the kidnapers held the US to ransom and had desecrated its public stated stance of no negotiating with terrorism (Busby 61).

Interestingly, the Iran- Contra scandal included the use of Iran-contra Affaire's money in the support of a rebellion militia in Nicaragua (the Contras), willing towards the violent overthrow of the Sandinistas or the leftist existing regime in Nicaragua,. For a while the U. S government was not sure about the virtues and benefits of supporting this rebel Militia. The policy was taken underground and secured from the congress surveillance; different manners of support were used by a selected crew in the Executive division. This included the staffing of a number of ex- government agents, the establishment of a main slush fund safeguarded by 28 fake companies, the premeditated and purposeful trick of the Congress' members, and the intentional elimination of a numeral of Executive administrators from the decision-making process (Busby 61).

In this respect, George Shultz and Robert McFarlane testified for the Foreign Affairs Committee on December, 8. That testimony gave convincing proof that the US; in fact, was cooperating; therefore, they could only involve in a restricted way, both having been disqualified from major parts of the secret operations. Shultz affirmed that he had no role in

the secret Nicaraguan Affair. He also strived, like George Bush, to assert the President's supervision of damage control plan. He took the responsibility of resolving any sudden problems that may happen (Busby 113).

Shultz, who was already a supportive of the President, had guaranteed that the Department of State was definitely under the control of foreign policy, a vital institutional concern. McFarlane was more approaching in affair concerning to the Iranian weapons sales. So, he kept away Reagan from the secret transfer of money from the arms transactions to rebels in Nicaragua, and affirmed that a verbal finding approving secret business was of comparable in value and worthy as much as the written finding. Moreover, Lee Hamilton, a senior Congressman, argued that there was no spoken finding. The White House supported Congressional view, and rejected the claims that the president gave any progress authorization for the arms transactions whether in written orders, or verbal instructions, looking for disengage Reagan as much as possible from certain actions (Busby 113).

Reagan did not make it; He was not able to recover from the double scandal of Iran-Contra and financing the guerillas in Nicaragua from December 1986 till February 1987. He seemed powerless and helpless. His speech failed to decrease civic skepticism over Iran-Contra Affair contribution. The lack of strong crucial headship was one of the main features which characterized this early era. Political instability also impacted negatively the performance and effectiveness of US administration (Busby 127).

2.1. Forcing an End To The War:

Shortly after its imminent victory in February 1986, Iran initiated its an ultimate offensive operation in Basra in January 1987, in order to take over as much Iraqi land as possible, in an attempt to make Iraq give some concession at peace negotiations. Meanwhile, Iraqi forces focused extremely on the Iranian advance in the southern territory, which was

Iranian's main target. They launched a deceptive attack across Shatt Al Arab; therefore, as the serious attacks targeted the eastern and northeastern region of Al Basrah, the Iranian forces at first made quick breakthrough, but they were driven back with a strong Iraqi reliance and military capability that used even chemical weapons. In spite of that Iran was able to take a considerable amount of Iraqi territory, that made U.S in a state of alert (Ross 1).

In the light of this recent events, US Officials including, the President's advisors, called for an urgent meeting to discuss the recent events and redirect the US policy and its stance towards the conflict in the Persian Gulf. Whilst serious debate came to suppose that the Iran-Contra scandal impacted negatively the US policy and its international credibility especially in the region, the issue was how to operate in favor of US in the middle of this mass and the necessity of improving US credibility in the Middle East. Caspar Weinberger claimed that it is time and all circumstances point to get rid of any pretense even equity, because there is no any possibility to force an end to the war without pointing to a winner. To emphasize his sight, Weinberger asserted that Iran is the assailant in this conflict besides explaining Saddam's reaction with his fear of triumph of Islamic Revolution.

Furthermore, the US should tilt to Iraq as soon as possible and be a real supportive with different manners; he proposed that US administration must arm Iraq, which provoked an intense dispute between US officials over the legitimacy of such an action that is doubtful. despite the fact that numerous officials adopted a contrasting stance to Weinberger's stand in the outcome of Iraq- Gate, but it marked a significant shift in the U.S. administration stance towards the Iraqi- Iranian conflict, based on the idea that Iran is certainly the aggressor and should lose the war (Pollack 221- 4; Cockell 1).

In reaction to the intense debate of supporting Iraq with military aid directly, or indirectly, the Department of State sketched a strategy examination of the progress of such

a backing operation. Certainly, providing arms to Iraq would absolutely heighten Iraqi confidence and motivation. Furthermore, it would signify a warning sign to the Gulf States that the US is committed to avoid an Iranian victory. Yet, the Department of State's analysis emphasized the clashing stances within the U.S. administration, a typical disagreement between Defense Department and State Department. The fact was that explicitly supporting Iraq was not a practical policy alternative; however, the administration had other choices that certainly would recover US credibility in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East with no fully ignoring the neutrality policy (Dep of state 1).

Shortly after Weinberger's appeal for candidly backing of Iraq, he suggested a plan to preserve US credibility and force an end to the conflict, but in the same time the U.S. would remain neutral towards the conflict by re-flagging Kuwaiti oil tankers with the Stars and Stripes. That certainly would result in building a US military base along the Persian Gulf, and increased the possibility of a confrontation with Iran, (Johnson 130). However, the decision was approved by the president Reagan and this was not with no risks when in May, 17 the *USS Stark* was had been attacked by two Mirage F-1 jets that fired two Exocet missiles at the vessel, resulting in the kill of thirty- five Americans (Secretary of State 1).

The *USS Stark* attack did not only stress the threat created by the re-flagging action, it provoked extreme disapproval from Congress that led to revising and evaluating the operation again. Reagan decided to emphasize on U.S naval presence in the Gulf, by augmenting the number of ships from six to nine and in the area to thirty- three. The *Stark* attack also led to defining and correcting again the Navy's assignment, from accompanying ships to being committed to assure the freedom of navigation and protecting the open flow of oil all the way through the Strait of Hormuz (Johnson 115).

As matter of fact the war witnessed several confrontations between US and Iran, but the shooting down of Air Travel 655 marked the war's turning point. At first

Washington disclaimed the shooting down the Iranian plane, but finally confessed it is responsible of the jet downing when Reagan declared that "This is a terrible human tragedy. Our sympathy and condolences go out to the passengers, crew, and their families... We deeply regret any loss of life." The motive for denying it at first was because of the massive charge of getting through a sieve of exhaustive reports in order prove that it was an awful issue of mistaken identity (Wilson 1).

Simultaneously, it was predictable that the Iranians considered the shooting down of the civilian aircraft intended to be warning that the U.S would never stop its actions in order to force end to the conflict in favor of Iraq. Consequently, Iran managed to call for an urgent meeting of Security Council on July 5, to condemn the US operations in the region, an unexpected decision ever since the Iranian boycott of UN in 1980 (Hiro 211- 2). When Mir Hussein Musavi, then-Iranian Prime Minister, had been told to end the war at the UN meeting, instead of supporting Iran's denunciation of the US assault on its aircraft, The Prime Minister's visit to UN took place when its leadership was discussing their country's concluding reply to Resolution, The insufficient support for Iran at the UN brought in a new fact to the Iranian officials, that it was fully secluded in the world (McNaugher 121).

On July 12, Iraqi forces launched a final operation in the war against Dehloran, breaking through almost forty kilometers inside Iran. After the decisive defeat of Iranian forces, Iraqi military punctually drew back to the territory with some spoils and captives, the decisive Iraqi wining had efficiently shattered the Iranian forces. Iran had no more choices so it was obliged to accept Security Council Resolution. Thus, on July 18, Iran accepted security Council's document with no reservations. then Khomeini himself confirmed Iran's approval." On July 20, Khomeini announced in the radio Iran"s acceptance of the resolution (Pollack 229). On August 7, both Iran and Iraq accepted a proposal for a truce and official

negotiation for peace were started on August 20, thus officially putting an end the conflict between the two nations.

Conclusion:

Despite the fact that the US publicly stated stance towards the Iran- Iraqi conflict was strictly neutral, but all the way through the war US explicitly contradicted its affirmed policy when it tilted to Iraq and provided military, political ,economic, and diplomatic support, since 198 the US officials including then-president Reagan started secretly contacting with Iraq at the appeal of the Gulf States which considered Iraq as a safeguard against the stretch of extremist Shi'ism. The intended to push Iraq into carrying on its movement towards moderation, and to see if Iraq was able to replace Iran in a customized "two-pillar" strategy, but at the same time as U.S-Iraqi relations had started to get better, Iran unexpectedly expelled Iraqi armed forces from its territory in 1982.

The Reagan administration founded its anxiety on an adaptation of the Truman's doctrine; namely, the Domino Theory, supposing that if Iraq lost the war, soon subsequently Gulf States including Saudi Arabia would fall down as well. These worries encouraged the United States to confidentially tilt towards Iraq. As part of the U.S tilt, the Reagan administration had provided Iraq with dual-use; military and civilian heavy equipment including trucks and Hughes helicopters, also provided Iraq with tactical battlefield planning and intelligence, beside information about Iranian facilities, Moreover, US supported Iraq diplomatically at the United Nations, and assisted Iraq to get EXIM loans in order to purchase US merchandise all through its economic crisis of 1983- 4.

In addition, the US also attempted to restrain the flow of US arms to Iran in Operation Staunch, the action, that considered as turning point of the war by preventing an imminent Iranian victory. Also, in 1987- 8, after Kuwait's appeal to re-flag its oil tankers, the US

vigorously engaged Iranian forces in battlefield, resulting in the down of Iranian Air Flight 655. In the light of these several affairs, obviously the US did not remain neutral in the Iran- Iraqi War.

Chapter Three: Analysis Of the US Involvement In the Persian Gulf War:

Introduction:

When the US began to formulate its foreign policy for its international relations, the first step was to determine which country deserved the highest priority, and which threatened, or served the US "national security". So, on that basis, world countries were reported for their relative importance.

During the Bi- polar era, the US foreign policy centred on containing the ex- USSR, since the first source of threat and the US main competitor in peace and war, in addition to politics and economy, cultural hegemony, and outreach. In sum, in the struggle of power, sects, and values; therefore, a coherent plan must be implemented to keep the US the first dominant power in the world. In order to achieve this objective, it was necessary for the US to exert its influence in the world, make alliances with many world countries, and establish strategic military bases around the world by which the Middle East region was the primary target because of its geopolitical interests and economic potentials(Mueller et al. 1- 2).

1.1.The Objectives Of The US involvement In The Persian Gulf War:

Since the end of the First World War, the US had the opportunity to impose its control over the Middle East, including the Gulf region which was seen as "a huge source of strategic power", where US allies are based; namely, Israel and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is world's first supplier of energy.

The success of the Islamic Revolution, led by Ayatollah Al Khomeini, in overthrowing the Shah regime, and the increased influence of Communism in the region made the US

worry about its interests in the region. These fears reached their peak after the outbreak of the Iran- Iraqi War, when the US President Jimmy Carter declared, in 1980, on a public speech that any effort by any foreign power to dominate the Persian Gulf region it will be regarded as an onslaught on the vital interests of the US, and it would be met by all the necessary means; including the military retaliation. Therefore, the US decided to intervene in the conflict indirectly through its allies first, and then directly where it chose to side with the Iraqi government and provided it with the fundamental means in order conduct the war.

On the other hand, the US had secret deals with Iran where it disclosed in the Iran Contra Scandal to end the war with a great loss to both parties as it was planned by the US under the banner of neutrality and the quest for peace in order to cover the real motives and objectives to engage in the said war (Richman 1- 6).

1.1.1.The Geopolitical Objectives:

The Iran- Iraqi War posed a series of questions and challenges to local and international powers, primarily the US. The challenges included: (1) the new threats that face Gulf oil production, (2) the supply routes besides to the free navigation in the Gulf in general and the Strait of Hormuz in particular, (3) the risk of the Islamic revolutionary tide in the region, and (4) the possibility of the emergence of Iraq as a rising power in the Gulf region which could threaten the major oil- producing countries and US allies.

One of the geopolitical objectives that was set by the US when it entered the Iran- Iraqi War was to ensure the flow of oil to the West. So, for this reason, when the war broke out, the US sent four warplanes to Saudi Arabia in order to protect its air space. The US administration also ordered the military vessels in the Indian Ocean to assemble at the entrance of the Gulf; including the Midway aircraft carrier, five escort ships and Eisenhower aircraft carrier that worked with nuclear powder missile and missile destroyer. Also, Jimmy Carter's administration invited the six major industrialized countries of Great

Britain, France, Canada, Japan, Germany and Ireland in order to discuss ways to control the Strait of Hormuz, as well as to reduce the economic impact of the conflict in international navigation and global oil markets. Moreover, President Jimmy Carter chaired a meeting of the UN Security Council announced that the impact of the supply of oil must remain open. However, if the supply of oil through the Strait of Hormuz stopped, this would pose a serious threat of the international economic situation. This; in fact, made it clear that the US intended to enter into a military confrontation in order to preserve oil resources (Al Sarhan 459-461).

In addition to the oil issue, Iran under the leadership of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was one of the Persian Gulf states which had excellent political relations with the US. It is worth to mention that the Shah pursued a policy of safeguarding the US interests by granting Washington privileges within his country; however, with the advent of the Islamic Revolution in 1978 and the coup d'état which overthrew the Shah, who sought a refuge in the US territory, the bi-lateral relations between Washington and Tehran were deteriorated, especially after the attack on the US Embassy in Tehran, in November 1979, led by a group of students which resulted in the detention of 63 hostages. Their main request was the hand over Shah Mohammad Reza to Iran for trial.

After Ayatollah Al Khomeini took power in Iran, he declared the export of the Islamic Revolution to the neighboring countries, especially Gulf states, This, of course, made the US feel the threat to its own interests in the region where the export of Anti- US revolutionary thought to the rest of the Gulf would be a real danger to the US presence in the region. Fortunately, the war that declared by Iraq against Iran on September 1980 made it a golden opportunity for the US to curb Khomeini's policy, destroy his intentions in the region, and overthrow the Iranian caste by supporting both sides with weapons secretly, since the US worked hard that no party would prevail in that war. Accordingly, President

Carter's adviser declared to the UN Security Council in June 1980 that "the US would not oppose Iraq's demand to annex Shatt Al-Arab region, as well as, it would not oppose the emergence of the Arabi Stan Republic in the areas close to Iran" (Al Sarhan 467- 9).

What would have caused more panic than the temporary disruption of oil production on the northern tip of the Gulf was the possibility that Iraq would emerge as a dominant military and economic power on the Arabian Peninsula with the support of the ex- USSR, which would contribute to the spread of the communism as well as the possibility of an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, or especially Israel. Therefore, the US supported Iraq in its war against Iran with all the means in order to: (1) prolong the duration of the conflict that led to the depletion of Iraq's military capabilities, (2) keep Iraq away from the Palestinian issue (Iraq and Saddam Hussein supported the Palestinian Liberation Organization in their struggle against Israel), and (3) eliminate the possibility of the USSR's involvement into the existing conflict and turn it to its advantage (Chomsky 28- 30).

1.1.2.The Geostrategic Objectives:

With the end of the First World War, the US had started exerted its influence in the Middle East because of its geostrategic position. After the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, the US held more firmly in the region especially the Gulf region which consists of eight countries that share language, culture, and aspirations for unity. In addition, the region has vital geostrategic interests and huge energy reserves, since it contains the eight largest oil producers and exporters in the world. Moreover, the region contains of a valuable contiguous land masses, airspace and waterways which without them the US- Asian trade will be severely constrained, and the US military maneuvering will be severely hampered. For example, the Suez Canal links the Red Sea to the Mediterranean through Egypt which plays a vital role in protecting both the US military and economic

interests, where 62 percent of the shipments from the US and Europe pass through the canal, in addition to the military ships that pass through it and through other vital waterways; such as, Bab Al-Mandab and the Straits of Gibraltar (Hernandez 63- 71).

The geostrategic objective of the US from its intervention in the Persian Gulf, was to abolish the urbanization and fragmentation of the developed Arab countries besides to make the region always in state of tension so that the Gulf countries would ask and seek protection from the US, and, on the other hand, the US intended to expand its economic and military influence by securing land access, airspace and waterways to Africa and Central Asia that will, in return, facilitate the process of delivery of crude oil from export areas in the Arabian Gulf to the US storage areas, where it requires the presence of naval, air and land bases along with transport routes for rapid intervention against any threats.

In addition, the concentration of these military bases within various areas contributes to the monitoring of Soviet movements in the region and their confinement within a certain range, as well as, linking the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean will be a single strategic bloc linked from the Arabian Gulf, which is linked to the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea that linked to the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, where this will ensure full control of the US on the Middle East (Ortiz 1- 4).

1.1.3.The Economic Objectives:

The Iraqi economic crisis of 1983 forced Saddam to adjust his war policy. The new strategy had two consistent aspects. First, Iraq had to assault Iranian economic targets; including facilities, oil fields, oil companies in the Gulf in order to convince Iran that the war of abrasion should be stop. Meanwhile Iran had no intention to put an end to the war, and was looking forward to remove Saddam Hussein from power. in spite of Iraq during 1980-1981, Iran would not willingly agree to end a war that it gave the impression to be a winning war.

Secondly, Iraq was intending to internationalize of the war with its inability to force an immediate end to the war, Iraq intended that attacks in the Gulf would punctual a sharp international reaction, rather probably in the shape of a Western interference. That would give Iran two options: be in agreement to a cessation of hostilities and fire or go through an armed confrontation with the West.

Shortly after the Iraqi threats, Iran installed around 600 troop in Sirri Island within Hormuz Strait. On August 12, Hussein affirmed the establishment of a "Naval barring Zone," that cover Shatt al-Arab's mouth, and extending south into the Gulf to including Kharg Island, Iran's main Gulf oil terminal. Moreover, by October 15, Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized U.S worries concerning an imminent escalation in the Gulf as he declared that "any Iraqi assault in the Gulf would led to closing it to all navigation, devastating most of Western oil companies facilities and interests in the area, by attacking the Kirkuk oilfields of Iraq" in brief, France's decision to provide Iraq with the Super Etendard plane had been a cataleptic to initiate what named as the Tanker War (O'Ballance 127- 8).

The Reagan administration was aware of the serious consequences of the Super Etendard transaction; it determined to approach the tenuous condition on both political aspects including diplomatic affaires and less at military one. Diplomatically, the US was resolved to induce France to either postpone, or rather abandon renting of the aircrafts. However, as it was canceled, the agreement between France and Iraq did not engage the "lease" of the Super Etendards, or the "sale" of the aircrafts.

The US involved in the deal through a different way. On September, 3, Shultz planned a three-track approach in order to keep away from a state that could cause an escalation and result in a menace to international navigation in the region. The first path involved convincing France to postpone or delay the deal of the aircraft to Iraq. If that did not

happen as expected, France could in any case think to impose on Iraq the condition that the aircraft would not be used against export facilities or oil shipping. In addition, the US Department of State would request from Great Britain to prop up this striving to France with an advanced approach of their own. Secondly there was a need to discuss with the Iraqis about the issue as a part of the second track, while the third one involved negotiations with the Gulf states about approaches in which they could attempt to deter Iraq from a possible serious escalation of military actions in the Gulf.

Despite the fact that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) approved at the end of August to come close to Syria concerning the Iraqi pipeline, there was no sign that President Hafiz Al Assad would negotiate on the current issue. Besides, the Gulf states could also employ their influence to encourage France to delay the sale. During these efforts, the government believed that it is able to use adequate pressure on France in order to reconsider the vending. On the other hand, must these efforts be unsuccessful, the administration required a contingency plan that included military actions (Secretary of State to American Embassy Abu Dhabi 1- 6).

On February 3, 1981, the State Department assembled the Iran-Iraq Work Group. Led by the Assistant Secretary Peter Constable, the meeting discussed the available political option for the new administration, and its main concern was the economic, political military and diplomatic aspect of the Persian Gulf War. Unfavorably, the conflict provisionally had interrupted the flowing and transportation of oil from the Persian Gulf. Fortunately, the impasse all the way through the winter momentarily decreased those worries and both disputers gradually restarted oil exporting. The end of the hostage crisis had given the new administration a better maneuverability in the area, particularly in light of the safety threat that had been posed by Iran on both the Gulf States. As a sign of goodwill, the Carter administration had secretly begun negotiations to sell to Saudi Arabia the extremely

advanced Airborne Warning and Control System, a deal that obviously Israel was against, Interestingly, the Iran- Iraqi conflict also served Israel's interests in the region, which in turn profited the US (Dep. of State 1- 5).

- ✚ The group's meeting resulted in five major conclusions:

- ✚ Based on the condition that Iran and Iraq resumed their efforts to export oil, the international oil supply would be stable;

- ✚ Although there were benefits from the continuance of the conflict, an ending of the war was the ultimate interest of the US;

- ✚ The probability of Iran dealing with the Soviet Union for military equipment was out of the question;

- ✚ Since Iraq had acknowledged resolution 470, the US ought to cleverly persuade Turkey or Pakistan to provide Iran with some equipment as it is possible that weapons furnish relationship could result in some Western influence to push Iran to negotiate;

- ✚ The US must offer diplomatic sustain to the arbitration efforts of the United Nations in particular, in addition to sustaining the Non- Aligned Movement and the Islamic Conference Organization attempts of mediation. (Schweitzer 1)

Despite the fact that the Iran- Iraq Work Group had acknowledged many considerable points, but some members of the National Security Council assumed that it proceed demands to be more futuristic and conceptual (Schweitzer 1).

However, the US Navy organized a group system to secure shipping in the Gulf. Concentrating on its permanent concern about the flow of oil, security and freedom of shipment and navigation in the Persian Gulf, the US also announced that it would provide the non-belligerent's oil facilities in the region and their territory with full protection.

Overall, the meaning of the military reaction to the escalated condition in the Persian Gulf emphasized the high value and importance of the region to US interests (Dep of Defense 1-12).

1.2.The US Involvement's Outcomes:

It is no secret that, the US worried that if Iran succeed to defeat Iraq, it would definitely take control over oil market and would be responsible of dictating OPEC oil policies all over the west, while military speaking US officials assumed that an Iranian wining would absolutely threaten the security of gulf state including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and other important allies in the region, but the most threatening outcome was that of placing Iran in a position to institutionalize for an extremist Islamic order in the region.

In spite of the need to keep away from playing major factor in the conflict, the US believed that is necessary to prevent establishing such order by the end of the war, thus the US strategy to end the Iraq-Iran war included preventing an Iraqi collapse, and it was only after US taking part; the Iranian leadership compulsory canceled Pax Irana, that idea to create a transactional Islamic order which is institutionalized for shortly after the Islamic revolution, hence it seems that US strategy was preventing both sides from claiming triumph, that strategy was useful not only in maintaining the U.S neutral stance, but also in bringing both disputers to negotiations and accept UN resolutions (Tarz 38).

Through supporting the weaker side, the US played a role of a balancer and as a part of this the US navy presence was serving as a shield for Iraq in order to protect Iraq and prevent Iran from accomplishing the Tanker War, on the contrary, the absence of any US fetters against Iraqi attacks on Iran facilitated for Iraq to continue assaulting tankers with immunity, however, the US policy provided Iraq with a military edge beside promoting an arms embargo against Iran that certainly resulted in the failure of Iranian offensives and

weakening their military sustain throughout the war. Furthermore, the US intervention decisively prevented Iran to turn the war against Iraq, as the Iranian armed forces was much better motivated to win the war, the US involvement had an adverse impact on Iranians Morale and motivation throughout the war (Tarz 39).

With a regard to US military and diplomatic proceedings, it is clear that some actions certainly helped wider the gap between Iran's military capability and its aim to defeat Iraq, In other words Iran's dream of building a Pan- Islamic millennium merely failed because of US military intervention which was mainly for preventing an Iraqi collapse, furthermore, US military involvement was decisive since it succeeded in "operation staunch", and supported UN resolution which strengthened Iraq's war effort (Tarz 40- 5).

Additionally, the US attempted to get in touch with both disputers throughout the course of the conflict in extreme confidentiality both times to try to build a strategic partnership. The catastrophic policy weapons for hostages, which known as the Iran- Contra affair persuaded Iraqis appropriately that the US was willing to cooperate with both belligerents. Consequently, by the war's end the Iraqi government and most Iraqis considered the United States as a threat, even though Washington's supported them during the war. That support had taken the form of significant intelligence assistance to Baghdad, significant political cover, and assistance from US Arab allies who financed Iraq with tens of billions of dollars in order to sustain Iraq's war effort. Iranians named the war as the "compulsory War" because they believe that the US subjected Iran to the war and coordinated the international "tilt" toward Iraq. Iranians note that the United Nations did not denounce Iraq for starting the conflict. In fact, the war was not an issue for discussion at the UN general assembly for weeks after it started, and it eventually considered Iraq to be the assailant only years later, as part of a deal arranged by President George H. W. Bush to release the US hostages detained by pro- Iranian extremists in Beirut (Riedel 103- 4).

Although the Persian Gulf War had terrible consequences for Iran, by depicting the war as compulsory fight that had been planned by the US and its allies, but it also shaped Iranians' worldview and marked the rise of Their anti- Americanism and deep doubt of US as a result of what they have experienced all the way through the Iran-Iraq War. Consequently, the world should be expecting the next war to make Iran more intense and more resolute to acquire the bomb (Riedel 104).

Retrospectively, the US has accomplished its immediate objective in the Persian Gulf War: it stopped the progress of Iran's advance into Iraq, secured the tankers in the Gulf, and succeeded to contain the conflict from spreading into the rest of the Arabian Gulf states. But the first US war with Iran made the latter a more radical and extreme state. Therefore, one more war with Iran or an attempt to make it stop its nuclear program may eventually prove to be the motive that pushes Iran to obtain dangerous nuclear weapons. So, instead of stopping proliferation, it could provoke it more (Riedel 106).

Conclusion:

The US had no natural stance or allies in the Iran- Iraq Conflict, but its interests required that the United States permit neither Saddam, nor Al Khomeini to take control of a region with such importance as it is the international energy supply. All the way through the war, Iran was just around the corner from winning the war; consequently US had no option but to support Iraq and prevent an Iraqi collapse, for those who are seeking for a national security policy based on the values of the United Nations Charter or an ethical high ground, Iran-Iraq war was an unethical bog. For American policymakers during the war, there was a simple distinction. When the war began, Iran detained some of US diplomats hostage and even tortured a few. Only after 444 days in detention did Iran sand the

American hostages free. Quite the opposite to Khomeini, many Americans was hoping that Saddam Hussein is somehow usable and could be worked with as a difficult but convenient ally. However, they realize now that this was an illusion, but in the 1980s it seemed as a hope. Thus, United State tilted toward Iraq, hoping it would curb what Americans named as the “medieval extremists” from taking control of the world’s oil reserves.

General conclusion:

In the present paper, the US involvement in the First Persian Gulf war was analyzed, using the gets modeling (general-to-specific) during the process, we tried to find out the role played by U.S. during this conflict, in addition to that the paper addressed and assessed how did the U.S exactly intervened and affected the conduct of the war in general also the present dissertation examined outcomes of the US intervention from different aspects.

As a conclusion, the Iran- Iraqi conflict had broken out during the Cold War period, possibly the most remarkable feature of the war was that it was not characterized with any specifications of the Cold War clashes such as Korean war, Cuban missiles crisis, Vietnam war, in fact, one could assert that the Iran-Iraq confrontation was a Cold War irregularity since neither the US, nor Soviet Union succeeded to influence Iran. Even it is assumed that Iraq and Iran had already decided to fight each other some point in the 1970s, the conflict was considered for a while as another Cold War disputes, because Earlier to the Iranian Revolution, Iran used to be a very important ally to United States, as much as Iraq was allied with the Soviet Union.

The triumph of Iranian Islamic Revolution 1979 had suddenly changed the whole thing. Shortly after that, the US had started to lose its safe prop in the area and the new Iranian regime had originated a non-aligned standpoint in international affairs. This sudden shift had left US in a rush to plan urgent procedures and long- term strategies, which mostly

rested on a positive conviction: that Iran would eventually reorganize itself because of its military-supply relationship with the US.

However, when Iraq invaded Iran and the US forecast failed to become visible, the US lost its only way of manipulate the Iranian regime. Interestingly, the Soviets had been through a similar issue because Iran deeply doubts Soviet objectives and the Kremlin lacked a military- supply relationship that it could utilize in order to create some influence in Iran. The US and Soviet Union shared the same strategy objectives concerning the conflict, which was absolutely different from what happened during other Cold War crisis. They both sought to go back to the *status quo*, with neither country claimed victory, at the same time as declining their enemy's chances to expand control in region and the Gulf in particular. Because of this weird convergence of concerns and the common lack of influence in Iran, the Iran-Iraq War was undoubtedly a Cold War irregularity.

Even though the American policy was contradictory, three main factors constantly impacted the White House intentions to re-establish constancy to the region: The Soviet Union; access to oil; and the security of regional allies. Similar to all crises that took place between 1945 and 1991, the major US objective was to stop the Soviet Union from proceeding its concerns and interests.

By the time the clash broke out, US influence in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf was at an unprecedented low because of Carter's mistreatment of the Iranian Revolution. Problematically, the conflict was a threat to the security of close US allies in the region, particularly Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain. These countries worried that if the war were to breakout beyond Iran and Iraq, the consequential insecurity would oblige them to seek for the protection and support of either the United States or the Soviet Union

Fortunately, Carter rapidly acknowledged the major policy objectives such as; surveillance of the Soviets, protecting hostages, guarantee access to oil through the Strait of

Hormuz, and securing regional allies, and reacted with a policy of strict neutrality that is rational, the Carter administration successfully obliged the Soviet Union to either go after suit or face the threat of escalating the Iran-Iraq conflict into a main Cold War crisis. Consequently, the Soviet played an inconsequential role impacting the range and length of the conflict.

Hence, since the war's outbreak, access and oil shipment in the Persian Gulf was a main motivating force behind American policy that is centered on the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which most of region's oil flows. Even prior to the war escalating, American concerns about access to oil were a crucial factor, securing United States' allies in the Middle East from both Iran and the Soviet Union. Thus U.S policy central concern was the immediate containment of the war in order to prevent its spreading out all through the region. The worries were that if the war escalated to include Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Bahrain and Oman, the United States would be obliged to intervene in order protect its allies or seem powerless in facing aggressors. But since the United States was able at once to keep Soviet opportunities in the war, the Gulf States sustained to pursue protection of the US.

Consequently since the US attempts during the Iranian Revolution to devise an effective grand strategy had failed, the US Policy towards the Iran-Iraq conflict was reactionary, Though the purpose of a grand strategy is providing policymakers with a plan to realize long- term policy objectives, as no such plan exists, policy can become imprecise and paradoxical, which was certainly the case of the US policies during the first Persian Gulf War, Throughout the conflict the Reagan administration incessantly adjusted its plans in order to make them fit and serves most-immediate objectives. On the other hand, because of the lack of any joint strategy that is able to guide its plans, the then-administration was forced to adopt an *ad hoc* approach to handle the war.

The consequence was that the US, sometimes openly desecrated its own policy of neutrality by supplying Iraq with strategic intelligence or vending arms to Iran. The dealings with Iran proved the contradiction in the policy adopted by US towards the war, By the mid-1980s, the U.S administration had already took a conscious decision to drop any affectation of neutrality in the war by supporting Iraq in favor of Iran; however, when it seemed that the Soviets were better in better position to manipulate events in a post-Khomeini Iran, since the Reagan administration determined to sell arms to Iran.

In order to make things worse, it made sure to keep these transactions secret especially for the Gulf States. Accordingly, by the sales disclosure the Gulf States became angry with the US administration. Because they always considered Iran as a major threat to the constancy of the region, and the main reason that pushed them to urge the United States to support Iraq. Eventually the contradictory and inconsistent policy towards the Iraqi- Iran conflict was because of the Reagan administration's failure to plan a functional strategy for managing and controlling the Persian Gulf after the beginning of the first Persian Gulf War.

This research was conducted regarding the questions asked earlier in the introduction. It had a limited source; most of them discussed the direction of US foreign policy and the role played in the Persian Gulf War, our exploration of the topic can be an opening for a further study of the subject matter.

Works Cited List

Al-Kaabi, B. Gen Mohamad Hilal. *The Question of Iranian Occupation of the Islands, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa Belonging to the United Arab Emirates.*

United Arab Emirates, 1994.

Al-Lihaibi, Maedh Ayed. *An Analysis of the Iran-Iraq War: Military Strategy and Political Objectives.* Albama: Maxwell Air Force Base, 1989.

Al-Mazrouei, S. Noura. “Disputed Islands between UAE and Iran: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb in the Strait of Hormuz”. *Gulf Research Centre.* Research paper. Cambridge, 2015.

Al Sarhan. Atallah, S. “United States Foreign Policy and the Middle East”. *Open Journal of Political Science*, Scientific Research Publishing, September 11, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2017.74036>, accessed 6 May 2019.

Ambrose, E. Stephen and Brinkley, Douglas. *Rise To Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938.* NY: Penguin Books, 1977.

Al- Nahyan, Khalid S. Z. *The Three Islands: Mapping the UAE- Iran Dispute.* London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, 2013.

Bali, Omar Ahmed. “The political Development of Iraqi Kurdistan”. *International Journal of Political Science and Development.* 4. 6 (July 2016): pp. 208- 215.

Beeman, O. William. "Iran and Kurdistan: A Studied Ambiguity". *Mazda Publishers*, 2007.

Bengio, Ofra. "The Iraqi Kurds: The struggle for autonomy in the shadow of the Iran – Iraqi conflict". *Immigrants and Minorities*, Routledge, 21 Jun. 2010, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02619288.1990.9974742>, accessed 10 Mars 2019.

Bengio, Ofra. *The Kurds of Iraq; Building a State Within a State*. London: Lynne Rienner Pub., 2019.

Busby, Robert. *Reagan and the Iran- Contra Affair: The Politics of Presidential Recovery*. 1st Ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999.

Chomsky, Noam. "After the Cold War: U. S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East". *The Economies of War*, University of Minnesota Press, Autumn, 1991, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1354305>, accessed 06 May 2019.

Cordesman, Anthony H, and Abraham R, Wagner. "The Iran- Iraq War". *The Lesson of Modern War. Vol II*. 1990. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/lessons-modernwar-volume-ii-iran-iraq-war-%E2%80%93chapter-2-conditions-shaped-iran-iraq-war>.

Gibson, Bryan. *American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988*". Unpublished M. A. Thesis. Department of History of The School of Graduate Studies University of Ottawa, 2007.

Glickstein, Daniel. "American Support of the Iran-Iraq War: A Pyrrhic Victory".

<https://www.pdfdrive.com/search?q=The%20IranIraq%20War&pagecount=&pubyear=&searchin=>, accessed 03 April 2019.

Halliday, Fred. *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power*. London: MacMillan Press LTD, 1999.

Hernández, Francisco and Berenguer, José. "Geostrategic and geopolitical considerations regarding energy".

<https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4884197.pdf>, accessed 07 May 2019.

Hiro, Dilip. *The longest war: the Iran-Iraq military conflict*. London: Grafton, 1989.

Hiro, Dilip. *The Longest War: The Iran- Iraq Military Conflict*. NY: Routledge, 1991.

Jasim, M. Abdulghani, *Iran and Iraq: The Years of Crisis*. Baltimore, MD.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Jalinusi, Ahmad and Vahid Barari, Arayee. "The three Islands: Abu Musa, the Greater & Lesser Tunb Islands. Integral parts of Iran". *The Iranian Journal of International Affairs*. XIX. 4. (Fall 2007): pp. 1- 23.

Jalinusi, Ahmad and Vahid Barari, Arayee. "The three Islands: Abu Musa, the Greater & Lesser Tunb Islands. Integral parts of Iran". *The Iranian Journal of International Affairs*. XIX. 4. (Fall 2007): pp. 1- 23.

Jones, William. "Banca Nazionale del Lavoro scandal in Italy may have Irangate links". *Executive Intelligence Review*. 16. 39 (September 29, 1989): pp. 6- 7.

Joyner, Christopher C. *The Persian Gulf War, Lesson for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy*. NY: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Karsh, Efraim, *The Iraq-Iran War 1980-1988*. NY: Rosen Publishing Group, INC, 1989.

Karsh, Efraim. *The Iran- Iraq War Impact and Implications*. Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1989.

Kinninmont, Jane, Stansfield, Gareth and Sirri, Omar. *Iraq on the International Stage: Foreign Policy and National Identity in Transition*. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 2013.

Lynch, Michael and Bogen, David, *The Spectacle Of History, Speech, Text And Memory At Iran-Contra Hearings*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1996.

Mc Manus, Doyle, "Hostages Crisis in Lebanon: Deal With Terrorists? U.S. policy Not Totally Clear". *Los Angeles Times*, August, 2, 1989.

<https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-08-02-mn-571-story.html>

McNaugher, Thomas L. "U.S. Policy and the Gulf War," Ed. Christopher C. Joyner,

The Persian Gulf War, Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy. NY: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Maass, Harold, „How the U.S. helped Saddam Hussein use chemical weapons against Iran“. *The week*, August 26, 2013. <https://theweek.com/articles/460716/howhelped-saddam-hussein-use-chemical-weapons-against-iran>

Maxwell, O. Johnson. *The Military as an Instrument of U.S. Policy in Southwest Asia: The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1979-1982*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983.

Mobley, A. Richard. “The Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands: Britain's Perspective”. *Middle East Journal*. 57. 4 (Autumn, 2003): pp. 627- 645.

Murray, Williamson and Kevin, M. Woods. *The Iran–Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History*. London: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Mueller, P. Karl. “U.S. Strategic Interests in the Middle East and Implications for the Army”. *RAND Corporation*, 2017.
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE265.html>, accessed 03May 2019.

Nader, Entessar. “The Kurds in Post-Revolutionary Iran and Iraq”. *Third World Quarterly*. 6. 4 (Oct., 1984): pp. 911- 933.

O'Ballance, Edgar. *The Gulf War*. NY: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988.

Oller Jan P, *Gods, Guns, & Fear*. Indiana: Author House, 2008.

Ortiz, Álvaro. “Geo- World: Conflict & Protest June”. *Geostrategic Analysis*, BBVA Resreach, June 2018. <https://www.bbvaresearch.com/en/publicaciones/geoworld-conflict-protest-june-2018/>, accessed 10 May 2019.

Ostovar, P. Afshon. *Guardians of the Islamic Revolution Ideology, Politics, and the Development of Military Power in Iran 1979–2009*. Unpublished Ph D Thesis. The University of Michigan, 2009.

Pipes, Daniel. *A Border Adrift; Origins Of the Iraq-Iran War*. 2014. Web. <http://www.danielpipes.org/164/a-border-adrift-origins-of-the-iraq-iran-war>

Pollack, Kenneth M. *Arabs at War, Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991*. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, Council on Foreign Relations, 2002.

Potter, Lawrence, G. *Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War*. London: Palgrave Mc Millian, 2004.

Ranstrom, Magnus, *Hizb 'allah*. London: Palgrave Mc Millian, 1997.

Riedel, Bruce, “Lessons from America’s first war with Iran”. *Brookings*. 37. 2. 2013. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/lessons-from-americas-first-war-with-iran/>

Roni, Cohen. (Col., Lt.). *Iranian Export of Revolution Doctrine and Implementation*. Hudson Institute, Washington D. C.: Herzliya Hudson Institute, 2007.

“Shaking Hands With Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts Toward Iraq 1980-1984”. Ed. Joyce Battle. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82.

February 25, 2003

Shane, Harris, Matthew and M, Aid. „CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran“ *Foreign Policy*. August 26, 2013.

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helpedsaddam-as-he-gassed-iran/>

Sheldon, L. Richman. “The United States and the Persian Gulf”. *Policy Analysis*, 46, January 10, 1985.

Stern, Michael. “The Iran-Iraq War”. *Foreign Affairs*. 63. 1. (Fall, 1984): pp. 128-143. NY: Council on Foreign Relations.

Swearingen, Will, D. “Geopolitical Origins of The Iran-Iraq War”. *Geographical Review* 78. 4 (1988): 405- 416.

Takeyh, Ray. “The Iran-Iraq War: A Reassessment”. *Middle East Journal*. 64. 3 (Summer,2010): pp. 365- 383.

Tarz, Shah M. „Iran-Iraq foreign policies: impact of US gulf intervention“. *International Journal on World Peace*. Paragon House. 9. 3. (September 1992): pp.35- 48.

“The course of the Iran – Iraq war”. Routledge, 2015.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597238508460684>, accessed 01 April 2019.

United States. Department of Defense. *Terms of Reference for the US Representative to Combined Military Discussions on Containment of an Escalation of the Iran- Iraq Conflict*. no date.

United States. Department of State. *Iraq-Iran War- Future U.S. Steps*. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. Geoffrey Kemp Files, box 90492 "Iran/Iraq, Jan-Jun 1982," folder 2, pp. 1-5.

United States. Secretary of State. *Iran- Iraq War: Next Steps with Gulf States on Deterring Escalation in the Gulf*. State Ref: State 252861, September 3, 1983.

Wilson, George C. "Navy Missile Downes Iranian Jet Liner," *The Washington Post*, July 4, 1988, pg. A1.

Woods, Kevin. M. *Saddam's war: An Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War*. 1st Ed. Washington D. C.: McNair Paper, National Defense University, 2009.

Yenigun, Cuneyt and Mesut, Ozcan. “Republic of Iraq”. *Foreign Policy in the Greater Middle East*. Ed. Wolfgang Gieler, Kemal Inat. Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2005. 39- 55.

Yildiz, Kerim. *The Kurds in Iraq Past, Present and Future*. London: Pluto Press, 2007

Resumé:

Après la révolution iranienne, l'Irak attaqua l'Iran, provoquant une guerre coûteuse de huit ans allant de 1980 à 1988 et menaçant certainement les intérêts américains dans le golfe Persique et au Moyen-Orient. Au début, la position officielle des États-Unis était strictement neutre. A donné aux États-Unis la possibilité de renforcer leurs relations avec l'Irak, en particulier après que l'Iran ait reflété l'attaque irakienne à l'été 1982 et parce que l'administration Reagan ne pouvait pas permettre la chute de l'Irak, les États-Unis ont incliné et pris le parti de l'Irak d'une manière totalement contraire. C'est intéressant d'être aligné. Reagan n'a pas empêché le gouvernement Reagan de traiter secrètement avec l'Iran en 1985. La découverte de ces transactions a conduit à la formation d'une flotte navale dans la région pour sécuriser les expéditions et les flux de pétrole et finalement mettre un terme à la guerre en 1988.

La guerre a changé les équations politiques du Moyen-Orient et ses résultats ont eu le plus grand impact sur les facteurs qui ont conduit à la seconde guerre du Golfe ou à la soi-disant tempête du désert en 1991.

Cette mémoire traite de la guerre Iran-Irak, en passant en revue ses racines et ses causes, ainsi que l'intervention américaine au cours de la guerre et la façon dont il a modifié l'équilibre des forces pendant la guerre. Nous examinons également les gains les plus importants réalisés par les États-Unis d'Amérique grâce à cette intervention dans le conflit Iraq-Iran.

Mots- Clés: Guerre Iran- Irak, Révolution Islamique, Etats- Unis d'Amérique, CIA.

الملخص:

بعد وقت قصير من الثورة الإيرانية، هاجمت العراق إيران متسببة في حرب مكلفة امتدت لثمانى سنوات من 1980 إلى 1988 و هذا بالتأكيد قد هدد المصالح الأمريكية في منطقة الخليج الفارسي و الشرق الأوسط. في البداية كان الموقف الرسمي الأمريكي صارم باتخاذها الحياد تجاه الصراع , غير أن الحرب قدمت للولايات المتحدة فرصة تعزيز العلاقات مع العراق. ولاسيما بعد أن عكست إيران الهجوم العراقي في صيف عام 1982 , و بسبب أن إدارة ريغان لم تستطع السماح بسقوط العراق فإن الولايات المتحدة قد مالت و انحازت بشكل كبير تجاه العراق في تعارض واضح لسياستها المعلنة, و من المثير للاهتمام أن الانحياز للعراق لم يمنع إدارة ريغان من التعامل بشكل سري مع إيران في 1985 , ولهذا فإن كشف هذه المعاملات أدى إلى تشكيل أسطول بحري في المنطقة لتأمين شحن و تدفق النفط و في نهاية المطاف الاضطرار إلى إنهاء الحرب في 1988 .

وقد غيرت الحرب المعادلات السياسية لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط وكان لنتائجها أعظم الأثر في العوامل التي أدت إلى حرب الخليج الثانية أو ما سميت بعاصفة الصحراء في 1991.

تتناول هذه الرسالة الحرب العراقية الإيرانية باستعراض جذورها وأسبابها وكذلك التدخل الأمريكي خلال أطوار الحرب وكيف غير من موازين القوى . ونستعرض أيضا أهم المكاسب التي جنتها الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية من خلال هذا التدخل في الصراع العراقي- الإيراني.

كلمات مفتاحية : الحرب الإيرانية العراقية، الثورة الإسلامية، الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، وكالة المخابرات المركزية.

Université Mohamed Boudiaf - M'sila Faculty of Letters & Languages
Department of Letters & English Language

Master Students' Research Achievement Report

This is to certify that Mr. Yahi Khaled

A Master two student Preparing a dissertation in partial fulfillment of the Requirement of
Master Two Degree in Language, literature and Civilization entitled:

The US involvement in the Persian Gulf War (1980- 88)

has already accomplished his/her research work and is of right to defend his/her work
before a jury.


The Teacher/examiner

The Head of the Department

Full Name & Signature

Mr. Boutkhil Guemide

BOUTKHIL Guemide



NB. The teacher / supervisor is the one to submit the report signed to the head of the department.

People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research



Université Mohamed Boudiaf - M'sila Faculty of Letters & Languages
Department of Letters & English Language

Master Students' Research Achievement Report

This is to certify that Mr. Ablaoui Mohamed Cherif
A Master two student Preparing a dissertation in partial fulfillment of the Requirement of
Master Two Degree in Language, literature and Civilization entitled:

The US involvement in the Persian Gulf War (1980- 88)


has already accomplished his/her research work and is of right to defend his/her work
before a jury.

The Teacher/examiner

The Head of the Department

Full Name & Signature

Mr. Boutkhil Guemide

BOUTKHIL Guemide


NB. The teacher / supervisor is the one to submit the report signed to the head of the department.